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&BSTR&CT 
The themes of the t h e s i s a r i s e from a perceived i n c r e a s e 
i n the incidence of l i a b i l i t y f o r negligence by 
p r o f e s s i o n a l persons. F a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g the i n c r e a s e are 
many and show there i s a d e l i c a t e balance to be maintained 
between independent a c t i o n on the p a r t of the p r o f e s s i o n a l 
and c o n t r o l by regulatory agencies such as the 
p r o f e s s i o n a l bodies and the c o u r t s . 
Chapter 1 
The h i s t o r y of p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence i s i n t i m a t e l y 
connected with the development of the t o r t of negligence 
and the law of c o n t r a c t . P r o f e s s i o n a l l i a b i l i t y d e r i v e d 
from membership of a 'common c a l l i n g ' and was based, 
i n i t i a l l y i n t o r t and l a t e r i n c o n t r a c t , on doing badly or 
not a t a l l something which had been undertaken. 
Chapter 2 
A p r o f e s s i o n may be described as an occupation which 
d i s p l a y s c e r t a i n t r a i t s i n common with a number of other 
occupations. Among most important t r a i t s a re autonomy 
from outside c o n t r o l , maintenance of standards and 
d i s c i p l i n e . I n the case of the l a t t e r two t r a i t s the 
courts a l s o assume an o v e r r i d i n g r o l e . As a r e s u l t , i t i s 
i n e v i t a b l e t h a t there can be no absolute autonomy. 
However, i f the prof e s s i o n s do t h e i r jobs w e l l enough then 
there should be l e s s need for court s u p e r v i s i o n , bearing 
i n mind t h a t the co u r t s , and not the p r o f e s s i o n s , w i l l 
d e a l with claims for compensation by those i n j u r e d by 
p r o f e s s i o n a l a c t i v i t y . 
Chapter 3 
Pr o f e s s i o n s are concerned about the i n c r e a s i n g i n c i d e n c e 
of claims i n p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence. Such i s the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between p r o f e s s i o n a l and c l i e n t t h a t d u t i e s 
may a r i s e i n c o n t r a c t and i n t o r t . For the purpose of 
i n v e s t i g a t i n g p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence a t t e n t i o n has been 
focussed upon the l e g a l and medical p r o f e s s i o n s . Much of 
the concern has been f u e l l e d by d i s t u r b i n g accounts of 
mal p r a c t i c e l i a b i l i t y i n the USA. American trends may 
w e l l develop i n the UK but owing to c u l t u r a l d i f f e r e n c e s 
and d i f f e r e n c e s between l e g a l and medical systems the f u l l 
impact w i l l not be f e l t . Among f a c t o r s which l e a d to 
concern over l i a b i l i t y and which a f f e c t both p r o f e s s i o n a l 
and c l i e n t , although d i f f e r e n t l y , are ca u s a t i o n , proof of 
negligence, l e v e l of awards, nature of awards and 
insurance. There are many procedural problems as a 
consequence of these f a c t o r s . 
Chapter 4 
The l i a b i l i t y of the l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n i s examined. The 
l i a b i l i t y of b a r r i s t e r s a r i s e s i n t o r t . L i a b i l i t y of 
s o l i c i t o r s , though formerly e x c l u s i v e l y based upon breach 
of c o n t r a c t , i s now based on c o n t r a c t and t o r t . A major 
area of concern has been the expanding scope of 
s o l i c i t o r s ' negligence, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the l i g h t of 
recent developments i n the House of Lords. I t appears 
t h a t the prospect of widening l i a b i l i t y has receded f o r 
the moment. 
Chapter 5 
Advocates' immunity produces an anomalous s i t u a t i o n of 
which b a r r i s t e r s are the main b e n e f i c i a r i e s . Immunity 
e x i s t s because of p u b l i c p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s upheld by 
the c o u r t s . Other p r o f e s s i o n s see no j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r 
the immunity and i t i s not granted i n some other 
j u r i s d i c t i o n s . I n a c l i m a t e of consumerism the immunity 
i s under a t t a c k . 
Chapter 6 
Medical negligence a f f o r d s an opportunity to examine the 
mechanism fo r maintenance of standards of one group of 
p r o f e s s i o n a l s . The General Medical Council i s charged 
with maintaining p r o f e s s i o n a l standards. However, i t has 
l i t t l e c o n t r o l over the standards a s s o c i a t e d with 
negligence and cannot, i n any event, provide compensation 
f o r i n j u r e d persons. The courts have t h i s t a s k and the 
i s s u e of negligence standards f a l l s to be considered by 
them. Unfortunately, the standards of the medical 
p r o f e s s i o n as a whole are taken to be the standards 
r e l e v a n t f o r negligence. Thus, the a c c o u n t a b i l i t y of the 
medical p r o f e s s i o n to the c o u r t s , and u l t i m a t e l y p a t i e n t s , 
i s l i m i t e d . 
Chapter 1 
D i s c l o s u r e of r i s k provides some i n s i g h t i n t o the 
doctor/patient r e l a t i o n s h i p . I n a c t i o n s r e l a t i n g to 
non-disclosure of r i s k there i s no a l l e g a t i o n t h a t medical 
treatment or procedures have been n e g l i g e n t l y performed. 
The p a t i e n t s u f f e r s the consequences or s i d e - e f f e c t s of 
adequately performed procedures. The g i s t of the 
a l l e g a t i o n i s t h a t there would have been no consent to the 
procedure i f the r i s k s had been d i s c l o s e d . The problem i s 
what r i s k s should be d i s c l o s e d ? The i s s u e r a i s e s 
questions about how f a r a p a t i e n t has an i n t e r e s t i n what 
happens to h i s own body, and how much p a t i e n t s should 
p a r t i c i p a t e i n decision-making. 
Conclusions 
There i s no p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence " c r i s i s " but there i s 
a need to maintain v i g i l a n c e i n order t h a t a balance might 
be maintained. Suggested reforms of the l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n 
may produce adequate standards and d i s c i p l i n e . Proposed 
reforms of h e a l t h c a r e p r o v i s i o n may produce t h e i r own 
problems with regard to negligence. S u b s t i t u t i o n of a 'no 
f a u l t * system for t o r t l i a b i l i t y might be a way forward. 
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I n t r o d u c t i o n 
P r o f e s s i o n a l a c t i v i t y has been a f e a t u r e of 
organised s o c i e t y . P r o f e s s i o n s are themselves organised 
s o c i e t i e s . E a r l y i n the development of c i v i l i z a t i o n i t i s 
p o s s i b l e to f i n d r e f e r e n c e to a c t i v i t y which today we 
would c l a s s i f y as ' p r o f e s s i o n a l . ' One of the e a r l i e s t 
p r o f e s s i o n s to emerge was medicine. I f medicine i s used 
as an example, the nature of p r o f e s s i o n a l a c t i v i t y might 
be i l l u s t r a t e d from an e a r l y stage. I n some a n c i e n t 
c i v i l i z a t i o n s r e f e r e n c e may be found to p r o f e s s i o n a l 
r e g u l a t i o n . An example may be found by r e f e r e n c e to 
Babylonian laws 
' I f a surgeon has made a s e r i o u s wound [presumably 
meaning "a deep i n c i s i o n " ] i n a gentleman with a bronze 
k n i f e , and has thereby saved the gentleman's l i f e . . . he 
s h a l l r e c e i v e t e n shekels of s i l v e r . I f (the p a t i e n t i s ) 
a commoner, he s h a l l r e c e i v e f i v e shekels of s i l v e r . I f 
(the p a t i e n t i s ) a gentleman's s l a v e , the s l a v e ' s master 
s h a l l pay the surgeon two shekels of s i l v e r . 
I f the surgeon has made a s e r i o u s wound i n a 
gentleman with a bronze k n i f e , and has thereby caused the 
gentleman to d i e , . . . they s h a l l cut o f f the surgeon's 
hand.' 1 
The modern doctor should be thankful t h a t the 
penalty for f a i l u r e to conform to standards i s no longer 
so d r a s t i c . Babylonian law was harsh but demonstrated 
t h a t , from an e a r l y stage, organised s o c i e t y has f e l t the 
need to r e g u l a t e the r i g h t s and d u t i e s of some 
occupations, p a r t i c u l a r l y doctors. Continuing the theme of 
doctors, modern r e g u l a t i o n s may be t r a c e d back to Greek 
s o c i e t y i n the 4th century B.C where the Hippocratic Oath 
represents an i d e a l by which a doctor should p r a c t i s e . As 
Greek philosophy provided an i n t e l l e c t u a l foundation the 
Hippocratic Oath found ready acceptance by the e a r l y 
C h r i s t i a n Church and the i n f l u e n c e continued through the 
Middle Ages. Modern medical e t h i c s , however, emerged and 
began to develop towards the l a t t e r p a r t of the 18th 
century. The o l d p r o f e s s i o n s of p h y s i c i a n s , surgeons and 
apothecaries were undermined by the a s p i r a t i o n s of the 
r i s i n g middle c l a s s e s . As medicine developed and new 
voluntary h o s p i t a l s were e s t a b l i s h e d , not only were the 
shortcomings of medical p r a c t i c e r e v e a l e d , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
during epidemics, but a l s o p u b l i c expectations were 
r a i s e d . A code of conduct was drawn up i n Manchester i n 
1789 during an epidemic as a r e s u l t of f r i c t i o n between 
h o s p i t a l s t a f f and a l o c a l p h y s i c i a n . I n 1803 the code 
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was published. The P r o v i n c i a l Medical and S u r g i c a l 
A s s o c i a t i o n was e s t a b l i s h e d which concerned i t s e l f w i th 
medical conduct and e t h i c s . A Committee on Medical E t h i c s 
was s e t up i n 1849 and i n 1856 the B r i t i s h Medical 
A s s o c i a t i o n was founded. I n 1857 a committee was 
appointed to frame a code of e t h i c a l laws. At the 
i n s t i g a t i o n of the B r i t i s h Medical A s s o c i a t i o n the General 
Medical ..Council was i n s t i t u t e d under the Medical Act 
1858. 4 
2 
Modem problems 
The problems a s s o c i a t e d with p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence 
appear to be more i n the p u b l i c eye today than a t any 
other time. The evidence to support t h i s statement i s to 
be found i n many sources. I t i s f a i r to say t h a t 
newspapers h i g h l i g h t the matters surrounding the 
p r o f e s s i o n s i n a way which was not common years ago. The 
same may be s a i d of other p a r t s of the media. Whether 
i n c r e a s e d a c t i v i t y on the p a r t of the media i s a t r u e 
r e f l e c t i o n of the growth of a l l e g a t i o n s of p r o f e s s i o n a l 
negligence i s d i f f i c u l t to determine. However, p u b l i c 
consciousness of the work of p r o f e s s i o n s and t h e i r members 
appears to be heightened. T h i s may be due i n p a r t to the 
i n c r e a s e d contact t h a t the p u b l i c has with p r o f e s s i o n a l 
people. The advent of the National Health S e r v i c e has 
allowed more contact with doctors °, l e g a l a i d and advice 
p r o v i s i o n has brought people i n t o contact with lawyers, 
and the i n c r e a s e i n home-ownership has f o s t e r e d the use of 
s o l i c i t o r s ' s e r v i c e s . I t may be t h a t i n the case of 
medicine, the r a p i d i n c r e a s e i n medical knowledge has a l s o 
r a i s e d expectations on the p a r t of the p u b l i c . Whereas 
d i s e a s e , d i s a b i l i t y and death were once accepted as p a r t 
of the human condition, almost a matter of d e s t i n y , t h a t 
i s not n e c e s s a r i l y the p o s i t i o n today. Diseases are to be 
cured, d i s a b i l i t i e s removed and the s u f f e r e r s r e s t o r e d to 
f u l l h e a l t h and m o b i l i t y , and death to be put o f f . 
Accidents no longer happen - they are caused. They always 
were but now there seems to be a g r e a t e r w i l l i n g n e s s on 
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the p a r t of the v i c t i m of medical i n j u r y to seek 
compensation and, perhaps, to prove the doctor wrong. I n 
the l e g a l sphere more people are engaged i n l e g a l 
t r a n s a c t i o n s - more home-ownerships, gr e a t e r wealth, 
d e s i r e to make w i l l s l e a v i n g t h a t property to the proper 
r e c i p i e n t , g r e a t e r i n t e r e s t i n property management and tax 
avoidance. I n a l l there are many business matters 
a f f e c t i n g ordinary people and r e q u i r i n g p r o f e s s i o n a l 
a s s i s t a n c e . Greater p r o t e c t i o n of people at work has a l s o 
involved lawyers i n a c t i v i t y designed to b e n e f i t the 
v i c t i m s of a c c i d e n t s . I n a l l of these c a s e s , medical and 
l e g a l , when something goes wrong, when the b e n e f i t sought 
i s not r e c e i v e d , people's expectations are l i k e l y to s e t 
them questioning what went wrong. That i s not to say t h a t 
l i t i g a t i o n i s the only way by which the problem can be 
solved. But i t i s a way and the i s s u e of p r o f e s s i o n a l 
negligence r e a r s i t s head. 
Pa r t of the problem a s s o c i a t e d with p r o f e s s i o n s and 
a l l e g a t i o n s of p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence i s t h a t the 
p r o f e s s i o n s and t h e i r members a l s o have a point of view. 
The recognised p r o f e s s i o n s , and i n p a r t i c u l a r medicine and 
law which have been s e l e c t e d f o r t h i s t h e s i s , provide 
v i t a l , even e s s e n t i a l , s e r v i c e s f o r the community. A 
balance has to be maintained ensuring t h a t p r o f e s s i o n a l 
s e r v i c e s are properly supplied so t h a t the s e r v i c e s may 
f l o u r i s h on the one hand and the r e c i p i e n t s of the 
s e r v i c e s may be protected on the other. Standards must be 
kept up and t h a t may be encouraged and achieved i n a 
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v a r i e t y of ways by the p r o f e s s i o n a l bodies and the c o u r t s , 
f o r example. I f standards are kept up the p u b l i c i s 
b e t t e r protected. I f standards are not reached by 
i n d i v i d u a l p r o f e s s i o n a l s and someone i s i n j u r e d as a 
consequence, a remedy should be provided. But the balance 
i s d e l i c a t e . Not only must the system be such as to 
provide means by which proper standards are maintained but 
access to remedies must be provided. Access, however, 
must not mean th a t the p r o f e s s i o n a l i s always found 
wanting i n each case of i n j u r y as t h a t would be u n j u s t to 
the p r o f e s s i o n a l and could be detrimental to the whole 
community i f a f u l l range of p r o f e s s i o n a l s e r v i c e s ceases 
to be provided. 
T h i s t h e s i s s e t s out to examine some of the problems 
of p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence. H i s t o r i c a l l y , the p r o v i s i o n 
of adequate p r o f e s s i o n a l s e r v i c e s i n England i s c l o s e l y 
l i n k e d with the genesis and development of the law of t o r t 
and c o n t r a c t . This i n i t s e l f i s i n d i c a t i v e of the 
importance of p r o f e s s i o n a l s e r v i c e s i n the l i f e even of a 
r e l a t i v e l y p r i m i t i v e E n g l i s h s o c i e t y . However, the term 
'pr o f e s s i o n a l * i t s e l f i s s u b j e c t to s c r u t i n y . By 
' p r o f e s s i o n a l ' i s not simply meant 'doing a job' or 
'performing a s e r v i c e ' . Although the term imports 
v o c a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y i t i s only c e r t a i n occupations which 
a t t r a c t the l a b e l 'profession'. I t i s with those 
occupations t h a t t h i s t h e s i s i s concerned. 
Assuming the p r o v i s i o n of a p r o f e s s i o n a l s e r v i c e s 
has a l l e g e d l y caused i n j u r y , the r o l e of the p r o f e s s i o n a l 
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body i s s i g n i f i c a n t . That there i s a p r o f e s s i o n a l body i s 
a t r a i t of p r o f e s s i o n a l s t a t u s . The e f f e c t i v e n e s s or 
otherwise of a p r o f e s s i o n a l body i s c r u c i a l i n maintaining 
the d e l i c a t e balance o u t l i n e d above. E f f e c t i v e n e s s i n 
t h i s context i s not merely a matter of f a c t but a l s o of 
perception. The c o u r t s have a r o l e to play i n the i s s u e 
of p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence. I n f a c t , the whole l e g a l 
system i s involved. From the point of view of the 
p r o f e s s i o n a l defendant, i t i s important t h a t the c o u r t 
understands the p r o f e s s i o n a l r o l e and does not impose 
l i a b i l i t y based upon inappropriate standards nor grant 
awards of compensation of a ruinous nature. From the 
c l i e n t / p a t i e n t point of view there i s the daunting 
prospect of the whole e d i f i c e of the law. A s s o c i a t e d with 
an a c t i o n based upon p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence t h e r e a r e 
problems of c o s t , proof, apparent sympathy of the c o u r t s 
with p r o f e s s i o n a l s , p a r t i c u l a r l y doctors and b a r r i s t e r s , 
and awards of compensation which are too small or not 
provided i n the most b e n e f i c i a l way. The l e g a l system 
must be up to the challenges or i t too w i l l c o n t r i b u t e to 
l o s s of confidence i n p r o f e s s i o n a l s e r v i c e s or may 
encourage unnecessary l i t i g a t i o n . The balance i s f i n e . 
As already i n d i c a t e d above, the p r o f e s s i o n s of 
medicine and law have been examined i n t h i s t h e s i s . Those 
two p r o f e s s i o n s are archetypal and serve as good 
i l l u s t r a t i o n s of a v a r i e t y of problems. There are 
a l s o p a r t i c u l a r problems a f f e c t i n g lawyers and medical 
men. 
6 
L a s e r s 
A.present problem f o r s o l i c i t o r s has been t h a t of 
ever widening l i a b i l i t y . The problem was exacerbated by 
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Aims and i t s progeny. However, now t h a t those 
developments are under control,, the question of 
s o l i c i t o r s ' l i a b i l i t y might be addressed more c a r e f u l l y . 
On the other hand, advocates, p a r t i c u l a r l y b a r r i s t e r s , 
have enjoyed immunity from a c t i o n s i n negligence. Such 
immunity represents an anomaly i n a world of i n c r e a s i n g 
l i a b i l i t y for negligence. However, the immunity has been 
j u s t i f i e d by the courts on many occasions and supported by 
a v a r i e t y of government and other committees on the 
grounds of p u b l i c p o l i c y . Support f o r such immunity has 
not been forthcoming from other p r o f e s s i o n a l s not so 
protected nor from aggrieved c l i e n t s . Immunity i s 
examined i n t h i s t h e s i s and, i t i s submitted, found to be 
i l l - c o n c e i v e d . 
Doctors 
Doctors are a vu l n e r a b l e group. They do t h i n g s to 
our bodies; we are i n t i m a t e l y concerned with these 
a c t i v i t i e s . To some extent doctors have c r e a t e d the 
problems a s s o c i a t e d with medical negligence. Remarkable 
advances i n medical s c i e n c e have r a i s e d expectations of 
the p a t i e n t s . Cures are now a v a i l a b l e which were mere 
dreams but a few years ago. I f a cure i s not e f f e c t e d 
then someone must be a t f a u l t . Mistakes do occur. E r r o r s 
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are not the same as negligence although some e r r o r s may 
c o n s t i t u t e negligence. As there i s no system of 
compensation y e t a v a i l a b l e to the v i c t i m of medical i n j u r y 
other than t h a t a s s o c i a t e d with l i t i g a t i o n f o r negligence 
the c o u r t s have a c r u c i a l r o l e . Victims of ne g l i g e n t 
e r r o r s are compensated; v i c t i m s of other e r r o r are not 
(except perhaps, i n the u n l i k e l y case of b a t t e r y ) . 
Medicine must f l o u r i s h f o r the b e n e f i t of a l l . V i c t i m s 
must a l s o be compensated. A matter of f i n e balance. The 
problems a s s o c i a t e d with medical negligence have a l s o been 
added to i n cases where the a l l e g a t i o n i s t h a t of 
n o n d i s c l o s u r e of r i s k . Does doctor know best or should 
he work i n pa r t n e r s h i p with the p a t i e n t ? T h i s type of 
cl a i m i s unusual i n t h a t the s u r g i c a l procedure or other 
treatment has not gone wrong but an un d i s c l o s e d r i s k or 
s i d e - e f f e c t has occurred. Had the p a t i e n t known of the 
r i s k , the p a t i e n t a l l e g e s , the procedure would not have 
been allowed. A r e a l dilemma between a doctor a c t i n g i n 
what he considers the best i n t e r e s t s of the p a t i e n t and 
the p a t i e n t ' s r i g h t s with regard to h i s own body. A 
problem assuming e t h i c a l as w e l l as s t r i c t l y medical 
dimensions. 
The Mature of L i a b i l i t y 
•It i s often s t a t e d t h a t E n g l i s h Law has developed 
laws of o b l i g a t i o n , the main d i v i s i o n s of which are 
r e s t i t u t i o n , t r u s t s , c o n t r a c t u a l l i a b i l i t y and l i a b i l i t y 
f o r t o r t . A d i s t i n c t i o n between these areas of o b l i g a t i o n 
8 
i s to be found by reference to the source of the 
o b l i g a t i o n . I n p a r t i c u l a r , i n c o n t r a c t the o b l i g a t i o n 
a r i s e s out of the agreement i n t o which the p a r t i e s to the 
c o n t r a c t have entered, whereas i n t o r t , the o b l i g a t i o n 
need not be s e l f imposed by the p a r t i e s to the a c t i o n but 
imposed by the law i t s e l f . T h is d i s t i n c t i o n i s probably 
too s i m p l i s t i c j a c r i t i c i s m made, f o r example, by A t i y a h 
who does not c o n s i d e r these d i s t i n c t i o n s to be c l e a r c u t 
but r a t h e r t h a t the l i n e s of demarcation between the 
d i f f e r e n t o b l i g a t i o n s have become b l u r r e d . ^ 
Even though there are d i v i s i o n s i t would seem t h a t 
any attempt to r i g i d l y separate claims i n t o c o n t r a c t or 
t o r t i s f u t i l e . H i s t o r i c a l l y , the c a t e g o r i e s of 
o b l i g a t i o n are c l o s e l y r e l a t e d and have much i n common. 
This i s not to say t h a t there are no important 
d i s t i n c t i o n s t o be considered when cl a i m i n g i n c o n t r a c t or 
t o r t ( i n f r a ) . However, at t h i s stage of t h i s t h e s i s i t i s 
s u f f i c e to say t h a t i n the context of p r o f e s s i o n a l 
negligence an o b l i g a t i o n may a r i s e e i t h e r i n t o r t or 
c o n t r a c t . I t i s q u i t e usual for the d u t i e s which a r i s e 
from a r e l a t i o n s h i p of p r o f e s s i o n a l and c l i e n t to be based 
on a c o n t r a c t . One cannot s t a t e g e n e r a l l y what the 
p r e c i s e form of that duty w i l l be as t h i s depends upon the 
c o n t r a c t u a l terms themselves. I n Greaves & Co 
7 
(Contractors) L t d v Baynhaim Meickle & Par t n e r s the 
general standard imposed by the law was modified by 
r e f e r e n c e to the terms of the agreement. Otherwise, the 
o b l i g a t i o n s imposed by the t o r t of negligence can be best 
expressed i n the terms used by Lord A t k i n i n Donogtoe w 
o 
Stevenson i n 1932 , as explained i n , f o r example, Dorset. 
9 
Yacht Co L t d -w Home O f f i c e and Mms v Elerton London 
Borouaglh Comic i l ^ i . e . the importance of p o l i c y 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s balanced against reasonably f o r s e e a b i l i t y . 
Lord Atkin's statement of what he understood by the t o r t 
of negligence i n Donoghue v Stephenson i s expressed as 
follows s 
".... You must take reasonable c a r e to avoid a c t s or 
omissions which you can reasonably foresee which 
would be l i k e l y to i n j u r e your neighbour. Who, then, 
i n law, i s my neighbour? The answer seems to be 
persons who are so c l o s e l y and d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d by 
my a c t t h a t I ought reasonably to have them i n 
contemplation as being a f f e c t e d when I am d i r e c t i n g 
my mind to^the a c t s or omissions which are c a l l e d i n 
question". 
The standard s t i p u l a t e d i s t h a t of reasonable c a r e to 
be judged by the c r i t e r i o n of the "reasonable man". Often 
that w i l l be the man i n the s t r e e t , the or d i n a r y l a y 
person, sometimes r e f e r r e d to as "the man on the top of a 
Clapham omnibus". But some persons are under an 
o b l i g a t i o n t o perform to a higher standard than t h a t of 
the reasonable man. They must s t i l l take reasonable c a r e 
but t h a t i s evaluated against a standard a p p l i c a b l e to the 
s p e c i a l group to which they belong. That group i s known 
12 
i n t h i s context as a p r o f e s s i o n . The more demanding 
requirement was expressed i n 1838 i n LanpMer v Pniposs 
'Every person who enters i n t o a learned p r o f e s s i o n 
undertakes t o bring to the e x e r c i s e of i t a reasonable 
degree of c a r e and s k i l l . He does not undertake, i f he i s 
10 
an attorney, t h a t a t a l l events he s h a l l gain your c a s e , 
nor does a surgeon undertake t h a t he w i l l perform a cure, 
nor does he undertake to use the highest p o s s i b l e degree 
of s k i l l . There may be persons who have higher education 
and g r e a t e r advantages than he has, but he undertakes to 
13 
b r i n g a f a i r , reasonable and competent degree of s k i l l ' . 
T h i s higher standard a p p l i c a b l e to the p r o f e s s i o n a l 
person was a l s o r e f e r r e d to by Lord Denning MR i n the 
Greaves case (supra) i n r e f e r r i n g to the d e s c r i p t i o n given 
by McWair J i n Bolam v F r i e n u H o s p i t a l Management 
14 
CofflMmittee 
"... where you get a s i t u a t i o n which i n v o l v e s the use 
of some s p e c i a l s k i l l or competence, then the t e s t as 
to whether there has been negligence or not i s not 
the t e s t of the man on top of a Clapham omnibus, 
because he has not got t h i s s p e c i a l s k i l l . The t e s t 
i s the standard of the ordinary s k i l l e d man 
e x e r c i s i n g and p r o f e s s i n g to have t h a t s p e c i a l s k i l l . 
A man need not possess the highest expert s k i l l ; i t 
i s a w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d law that i t i s s u f f i c i e n t i f he 
e x e r c i s e s the ordinary s k i l l of an ordinary competent 
man e x e r c i s i n g t h a t p a r t i c u l a r a r t " . 
Thus, the p r o f e s s i o n a l person w i l l not be able to 
discharge h i s o b l i g a t i o n s to those whom he has i n j u r e d by 
performing up to the standards of the ordinary l a y person. 
The reason for t h i s as Linden says i s c l e a r s 
"They hold themselves out as being possessed of e x t r a 
s k i l l and experience. That i s why people c o n s u l t 
them. That i s why they are u s u a l l y paid f o r t h e i r 
advice and s e r v i c e I n a l l of these c a s e s , 
the courts are balancing the i n t e r e s t s of the c l i e n t s 
or p a t i e n t s i n r e c e i v i n g s k i l l e d s e r v i c e as w e l l as 
the i n t e r e s t s of p r o f e s s i o n a l men i n a c e r t a i n degree 
of autonomy i n t h e i r dealings with the 
community....... Every recognised p r o f e s s i o n a l group 
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has i t s own i n d i v i d u a l standard, ..to which a l l members 
of the p r o f e s s i o n must conform." 
Attaching such l i a b i l i t y to p r o f e s s i o n a l persons 
seems to be an acceptable s t a t e of a f f a i r s . There has 
been a growth i n the p r o v i s i o n of p r o f e s s i o n a l s e r v i c e s 
and, judging from the law r e p o r t s , an i n c r e a s e i n the 
frequency i n which a c t i o n s f o r p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence are 
being brought. Whether t h i s l i a b i l i t y i s to be founded on 
c o n t r a c t or t o r t i s determined by f a c t o r s which w i l l be 
examined l a t e r i n gr e a t e r depth. The main d i f f e r e n c e s 
between the forms of l i a b i l i t y r e l a t e , i n t e r a l i a , to the 
ob j e c t s of compensation, t o r t i o u s d u t i e s extending ( i . e . 
i n a d d i t i o n to p a r t i e s ) to persons other than p a r t i e s to 
the c o n t r a c t ( i f one e x i s t s ) , computation of l i m i t a t i o n 
periods and the operation of the r u l e s of remoteness of 
damage 
The O r i g i n of P r o f e s s i o n a l Negligence 
To suppose l i a b i l i t y f o r p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence i s 
merely another aspect of general l i a b i l i t y i n c o n t r a c t and 
t o r t i s to ignore the h i s t o r i c a l o r i g i n s of both c o n t r a c t 
and t o r t . An understanding of p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence, i t 
i s submitted, i s not merely a matter of c o n s i d e r i n g a 
branch of the general p r i n c i p l e s of negligence but i s 
v i t a l to an understanding of the genesis of l i a b i l i t y i n 
c o n t r a c t and t o r t . 
With the e v o l u t i o n of the forms of a c t i o n , notably 
the a c t i o n s on the case, negligence was recognised by the 
12 
courts as a mode of performance i n the commission of some 
17 
t o r t s , although not a method of committing a breach of 
c o n t r a c t as the modern law of c o n t r a c t had not y e t 
emerged. L a t e r i t came to be regarded as such. 
Nonetheless the o r i g i n s are t o r t i o u s . 
"Case" i n the a c t i o n on the case r e f e r s to the 
n e c e s s i t y f o r the p l a i n t i f f to s e t out i n the w r i t the 
f a c t s upon which he sought a remedy. I n h i s Forms of 
Ac t i o n a t Common Law F W Maitland s t a t e s t h a t Case became 
a s o r t of general r e s i d u a r y a c t i o n from which developed 
18 
much of the law of negligence. Assumpsit f o r example, 
which was so important i n the development of negligence, 
emerged as a d e l i c t u a l a c t i o n on the case. 
I t i s i r o n i c t h a t i n t r a c i n g the law of c o n t r a c t from 
i t s t o r t i o u s roots one has to consider t h a t the modern 
t o r t of negligence developed out of the nineteenth century 
19 
law of c o n t r a c t . As Atiyah puts i t "the t o r t of 
negligence which dominates modern t o r t law grew almost 
20 
e n t i r e l y out of c o n t r a c t u a l - t y p e arrangements". S i r 
Percy W i n f i e l d i n 1926 a s s e r t e d t h a t the t o r t of 
negligence d i d not become e s t a b l i s h e d u n t i l the l a t e 
nineteenth century and he supports h i s a s s e r t i o n with a 
catalogue of j u d i c i a l d i c t a i n d i c a t i n g the e x i s t e n c e of an 
21 
independent t o r t of negligence. The beginning of t h i s 
development cannot be i d e n t i f i e d with any p r e c i s i o n but he 
22 
postulated t h a t i t was from about 1825 onwards. I f the 
c h i l d i s c a l l e d the independent t o r t of negligence then 
the parent can be i d e n t i f i e d i n the form of negligence as 
a mode of committing c e r t a i n t o r t s . T h i s t r a n s i t i o n from 
mode to independence was not c l e a r - c u t but W i n f i e l d 
contended t h a t the judges appreciated t h i s movement 
sub=consciously. I n 1926 he f e l t able to a t t r i b u t e to 
negligence the following double meanings 
" . . . . ( i ) a d e f i n i t e t o r t , which c o n s i s t s i n the 
breach of a l e g a l duty to advert to the circumstances 
or the consequences (or both) of an a c t or omission 
which causes damage to another, the standard of t h i s 
duty i s th a t of a reasonable man, so f a r as 
advertence to the circumstances of the a c t or 
omission i s concerned, and t h a t of d i r e c t n e s s with 
r e s p e c t to the consequences? 
( i i ) merely inadvertence to a l e g a l duty, which 
inadvertence i s a p o s s i b l e , mental element i n the 
commission of some other (but by no means a l l ) 
t o r t s " . 
At the time t h a t he was expounding t h i s view, 
W i n f i e l d accepted t h a t some w r i t e r s denied the e x i s t e n c e 
of the separate t o r t of negligence but nonetheless 
prepared a l i s t of cases to support h i s opinion. I n 
24 
Brown v Boorman the House of Lords recognised concurrent 
a c t i o n s i n c o n t r a c t and t o r t . But there are perhaps two 
nineteenth century cases which demonstrate t h i s i s s u e of 
independence more c l e a r l y than any ot h e r s . The f i r s t i s 
25 
George v Skivington i n which the notion of an 
independent t o r t was i m p l i e d l y recognised by the co u r t . 
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The second a u t h o r i t y i s Heaven v Pender i n which i t was 
s t a t e d "And f o r negle c t of such ordinary c a r e or s k i l l 
whereby i n j u r y happens a l e g a l l i a b i l i t y a r i s e s to be 
enforced by an a c t i o n f o r negligence". At a l a t e r stage 
one can ..identify two cases i n the f i r s t quarter of the 
14 
twentieth century confirming t h i s trends Grayson ? Lint v 
27 
Ellermaan L i n e „ Lira and Attorney General v Cory Brothers 
& Co" 2 8 
Winfield's acceptance of the e x i s t e n c e of an 
independent t o r t of negligence was not, as p r e v i o u s l y 
s t a t e d , shared by a l l . At the same time, developments 
were t a k i n g p l a c e on the other s i d e of the A t l a n t i c to 
29 
r e i n f o r c e h i s conception of an independent t o r t , but 
u l t i m a t e r e c o g n i t i o n of the d i s t i n c t t o r t was only given 
30 
by the Rouse of Lords i n Donogfaue v Stevenson= The 
courts continued to a f f i r m t h i s and examples of d i c t a can 
be found to t h i s e f f e c t i n , L o c h g e l l y I r o n and Coal Co L t d 31 32 v McMullen and Grant v A u s t r a l i a n K n i t t i n g M i l l s L t d . 
I t seems t h a t a l l would agree t h a t the o r i g i n of the 
t o r t of negligence i s r e c e n t . R.W.M.Dias w r i t i n g i n 1955 
can give no p r e c i s e date of b i r t h but c i t e s W i n f i e l d as 
l o c a t i n g the process as complete i n "almost our own 
generation", while Payne and Paton i s o l a t e the occurrence 
33 
to 1932 and 1934 r e s p e c t i v e l y . I n an endeavour to 
c l a r i f y t h i s general p i c t u r e a b r i e f h i s t o r i c a l survey of 
the way i n which t h i s o b l i g a t i o n came i n t o being i n 
E n g l i s h law follows with p a r t i c u l a r r e f e r e n c e to the 
context of p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence. 
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Chapter 1 
A H i s t o r i c a l Survey of P r o f e s s i o n a l negligence 
The o r i g i n of negligence has been subjected to a long 
and i n t e n s i v e i n v e s t i g a t i o n . The protagonists have been 
p r i n c i p a l l y P r o f e s s o r s Ames, W i n f i e l d and P o t t e r 1 although 
others have taken p a r t . Each has a theory which d i f f e r s 
from t h a t of the others' except i n t h i s r e s p e c t . A l l , 
among other f a c t o r s i t i s conceded, i d e n t i f y the o r i g i n of 
negligence i n the performance of a c a l l i n g or occupation. 
Linden notes t h a t among the f i r s t negligence c a s e s ever 
brought were a c t i o n s a g a i n s t persons engaged i n p u b l i c 
2 
c a l l i n g s such as doctors, lawyers e t c . Many of the 
occupations w i t h i n t h i s category would not now be 
recognised as p r o f e s s i o n s i n the modern sense even though 
t h e i r b a s i c nature may be unchanged. The reason f o r t h i s , 
as w i l l be developed l a t e r , i s t h a t an occupation which 
a s p i r e s to the s t a t u s of p r o f e s s i o n w i l l only a t t a i n t h a t 
s t a t u s i f i t conforms with s o c i e t y ' s perception of a 
pr o f e s s i o n . I t i s appreciated t h a t t h i s c r i t e r i o n i s not 
a c l e a r determinant of what c o n s t i t u t e s a p r o f e s s i o n but 
i n t h a t i t i s r e f l e c t i v e of the general d i f f i c u l t y i n t h i s 
f i e l d . S o c i e t y p e r c e i v e s an occupation to be a p r o f e s s i o n 
i f t h a t occupation s a t i s f i e s v a r i o u s c r i t e r i a . What these 
c r i t e r i a are i s s t i l l the s u b j e c t of debate but many 
consider t h a t o r g a n i s a t i o n , t r a i n i n g and d i s c i p l i n e of 
members i s included. T r a d i t i o n a l l y , the p r o f e s s i o n s a r e 
18 
medicine, law and the m i n i s t r y . However, many of the 
common c a l l i n g s r e f e r r e d to i n case law and commentaries 
would not, by re f e r e n c e to the proposed c r i t e r i a or even 
based upon a general impression of the occupation, be 
c a l l e d a p r o f e s s i o n today. I t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t the 
occupation of shepherd, smith or innkeeper would be 
considered a p r o f e s s i o n today. T h i s i s a matter to be 
4 
d e a l t with more f u l l y i n a subsequent chapter. 
Nonetheless, i t i s to the h i s t o r y of the development 
of negligence t h a t recourse must be made f o r the purpose 
of showing how r e g u l a t i o n of p r o f e s s i o n a l a c t i v i t y by the 
courts has evolved. A u s e f u l theory to commence with i s 
tha t of W i n f i e l d i n h i s seminal a r t i c l e i n the Law 
5 
Qua r t e r l y Review of 1926. I n t h i s a r t i c l e W i n f i e l d 
i d e n t i f i e s four sources of negligence. He l o c a t e s the 
o r i g i n s of l i a b i l i t i e s f o r negligence i n common c a l l i n g s , 
i n assumpsit, i n nuisance and i n l i a b i l i t y f o r dangerous 
thi n g s . The nature of the cases connected with these 
areas of l i a b i l i t y suggests t h a t the g r e a t e s t r e l e v a n c e to 
t h i s study are the o r i g i n s a s s o c i a t e d with d u t i e s imposed 
upon persons c a r r y i n g on a common c a l l i n g and d u t i e s * 6 v o l u n t a r i l y undertaken i n assumpsit. I t w i l l be seen t h a t 
i n some i n s t a n c e s , the presence of both elements i . e . 
assumpsit and common c a l l i n g could be found. What has to 
be considered i s whether i n a l l cases of negligence, the 
7 
assumpsit need be e s t a b l i s h e d . Simpson c o n s i d e r s t h a t 
both a c t i o n s are p o s s i b l e but not interdependent. 
19 
A r t i f i c e r s could be l i a b l e f o r negligent misfeasance 
a 
without the need fo r an assumpsit. The way i n which 
these two p o s s i b l e sources achieve s p e c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e 
can be expressed i n t h i s way. 
'The whole h i s t o r y of l i a b i l i t y for negligence, r i g h t 
up to our own time, r e v e a l s a constant i n t e r p l a y 
between the idea that l i a b i l i t y f o r negligence can 
only be imposed i f there i s some previous nexus 
between the p a r t i e s and the idea t h a t negligence 
alone i s s u f f i c i e n t , nor i s there any i n d i c a t i o n t h a t 
the c o n f l i c t between these two ideas has been 
r e s o l v e d g i n the course of the l a s t f i v e c e n t u r i e s ' 
The point has now been reached a t which more 
p a r t i c u l a r a n a l y s i s of these p o s s i b l e sources of 
negligence can be attempted. 
' Conumon " C a l l i n g ' 
Although there i s disagreement as to the meaning of 
'common c a l l i n g ' s u f f i c e i t i s a t t h i s stage to say t h a t 
those who professed competence i n occupations r e q u i r i n g 
s k i l l and l e a r n i n g were under a duty imposed by law to 
behave i n a competent fashion. F a i l u r e to f u l f i l such a 
duty was remedied by the a c t i o n on the case based upon 
t h i s general o b l i g a t i o n to show s k i l l i n t h a t c a l l i n g . ^ 
I n h i s a r t i c l e "History of Negligence i n the Law of 
T o r t s " i n 1 9 2 6 1 1 W i n f i e l d compiled a 'miscellaneous 
12 
catalogue' of trades f a l l i n g i n t o the category of common 
c a l l i n g s , ' including c a r r i e r , innkeeper, surgeon, the 
marshal1 or v e t i n a r y surgeon, the smith or f a r r i e r , the 13 14 ferryman , the shepherd and the barber'. Other wrxters 
20 
had t h e i r own views on the membership of such a group. 
Some w r i t e r s confirmed the presence of c e r t a i n occupations 
15 
as 'common c a l l i n g s ' others doubted the i n c l u s i o n . 
There i s thus a measure of consensus as to the 
p o s s i b l e o r i g i n of l i a b i l i t y i n the performance of 
p a r t i c u l a r c a l l i n g s together with d i s s e n s i o n as to the 
membership of such a category. The b a s i s of t h i s 
l i a b i l i t y r e s t s upon o b l i g a t i o n s imposed by law.1** 
But the compilation of l i s t s alone w i l l not a s s i s t i n 
the a n a l y s i s of these c a l l i n g s f o r the purpose of 
determining the nature of l i a b i l i t y f o r negligence. I t i s 
e s s e n t i a l l y the nature of the common c a l l i n g which i s the 
key to t h i s . There i s no pretence a t d i s c o v e r i n g the 
answer i n t h i s survey but t h i s i s the path, i t i s 
submitted, which must be trodden. I t i s probably more 
important than attempting to compile l i s t s of c a l l i n g s . 
Simpson considers t h a t the ' a d j e c t i v e "common" means 
no more than a v a i l a b l e to or for the p u b l i c , or g e n e r a l l y 
a v a i l a b l e . . . . T his i s the sense i n which the word i s used 
i n medieval c a s e s , and i t cannot be too s t r o n g l y 
emphasised t h a t the term i s used without any t e c h n i c a l 
overtones whatsoever a t t h i s period, i t i s nowhere found 
17 
as a. l e g a l term of a r t ' . He a l s o s t a t e s t h a t a common 
c a l l i n g i s an expression of greate r s i g n i f i c a n c e than has 
h i t h e r t o been assumed. Members of s k i l l e d p r o f e s s i o n s 
appear to be included i n the term 'common c a l l i n g ' as are 
some a r t i f i c e r s . The terms ' a r t i f i c e r ' and ' s k i l l e d 
21 
p r o f e s s i o n a l ' are not synonymous. That they overlap 
should not b l u r the d i s t i n c t nature of the 
18 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s . I f one accepts t h a t common c a l l i n g has 
19 
no simple meaning i n the sense of common l i a b i l i t i e s and 
a l s o accepts 'that the courts t r e a t the f a c t t h a t a person 
e x e r c i s e s a common c a l l i n g r e l e v a n t to h i s l e g a l p o s i t i o n 
20 
i n a v a r i e t y of d i f f e r e n t ways' , then one can con s i d e r 
the relevance of p r o f e s s i o n a l s t a t u s to l i a b i l i t y f o r 
n e g l i g e n c e . ^ 
As an u n s k i l l e d person might e x e r c i s e a common 
c a l l i n g e.g. labourer, the essence of t h i s a c t i o n was t h a t 
the defendant was a member of a s k i l l e d p r o f e s s i o n i . e . 
the a r t i f i c e r pursuing a common c a l l i n g . I n such 
circumstances an assumpsit appears to have been an 
unnecessary and immaterial a l l e g a t i o n when suing by a c t i o n 
22 
on the case for negligent misfeasance. The defendant i s 
to be judged a g a i n s t the standard appropriate to h i s 
c a l l i n g as a s k i l l e d p r o f e s s i o n a l . 
F i t z h e r b e r t makes an a s s e r t i o n of l i a b i l i t y f o r 
negligence based on the narrower s p e c i f i c a t i o n of 
a r t i f i c e r w i t h i n the general context of d u t i e s imposed 
upon those e x e r c i s i n g common c a l l i n g s . Simpson does not 
consider t h a t t h i s a s s e r t i o n i s based upon a u t h o r i t y but 
does espouse the p r i n c i p l e as a p o s s i b l e b a s i s f o r the 
23 
a n a l y s i s of negligence' That other modes of a n a l y s i s 
may be countenanced can be seen by re f e r e n c e to the 
l i a b i l i t i e s a r i s i n g out of an a l l e g a t i o n of assumpsit. 22 
But before t h a t step i s taken c o n s i d e r a t i o n of another 
r e l a t e d area of a c t i v i t y which might i n v o l v e both sources 
of custom and assumpsit may shed some l i g h t on the b a s i s 
of l i a b i l i t y i n negligence. 
24 
Bailmemt 
An area of a c i t i v i t y a t t r a c t i n g l i a b i l i t y r e l e v a n t to 
t h i s survey i s t h a t of bailment. The law of bailment 
r e l a t e s to the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of one person f o r the s a f e 
custody of goods en t r u s t e d to him by another. A f a i l u r e 
to r e t u r n the goods r e s u l t e d i n l i a b i l i t y i n detinue. 
W i n f i e l d considers t h a t l i a b i l i t y was o r i g i n a l l y s t r i c t 
and may even have been absolute. He based h i s view upon 
25 
Bracton. Plucknett informs us t h a t r e l i e f was granted 
i n the medieval period so th a t i n the two c e n t u r i e s 
following Bracton there were cases i n which there was no 
2 6 
l i a b i l i t y without f a u l t or negligence of the b a i l e e . 
Holdsworth would agree with t h i s . He gave the reason f o r 
these severe r u l e s as p a r t l y the regard the common law had 
for p ossessions and a l s o the development of such r u l e s 
27 
p r i o r to the common law conception of negligence. But i n 
1601 when the i s s u e of l i a b i l i t y was considered i n 
28 
Souttocote v Bennett there i s a r e a f f i r m a t i o n of s t r i c t 
l i a b i l i t y based upon the a c t i o n of detinue. According to 
Holdsworth the court was aware t h a t the r u l e s were hard, 
e s p e c i a l l y as they could be judged alongside the 
developing conception of negligence. Only the o l d e r types 
of b a i l e e were to be governed by these r u l e s and even 
those p r o f e s s i n g these c a l l i n g s should have been able to 
29 
r e s t r i c t t h e i r l i a b i l i t y by s p e c i a l c o n t r a c t 
A century l a t e r the law of bailment became 
e s t a b l i s h e d on the b a s i s of negligence i n Coggs w 
30 
Barnard. Holt C J appli e d Roman law r u l e s as to 
negligence, which he had taken from Bracton, and 
31 
determined the modern b a s i s of bailment. The innkeeper 
and the common c a r r i e r remained s u b j e c t to s t r i c t 
l i a b i l i t y as exc e p t i o n a l c a s e s . The innkeeper was l i a b l e 
by the common custom of the realm f o r the s a f e custody of 
h i s guests' goods. The common c a r r i e r who e x e r c i s e d a 
pu b l i c employment was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r goods, except i n 
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cases of a c t of God or a c t i o n s of the King's enemies. 
Lord Mansfield accepted t h i s a p p l i c a t i o n of the s t r i c t 
33 
l i a b i l i t y r u l e to common c a r r i e r s i n Forward v P i t t a r d . 
Bailment and Assumpsit 
T h i s was not the only l i n e of development. To show 
l i a b i l i t y based upon detinue was only one approach. An 
a l t e r n a t i v e was through an assumpsit or an express 
34 
c o n t r a c t to be c a r e f u l or provide s a f e custody. Thus 
the express assumpsit becomes an e s s e n t i a l p a r t of an 
a c t i o n on the case based on negligent custody of goods by 
b a i l e e s . According to Ames t h i s a c t i o n preceded the 
a c t i o n of assumpsit by f i f t y y e a r s . P l a i n t i f f s would 
p r e f e r t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e a c t i o n as g e n e r a l l y the procedure 
i n case was more s a t i s f a c t o r y than i n detinue. The f i r s t 
case appears to have been l i t i g a t e d i n 1472 and 
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1 
r e c o g n i t i o n of the b a i l o r ' s r i g h t to sue i n case r a t h e r 
than detinue came before the end of the f i f t e e n t h 
35 
century. 
T h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
bailment and the developing a c t i o n of assumpsit may 
strengthen the argument t h a t the l i a b i l i t i e s of those 
e x e r c i s i n g common c a l l i n g s , i n c l u d i n g b a i l e e s , are a 
primary source of l i a b i l i t y i n negligence. T h i s a c t i o n 
for negligent custody was regarded as an a c t i o n i n t o r t 
i t 
f o r misfeasance and not as one based on c o n t r a c t . The 
s i m i l a r i t y of t h i s a c t i o n to a c t i o n s a g a i n s t surgeons i s 
shown by reference to the b a i l e e a c t i v e l y t a k i n g the goods 
i n t o h i s custody. I t i s here t h a t the i n g r e d i e n t s of the 
a c t i o n can be found i e . t a k i n g the goods i n t o custody, the 
assumpsit to keep them s a f e l y and the l o s s caused by the 
f a i l u r e to do so. T h i s i s t o r t i o u s l i a b i l i t y and as a 
r e s u l t -gratuitous bailments were brought w i t h i n i t s 
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scope. 
On the other hand those b a i l e e s who c a r r i e d on a 
common c a l l i n g were bound by du t i e s imposed by the common 
custom of the realm. This was i n common with others who 
s i m i l a r l y e x e r c i s e d a common c a l l i n g eg. common surgeon. 
I n the case of such b a i l e e s , no express assumpsit of the 
defendant was necessary. And there i s no record of any 
such count being l a i d i n a case a g a i n s t a common innkeeper 
38 
or c a r r i e r f o r l o s s of goods. B a i l e e s who d i d not f a l l 
i n t o the "Common" category were l i a b l e only upon proof of 25 
an assumpsit. This was a l e g a l requirement i n 1598 when 
the four judges of the Queen's Bench ' a l l agreed t h a t 
39 
without such an assumpsit the a c t i o n would not l i e ' . 
The n e c e s s i t y f o r t h i s requirement, however, d i d not 
continue to r e c e i v e support and the need fo r an express 
assumpsit was dispensed with j u s t as had happened i n the * 40 case of surgeons. 
Assumpsit 
Throughout t h i s survey r e f e r e n c e has been made to the 
a c t i o n based upon assumpsit. According to some cas e s t h i s 
a c t i o n was necessary to e s t a b l i s h l i a b i l i t y , whereas 
others suggest i t was not. E i t h e r way i t i s necesary to 
e x p l a i n the meaning of assumpsit, i t s development and from 
t h i s the development of negligence and the law of 
c o n t r a c t . 
C.H.S. F i f o o t c onsiders t h a t the o r i g i n s of assumpsit 
41 
have been a matter of controversy f o r a long time. T h i s 
controversy i s i r r e l e v a n t f o r present purposes and i t w i l l 
s u f f i c e to say t h a t the o r i g i n s of assumpsit are t o r t i o u s , 
42 
the a c t i o n being based upon the a c t i o n on the case. 
I n e a r l y a c t i o n s a g a i n s t surgeons f o r n e g l i g e n t 
misfeasance, assumpsit formed pa r t of the w r i t although 
the p r e c i s e s i g n i f i c a n c e of the undertaking i s obscure. 
L a t e r i n the f i f t e e n t h century persons e x e r c i s i n g 
occupations r e q u i r i n g s k i l l and t r a i n i n g were bound 
because the nature of t h e i r c a l l i n g determined t h a t they 
ought to behave i n a competent manner. Such persons would 26 
be sued for negligence without assumpsit being a l l e g e d . 
I t i s on t h i s b a s i s t h a t the a r t i f i c e r i s bound and i s 
evidence of a s h i f t from s e l f imposed l i a b i l i t y to 
l i a b i l i t y imposed by law by the middle of the s i x t e e n t h 
century. 
Winfield's a r t i c l e i n the Law Quar t e r l y Review of 
1926 draws a t t e n t i o n to the h i s t o r y of assumpsit and i t s 
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relevance to the p u r s u i t of a trade, or p r o f e s s i o n . 
I t seems e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t those p r o f e s s i o n a l s or s k i l l e d 
persons who e x e r c i s e d a common c a l l i n g were l i a b l e f o r 
t h e i r d e f a u l t s without an assumpsit. The law imp l i e d a 
duty i n such circumstances and l i a b i l i t y e x i s t e d by v i r t u e 
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of the custom of the realm. But Simpson denies t h a t 
there were any p r i n c i p l e s , or indeed any attempts to l a y 
down such p r i n c i p l e s , about those who e x e r c i s e d common 
c a l l i n g s . The m i s c e l l a n y of r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s 
governing medieval l i f e were not a l l imposed and enforced 
by the c o u r t s . Other agencies were a t work i e . the 
s u r g i c a l p r o f e s s i o n was c o n t r o l l e d i n London, Master 
Surgeons were p u b l i c l y admitted and swore on oath to work 
w e l l , charge reasonable fees and present to the 
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a u t h o r i t i e s the d e f a u l t s of others undertaking c u r e s . 
Once i t i s r e a l i s e d , argued Simpson, how miscellaneous 
occupations could be c a l l e d 'common' the reason becomes 
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c l e a r . To resume the d i s c u s s i o n i n hand i t seems to 
Win f i e l d t h a t use of assumpsit i s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to the 
development of l i a b i l i t y f o r p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence, and 
27 
the study of t h i s development shows the u l t i m a t e b a s i s of 
l i a b i l i t y f o r p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence r e s t i n g 
47 
a l t e r n a t x v e l y on t o r t or on c o n t r a c t . I t seems 
para d o x i c a l t h a t the a c t i o n of assumpsit, t o r t i o u s as i t 
was, developed because of the d e f i c i e n c i e s of the w r i t 
system i n r e l a t i o n to c o n t r a c t u a l l i a b i l i t y . At the 
beginning of the f i f t e e n t h century there were four w r i t s 
48 
used to enforce c o n t r a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n s a t common law. 
The main drawbacks of pursuing a c l a i m u s i n g the w r i t s 
were l a r g e l y procedural i e . wager of law, and i n the case 
of one, i e covenant, the requirement of a s e a l . I n 
a d d i t i o n , p l a i n t i f f s no longer had the choice of venues as 
49 
there had been j u r i s d i c t i o n a l changes. The judges f e l l 
back on a remedy with which they were f a m i l i a r , i e . 
t r e s p a s s on the case, which arose i n the l a t t e r h a l f of 
the fourteenth century when one person caused damage to 
another by the way i n which he c a r r i e d out the duty which 
he had undertaken to perform. The a c t i o n of t r e s p a s s on 
the case on an assumpsit became known as assumpsit. The 
e a r l i e s t assumpsit a c t i o n s were i n the nature of t r e s p a s s , 
based upon what we now c a l l p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence. Only 
with the b e n e f i t of hindsight can we see t h e i r sudden 
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appearance about 1370 as a new development i n c o n t r a c t . 
Thus, the extension of the theory of c o n t r a c t came about 
by means of what was e s s e n t i a l l y an a c t i o n i n t o r t . The 
choice of suing i n c o n t r a c t or t o r t d i d not e x i s t i n the 
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fourteenth century as the d i s t i n c t i o n had not been drawn 28 
a t t h a t time. Where an assumpsit was the b a s i s of the 
a c t i o n i n the fourteenth century F i f o o t denies i t s 
s i g n i f i c a n c e . When a p l a i n t i f f i n the fourteenth century 
had a l l e g e d conduct i n breach of an undertaking, the 
undertaking was i n c i d e n t a l to the misfeasance upon which 
the a c t i o n depended and was not an ope r a t i v e p a r t of the 
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w r i t . Although t h i s development was to prove a s p r i n g 
board f o r the development of c o n t r a c t the l i n k of 
assumpsit with i t s t r e s p a s s o r y o r i g i n s was maintained by 
the i n a b i l i t y of the courts f o r some time to formulate any 
remedy i n case f o r nonfeasance. I n time the a c t i o n of 
assumpsit was converted from a t o r t i o u s remedy to become 
the main remedy a t common law f o r breach of c o n t r a c t . 
T h i s e v o l u t i o n came about i n the fol l o w i n g stages 
p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l e v a n t to p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence. 
a) to remedy misfeances i n breach of an undertaking? 
b) to remedy c e r t a i n kinds of non-feasance i n breach of 
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an undertaking. 
Misfeasance i n Assumpsit 
The a c t i o n appears to be based upon the p r o p o s i t i o n 
t h a t 'where negligence and imprudence were a l l e g e d i n 
act i o n s f o r misfeasance by c o n t r a c t o r s eg. neg l i g e n t 
54 
cures by surgeons , i t became a wrong to do an a c t i o n 
n e g l i g e n t l y where the c o n t r a c t imposed a s p e c i a l duty to 
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take c a r e ' . "Contractor" i n t h i s context, i t i s 
submitted, means the person who was a c t i n g pursuant to an 
undertaking and "contract" should be read a c c o r d i n g l y . 
29 
The e a r l i e s t known cases i n which an assumpsit was l a i d 
are cases concerning the e x e r c i s e of a common c a l l i n g eg. 
ferryman, surgeon, smith. K i r a l f y i d e n t i f i e s i n the case 
of the Humfoer ferryman one of the e a r l i e s t a c t i o n s on the 
5 6 
case, although Plucknett does not agree on procedural 
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grounds. However, Ames i d e n t i f i e d t h i s as one of the 
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e a r l i e s t cases i n which an assumpsit was a l l e g e d . 
Be t h a t as i t may i n Buckton V Towmsend, otherwise 
known as the case of the Humber Ferryman (upon which so 
much has been w r i t t e n ) , the complaint was made by the 
p l a i n t i f f t h a t the defendant had r e c e i v e d h i s mare to 
c a r r y over the Humber, the defendant overloaded h i s boat 
and the mare drowned. Although Counsel f o r the defendant 
argued t h a t the a c t i o n should have been i n covenant, thus 
rendering the p l a i n t i f f without a remedy, the court h e l d 
the overloading was a t r e s p a s s . There i s , however, no 
record of an undertaking. I t seems t h a t the aspect of the 
t r a n s a c t i o n to c a r r y the mare which i s most p e r t i n e n t to 
the d e c i s i o n i s the r e c e i p t of the ferryman of the mare 
f o r s a f e c a r r i a g e . The agreement or undertaking was not 
taken as important. The t r a n s a c t i o n i s important i n t h a t 
i t s e t s the scene f o r the wrongdoing. The only reason f o r 
the presence of the mare i n the boat was the 
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t r a n s a c t i o n . 
The next reported case i s Waldon V M a r s h a l . T h e 
a l l e g a t i o n here was t h a t the defendant had undertaken to 
cure the p l a i n t i f f ' s horse but d i d h i s work so badly t h a t 
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the horse diech Again, counsel f o r the defence argued 
t h a t the a c t i o n should have been framed i n covenant, and 
then, a l t e r n a t i v e l y t h a t the w r i t of t r e s p a s s should have 
been used. T h i s argument was countered by the counsel f o r 
the p l a i n t i f f who r e p l i e d t h a t the a c t i o n was brought as a 
r e s u l t of the defendant's negligent cure. I t was h e l d 
t h a t the a c t i o n sounded i n t o r t . The appropriate w r i t was 
the a c t i o n on the case and the court found i n favour of 
the p l a i n t i f f because the defendant's negligent conduct 
had caused damage to the p l a i n t i f f . Around t h i s p e r i od 
cases can be found a l l e g i n g c a r e l e s s n e s s causing harm 
a g a i n s t , for example, surgeons and smiths? and then a 
number of cases of a s i m i l a r nature followed, through the 
medieval age. Ames observed t h a t i n these cases 'the 
p l a i n t i f f sought to recover damages for p h y s i c a l i n j u r y to 
h i s person or property caused by the a c t i v e misconduct of 
the defendant...... But the a c t i o n s were not o r i g i n a l l y , 
and are not today, regarded as a c t i o n s of c o n t r a c t ' . ^ * 
Assumpsit did not appear to be e s s e n t i a l i n such c a s e s and 
the a c t i o n l i e s i n these matters without a l l e g i n g any 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n . The defendant's negligence i s the cause of 
the a c t i o n , and not assumpsit. Does, then, assumpsit 
have any s i g n i f i c a n c e ? I n the following sense i t does. 
The defendant had been authorised to come i n t o c o n t a c t 
with the p l a i n t i f f ' s person or property and without more 
there could be no t o r t . Ames e x p l a i n s i t thus 'The person 
i n j u r e d took the r i s k of a l l i n j u r i o u s consequences, 
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u n l e s s the other e x p r e s s l y assumed the r i s k h i m s e l f , or 
u n l e s s the p e c u l i a r nature of ones c a l l i n g , as i n the case 
of the smith, imposed a customary duty to a c t with 
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reasonable s k i l l . ' But t h i s does not take f u l l y i n t o 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a t although the form of the a c t i o n was 
undoubtedly t o r t i o u s the substance of the p l a i n t i f f ' s 
c l a i m was c o n t r a c t u a l . As Cheshire and F i f o o t put i t 'The 
r e s u l t of (Maiden V Marshall) and s i m i l a r cases was to 
b l u r the d i s t i n c t i o n between t o r t and c o n t r a c t . A 
p l a i n t i f f might bri n g Case i f h i s person or property had 
been i n j u r e d by the defendant's c a r e l e s s or u n s k i l f u l 
performance of a p a r t i c u l a r undertaking, and i t was by 
pursuing t h i s l i n e of argument t h a t an a c t i o n f o r breach 
of c o n t r a c t was gradually, though somewhat p a i n f u l l y 
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e s t a b l i s h e d ' . This t r a n s i t i o n from t o r t to c o n t r a c t 
takes place on the b a s i s t h a t a c o n t r a c t i n g p l a c e p a r t y 
performs h i s undertaking badly and thereby causes damage 
to the p l a i n t i f f . L i a b i l i t y was c l e a r l y w i t h i n the scope 
of case f o r misfeasance but i n modern law i t might e q u a l l y 
c l e a r l y and a p p r o p r i a t e l y be expressed i n c o n t r a c t u a l 
terms. Thus the stage has been reached t h a t n e g l i g e n t 
performance of an o b l i g a t i o n assumed under an agreement 
gives r i s e to the a c t i o n on the case. While the judges 
were prepared to accept t h i s , the t r e s p a s s o r y o r i g i n of 
the a c t i o n on the case retarded the process of a l l o w i n g 
such a c t i o n s f o r n o n f e a s a n c e , ^ 
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As sumps i t ; f o r nonfeasance 
The problem of nonfeasance i s more acute. Actions 
f o r nonfeasance were not allowed i n 15th century law. And 
yet there i s a lacuna i n t h a t i f one approaches a person 
to c a r r y out a task, r e a l damage may ensue i f t h a t t a s k i s 
not performed. The medieval judges f e l t unable to 
progress from misfeasance p a r t l y because they could not 
see f a i l u r e to perform as a t o r t . 
T h i s was a conceptual problem caused by the nature of 
d u t i e s . Misfeasance i s wrong where there i s a duty to 
r e f r a i n from causing harm. This i s the normal form of 
duty. Less commonly w i l l there be a p o s i t i v e duty to a c t 
c o n f e r r i n g a b e n e f i t and t h i s remains the u s u a l s t a t e of 
a f f a i r s today i n the modern t o r t of negligence. Another 
impediment to the extension of l i a b i l i t y f o r nonfeasance 
was the circumvention of the Writ of Covenant which the 
judges were l o a t h to permit. Thus there i s a s i t u a t i o n i n 
which a person would undertake to perform a t a s k f o r 
another. But whereas misfeasance d i d not n e c e s s a i l y 
i n v o l v e a promissory undertaking, f a i l i n g to perform a 
future undertaking sounded i n covenant as the duty to 
perform arose out of the agreement or undertaking. 
Trespass cannot be committed by nonfeasance and 
r e q u i r e s that the defendants have done something. I t 
seems, however, t h a t attempts to f i n d l i a b i l i t y f o r 
nonfeasance can be t r a c e d back to the fourteenth century 
as i n the case of Wattom v B r i n t h ^ i n which the p l a i n t i f f 
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a l l e g e d the defendant had undertaken to b u i l d a house and 
had not done so. The p l a i n t i f f f a i l e d upon the p r e c i s e 
i s s u e of misfeasance or nonfeasance. Nonfeasance r e q u i r e d 
a deed and the Writ of Covenant. The c r u c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n 
between misfeasance and nonfeasance was s i m i l a r l y made i n 
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Watklms' case by Marton J . where no t o r t i s 
a l l e g e d i n the w r i t , but only t h a t the defendant has 
promised to do something and he has not done i t ; f o r i n 
such case a good Writ of Covenant l i e s , supposing t h a t he 
has a s p e c i a l i t y i n as much as he had done badly 
what he had covenanted to do, the covenant i s thereby 
changed and made i n t o a t o r t , f o r which a good w r i t of 
t r e s p a s s l i e s ' . Babington C J and Cockayne J disagreed 
re c o g n i s i n g l i a b i l i t y i n Trespass f o r l o s s caused by 
nonfeasance. This made no d i f f e r e n c e to the outcome of 
the case, depending upon some other procedural 
t e c h n i c a l i t y for c o n c l u s i o n but i t does show some judges 
are prepared to allow case f o r nonfeasance on the grounds 
of the r e s u l t i n g l o s s to the p l a i n t i f f . 
The t r e s p a s s o r y o r i g i n of assumpsit continued to 
impede the extension of l i a b i l i t y i n Case to nonfeasance. 
I n an e f f o r t to s i d e s t e p t h i s o b s t a c l e novel use of D e c e i t 
on the Case was made but there are no a u t h o r i t i e s 
suggesting t h a t t h i s came any nearer to s o l v i n g the 
C Q 
problem* of nonfeasance. Towards the end of the 
f i f t e e n t h century the d i s t i n c t i o n became a matter of the 
utmost importance. F i f o o t r e p o r t s t h a t i n 1503 i t was 
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d e c l a r e d t h a t , 'where a carpenter makes a bargain to make 
me a house and does nothing, no a c t i o n on the case l i e s , 
f o r i t sounds i n covenant. But i f he makes the house 
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improperly, the a c t i o n on the case w e l l l i e s ' . T h i s , 
however, appears to be the l a s t statement which makes the 
d i s t i n c t i o n . L o g i c a l i t may have been? u n f a i r i t 
c e r t a i n l y was, denying a remedy as i t did. Moving towards 
l i a b i l i t y f o r nonfeasance may not have been l o g i c a l but i t 
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was expedient and produced a reasonable r e s u l t . I n 1505 
the l i a b i l i t y f o r nonfeasance was admitted i n c l e a r terms 
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and r e i n f o r c e d by a judgment i n 1506. 
The case of 1505 concerned a p l a i n t i f f who brought an 
a c t i o n on the case a l l e g i n g t h a t he had bought 20 q u a r t e r s 
of b a r l e y from the defendant. These were to be d e l i v e r e d 
to the p l a i n t i f f but the defendant converted the goods to 
h i s own use. Frowicke C J s a i d i n judgments 
' I f I s e l l you ten ac r e s of my land p a r c e l of my 
manor and then make a feoffment of my manor, you 
s h a l l have an a c t i o n on the case a g a i n s t me, because 
I r e c e i v e d your money, and i n t h a t case you have no 
other remedy ag a i n s t me. And so, i f I s e l l you my 
land and covenant to enfeoff you and do not, you 
s h a l l have a good a c t i o n on the case, and t h i s i s 
adjudged ..... And i f I covenant with a carp e n t e r 
to b u i l d a house, and pay him 20 pounds for, the house 
to be b u i l t by a c e r t a i n day, now I s h a l l have a good 
a c t i o n on my case, because of payment of money, and 
s t i l l i t sounds only i n covenant and without payment 
of money i n t h i s case no remedy, and s t i l l i f he 
b u i l d s i t and misbuilds, a c t i o n of the case l i e s . 
And a l s o f o r nonfeasance, i f money paid, case l i e s ' . 
Following the r e c o g n i t i o n of the a c t i o n f o r 
nonfeasance the way was opened f o r the development of a 
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general c o n t r a c t u a l remedy. Much had y e t to be done and 
i n time Assumpsit absorbed Debt and was able to remedy 
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breach of executory c o n t r a c t s . 
From the middle of the s i x t e e n t h century assumpsit 
could be brought f o r debt provided t h a t the debtor had 
e x p r e s s l y promised to pay the debt a f t e r i t was i n c u r r e d . 
Ames e x p l a i n s t h a t t h i s was due to the fundamental 
d i f f e r e n c e s between debt and assumpsit. To emphasise the 
d i s t i n c t i o n , r e l i a n c e was pla c e d upon the new promise to 
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pay. A f u r t h e r development was caused by the 
i m p l i c a t i o n of an agreement from the e x i s t e n c e of the debt 
and thus allowing assumpsit to be brought on t h i s i m p l i e d 
agreement. T h i s approach by the Court of King's Bench had 
been r e s i s t e d by the Courts of Common Pleas and Exchequer 
Chamber but i n 1602 i n Blades' Case the King's Bench 
stance was upheld. From then on I n d e b i t a t u s Assumpsit 
replaced the remedy f o r simple c o n t r a c t s formerly provided 
by Debt. Supersession of Debt by In d e b i t a t u s Assumpsit 
allowed a remedy by assumpsit f o r nonfeasance. T h i s 
allowed a cont i n u a t i o n of the l i n e of reasoning which was 
merely an a p p l i c a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e t h a t a person who 
had changed h i s p o s i t i o n on the b a s i s of an undertaking 
could sue the person i n breach of the undertaking. The 
subsequent development now applied the p r i n c i p l e to both 
p a r t i e s to the undertaking and promises i f given f o r 
promises became a c t i o n a b l e . Baker regards Blades'Case 
as the point 'whence the modern law of c o n t r a c t t r a c e s i t s 
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l i f e as a s i n g l e e n t i t y . ' The law of c o n t r a c t i s 
confined through the a c t i o n on the case of assumpsit. 
A f t e r t h i s date, a c t i o n s f o r misfeasance by p r o f e s s i o n a l 
persons such as surgeons could s t i l l be brought i n t o r t 
with no c o n t r a c t u a l overtones a t a l l . The l i a b i l i t y f o r 
nonfeasance does not u s u a l l y e x i s t i n t o r t i n the absence 
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of a p r e - e x i s t i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
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negligence as a Tort 
The s t a t u s of negligence was p r i n c i p a l l y as a mode of 
performance. From the modern standpoint i t i s more than 
j u s t a method of committing a t o r t or breaking a c o n t r a c t . 
The d u t i e s which arose emerged from a r e l a t i o n s h i p based 
upon a common c a l l i n g , bailment or assumpsit. No 
d i s t i n c t i o n was made between c o n t r a c t and t o r t and 
assumpsit covered cases under e i t h e r head. I t was l a t e r 
t h a t negligence acquired the nature of an independent 
t o r t . The date of b i r t h i s unknown as the i n f a n t t o r t 
grew imperceptably, p o s s i b l y even unconsciously, i n the 
minds of the judges. I n h i s a r t i c l e on the nature of duty 
i n t o r t i o u s negligence published i n the Columbia Law 
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Review i n 1934 , W i n f i e l d s t a t e d t h a t the transformation 
took p l a c e through the a c t i o n on the case but t h a t the 
exact moment could not be i d e n t i f i e d . With regard to 
cases i n v o l v i n g p u b l i c c a l l i n g s or bailment there was no 
need f o r lawyers to develop any ideas f o r formulating a 
new head of t o r t i o u s l i a b i l i t y as the a c t i o n on the case 
did t h a t quite s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . But W i n f i e l d f i x e s upon 
1837 as a l i k e l y date a t which the notion of negligence as 
an independent t o r t based upon a duty of care begins to 
78 
emerge. He c i t e s Vaugh&m v EJemlowe and Langridge w 
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L e v f o P a r a d o x i c a l l y Lamgridge v Isevy i s not a case on 
negligence but i t i s important because of the r e l i a n c e 
placed upon duty by counsel f o r the p l a i n t i f f . I n support 
of h i s argument i n t h i s case counsel f o r the p l a i n t i f f 
made re f e r e n c e to old cases d e a l i n g with c a l l i n g s and 
bailment. As the i s s u e of duty was hard l y even expressed 
i n such cases counsel was developing a novel notion. I n 
add i t i o n a broad p r i n c i p l e of duty was contended f o r which 
the court could not accept. 
W i n f i e l d next i d e n t i f i e s a case of 1842 which 
although i t caused problems i n the development of 
negligence did h i g h l i g h t the requirement of duty so 
important i n the modern t o r t of negligence. 
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Winterbottom v Wright decided i n 1842 concerned an 
a c t i o n a g a i n s t the defendent who had supplied a t h i r d 
party, under a c o n t r a c t , with a d e f e c t i v e mail-coach. The 
a l l e g a t i o n was t h a t the p l a i n t i f f , the d r i v e r of the 
coach, w,as i n j u r e d because the defendant n e g l i g e n t l y acted 
i n d i s r e g a r d of h i s c o n t r a c t . As the d r i v e r was not a 
party to t h a t c o n t r a c t , i t was taken from then on t h a t 
even i f the a c t i o n had been brought f o r negligence without 
r e l i a n c e on a c o n t r a c t l a c k of p r i v i t y would nonetheless 
have defeated the p l a i n t i f f . W i n f i e l d b e l i e v e d t h a t t h i s 
case d i d good s e r v i c e to the development of the t o r t . The 
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argument was t h i s . The p l a i n t i f f sued because he was 
i n j u r e d and a l l e g e d l y a duty was owed to him by the 
defendant. That duty d i d not a r i s e from the c o n t r a c t 
because the p l a i n t i f f was not a party to i t . As the 
p l a i n t i f f had not shown t h a t i t had a r i s e n from any other 
source i e . p u b l i c c a l l i n g , the defendant was not l i a b l e . 
To W i n f i e l d i t follows t h a t i f the p l a i n t i f f could have 
proved a l e g a l duty to take care (as i n p u b l i c c a l l i n g 
types of c a s e s ) the defendant would have been l i a b l e . 
Thus/ there i s an emphasis upon the need to e s t a b l i s h a 
duty of c a r e . Unfortunately, "the hypnosis of ' p r i v i t y of 
c o n t r a c t ' was so strong upon the Court of Exchequer i n 
^interbottom v b r i g h t t h a t they f a i l e d to see t h a t i n the 
t o r t of negligence the defendant's l i a b i l i t y ought to be 
determined without paying any regard to the e x i s t e n c e of a 
8 1 
c o n t r a c t between the defendant and a t h i r d p a rty 
The adverse e f f e c t t h a t t h i s case had on the development 
of the t o r t of negligence i s demonstrated by the l a p s e of 
ninety years before the House of Lords destroyed t h i s 
p r i v i t y f a l l a c y i n 1 9 3 2 . 
During the f i r s t h a l f of the nineteenth century i t 
was important to bear i n mind t h a t no d i s t i n c t i o n was 
drawn as to c o n t r a c t or t o r t . Many cases of negligence 
were based upon the undertaking inherent i n assumpsit. To 
t h i s extent Winterbotton v Wright i s c o n s i s t e n t with t h i s 
absence of d i s t i n c t i o n . From 1 8 4 2 up to 1 8 8 3 t h e r e was 
l i t t l e development of the notion of t o r t i o u s duty. 
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Heaven v Pender i n 1883 i s regarded as having 
e s t a b l i s h e d t h i s notion. Although i t was a c o n t r a c t / t o r t 
case the absence of a co n t r a c t between the p l a i n t i f f and 
the defendant was no bar to the p l a i n t i f f ' s s u ccess i n the 
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a c t i o n . W i n f i e l d c i t e s Lord Esher M Rs-
"The a c t i o n i s i n form and substance an a c t i o n f o r 
negligence. That the stage was, through want of 
a t t e n t i o n of the defendant's s e r v a n t s , s u p p l i e d i n a 
s t a t e u n f i t f o r use i s not denied. But want of 
a t t e n t i o n amounting to a want of ordinary c a r e i s not 
a good cause of a c t i o n , although i n j u r y ensued from 
such want, u n l e s s the person charged with such want 
of o rdinary care had a duty to the person complaining 
to use ordinary c a r e i n re s p e c t of the matter c a l l e d 
i n question. Actionable negligence c o n s i s t s i n the 
negl e c t of the use of ordinary c a r e or s k i l l towards 
a person to whom the defendant g owes the duty of observing o r d i n a r y c a r e and s k i l l by which n e g l e c t 
the p l a i n t i f f , without c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence on h i s 
p a r t , s u f f e r e d i n j u r y to h i s person or property" 
The point has now been reached a t which the requirement of 
duty was s e t i n the law of negligence. From t h i s moment 
the n e c e s s i t y of duty i n negligence was accepted and 
f u r t h e r development was concerned with the r e c o g n i t i o n of 
the e x i s t e n c e of a duty s i t u a t i o n as i n Donoghue v 
84 85 Stevenson Home O f f i c e v Dorset Yacht Co L t d and Anns v 
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Merton London Borough Council. The cou r t s have a l s o 
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concerned themselves with the scope of such a duty. And 
at the root of t h i s determination of duty was j u d i c i a l 
p o l i c y which i s i t s e l f a product of the j u d i c i a l w i l l to 
grasp the n e t t l e and decide on whom the l o s s should f a l l . 
Although the 20th century has seen the c l e a r development 
of negligence as an independent t o r t i t i s a l s o c l e a r l y 
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e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t the p l a i n t i f f may have the choice of 
suing i n c o n t r a c t or t o r t where p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence i s 
i n i s s u e . Perhaps the l a s t b a s t i o n f o r suing i n c o n t r a c t 
only was the law r e l a t i n g to s o l i c i t o r s ' negligence. 
Today, even i n cases a g a i n s t s o l i c i t o r s the p l a i n t i f f has 
the choice. 
I n conclusion, i t might be s a i d t h a t the h i s t o r i c a l 
foundations have been l a i d f o r c o n s i d e r i n g l i a b i l i t y f o r 
p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence whether the a c t i o n be based on 
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breach of c o n t r a c t or on t o r t . 
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Chapter 2 
The Mature of P r o f e s s i o n s 
A o I n t r o d u c t i o n 
A p r o f e s s i o n a l person and a c l i e n t may enter i n t o a 
r e l a t i o n s h i p i n which a duty to take care i s imposed upon 
the p r o f e s s i o n a l . This duty may a r i s e by v i r t u e of an 
agreement between them or by operation of law. E i t h e r way 
a f a i l u r e to take care may r e s u l t i n an a c t i o n f o r 
negligence being i n s t i t u t e d by t h a t c l i e n t a g a i n s t the 
p r o f e s s i o n a l . 
The l e g a l meaning of "negligence" i n c a s e s not 
i n v o l v i n g s p e c i a l s k i l l i s f a i l i n g to a c t as a reasonable 
man would a c t i n the circumstances or a c t i n g as a 
reasonable man i n the circumstances would not do. T h i s i s 
g e n e r a l l y judged by the h y p o t h e t i c a l standard of the man 
i n the street.''' Where the defendant i s not an o r d i n a r y man 
but one possessed of some s p e c i a l s k i l l , then the t e s t i s 
'the standard of the ordinary s k i l l e d man e x e r c i s i n g and 
2 
p r o f e s s i n g to have t h a t s p e c i a l s k i l l . ' The duty f o r the 
p r o f e s s i o n a l and others i s the same i n t h a t reasonable 
care i s required, but i n the case of the s k i l l e d person 
s p e c i a l steps may have to be taken to e s t a b l i s h t h a t 
reasonable care was used. 
E x c e p t i o n a l l y , the e x i s t e n c e of a c o n t r a c t may imply 
a warranty imposing a more onerous standard to discharge 
the duty. And i n c e r t a i n unusual circumstances the terms 
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of the c o n t r a c t are t h a t not only reasonable c a r e be 
e x e r c i s e d but a l s o be t h a t a d e s i r e d r e s u l t must be 
.achieved,, T h i s i s the e f f e c t of Greaves and CO 
3 
( C o n t r a c t o r s ) L t d v Baymhain Meikle and P a r t n e r s on i t s 
s p e c i a l f a c t s . There i s no general p r i n c i p l e t h a t every 
p r o f e s s i o n a l w i l l warrant the s u c c e s s f u l outcome of h i s 
work. Thus, the doctor does not warrant t h a t he w i l l cure 
h i s p a t i e n t nor the lawyer t h a t he w i l l win h i s c a s e . The 
only term implied i n the usual case i s the e x e r c i s e of 
4 
reasonable c a r e i n the discharge of d u t i e s . 
Recent cases have e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t concurrent 
l i a b i l i t y i n c o n t r a c t and t o r t i s p o s s i b l e , except f o r the 
immunity of a s o l i c i t o r or a b a r r i s t e r i n the course of 
5 
l i t i g a t i o n i n c o u r t . T h i s immunity p e r t a i n i n g to 
l i t i g a t i o n i s r e s t r i c t e d but observations of judges have 
shown t h a t immunity i s not l i m i t e d to what happened i n 
court but should include 'some things which occurred a t an 
e a r l i e r stage broadly c l a s s i f i e d as r e l a t e d to conduct and 
g 
management of l i t i g a t i o n * . Such p r o t e c t i o n should be 
o f f e r e d to p r e - t r i a l work, as w e l l as t h a t done i n c o u r t , 
provided the p a r t i c u l a r work was 'so i n t i m a t e l y connected 
with the conduct of the cause i n court t h a t i t can be 
f a i r l y be a p r e l i m i n a r y d e c i s i o n a f f e c t i n g the way t h a t 
7 
cause i s to be conducted when i t comes to a hearing'. 
However, i t must be emphasised t h a t i n p r i n c i p l e , the 
general requirement of reasonable care and s k i l l a p p l i e s 
to those who give s k i l l e d advice. The immunity regarding 
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l i t i g a t i o n i s an exception a p p l i c a b l e only i n the a r e a 
o u t l i n e d above. 
Notwithstanding the development of the above 
immunity, c l i e n t s w i l l u s u a l l y have the choice of suing i n 
c o n t r a c t or t o r t whenever a person engaging i n h i s 
p r o f e s s i o n undertakes to perform a s e r v i c e f o r a c l i e n t 
where t h a t c l i e n t i s r e l y i n g on t h a t s e r v i c e . Although 
the p r o f e s s i o n a l / c l i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p w i l l u s u a l l y be 
covered by a c o n t r a c t , a duty of care i n t o r t w i l l be 
o 
c r e a t e d by the r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
B o The Problems of d e f i n i n g a "Profession" 
Statements of the above kind concerning the l i a b i l i t y 
of p r o f e s s i o n a l persons beg the questions 'What i s a 
p r o f e s s i o n ? ' They a l s o leave open the i s s u e s 'Does the 
nature of a p r o f e s s i o n have any bearing upon the l i a b i l i t y 
of those members p r a c t i s i n g w i t h i n i t ? ' 
I t cannot be s a i d with c e r t a i n t y what a p r o f e s s i o n 
i s . Any attempt at a d e f i n i t i o n of a p r o f e s s i o n i s not 
p r i m a r i l y the work of lawyers, but judges have on o c c a s i o n 
ventured, a l b e i t r e l u c t a n t l y , to provide one. 
g 
Scrutton L J asked 'The next question i s what i s a 
"profession"?' He continued ' I am very r e l u c t a n t f i n a l l y 
to propound a comprehensive d e f i n i t i o n . A s e t of f a c t s 
not present to the mind of the j u d i c i a l propounder, and 
not r a i s e d i n the case before him, may immediately a r i s e 
to confound h i s p r o p o s i t i o n . But i t seems to me as a t 
present advised t h a t a "profession" i n the present use of 
50 
language involves the idea of an occupation r e q u i r i n g 
e i t h e r purely i n t e l l e c t u a l s k i l l , or of manual s k i l l 
c o n t r o l l e d , as i n p a i n t i n g and s c u l p t u r e , or surgery, by 
the i n t e l l e c t u a l s k i l l of the operator, as d i s t i n g u i s h e d 
from an occupation which i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y the production 
or s a l e or arrangements fo r the production or s a l e of 
commodities. The l i n e of demarcation may vary from time 
to time. The word "profession" used to be confined to the 
three learned p r o f e s s i o n s , the Church Medicine and Law. 
I t has now, I think a wider meaning'. 
A s i m i l a r d i f f i c u l t y was encountered by Du Parcq L J i n 
C a r r v I n l a n d Revenue Commissioners*^s 
1 I t appears to me to be dangerous to t r y to d e f i n e 
the word "profession" as Scrutton L J r e a l i s e d ..... 
I think t h a t everybody would agree t h a t , before one 
can say t h a t a man i s c a r r y i n g on a p r o f e s s i o n , one 
must see t h a t he has some s p e c i a l s k i l l or a b i l i t y or 
some s p e c i a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s d e rived from t r a i n i n g or 
experience. Even then one has to be very c a r e f u l , 
because there are many people whose work demands 
great s k i l l and a b i l i t y and long experience and many 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s who would not be s a i d by anyone to be 
c a r r y i n g on a p r o f e s s i o n . 
U l t i m a t e l y one has to ask t h i s questions Would 
the ordinary man, the ordinary reasonable man ..... 
say now, i n the time which we l i v e , of any p a r t i c u l a r 
occupation, t h a t i t i s properly d e s c r i b e d as a 
p r o f e s s i o n ? Times have changed. There are 
p r o f e s s i o n s today which nobody would have considered 
to be p r o f e s s i o n s i n times pas t . Our f o r e f a t h e r s 
r e s t r i c t e d the p r o f e s s i o n s to a very small number? 
the work of the surgeon used to be c a r r i e d on by a 
barber whom nobody would have considered a 
p r o f e s s i o n a l man. The p r o f e s s i o n of the c h a r t e r e d 
accountant has grown up i n comparatively r e c e n t 
times, and other t r a d e s , or vocations ...... may i n 
future years acquire the s t a t u s of p r o f e s s i o n s . ' 
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As the j u d i c i a r y have i n d i c a t e d (supra) i t i s 
d i f f i c u l t to formulate a s a t i s f a c t o r y d e f i n i t i o n of a 
pr o f e s s i o n . Some observers would deny i t s 
11 12 p o s s i b i l i t y . However d e f i n i t i o n s have been attempted 
and i t may be p o s s i b l e to e x t r a c t the common f e a t u r e s of 
these d e f i n i t i o n s to produce a working model f o r the 
purpose of co n s i d e r i n g l e g a l l i a b i l i t y . 
I n an attempt to draw out the s a l i e n t f e a t u r e s of a 
13 
p r o f e s s i o n A.V.Dicey produced a d e f i n i t i o n i n 1867 which 
i s l e s s than s a t i s f a c t o r y but nontheless draws a 
d i s t i n c t i o n between p r o f e s s i o n s and t r a d e s . Many 
pro f e s s i o n s are s e n s i t i v e on t h i s i s s u e , p a r t i c u l a r l y i t 
seems, the o p t i c i a n s . " ^ One a t t r i b u t e of a p r o f e s s i o n a l 
i t i s sometimes s a i d i s th a t a p r o f e s s i o n a l s u p p l i e s 
s e r v i c e s but does not s e l l goods. B o r r i e doubts t h i s as a 
r e a l a t t r i b u t e and asks 'Would anyone say t h a t a doctor 
was any l e s s a p r o f e s s i o n a l man i f he happened to s e l l the 
drugs he p r e s c r i b e s ? And i s an opthalmic o p t i c i a n to be 
denied p r o f e s s i o n a l s t a t u s because he does s e l l 
s p e c t a c l e s ? ' ^ One might a l s o ask whether a d e n t i s t 
continues to be a p r o f e s s i o n a l i f he s e l l s dentures or a 
toothbrush. B o r r i e suggests t h a t 'perhaps i t i s a matter 
of degree and, as long as the a c t i v i t y of s e l l i n g i s 
i n c i d e n t a l to the e x e r c i s e of p r o f e s s i o n a l s k i l l s , I t h i n k 
we are s t i l l i n the realm of p r o f e s s i o n a l p r a c t i c e r a t h e r 
than commerce.'^ A s i m i l a r view appears to p r e v a i l 
regarding a d v e r t i s i n g , perhaps because a d v e r t i s i n g and 
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s e l l i n g are a s s o c i a t e d with commerce. The o p t i c i a n s i n 
p a r t i c u l a r , f e e l i n s e c u r e about t h e i r p r o f e s s i o n a l s t a t u s 
f o r which they struggled over a long period. To maintain 
t h e i r s t a t u s they oppose a d v e r t i s i n g and model themselves 
on medical p r a c t i t i o n e r s . 
However, not a l l p r o f e s s i o n a l groups f e e l t h i s 
s t r o n g l y over the s u b j e c t of involvement i n trade. T h i s 
can be i l l u s t r a t e d with the contingency fee f o r l e g a l 
s e r v i c e s , the a t t i t u d e to which d i f f e r s between England 
and America. The reason f o r t h i s d i f f e r e n t approach to 
contingency fees i n England and America appears to be 
h i s t o r i c a l . I n England, l i t i g a t i o n was and i s seen as 
s o c i a l l y d i s r u p t i v e , and to be discouraged, whereas i n 
America i t i s seen as a s o c i a l l y u s e f u l way of s e t t l i n g 
disputes and to be encouraged. The use of l i t i g a t i o n i n 
the middle ages i n England i n order to challenge a u t h o r i t y 
l e d to the development of the crimes of maintenance and 
champerty. Fleming r e f e r s to an 'aggravated form of 
17 
maintenance, known as champerty, [which] c o n s i s t s i n 
u n l a w f u l l y maintaining a s u i t i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a 
bargain to r e c e i v e by way of reward, p a r t of anything t h a t 
may be gained as a r e s u l t of the proceedings, or some 
other p r o f i t . . . Hence, s o l i c i t o r s , though i n other 
r e s p e c t s f r e e to make any arrangements they l i k e w i th 
t h e i r c l i e n t s regarding c o s t s , may not s t i p u l a t e f o r 
remuneration proportioned to the amount recovered i n the 
a c t i o n , l i k e the customary "contingency" fee of American 
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p l a i n t i f f s ' attorneys i n t o r t a c t i o n s ' . A contingency 
fee has been defined as '... a fee r e c e i v e d f o r s e r v i c e s 
performed on behalf of a c l i e n t who i s a s s e r t i n g a c l a i m , 
payable to the lawyer i f , and only i f , some recovery i s 
19 
achieved through the lawyer's e f f o r t s . ' I n most 
c o u n t r i e s i n c l u d i n g England, such agreements f o r payment 
20 21 are banned and Zander points out t h a t the only common 
law country where they are used i s the United S t a t e s of 
22 
America; I t i s the dominant system i n America but i s not 
allowed there i n r e l a t i o n to divorce and c r i m i n a l 
23 
l i t i g a t i o n . 
The r e a l f e a r i n England regarding contingency fees 
r e l a t e s to contentious b u s i n e s s . Zander s t a t e s t h a t 
'contingency arrangements are i n r e a l i t y not unknown even 
i n England. Many s o l i c i t o r s w i l l accept i n s t r u c t i o n s on a 
contingency b a s i s to process claims up to the point a t 
which proceedings have become necessary... Moreover, t h e r e 
i s f requently a small contingent element i n any fee f i x e d 
a f t e r the event to the extent t h a t a lawyer w i l l normally 
24 
charge a l i t t l e more i f he wins than i f he l o s e s . But 
t h i s d i f f e r e n c e i n a t t i t u d e may be explained more r e a d i l y 
be r e f e r e n c e to the d i f f e r i n g a t t i t u d e s to the nature of a 
p r o f e s s i o n . Contingent fees have been a s s o c i a t e d with 
s p e c u l a t i o n and t h e r e f o r e a means of doing business or 
engaging i n trade and as such beneath the d i g n i t y of the 
p r o f e s s i o n a l man. As a r e s u l t the E n g l i s h l e g a l 
25 
p r o f e s s i o n disapproves of them. That there i s an 
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a t t i t u d i n a l d i f f e r e n c e i s supported by c o n s i d e r i n g the 
American l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n . Although the American 
p r o f e s s i o n i s based upon the E n g l i s h system there was a 
strong a n t i - p r o f e s s i o n a l a t t i t u d e i n the nineteenth 
century which 'brought about a condemnation of t r a d i t i o n a l 
p r o f e s s i o n a l groups as a r i s t o c r a t i c and anti-democratic. 
T h e i r e x c l u s i v e p r i v i l e g e s and d i s t i n c t i v e standards were 
looked upon with s u s p i c i o n . Organization of the l e g a l 
p r o f e s s i o n weakened and p r a c t i c a l l y disappeared i n many 
pa r t s of the country... As the counterpart to the 
animosity towards an organised p r o f e s s i o n a l body, the id e a 
spread t h a t p r a c t i s i n g law, l i k e other occupations, was 
e s s e n t i a l l y a means of earning a l i v i n g , so t h a t i t was 
sometimes argued t h a t the economic r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
lawyer and c l i e n t s should be governed by the same 
p r i n c i p l e s which e s t a b l i s h the p r i c e of goods and s e r v i c e s 
g e n e r a l l y i n a l a i s s e z f a i r e economy... The r e j e c t i o n of 
the contingent fee as "speculation" by lawyers i n other 
c o u n t r i e s may r e f l e c t t h i s a v e r s i o n to the supposed 
imm o r a l i t i e s of commercial l i f e as much as i t does a 
b e l i e f t h a t the contingent fee w i l l b r i n g harmful e f f e c t s 
upon today's lawyers, c l i e n t s and c o u r t s . The E n g l i s h 
Bar, f o r example, s t i l l r e t a i n s the r u l e t h a t being " i n 
trade" i s i n c o n s i s t e n t with membership i n 'the 
2 6 
p r o f e s s i o n . ' Writing i n 1978 White considered the 
E n g l i s h a t t i t u d e to be u n r e a l . There are commercial 
aspects of l e g a l p r a c t i c e and 'no longer can i t be 
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pretended t h a t fees are a mere honoraria f o r a s e r v i c e to 
j u s t i c e . Lawyers are i n business and run t h e i r p r a c t i c e s 
i n the main as b u s i n e s s e s . Furthermore the value of the 
subject-matter of a lawyer's work i s always r e l e v a n t to 
the fees charged, even though the normal b a s i s of charging 
27 
i s for the work done. Despite the open connection with 
'trade' there i s no doubt t h a t the American bar i s a 
2 8 
p r o f e s s i o n , probably recognisable as such by any 
c r i t e r i a used to recognise an occupation as a p r o f e s s i o n 
i n England. At the moment the B r i t i s h Government has 
published a Green Paper on Contingency Fees. Whether or 
not a system of contingency fees or something approaching 
such a system i s implemented there i s no doubt t h a t a 
change i s favoured by some. Perhaps the E n g l i s h 
p r o f e s s i o n i s becoming more Americanised. I n any event 
the l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n i n England w i l l s u r v i v e as a 
recognisable p r o f e s s i o n . 
Thus, i t would seem t h a t whereas the occupations of 
law and medicine, for example, are recognised and accepted 
as having p r o f e s s i o n a l s t a t u s , the p o s i t i o n regarding 
other occupations may not always be c l e a r - c u t . The ranks 
of the p r o f e s s i o n s are not c l o s e d . Those who have 
attempted to define a 'profession' have i n d i c a t e d the 
29 
dynamic q u a l i t y . And some occupations are now accepted 
as p r o f e s s i o n s when r e l a t i v e l y r e c e n t l y they were not so 
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regarded. Many occupational groups a s p i r e to 
p r o f e s s i o n a l s t a t u s . The d e s i r e to do so appears to 
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puzzle the e s t a b l i s h e d p r o f e s s i o n s , although why i s not 
immediately apparent. The commonly recognised 
consequences of high rewards and p r e s t i g e , f o r example, 
might seem good enough reason. 
Bearing i n mind the dynamic q u a l i t y of the process of 
p r o f e s s i o n a l i z a t i o n , there has to be some means of 
r e c o g n i s i n g when t h i s s t a t u s has been a t t a i n e d . As 
occupations evolve i n t o the ' p r o f e s s i o n a l ' category the 
q u a l i t i e s of p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m have to be i n e x i s t e n c e 
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before the a s s o c i a t e d p r i v i l e g e s are granted. The 
q u a l i t i e s or t r a i t s of p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m w i l l be considered 
below. However, the q u a l i t i e s which maintain the s t a t u s 
need not n e c e s s a r i l y be the same as those from which the 
s t a t u s can be assumed. Even i f the q u a l i t i e s appear to be 
the same, i t may be t h a t they do not n e c e s s a r i l y have the 
same importance. Be t h a t as i t may, the problem of 
determining the attainment of p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m i s a 
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d i f f i c u l t one. But i t i s a problem to be faced. Western 
s o c i e t y i s an i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y . Goode a s s e r t s t h a t an 
' i n d u s t r i a l i s i n g s o c i e t y i s a p r o f e s s i o n a l i z i n g 
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s o c i e t y ' . S i r Gordon B o r r i e recognises t h a t the process 
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s t i l l goes on. I n terms of American s o c i e t y , Goode 
i d e n t i f i e s i t through the i n d i c e s of the growth of white 
c o l l a r occupations and 'the i n c r e a s e i n the number of 
occupations t r y i n g to acquire the symbols of p r o f e s s i o n a l 
s t a t u s , f o llowing a program of a c t i o n spearheaded by t h e i r 
formal a s s o c i a t i o n s , which might lead to r e c o g n i t i o n as 
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p r o f e s s i o n s ' . Goode's 'encroachment' notion r e f e r s to 
the process whereby one body claims competence to s o l v e a 
problem formerly solved by another group. An occupation 
has to engage i n a s t r u g g l e f o r p r o f e s s i o n a l s t a t u s . 
Whatever t r a i t s are d i s c e r n i b l e f o r the r e c o g n i t i o n 
of a p r o f e s s i o n , Goode i d e n t i f i e s as an important p a r t of 
the process by which an occupation becomes a p r o f e s s i o n 
'the gradual i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of v a r i o u s r o l e 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s between i t s e l f and other p a r t s of the 
s o c i e t y . These c l i e n t s or agencies, or the s o c i e t y 
g e n e r a l l y , w i l l concede autonomy to the p r o f e s s i o n only i f 
i t s members are able and w i l l i n g to p o l i c e themselves} 
w i l l grant higher fees or p r e s t i g e only when both i t s 
competence and i t s area of competence seem to merit themi 
or w i l l grant an e f f e c t i v e monopoly to the p r o f e s s i o n 
through l i c e n s u r e boards only when i t has p e r s u a s i v e l y 
shown t h a t i t i s the s o l e master of i t s s p e c i a l c r a f t , and 
t h a t i t s d e c i s i o n s are not to be reviewed by other 
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p r o f e s s i o n s ' . S i r Gordon B o r r i e a l s o a t t a c h e s 
s i g n i f i c a n c e to o r g a n i z a t i o n as d i d Scrutton L . J . i n 
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C u r r i e v I n l a n d Revenue Commissioners <> What i s a l s o 
apparent from Goode 1s a n a l y s i s of the process i s i t s two 
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way nature. The occupational groups perception of 
i t s e l f needs to be matched by t h a t of the s o c i e t y w i t h i n 
which i t operates. As B o r r i e observes 'A p a r t i c u l a r 
occupational group's s u b j e c t i v e view of i t s e l f can h a r d l y 
be s u f f i c i e n t . . . no group can a c t u a l l y become a p r o f e s s i o n 
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j u s t because i t f a n c i e s the idea. There must be some 
p u b l i c r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t the occupation has p r o f e s s i o n a l 
s t a t u s . . . . . . 1 A d i f f i c u l t y f o r the p u b l i c or a member of 
the p u b l i c i s t h a t the q u a l i t y of p r o f e s s i o n a l s e r v i c e 
cannot be adequately evaluated by the layman, although h i s 
perception of the u t i l i t y i s important. I n the absence of 
knowledge on the par t of t h e i r c l i e n t s , the p r o f e s s i o n s 
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r e l y on t h e i r c l i e n t s f a i t h . Goode gives c h i r o p r a c t c y as 
an example of an occupation's e v o l u t i o n i n t o a p r o f e s s i o n 
through c l i e n t ' s f a i t h . He evidences t h i s by the 
i n a b i l i t y of c h i r o p r a c t c y 'to demonstrate, by or d i n a r y 
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canons of s c i e n c e , i t s c u r a t i v e powers....' Although 
Goode gave t h i s as an American example, the B r i t i s h 
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experience of a l t e r n a t i v e medicine i s s i m i l a r . The 
medical p r o f e s s i o n appears to r e s i s t the growth of such 
p r a c t i c e s but i t a l s o seems t h a t no p r o f e s s i o n has ever 
been d i s p l a c e d by another by having i t s clai m s to 
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t e c h n i c a l e f f e c t i v e n e s s r e f u t e d by e m p i r i c a l t e s t . Thus, 
although the advantages enjoyed by p r o f e s s i o n s r e s t upon 
the inadequate e v a l u a t i o n by members of s o c i e t y (a 
nebulous body), these advantages are not i n the g i f t of 
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the occupational group. 
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According to Cogan, the h i s t o r y of the modern 
pr o f e s s i o n can be t r a c e d to eleventh century Europe when 
the occupations which were u l t i m a t e l y to develop i n t o 
p r o f e s s i o n s began to organise i n t o a s s o c i a t i o n s . I n 
England, the u n i v e r s i t i e s came to be founded a f t e r the 59 
formation of e x c l u s i v e s o c i e t i e s by teachers and students 
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i n the t w e l f t h century and had the r u l e 'that no one was 
to p r a c t i s e h i s c r a f t without formal l i c e n s e ' . The 
u n i v e r s i t i e s l a t e r came under the c o n t r o l of the Church 
but other s e c u l a r s o c i e t i e s were being formed. I n the 
fourteenth century the surgeons organised themselves i n t o 
a g u i l d and the f i f t e e n t h century saw the Common lawyers 
s e p a r a t i n g from the Church. By the seventeenth century 
the u n i v e r s i t i e s had returned to a s e c u l a r foundation. 
D i c t i o n a r y d e f i n i t i o n s tend to apply the word 
'professions' s p e c i f i c a l l y to 'the three l e a r n e d 
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p r o f e s s i o n s of d i v i n i t y , law and medicine'. R e f e r r i n g to 
the Shorter Oxford E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y Cogan s t a t e s t h a t 
the ' e a r l i e s t recorded use of the word p r o f e s s i o n to mean 
a learned vocation was i n 1541, and as e a r l y as 1576 i t s 
meaning had already been g e n e r a l i s e d to i n d i c a t e "any 
c a l l i n g or occupation by which a person h a b i t u a l l y earns 
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h i s l i v i n g " . ' A p r o f e s s i o n i s concerned not merely with 
the possession and use of a s k i l l but with the requirement 
of an occupation or vocation? v i z , the means of earning a 
l i v i n g . Whilst there appears to be a f a i r measure of 
agreement on t h i s idea of vocation, there are s i g n i f i c a n t 
l e g a l i m p l i c a t i o n s i n the d i f f e r e n t d e f i n i t i o n s . For 
example, i n a d d i t i o n , there i s a notion t h a t a p r o f e s s i o n 
a p p l i e s i t s s k i l l f o r the s e r v i c e of o t h e r s . 'The notion 
of s e r v i c e of s k i l l e d s e r v i c e to the community i n ways 
more h i g h l y esteemed s o c i a l l y than the s k i l l s of t r a d e s 60 
and c r a f t s - i s i n s e p a r a b l e from a modern image of a 
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profession* . The assumption t h a t t h i s i s usually-
expressed w i t h i n some i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework,, and o f t e n 
under the auspices of some p r o f e s s i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n or 
a s s o c i a t i o n with a s u p e r v i s o r y and r e g u l a t o r y f u n c t i o n , 
must be almost as widespread. 
The formulation of d e f i n i t i o n s can serve a u s e f u l 
purpose as i t concentrates thought about p r o f e s s i o n s as a 
p a r t i c u l a r type of occupation. D e f i n i t i o n s p l a c e 
p r o f e s s i o n s i n t o a category and t h i s may be l a b e l l e d a 
51 
taxonomic approach This taxonomic approach r e s t s on the 
p r i n c i p l e t h a t p r o f e s s i o n s are d i f f e r e n t from other 
occupations because they possess unique c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
and have an important r o l e i n s o c i e t y . The approach can 
be d i v i d e d i n t o twos the t r a i t and f u n c t i o n a l i s t models. 
The former i s l e s s a b s t r a c t but tends to be a r b i t r a r y . 
According to Saks, the t r a i t form i s centred upon 'the 
formulation of a l i s t of a t t r i b u t e s which are not 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y r e l a t e d but which are held to r e p r e s e n t the 
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core f e a t u r e s of p r o f e s s i o n a l occupations'. The 
f u n c t i o n a l i s t model i s r e s t r i c t e d to elements ' f e l t t o be 
of f u n c t i o n a l relevance f o r e i t h e r the s o c i a l system as a 
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whole or the p r o f e s s i o n a l - c l i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p ' . 
Saks i t e m i s e s the most commonly mentioned f e a t u r e s of 
a p r o f e s s i o n i n the various t r a i t models ass 
a) high l e v e l s of s k i l l based on t h e o r e t i c a l 
knowledge, 
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b) a l t r u i s t i c s e r v i c e , 
c) adherence to a code of conduct maintaining 
i n t e g r i t y . 
The exponents of the f u n c t i o n a l i s t view seem to underpin 
the t r a i t model with the notion of some form of s o c i a l 
c o ntract? t h a t ' i n exchange f o r e t h i c a l and no n - e x p l o i t i v e 
c o n t r o l of hi g h l y e s o t e r i c and complex bodies of knowledge 
of great importance to s o c i e t y , p r o f e s s i o n s were s a i d to 
be granted a p r i v i l e g e d s o c i a l and economic p o s i t i o n which 
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i n c l u d e s the r i g h t to s e l f r e g u l a t i o n ' . 
Although there appears to be no reason why the 
taxonomic approach should be non-empirical i n method, t h i s 
appears to be the case. I t s use of a p r i o r i reasoning has 
r e s u l t e d i n strong c r i t i c i s m . The defe c t of the 
non-empirical approach, i t i s maintained, i s t h a t of 
tak i n g the a t t r i b u t e s of p r o f e s s i o n s on t r u s t , a c c e p t i n g 
the p r o f e s s i o n s ' own perception of t h e i r c h a r a c t e r and 
r o l e , and, as a r e s u l t , r e i n f o r c i n g the dominant p o s i t i o n 
of e s t a b l i s h e d p r o f e s s i o n s . There i s s i m i l a r i t y between 
the taxonomic conceptions of p r o f e s s i o n s and the preambles 
to, and contents of, p r o f e s s i o n a l codes. 
However, d e s p i t e c r i t i c i s m , the taxonomic approach 
continues to be used. Other c r i t i c i s m has been l e v e l l e d 
a t the f a i l u r e to provide a proper b a s i s f o r understanding 
the nature and r o l e of p r o f e s s i o n s i n s o c i e t y . There 
emerged a r e f u s a l to accept a t face value the p r o f e s s i o n s ' 
own image, 'profession' being seen as not 'so much a 
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55 d e s c r i p t i v e term as one of value and p r e s t i g e 1 . 
S i m i l a r l y Becker spurned d e f i n i t i o n s of p r o f e s s i o n s 
containing suppositions about t h e i r d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g 
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i n t r i n s i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 'and suggested t h a t the term 
"profession" was not a n e u t r a l and s c i e n t i f i c concept but 
"a f o l k concept, a p a r t of the apparatus of the s o c i e t y we 
study, to be s t u d i e d by noting how i t i s to be used and 
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the r o l e i t plays i n the operations of t h a t s o c i e t y " . ' 
Even the e m p i r i c a l approach has been c r i t i c i s e d f o r 
i t s s u p e r f i c i a l and narrow use of data. Although Hughes 
and Becker argued t h a t p r o f e s s i o n s were merely 
occupational groups who had been p o l i t i c a l l y s u c c e s s f u l i n 
a t t a i n i n g t h e i r p r i v i l e g e d s t a t u s , we are s t i l l l e f t i n 
the dark as to how t h i s s t a t u s i s l i k e l y to be achieved or 
5 8 
what p r i v i l e g e s were to be a t t a i n e d . 
The neo-Weberian approach i s one i n which p r o f e s s i o n s 
tend to be regarded as ' l e g a l l y p r i v i l e g e d groups which 
have managed to monopolise to a c o n s i d e r a b l e degree s o c i a l 
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and economic o p p o r t u n i t i e s . ' There are many views w i t h i n 
t h i s school of thought. Freidson, f o r example, c o n s i d e r s 
t h a t p r o f e s s i o n s are occupations enjoying autonomy i n the 
context of t h e i r work and i n p r o f e s s i o n a l judgment. He 
argues t h a t 'the most s t r a t e g i c d i s t i n c t i o n l i e s i n 
l e g i t i m a t e , organised autonomy - t h a t a p r o f e s s i o n i s 
d i s t i n c t from other occupations i n t h a t i t has been given 
the r i g h t to c o n t r o l i t s own work.'^^ 
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I n P r o f e s s i o n a l Dominance, Freidson observes t h a t 
'the economic and p o l i t i c a l autonomy of the medical 
p r o f e s s i o n v a r i e s from country to country. What seems 
i n v a r i a n t , however, i s i t s t e c h n o l o g i c a l or s c i e n t i f i c 
autonomy, for everywhere the p r o f e s s i o n appears to be l e f t 
f a i r l y f r e e to develop i t s s p e c i a l area of knowledge and 
to determine what are " s c i e n t i f i c a l l y acceptable 
p r a c t i c e s " . . . Thus, while the p r o f e s s i o n may not 
everywhere be f r e e to c o n t r o l the terms of i t s work, i t i s 
f r e e to c o n t r o l the content of i t s work. S i m i l a r l y , i t i s 
f r e e to c o n t r o l the t e c h n i c a l i n s t r u c t i o n of i t s 
r e c r u i t s . ' ^ 
According to Freidson, t h i s autonomy i s the h a l l mark 
of a p r o f e s s i o n . For hims 'The c e n t r a l i s s u e i n the 
a n a l y s i s of work i s c o n t r o l of performance ........ 
p r o f e s s i o n s , u n l i k e other occupations, have s u c c e s s f u l l y 
gained freedom from c o n t r o l by o u t s i d e r s . Indeed, a 
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p r o f e s s i o n i s s a i d to c o n t r o l i t s own performance'. 
I f t h i s i s t r u e of p r o f e s s i o n s , i t does not answer 
the questions how f a r i s a p r o f e s s i o n s e l f - r e g u l a t i n g ? 
There are s e v e r a l i s s u e s which may throw l i g h t on the 
extent of autonomy and i n so doing r a i s e questions as to 
c o n s i s t e n c y with l e g a l s a n c t i o n s . Important areas of 
p r o f e s s i o n a l a c t i v i t y , p a r t i c u l a r l y with regard to the 
medical p r o f e s s i o n , but not e x c l u s i v e l y so, are resource 
a l l o c a t i o n , informed consent and c l i n i c a l freedom. 
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Co P r o f e s s i o n a l tatonoimy and Legal Sanctions 
When a p a t i e n t seeks medical advice, the d e c i s i o n as 
to the p a t i e n t ' s need for medical care i s made by a 
doctor. Many f a c t o r s are involved i n t h i s d e c i s i o n but a 
major f a c t o r i s t h a t of r e s o u r c e s . 'Whether p a t i e n t s are 
admitted to h o s p i t a l or seen as o u t - p a t i e n t s on a long 
term b a s i s w i l l depend not only on c l i n i c a l f a c t o r s but 
a l s o on the number of beds and out-patient s e s s i o n s 
a v a i l a b l e to a c o n s u l t a n t and the pressure on these 
f a c i l i t i e s . . . Every c o n s u l t a n t has a r i g h t to formulate 
h i s own concept of p a t i e n t need and thus to decide what 
resources are r e q u i r e d , i n h i s opinion, to c a r e f o r 
c o 
them. 1 However, i t must be recognised t h a t where t h e r e 
are c o n s t r a i n t s , 'consultants .... must decide what they 
are t r y i n g to do and what are the ways of doing i t which 
provide not only e f f e c t i v e c a r e f o r p a t i e n t s but a l s o an 
e f f i c i e n t use of r e s o u r c e s . ' 6 4 Thus, i t would seem t h a t 
w i t h i n the l i m i t s of p r o f e s s i o n a l work, the p r o f e s s i o n a l 
i s endowed with the a b i l i t y to make many v i t a l d e c i s i o n s . 
With regard to c l i n i c a l freedom, an e x p r e s s i o n 
a p p l i c a b l e to both treatment and informed consent, the 
p r o f e s s i o n a l j e a l o u s l y p r o t e c t s i t s e l f . The p r o f e s s i o n 
claims to regulate the work of i t s members. There i s a 
s i g n i f i c a n t degree of acceptance of such s e l f r e g u l a t i o n 
by the courts i n cases of p r o f e s s i o n a l malpractices t h a t 
the l e g a l standard of s k i l l to be observed i s t h a t of the 
reasonably competent person w i t h i n t h a t p r o f e s s i o n . To 
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t h i s end, recourse i s made to the testimony of expert 
witnesses, a l s o members of t h a t p r o f e s s i o n , with regard to 
which the court must, at l e a s t i n p a r t , i n e v i t a b l y base 
i t s c o nclusion. But no matter how much a p r o f e s s i o n may 
c l a i m to e x e r c i s e c o n t r o l over i t s members, the 
a u t h o r i t i e s show the courts w i l l have the f i n a l word. 
Expert testimony i s not c o n c l u s i v e . 
When co n s i d e r i n g autonomy as a hallmark of a 
p r o f e s s i o n i t i s important to see o r g a n i s a t i o n i n a 
supporting r o l e . Not only i s o r g a n i z a t i o n a f e a t u r e 
commonly r e l i e d upon as c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a p r o f e s s i o n but 
autonomy appears to be maintained through the 
o r g a n i s a t i o n a l framework. There i s l i t t l e disagreement 
t h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n i s an e s s e n t i a l requirement, and y e t 
d i s c u s s i o n of other c r i t e r i a , such as autonomy, e t h i c s and 
d i s c i p l i n e , do not appear to be r e a l i s t i c i n the absence 
of an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e . Those who have attempted 
to formulate d e f i n i t i o n s i n which o r g a n i z a t i o n i s an 
e s s e n t i a l element include Edward Gross, who r e f e r r e d to 
group i d e n t i t y as an e s s e n t i a l of p r o f e s s i o n a l i z a t i o n . ^ 
Lewis and Maude consider one of the a t t r i b u t e s of a group 
of persons ' p r o f e s s i o n a l i n c h a r a c t e r ' to be 'the 
o r g a n i s a t i o n of the P r o f e s s i o n a l Group, devoted to i t s 
common advancement and i t s s o c i a l duty r a t h e r than the 
maintenance of an economic monopoly.'^ The Law S o c i e t y 
considers a f u l l y developed p r o f e s s i o n to c o n s i s t of 'a 
body of men and women (a) i d e n t i f i a b l e by r e f e r e n c e to 
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some r e g i s t e r or record'. Harrington Kaye i n 1960 
defined p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m 'as the i n s t i t u t i o n of an 
o c c u p a t i o n . ' ^ On the other hand, M i l l e r s o n maintains t h a t 
'An occupation does not have to be organised to become a 
p r o f e s s i o n , An organised occupation i s not n e c e s s a r i l y a 
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p r o f e s s i o n . ' I t i s submitted t h a t the second sentence 
quoted from M i l l e r s o n i s c o r r e c t , as other e s s e n t i a l 
c r i t e r i a may be absent. However, the f i r s t sentence 
appears to be out of l i n e with most other opinions. 
F i n a l l y , B o r r i e a l s o regards o r g a n i z a t i o n as e s s e n t i a l . 
I n the Fourth Hampton Lecture i n 1983 he s t a t e d 'that i t 
i s e s s e n t i a l too t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l s concerned are backed 
by and d i s c i p l i n e d by a coherent p r o f e s s i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n 
and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . A p r o f e s s i o n must have an 
o r g a n i z a t i o n . ' ^ 
D. Two Systems of Control 
I P r o f e s s i o n a l I n s t i t u t i o n s 
Autonomy and power of s e l f r e g u l a t i o n may be taken as 
p r i n c i p a l t r a i t s of a f u l l y developed p r o f e s s i o n . For the 
purpose of t h i s t h e s i s a t t e n t i o n has been concentrated 
upon the l e g a l and the medical p r o f e s s i o n s . Both of these 
p r o f e s s i o n s are regarded as archetypal and demonstrate 
many of the i s s u e s a t stake i n a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of 
p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence. A simple account of these 
p r o f e s s i o n s f o l l o w s . 
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a) L e g a l Professlorn 
1. The Two Branches 
1.1 The Bar 
The Bar has a long h i s t o r y s t r e t c h i n g back i n t o the 
Middle Ages. For the purpose of t h i s t h e s i s the modern 
h i s t o r y w i l l s u f f i c e to give an i n d i c a t i o n of t h i s branch 
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of the l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n " I n 1852 the C o u n c i l of Legal 
education was s e t up. L a t e r , i n 1875, the Order of 
S e r j e a n t s was abolished. 1895 saw the General C o u n c i l of 
the Bar c r e a t e d . However i t s functions were not to 
' i n t e r f e r e with the property, j u r i s d i c t i o n , power or 
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p r i v i l e g e s of the I n n s 1 . D i s c i p l i n a r y powers over 
b a r r i s t e r s remained vested i n the Inns, but the r u l i n g s of 
the Bar Council on matters of e t i q u e t t e were i n p r a c t i c e 
accepted by the Bar as a whole. The Senate of the Four 
Inns of Court was s e t up by r e s o l u t i o n of the four Inns 
and the General Council of the Bar i n 1966. I n 1974 the 
Senate of the Inns of Court and the Bar took over the 
former Senate's function. This i s the p r i n c i p a l body 
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concerned with the p r o f e s s i o n of b a r r i s t e r . 
1.2 The Law S o c i e t y 
The branch of the l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n we now c a l l 
s o l i c i t o r s a l s o has a long h i s t o r y . O r i g i n a l l y members of 
t h i s p r o f e s s i o n were known by d i f f e r e n t names depending 
upon the business they conducted - s o l i c i t o r s , a t torneys 
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and p r o c t o r s ' The functions of s o l i c i t o r s , a t t o r n e y s 
and proctors were merged by the J u d i c a t u r e Act 1873. 68 
However p r i o r to t h i s time, i n 1831, a Royal C h a r t e r 
created^the Law S o c i e t y . I n 1845 another Charter defined 
the o b j e c t s of the S o c i e t y as 'promoting p r o f e s s i o n a l 
improvement and f a c i l i t a t i n g the a c q u i s i t i o n of l e g a l 
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knowledge.' 
2. Good P r a c t i c e 
Both branches of the l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n have developed 
r u l e s and g u i d e l i n e s as to p r o f e s s i o n a l standards and 
conduct of members. Not a l l would agree the standards 
l a i d down are adequate and i n 1989 the Lord C h a n c e l l o r 
published a Green Paper The Work and Organisation of the 
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L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n which gives an account of the present 
c o n d i t i o n , weaknesses and proposals f o r reform of the 
r e g u l a t i o n of the l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n . B r i e f l y , the c u r r e n t 
r e g u l a t i o n s are as fol l o w s . 
2.1 The Bar 
Standards of the Bar are provided i n a w r i t t e n Code 
of Conduct, a r e v i s e d v e r s i o n of which came i n t o f o r c e on 
February 1, 1989. The code s e t s out the general 
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p r i n c i p l e s applying to a l l b a r r i s t e r s . 
2.2 The Law S o c i e t y 
The Law So c i e t y publishes P r a c t i c e Rules, the c u r r e n t 
s e t dating from 1988. The r u l e s are not comprehensive, 
some matters of good p r a c t i c e being omitted. However, the 
Law S o c i e t y a l s o publishes a guide c a l l e d the 
69 
" P r o f e s s i o n a l Conduct of S o l i c i t o r s " to d e a l with the 
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matters of p r a c t i c e not covered by the P r a c t i c e Rules. 
3. Complaints and D i s c i p l i n e 
I t i s the duty of a p r o f e s s i o n a l body to maintain 
standards of competence and p r o f e s s i o n a l conduct. 
Connected with t h a t duty i s the need to e x e r c i s e 
d i s c i p l i n a r y powers to ensure as f a r as p o s s i b l e t h a t 
those standards are maintained and t h a t the p u b l i c who 
seek p r o f e s s i o n a l s e r v i c e s are protected. One of the 
prime functions of a p r o f e s s i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n i s the 
maintenance of standards by r e f e r e n c e to e t h i c a l codes and 
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d i s c i p l i n a r y powers. With t h a t aim i n mind there are i n 
e x i s t e n c e arrangements p e c u l i a r to the Bar and to the Law 
S o c i e t y f o r the purpose of maintaining standards. 
4. Present Arrangements f o r Maintenance of D i s c i p l i n e 
4.1 The Bar 
Although a b a r r i s t e r i s immune from a c t i o n s i n 
negligence i n r e s p e c t of the conduct or management of a 
case i n court there i s no immunity from a c t i o n s i n 
negligence i n other types of work. I n r e s p e c t of c l a i m s 
of negligence a p r a c t i s i n g b a r r i s t e r i s r e q u i r e d to have 
p r o f e s s i o n a l indemnity insurance of £250,000. 
Apart from l i a b i l i t y as above, a b a r r i s t e r i s a l s o 
s u b j e c t to p r o f e s s i o n a l d i s c i p l i n e i n r e s p e c t of conduct 
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of a case i n or out of work. The present machinery f o r 
d e a l i n g with complaints i s as f o l l o w s . 
F i r s t , the matter may be considered by the 
P r o f e s s i o n a l Conduct Comittee of the General C o u n c i l of 
the Bar (PCC) Conduct may be d e a l t with i n f o r m a l l y . 
However, there has been a proposal f o r a summary procedure 
which has been considered but not y e t introduced. Such a 
procedure would allow the PCC to deal with the matter 
f u r t h e r without r e f e r r i n g i t to the D i s c i p l i n a r y T r i b u n a l . 
The Summary Procedure would be u s e f u l where there was no 
r e l e v a n t dispute of f a c t . 
I f the case i s regarded as s e r i o u s or i f th e r e i s a 
r e l e v a n t dispute of f a c t the matter i s brought before a 
D i s c i p l i n a r y T r i b u n a l . The T r i b u n a l i s c h a i r e d by a Judge 
and has four other members i n c l u d i n g one l a y member. 
Appeal from the D i s c i p l i n a r y T r i b u n a l l i e s to no 
fewer than three Judges of the High Court nominated by the 
Lord Chief J u s t i c e a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n with the Lord 
Chancellor. The Judges are known as V i s i t o r s and th e r e i s 
81 
no f u r t h e r i n t e r n a l appeal from t h e i r d e c i s i o n . 
4.2 The Law S o c i e t y 
A l l p r a c t i s i n g s o l i c i t o r s are req u i r e d to take out 
p r o f e s s i o n a l indemnity insurance i n r e s p e c t of c i v i l 
l i a b i l i t y c l a i m s . The Law S o c i e t y a l s o a d m i n i s t e r s a 
compensation fund i n cases of dishonesty by s o l i c i t o r s 
82 
with regard to c l i e n t ' s money held by them. 
Complaints a g a i n s t s o l i c i t o r s may r e l a t e to conduct 
or inadequate p r o f e s s i o n a l work. Such complaints must be 
made to the S o l i c i t o r s ' Complaints Bureau where most w i l l 
be s e t t l e d . Other complaints w i l l be considered by the 
S o l i c i t o r s ' D i s c i p l i n a r y T r i b u n a l , the High Court or the 
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Lay Observer. 
4.2.1 S o l i c i t o r s 1 Complaints Brareaua 
Complaints are f i r s t d e a l t with by the s t a f f of the 
Bureau who prepare the cases f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n or inform 
the complainant there i s no i s s u e of conduct or poor work. 
The Bureau's handling of complaints i s monitored by the 
I n v e s t i g a t i o n Committee which has the functi o n p r i n c i p a l l y 
of reviewing cases coming before the Bureau. The 
I n v e s t i g a t i o n Committee c o n s i s t s of seven l a y members, one 
of whom i s Chairman, and four s o l i c i t o r s , two of whom are 
Law S o c i e t y Council members. 
The Law S o c i e t y ' s d i s c i p l i n a r y powers are e x e r c i s e d 
by the A d j u d i c a t i o n Committee. The Committee c o n s i s t s of 
nine Law Soc i e t y members, i n c l u d i n g the Chairman, t h r e e 
other s o l i c i t o r s and s i x l a y members. I t has many powers 
and i n p a r t i c u l a r may take d i s c i p l i n a r y proceedings 
a g a i n s t a s o l i c i t o r a t the S o l i c i t o r s ' D i s c i p l i n a r y 
T r i b u n a l and may d i s c i p l i n e s o l i c i t o r s f o r poor work. 
4.2.2 The S o l i c i t o r s ' D i s c i p l i n a r y T r i b u n a l was 
e s t a b l i s h e d by s t a t u t e and e x e r c i s e s the delegated power 
of the High Court. I t i s to t h i s T r i b u n a l t h a t the most 
s e r i o u s cases of p r o f e s s i o n a l misconduct are r e f e r r e d . 
The complaint may be r e f e r r e d by the S o l i c i t o r s ' 
Complaints Bureau, the High Court, a member of the p u b l i c , 
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or the Lay Observer. I t u s u a l l y has three members, a t 
l e a s t one of which i s l a y , appointed by the Master of the 
R o l l s . I t s powers are to s t r i k e o f f the r o l l , , suspend, 
f i n e or'reprimand. 
4.2.3 The High Court 
Appeal from the S o l i c i t o r s ' D i s c i p l i n a r y T r i b u n a l 
l i e s to the High Court. The High Court a l s o has a general 
s u p e r v i s o r y j u r i s d i c t i o n over the p r o f e s s i o n . 
4.2.4 The Lay Observer i s an independent o f f i c e - holder 
appointed by the Lord Chancellor. The S o l i c i t o r s Act 1974 
S 4 5 ( l ) empowers him to examine any w r i t t e n a l l e g a t i o n made 
by or on behalf of a member of the p u b l i c concerning the 
Law S o c i e t y ' s treatment of a complaint by a s o l i c i t o r or 
h i s employee. The Lay Observer i s empowered to re p o r t on 
treatment and make recommendations but has no power to 
i n v e s t i g a t e the complaints. I t i s i n r e s p e c t of 
complaints of both conduct and q u a l i t y of s e r v i c e s only 
t h a t the Lay Observer may make a p p l i c a t i o n to the 
S o l i c i t o r s ' D i s c i p l i n a r y T r i b u n a l i n r e s p e c t of the 
84 
q u a l i t y of s e r v i c e s " I t i s of i n t e r e s t t h a t i t was as a 
consequence of complaints about the Law S o c i e t y ' s handling 
of grievances t h a t the Lay Observer was s e t up i n 
accordance with the S o l i c i t o r s Act 1974. I t i s as a 
r e s u l t of the Lay Observer's observation t h a t the Law 
So c i e t y organised negligence panels to help those who 
wanted to b r i n g an a c t i o n a g a i n s t a s o l i c i t o r but could 
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not f i n d another s o l i c i t o r to accept the case. Even so, 
i t i s only the p e r s i s t e n t complainants who w i l l e v e n t u a l l y 
be informed of the e x i s t e n c e of the negligence panel. 
Q C 
T h e r e a f t e r , of course, the complainant i s on h i s own. 
b) Medical P r o f e s s i o n 
The B r i t i s h Medical A s s o c i a t i o n (BMA) was founded i n 
1856. The General Medical Council (GMC) was e s t a b l i s h e d 
under the Medical Act 1858 at the i n s t i g a t i o n of the 
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B r i t i s h Medical A s s o c i a t i o n . These two i n s t i t u t i o n s are 
separate and have separate functions. The B r i t i s h Medical 
A s s o c i a t i o n r e p resents the i n t e r e s t s of doctors. The 
General Medical Council has functions r e l a t e d to standards 
and d i s c i p l i n e although o r i g i n a l l y i t s purpose was to keep 
a r e g i s t e r of medical p r a c t i t i o n e r s . Standards are 
maintained by the General Medical Council through a number 
of committees, one of which i s c a l l e d the P r o f e s s i o n a l 
Conduct Committee. Under S36 Medical Act 1983 a doctor 
may be d i s c i p l i n e d or punished f o r 'serious p r o f e s s i o n a l 
misconduct' the concept of which has r e c e n t l y been 
broadened to i n c l u d e negligence or gross negligence. 
There i s an expectation t h a t 'a medical p r a c t i t i o n e r w i l l 
a f f o r d and maintain a good standard of medical c a r e . 1 The 
Council has moved away from i t s t r a d i t i o n a l r o l e w ith 
regard to moral turpitude i n t o the realm of p r o f e s s i o n a l 
negligence, an area once regarded s o l e l y as a matter f o r 
the c o u r t s . Wow the Council ' i s concerned with e r r o r s i n 
diagnosis or treatment, or with the kind of matters which 
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give r i s e to a c t i o n i n the c i v i l c o urts f o r negligence, 
only when the doctor' s. conduct i n the case involved such a 
d i s r e g a r d of h i s p r o f e s s i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to h i s 
p a t i e n t s or such a neglect of h i s p r o f e s s i o n a l d u t i e s as 
to r a i s e a question of s e r i o u s p r o f e s s i o n a l misconduct,' 
An a l l e g a t i o n of 'serious misconduct may a l s o i n c l u d e 
doctor's p e r s i s t i n g i n unsupervised p r a c t i c e of a branch 
of medicine i n which he does have the appropriate 
knowledge and s k i l l and has not acquired the experience 
which i s necessary.' Whether t h i s change i n the 
d e f i n i t i o n means t h a t there has been a b l u r r i n g of the 
t r a d i t i o n a l d i s t i n c t i o n between the functions of the GMC 
and the courts i s open to argument. The s a n c t i o n s 
a s s o c i a t e d with the functions of the Council and the 
courts remain d i f f e r e n t . I n the event of s e r i o u s 
p r o f e s s i o n a l misconduct being found the Council may e r a s e 
the p r a c t i t i o n e r ' s name from the r e g i s t e r , suspend f o r up 
to 12 months or impose conditions f o r the p r o t e c t i o n of 
the p u b l i c or i n the doctor's own i n t e r e s t s . There i s no 
p r o v i s i o n for the award of compensation. For compensation 
the p a t i e n t must b r i n g an a c t i o n i n r e s p e c t of an 
a l l e g a t i o n of negligence i n the c o u r t s . However, i t i s 
argued t h a t there i s pressure 'for a broader 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of c u l p a b i l i t y , without lowering the 
t h r e s h o l d of what has to be proved i n order to e s t a b l i s h 
the s e r i o u s medical misconduct. 1 There are i n d i c a t i o n s , 
t h a t more doctors are being d i s c i p l i n e d f o r s e r i o u s 
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p r o f e s s i o n a l misconduct. General advice and guidance i s 
88 
i n the Blue Book, as amended" The GMC a d j u d i c a t e s but 
the law i s a matter f o r the P r i v y C o u n c i l . As the matter 
of p r o f e s s i o n a l misconduct i s grave a high standard of 
proof i s c a l l e d f o r and a p r o f e s s i o n a l person w i l l not be 
89 
condemned on a mere balance of p r o b a b i l i t i e s . I n 
re s p e c t of negligence, t h e r e f o r e , an a l l e g a t i o n of which 
may be brought before the c o u r t s , i t may be p o s s i b l e to 
succeed i n a c i v i l c l a i m where a complaint of s e r i o u s 
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p r o f e s s i o n a l misconduct i s not upheld. 
I I The P r o f e s s i o n s and the Courts 
I t would appear t h a t the p r o f e s s i o n a l i s bound by two 
s e t s of norms i n the context of negligent m a l p r a c t i c e s 
the general law and the codes of conduct a p p l i c a b l e to h i s 
p r o f e s s i o n . The courts and the p r o f e s s i o n a l bodies each 
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have r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r d i s c i p l i n e . Goode r e l a t e d to 
t h i s dual c o n t r o l the propositions t h a t 'the p r a c t i t i o n e r 
i s r e l a t i v e l y f r e e of l a y e v a l u a t i o n and c o n t r o l ' and t h a t 
the norms of p r a c t i c e enforced by the p r o f e s s i o n are more 
s t r i n g e n t than l e g a l c o n t r o l s . ' I f by 'lay e v a l u a t i o n ' 
Goode inc l u d e s the c o u r t s , t h i s may be so, as the 
incidence of l e g a l a c t i o n s f o r p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence 
demonstrates. I t i s arguably t r u e i n f u n c t i o n a l as 
opposed to formal terms, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n cas e s of medical 
negligence. Even i n formal terms expert medical evidence 
i s of great importance. I f he means freedom from 
e v a l u a t i o n by other p r o f e s s i o n a l bodies t h i s i s probably 
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t r u e . I n any event, e v a l u a t i o n i s u s u a l l y a matter of 
d i f f i c u l t y f o r the c l i e n t . With regard to the s t r i n g e n c y 
of the norms involved i n p r o f e s s i o n a l c o n t r o l t h i s would 
not seem to be a w e l l founded p r o p o s i t i o n . The 
pr o f e s s i o n s appear to be l e s s capable of imposing r e a l 
s anctions upon t h e i r members. The Royal Commission on 
Legal S e r v i c e s reported t h a t 'A p r o f e s s i o n i s given a 
measure of s e l f r e g u l a t i o n so t h a t i t may r e q u i r e i t s 
members to observe higher standards than could be 
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s u c c e s s f u l l y imposed from without.' Linden c o n s i d e r s the 
pr o f e s s i o n s to be l e s s than zealous i n p o l i c i n g 
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themselves. I n the l i g h t of Sidaway v Bethlemt Royal 
94 95 H o s p i t a l Governors and Others some members of the 
j u d i c i a r y are able to contemplate the medical p r o f e s s i o n 
as being capable of developing unacceptable p r a c t i c e s from 
which the p u b l i c must be protected. And so the c o u r t s 
r e s e r v e the r i g h t to i n t e r f e r e with medical p r a c t i c e i n 
the i n t e r e s t of the p a t i e n t , although u s u a l l y the 
pr o f e s s i o n does s e t and adhere to the r e q u i s i t e standard 
of c a r e . I t must a l s o be considered whether the 
pr o f e s s i o n s give enough thought to the e s s e n t i a l i s s u e s of 
p r a c t i c e . I f Linden i s c o r r e c t and 'hardly ever does a 
doctor ... l o s e h i s l i c e n s e to p r a c t i c e medicine because 
of h i s incompetence or p r o f e s s i o n a l misconduct', then the 
medical p r o f e s s i o n seems to be more d i l i g e n t with regard 
to p e n a l i s i n g sexual misconduct with a p a t i e n t , f o r 
example, than with negligent treatment. Neither has the 
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Law S o c i e t y shown i t s e l f to be adequate i n matters of 
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c o n t r o l over p r o f e s s i o n a l misconduct. 
I t i s p o s s i b l e to t r a n s l a t e t h i s t r a i t r e l a t i n g to 
standards i n t o a l e g a l requirement. Commencing wi t h 
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Lanphier v PMpos i n 1838 every person who e n t e r s i n t o 
a learned p r o f e s s i o n undertakes to b r i n g to the e x e r c i s e 
of i t a reasonable degree of care and s k i l l . ' To some 
t h i s would be taken to mean the standard of the average 
p r a c t i t i o n e r w i t h i n t h a t p r o f e s s i o n . Furthermore, t h e r e 
are a l s o those who would r e l y upon the e x i s t e n c e of a 
common p r a c t i c e of the p r o f e s s i o n as i n d i c a t i n g adherence 
to the appropriate standard for the purpose of avoiding 
l e g a l l i a b i l i t y . To t h a t end the testimony of expert 
witnesses i s adduced but not c o n c l u s i v e l y . The judges 
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have not abdicated t h e i r duty to f i x standards. Having 
s a i d t h a t there i s a l i n e of cases supporting the 
p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t adherence to a common standard i s 
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c o n c l u s i v e disproof of negligence. 
The P r i v y Council i n Vancouver General H o s p i t a l v 
McDanlel i n 1934 1 0 0 affirmed t h a t 'A defendant charged 
with negligence can c l e a r h i s f e e t i f he shows t h a t he has 
acted i n accord with general and approved p r a c t i c e . ' T h i s 
dictum was approved by Maugham, L . J . i n Marshall v L i n d s e y 
County C o u n c i l 1 ^ 1 i n which he s t a t e d 'the defendant 
Council ... have acted i n accordance with the recognised 
p r a c t i c e and are t h e r e f o r e f r e e from l i a b i l i t y on the 
ground of negligence ... An a c t cannot, i n my opinion, be 78 
held to be due to a want of reasonable c a r e i f i t i s i n 
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accordance with the general p r a c t i c e of mankind. The 
dictum of Maugham, L . J . has been accepted by the House of 
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Lords i n MMteford v Hunter and, t h e r e f o r e , appears to 
represent the law i n England. The a u t h o r i t y of these 
cases i s evident when one considers the dictum of Denning, 
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L . J . i n Hatcher w Black t h a t the law concerns the 
doctor only 'when he f a l l s short of the accepted standard 
of a great p r o f e s s i o n . ' His Lordship added 'No one of the 
doctors t h a t have been c a l l e d before you has suggested 
t h a t Mr. Tuckwell d i d wrong. A l l agree t h a t i t was a 
matter f o r h i s own judgment. They d i d not condemn him? 
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nor should we.' I n 1953 i n Bolam w F r i e r n H o s p i t a l 
Management Committee the requirement was expressed as 'A 
p r o f e s s i o n a l man need not possess the highest expert 
s k i l l ; i t i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d law t h a t i t i s s u f f i c i e n t i f 
he e x e r c i s e s the ordinary s k i l l of an ordinary competent 
man e x e r c i s i n g t h a t p a r t i c u l a r a r t . ' 1 ^ I n Chapman v 
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R i x Romer, L . J . went so f a r as to s t a t e t h a t he knew 
of no case i n which a medical man had been found g u i l t y of 
negligence when eminent members of h i s own p r o f e s s i o n had 
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approved of what he had done. There i s t h e r e f o r e an 
emphasis placed upon expert testimony i n r e l a t i o n to 
p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence by t h i s l i n e of c a s e s . Uhitehouse 
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v Jordan supports the standard l a i d down i n Bolam. 
Lord F r a z e r of Tullybenton r e f e r r e d to the meaning of 
negligence as 'a f a i l u r e . . . to e x e r c i s e the standard of 79 
s k i l l expected from the ordinary competent s p e c i a l i s t 
having regard to the experience and e x p e r t i s e t h a t 
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s p e c i a l i s t holds himself out as possessing„•' 
However the i s s u e of adherence to the standard of 
ca r e has not been s e t t l e d . There i s another l i n e of c a s e s 
i n which the judges have re s e r v e d to themselves the r i g h t 
to determine the appropriate standard. I n these c a s e s , 
l e s s emphasis i s placed on expert testimony. Such 
testimony i s no longer regarded as c o n c l u s i v e . I n 
Cavanagh v U l s t e r Weaving Co.*'1'''" evidence of a common 
i n d u s t r i a l p r a c t i c e d i d not preclude the f i n d i n g of 
negligence. Despite h i s statement i n Hatcher v B l a c k 
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Denning L . J . i n Roe v M i n i s t e r of Health i n d i c a t e d t h a t 
he would be w i l l i n g to hold a general p r o f e s s i o n a l 
p r a c t i c e n e g l igent. T h i s i s c o n s i s t e n t with His Lordships 
l a t e r judgment i n Greaves v Baynham Meikle and 
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P a r t n e r s . I n Greaves he accepted the t e s t l a i d down 
down f o r standards i n Bolam but de c l a r e d t h a t evidence of 
a s i m i l a r p r a c t i c e would not exculpate the defendant. 
T h i s l i n e of a u t h o r i t y has continued up to the present day 
with the P r i v y Council's d e c l a r a t i o n i n Edward Wong 
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Finance Co„ L t d . v Johnson Stokes and Master t h a t . 
adherence to a common p r a c t i c e could s t i l l r e s u l t i n a 
fi n d i n g of negligence. However, i t must be pointed out 
t h a t the P r i v y Council emphasised the f o r e s e e a b i l i t y of 
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the r i s k inherent i n th a t p r a c t i c e . F i n a l l y , the 
d e c i s i o n of the Court of Appeal i n Sidaway v Bethleai Royal 
80 
H o s p i t a l Governors and Others r e s e r v e s the r i g h t of the 
judge to determine the appropriate standard. S i r John 
Donaldson M.R. accepted the t e s t l a i d down i n Balaam and 
found s t a t u t o r y approval i n s . l ( 5 ) Congenital D i s a b i l i t y 
( C i v i l L i a b i l i t y ) Act 1976. But he r e s e r v e d the r i g h t 'to 
r e j e c t a unanimous medical view of a p r a c t i c e i f he were 
s a t i s f i e d t h a t i t was m a n i f e s t l y wrong and the doctors 
must have been m i s d i r e c t i n g themselves as to t h e i r duty i n 
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law'. The Master of the R o l l s then expressed the t e s t 
as 'The duty i s f u l f i l l e d i f the doctor a c t s i n accordance 
with a p r a c t i c e r i g h t l y accepted as proper by a body of 
s k i l l e d and experienced medical men.' That there are two 
l i n e s of a u t h o r i t y r e l a t i n g to standards r a i s e s doubts as 
to the cogency of some statements about autonomy. 
I n our s o c i e t y the u l t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y i s the S t a t e , 
which i n terms of standards means the law. T h i s autonomy 
has to be l i n k e d with r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and the p r o f e s s i o n s 
must be seen to discharge t h e i r d u t i e s properly e l s e the 
e x t e r n a l standards from which they seek immunity w i l l 
i n t r u de. As Linden puts i t s ' A l l p r o f e s s i o n a l groups 
come under the aegis of t o r t law. The e x p e r t i s e of 
doctors, lawyers, engineers and accountants may be 
impugned i n a t o r t s u i t . Of course, negligence law 
normally adopts as i t s own standards t h a t the p r o f e s s i o n s 
r e q u i r e of themselves. But t h i s does not make negligence 
law redundant, because p r o f e s s i o n a l groups are l e s s than 
zealous i n p o l i c i n g themselves. Hardly ever does a 
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doctor, f o r example, l o s e h i s l i c e n s e to p r a c t i s e medicine 
because of h i s incompetence or p r o f e s s i o n a l misconduct. 
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I t may be more common f o r a p h y s i c i a n to be sued by a 
p a t i e n t i n j u r e d by h i s m a l p r a c t i c e . Consequently, i t i s 
the judges, not the College of P h y s i c i a n s and Surgeons, 
who by d e f a u l t become the r e g u l a t o r s of the q u a l i t y of 
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medical p r a c t i c e . ' I t would seem t h a t the u l t i m a t e 
determinant of p r o f e s s i o n a l competence i n some c o u n t r i e s 
eg Canada, i s the law, a t l e a s t i n the sense t h a t i t i s 
the u l t i m a t e recourse, though not n e c e s s a r i l y invoked i n 
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p r a c t i c e . 
Eo Problems of L i a b i l i t y f o r P r o f e s s i o n a l Megligemce. 
I t has been s t a t e d e a r l i e r t h a t a hallmark of 
p r o f e s s i o n a l a c t i v i t y i s government by a p r o f e s s i o n a l 
body. A s i g n i f i c a n t t r a i t f o r r e c o g n i s i n g an occupation 
as a p r o f e s s i o n i s t h a t the governing body has powers of 
r e g u l a t i o n and d i s c i p l i n e . The p r o f e s s i o n a l person thus 
c a r r i e s out p r o f e s s i o n a l t a s k s under a regime of c o n t r o l . 
As a r e s u l t l i a b i l i t y f o r negligence places a burden upon 
the p r o f e s s i o n a l which i s separate from the standards 
p r e s c r i b e d by the p r o f e s s i o n i t s e l f . The Royal Commission 
on L e g a l S e r v i c e s emphasised "the importance of high 
standards, beyond those re q u i r e d by the law, v o l u n t a r i l y 
s e t and maintained'. However, cases concerned w i t h the 
standard of care r e q u i r e d of a medical man show t h a t the 
standards expected of the p r o f e s s i o n a l by the law are 
higher than those expected of the p r a c t i t i o n e r by h i s 
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p r o f e s s i o n i n matters of negligence. Nontheless, the 
courts are aware t h a t cases i n negligence a g a i n s t 
p r o f e s s i o n a l s may have consequences d i f f e r e n t from those 
a f f e c t i n g persons not sued i n re s p e c t of p r o f e s s i o n a l 
p r a c t i c e . I r o n i c a l l y , the a t t i t u d e s of the cou r t s appear 
to f o s t e r a lowering of standards. Lord Denning, i n the 
foreword to J.P.Eddy's Professiomal Negligence „ wrotes 
'We are so used to a c t i o n s f o r negligence i n f a c t o r y 
cases that we are apt to think the same p r i n c i p l e s 
apply to a c t i o n s f o r negligence a g a i n s t p r o f e s s i o n a l 
men. This i s a great mistake ... a d i f f e r e n c e i s the 
standard of care which was expected. The 
courts have no h e s i t a t i o n i n holding t h a t mistakes 
made by c a r d r i v e r s or employers are v i s i t e d by 
damages s but they make allowances f o r the mistakes of 
p r o f e s s i o n a l men. They r e a l i s e t h a t a f i n d i n g of 
negligence a g a i n s t a p r o f e s s i o n a l man i s a s e r i o u s 
matter f o r him. I t i s not so much the money because 
he i s often i n s u r e d a g a i n s t i t . I t i s the i n j u r y to 
h i s r e p u t a t i o n which a f i n d i n g of negligence 
i n v o l v e s . ' 
Not only would the f i n d i n g of negligence a g a i n s t a 
p r o f e s s i o n a l man be grave but there would be adverse 
consequences f o r the p r o f e s s i o n as a whole and the 
community i n r e c e i p t of the p r o f e s s i o n a l s e r v i c e . Such an 
opinion i s not n e c e s s a r i l y c o r r e c t . The community may 
b e n e f i t and the q u a l i t y of s e r v i c e s might improve. 
'Defensive medicine', often l a b e l l e d as a bad consequence 
of l i t i g a t i o n , may be i n d i c a t i v e of proper c a r e f o r a 
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p a t i e n t . Denning L . J . , as he was then, urged c a u t i o n 
i n a c t i o n s a g a i n s t p r o f e s s i o n a l mens ' I t i s so easy to be 
wise a f t e r the event and to condemn as negligence t h a t 
which was only a misadventure. We ought always to be on 
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our guard a g a i n s t i t , e s p e c i a l l y i n cases a g a i n s t 
h o s p i t a l s and doctors. Medical s c i e n c e has c o n f e r r e d 
great b e n e f i t s on mankind but these b e n e f i t s are attended 
by considerable r i s k s . Every s u r g i c a l o peration i s 
attended by r i s k s . We cannot take the b e n e f i t s without 
t a k i n g the r i s k s . Every advance i n technique i s a l s o 
attended by r i s k s . Doctors, l i k e the r e s t of us, have to 
l e a r n by experience? and experience often teaches i n a 
hard way. Something goes wrong and shows up a weakness, 
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and then i t i s put r i g h t . ' And he expressed concern 
t h a t ' ... we should be doing a d i s s e r v i c e to the 
community a t l a r g e i f we are to impose l i a b i l i t y on 
h o s p i t a l s and doctors for everything which happens to go 
wrong. Doctors would be l e d to think more of t h e i r own 
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s a f e t y than t h a t of the good of t h e i r p a t i e n t s . 
I n i t i a t i v e would be s t i f l e d and confidence shaken. A 
proper sense of proportion r e q u i r e s us to have regard to 
the conditions i n which h o s p i t a l s and doctors have to 
work. We must i n s i s t on due care f o r the p a t i e n t a t every 
point but we must not condemn as negligence t h a t which i s 
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only a misadventure 1. 
However, t h a t i s not to say t h a t there should not and 
w i l l not be c a r e f u l examination of p r o f e s s i o n a l a c t i v i t y . 
The generosity so f a r i n d i c a t e d by Lord Denning was not to 
be found i n h i s Lordships judgment i n A l l e n v S i r A l f r e d 
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MacMpine and Sons i n 1968. Nor was i t found i n the 
judgment of the other members of t h a t Court of Appeal. I t 84 
would be a matter f o r concern i f there was to be a 
backlash a g a i n s t p r o f e s s i o n a l s g e n e r a l l y . F o r t u n a t e l y 
t h i s has not happened i n England. Medical p r a c t i t i o n e r s 
i n America have not been so fortunate. I t was the 
incidence of medical malpractice s u i t s i n America t h a t 
underlay Lord Denning' s reasoning i n Isfhitehouse v Jordan 
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and Another s 'Take heed of what has happened i n the 
United S t a t e s . "Medical m a l p r a c t i c e " cases there a r e v e r y 
worrying, e s p e c i a l l y as they are t r i e d by j u r i e s who have 
sympathy fo r the p a t i e n t and none f o r the doctor, who i s 
insured. The damages are c o l o s s a l . The doctors i n s u r e 
but the premiums become very highs and these have to be 
passed on as fees to the p a t i e n t s . Experienced 
p r a c t i t i o n e r s are known to have r e f u s e d to t r e a t p a t i e n t s 
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for f e a r of being accused of negligence. Young men are 
even deterred from e n t e r i n g the p r o f e s s i o n because of the 
r i s k s involved. I n the i n t e r e s t s of a l l , we must avoid 
such consequences i n England. Not only must we avoid 
e x c e s s i v e damages. We must say, and say f i r m l y , t h a t i n a 
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medical man, an e r r o r of judgment i s not negligence.' 
However, i t i s submitted t h a t the f e a r s of Lord 
Denning may prove to be unfounded i n r e l a t i o n to the 
United Kingdom. There are a number of c r i t i c i s m s of Lord 
Denning's assessment. F i r s t , j u r i e s do not decide c a s e s 
i n negligence i n the United Kingdom. They are used 
n e i t h e r i n determining l i a b i l i t y nor i n a s s e s s i n g damages. 
Secondly, the a t t i t u d e of Americans towards medical c a r e 85 
and l e g a l s e r v i c e s i s d i f f e r e n t from t h a t p r e v a i l i n g i n 
the United Kingdom. I n the USA there i s an e x p e c t a t i o n to 
pay f o r medical care and such c a r e i s seen as a commercial 
t r a n s a c t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n , i n some s t a t e s the system of 
contingent fees operates which c r i t i c s c l a i m to be 
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i n f l a t i n g awards. I t i s , t h e r e f o r e , not 
too h e l p f u l f o r the j u d i c i a r y to base t h e i r views on 
p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence too c l o s e l y upon a jaundiced 
opinion of American developments. None of the foregoing, 
however, should be taken to suggest t h a t there are no 
problems i n USA nor t h a t the s i t u a t i o n i n UK would not 
take a t u r n f o r the worse. Havard agrees with Lord 
Denning that the c o s t of medicine to the p a t i e n t has 
131 132 i n c r e a s e d i n USA. Southwick d i s c u s s e s the s i t u a t i o n 
i n USA as one i n which the attorneys and p h y s i c i a n s blame 
each other f o r the medical m a l p r a c t i c e ' c r i s i s ' . I n t u r n , 
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both groups blame the insurance i n d u s t r y . Weir 
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comments t h a t i n England, p a t i e n t s are r e l u c t a n t to sue 
t h e i r doctors. Not t h a t c r i t i c i s i n g doctors i n England i s 
a modern phenomenon. I n 1908 a book reviewer wrote of a 
newly published work t h a t a chapter on "Negligence and 
Malpractice" was 'of s p e c i a l importance i n these days when 
every p a t i e n t considers himself i n a p o s i t i o n to c r i t i c i s e 
h i s doctors supposed l a c k of s k i l l or want of 
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a t t e n t i o n ' ' C r i t i c i s m should not, however, be l i k e n e d 
to a r e a d i n e s s to sue. R e l a t i v e l y speaking there has not 
been a r a s h of a c t i o n s a g a i n s t doctors i n England compared 86 
with USAo I t was p o s s i b l e to s t a t e t h a t i n 1983 one ^ 
the medical p r o t e c t i o n s o c i e t i e s could o f f e r u n l i m i t e d 
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l i a b i l i t y insurance f o r £150 per annum. The e x t e n s i o n 
of l i t i g a t i o n and l i a b i l i t y would appear to be slow. 
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However, Havard contends t h a t i t i s the i n c i d e n c e of 
l i a b i l i t y f o r negligence i n England which i s causing 
p a t i e n t s to r e c e i v e out=of-date or unnecessary treatment. 
According to Havard the trend i n court cases had r e s u l t e d 
i n an i n c r e a s e i n doctors' medical defence insurance of 
40% i n 1 9 8 3 . 1 3 8 
I n 1986 the p o s i t i o n appeared to have worsened. 
Doctors had to pay 70% more f o r cover a g a i n s t medical 
negligence claims i n 1987. T h i s e n t a i l e d an i n c r e a s e from 
£336 to £576. I n 1988 the premium rose to £1080 and 
£2000 was considered not improbable as the next 
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i n c r e a s e . Whether the i n c r e a s e i n premiums c o n s t i t u t e s 
the problem fo r doctors often made out by members of t h a t 
p r o f e s s i o n i s debatable. Premiums are tax deductable and 
payable by instalments. When compared with premiums p a i d 
by members of other p r o f e s s i o n s , the f i g u r e s do not appear 
e x c e s s i v e . The Medical Defence Union, the b i g g e s t 
insurance s o c i e t y for doctors, reported t h a t £11.5 m i l l i o n 
i n damages was paid out i n 1985. Further f e a r s were 
expressed of more alarming awards i f contingency fees were 
permitted. An e f f e c t has been, confirming Havard ( s u p r a ) , 
t h a t p r o t e c t i o n from l i t i g a t i o n r a t h e r than p a t i e n t s 1 
w e l f a r e has prompted doctors to p r a c t i s e d e f e n s i v e 
87 
medicine whether or not doctors are more c a r e f u l . Claims 
a g a i n s t doctors have continued to r i s e from 16,000 i n 1982 
to 20,000 i n 1985, about 20 per cent r e l a t e d to o b s t e t r i c s 
and gynaecological p r a c t i c e . Fears have been expressed 
t h a t the l i k e l y i n c r e a s e i n l i a b i l i t y i n these 
s p e c i a l i s a t i o n s could lead to s e r i o u s shortages of doctors 
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prepared to do the work. And y e t even i n USA i t i s not 
a l l gloom and despondency. I t i s worthwhile c o n s i d e r i n g 
the contrary view given by Southwick from which one might 
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ask 'what c r i s i s ' ? 
' I t might be w e l l f i r s t to take a d i f f e r e n t view of 
the malpractice c r i s i s from t h a t u s u a l l y o f f e r e d by news 
sources, attorneys, p h y s i c i a n s and i n s u r e r s . A 1973 
r e p o r t of an HEW Commission on medical m a l p r a c t i c e based 
on a study of c l a i m f i l e s c l o s e d i n 1970, o f f e r s a more 
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o b j e c t i v e summary of the magnitude of the s o - c a l l e d 
c r i s i s to dates 
"Despite the p u b l i c i t y r e s u l t i n g from a few l a r g e 
m a l p r a c t i c e c a s e s , a medical m a l p r a c t i c e i n c i d e n t i s 
a r e l a t i v e l y r a r e events claims are even r a r e r and 
j u r y t r i a l s are r a r e r s t i l l . 
I n 1970, a m a l p r a c t i c e i n c i d e n t was a l l e g e d or 
reported f o r one out of every 158,000 p a t i e n t v i s i t s 
to doctors. 
I n 1970 a c l a i m was a s s e r t e d f o r one out of every 
226,000 p a t i e n t v i s i t s to doctors. 
Fewer than one court t r i a l was held f o r every 10 
claims c l o s e d i n 1970. 
Most doctors have never had a medical m a l p r a c t i c e 
s u i t f i l e d a g a i n s t them and those who have, have 
r a r e l y been sued more than once. 
I n 1970, 6.5 medical m a l p r a c t i c e claims f i l e s were 
opened for every 100 a c t i v e p r a c t i t i o n e r s . 
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A 10 year survey, from 1960 to 1970, of the c l a i m s 
experience of 2,045 p h y s i c i a n s i n Maryland i n d i c a t e d 
t h a t 85 percent had not been sued, 14 percent were 
sued once, and 2 percent were sued more than once. 
Most h o s p i t a l s no matter how l a r g e , go through an 
e n t i r e year without having a s i n g l e c l a i m f i l e d 
a g a i n s t them. S i x t y nine percent of 4,113 h o s p i t a l s 
surveyed from June 1971 to June 1972 had not had a 
m a l p r a c t i c e c l a i m , 10 percent had one, and 21 percent 
had two or more. Most p a t i e n t s have never s u f f e r e d a 
medical i n j u r y due to m a l p r a c t i c e and fewer have made 
a c l a i m a l l e g i n g m a l p r a c t i c e . 
I f the average person l i v e s 70 y e a r s , he w i l l have, 
based on 1970 data, approximately 400 c o n t a c t s as a 
p a t i e n t with doctors and d e n t i s t s . The chances t h a t 
he w i l l a s s e r t a medical m a l p r a c t i c e c l a i m are one i n 
39,500." 
However, the expression ' c r i s i s ' does have some currency 
and there appears to have been a r a p i d growth i n 
s u c c e s s f u l a c t i o n s against medical men i n the United 
S t a t e s . Doctors had to come to terms with l o s i n g 
negligence s u i t s and found i t d i f f i c u l t to p r e d i c t 
l i a b i l i t y due to c o n f l i c t i n g j u d i c i a l r u l e s . Doctors 
began to become defensive and avoid r i s k y courses of 
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treatment. Wot only t h a t , but i n USA an unfortunate 
development appears to be an alarming absence of a sense 
of o b l i g a t i o n to a s s i s t a person i n need. There i s no 
l e g a l duty to a s s i s t a stranger (although there may be 
l i a b i l i t y to p r o f e s s i o n a l d i s c i p l i n e ) under Anglo-American 
law. One American doctor i n two, according to Havard, i s 
so f e a r f u l of l e g a l consequences t h a t he would not give 
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f i r s t - a i d i n a road a c c i d e n t . T h i s i s d e s p i t e the 
s o - c a l l e d 'Good Samaritan' s t a t u t e s which seek to 
encourage emergency a i d by r e l i e v i n g doctors from the r i s k 
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of being charged with ordinary negligence. At the root 89 
of t h i s problem i s f a u l t . The idea of n o - f a u l t 
compensation f o r medical a c c i d e n t s has been r e j e c t e d by 
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Pearson i n B r i t a i n , although the B r i t i s h Medical 
A s s o c i a t i o n e s t a b l i s h e d a working party to co n s i d e r a 
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no- f a u l t compensation scheme. The Working Par t y has 
now reported i n favour of a n o - f a u l t scheme ( I n f r a ) . 
The l e g a l b a s i s f o r medical negligence i s now f a i r l y 
w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d . Very few cases a c t u a l l y go to c o u r t . 
Medical defence s o c i e t i e s , which handle many cla i m s f o r 
negligence, decide whether to s e t t l e or defend. The 
s o c i e t i e s expect to win those cases t h a t do r e q u i r e 
defence i n court. Jandoo and Harland consider t h a t t h i s 
e x p l a i n s why 'the proportion of s u c c e s s f u l c l a i m s f o r 
damages i n t o r t i s much lower f o r medical negligence than 
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for a l l negligence c a s e s . 1 
I t i s probably f a i r to say th a t i t i s not only good 
judgment on the p a r t of the defence s o c i e t i e s t h a t doctors 
win c a s e s . There are many other f a c t o r s , e s p e c i a l l y 
matters of evidence and ca u s a t i o n t h a t enable the defence 
to succeed. I n those i n s t a n c e s of a l l e g e d negligence t h a t 
do not reach the stage of l i t i g a t i o n , l e g a l a i d becomes an 
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i s s u e . One of the problems, i t i s argued, i s t h a t the 
f a u l t based system of t o r t i s i n danger of being 
undermined. This i s due to the d e s i r e to s e t t l e out of 
court a t a lower l e v e l of compensation i n those c a s e s 
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where l i a b i l i t y could not be e s t a b l i s h e d . S i nce where 
the p l a i n t i f f i s l e g a l l y aided, the s u c c e s s f u l defendant 
could not recover c o s t s and an ex g r a t i a payment i s made. 90 
Compensation based on the establishment of f a u l t under the 
law of t o r t gives way to a payment made on the b a s i s of 
expediency. The unfortunate e f f e c t with regard to the 
p r o f e s s i o n a l / c l i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p i s th a t the p a t i e n t i s 
u n l i k e l y , and perhaps unable, to d i f f e r e n t i a t e between an 
ex g r a t i a payment and damages, and f e e l s he has won and 
the doctor has l o s t i e i s at f a u l t . The do c t o r / p a t i e n t 
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r e l a t i o n s h i p i s i r r e p a r a b l y damaged. I t i s suggested 
t h a t reform of the system of l e g a l a i d might improve the 
s i t u a t i o n o u t l i n e d above. Under 13(2) Legal Aid Act 1974 
the court must consider whether an order f o r c o s t s should 
be made aga i n s t the a s s i s t e d party and whether or not i t 
i s j u s t and equ i t a b l e to make p r o v i s i o n f o r c o s t s out of 
p u b l i c funds. Stoddart, commenting on a s i m i l a r s t a t u t o r y 
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p r o v i s i o n operating i n Scotland, s t a t e s ' i t seems 
i r o n i c t h a t while the S t a t e w i l l not g e n e r a l l y h e s i t a t e to 
t r y and c o l l e c t expenses from an u n a s s i s t e d p a r t y i f h i s 
a s s i s t e d opponent i s s u c c e s s f u l , i t w i l l not n e c e s s a r i l y 
bear the expense due to the u n a s s i s t e d p a r t y i f the 
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a s s i s t e d p arty l o s e s ' . Reform of the system would not 
be so expensive, i t i s argued, because so few cases go to 
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court. What i s u n c e r t a i n i s how many cases do not go to 
court because of the c o s t s problem t h a t would go to cour t 
i f the problem was solved. 
An a l t e r n a t i v e s o l u t i o n has been suggested by Jandoo 
and Harland v i z the adoption of a contingent fee 
system. Contingent fees are g e n e r a l l y viewed w i t h 
disapprobation (supra) but the supporters of the system 91 
regard i t as an a l t e r n a t i v e to l e g a l a i d i n t h a t ' i t 
promotes e q u a l i t y before the law. I t allows those who 
have s u f f e r e d a wrong to get r e d r e s s through the Courts. 
Poor people who have meritorious claims have an 
opportunity to secure competent counsel with no c o s t to 
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themselves i n the event of there being no recovery. I t 
i s argued t h a t the contingent fee has served as the only 
p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e to s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n to a s s i s t the 
poor i n obtaining adequate l e g a l s e r v i c e s . The system 
does to an extent, t h e r e f o r e , f u l f i l l the functions of a 
1 C O 
p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e welfare scheme'. One must bear i n 
mind, of course, t h a t the payment of a s u c c e s s f u l 
opponent's c o s t s i s an E n g l i s h p r a c t i c e not found i n 
America where contingency fees are p e r m i s s i b l e . On the 
other hand i f a party l o s e s he pays nothing to h i s lawyer 
and i f he wins he pays out of the proceeds. But assuming 
the adoption of the contingent fee system and the 
r e t e n t i o n i n some form of the present c o s t s system, White 
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suggests t h a t the contingent fee would exclude any 
award of c o s t s to the s u c c e s s f u l p l a i n t i f f . I f the 
p l a i n t i f f l o s e s then the defendant should not be placed i n 
a worse p o s i t i o n because the p l a i n t i f f had a contingent 
fee arrangement with h i s lawyer. The defendant should be 
e n t i t l e d to h i s c o s t s . The p l a i n t i f f might have 
i n s u f f i c i e n t means and a b i l l f o r c o s t s would defeat the 
contingent fee system as a method of e l i m i n a t i n g the c o s t s 
s a n c t i o n . A p l a i n t i f f without means would r e q u i r e the 
a s s i s t a n c e of p u b l i c funds. Legal a i d by the back door? 92 
White argues t h a t the system of contingent fees could be 
adopted i n the United Kingdom provided safeguards, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y regarding the merit of the case and the l e v e l 
of f e e s , were b u i l t i n . He sees the contingent fee as a 
supplement to l e g a l a i d . The governing bodies of the 
l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n can s u p e r v i s e the system. The use of the 
contingent fee could be c o n d i t i o n a l upon i n e l i g i b i l i t y f o r 
l e g a l a i d or the r e f u s a l of an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r l e g a l 
a i d . * ^ I n t h i s way i t would f u l f i l l a u s e f u l f u n c t i o n . 
But i n the context of medical m a l p r a c t i c e , i t has been 
blamed, with other f a c t o r s , for the alarming s t a t e of 
a f f a i r s i n America. ' I t had not only allowed many 
claimants with i n j u r i e s e n t i t l i n g them to compensation to 
obtain l e g a l counsel which they could not otherwise 
a f f o r d , but i t had a l s o encouraged lawyers to accept 
claims with l i t t l e merit i f the p o t e n t i a l rewards were 
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high'. Despite the above c r i t i c i s m of contingency fees 
the matter i s r e c e i v i n g s e r i o u s c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n the 
United Kingdom. A Green Paper was published i n 1989. The 
Government appears to favour a change. I t i s not l i k e l y 
t h a t a 'no w i n 1 , 'no fee' system w i l l be adopted but 
r a t h e r a system s i m i l a r to the s p e c u l a t i v e a c t i o n used i n 
Scotland ( i n f r a ) . 
I n c o nclusion, i t seems t h a t , i f some members of a 
p r o f e s s i o n see the o v e r r i d i n g c o n t r o l of the c o u r t s as 
being an i n t r u s i o n i n t o t h e i r domain, evidence shows t h a t 
the medical p r o f e s s i o n , f o r example, formerly favoured the 
r e t e n t i o n of the t o r t system. L i a b i l i t y i s seen as a 
93 
means of showing r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and could t h e r e f o r e 
j u s t i f y p r o f e s s i o n a l freedom, but r e t e n t i o n has a l s o 
presumably been favoured because of the t o r t system's 
I C O 
marginal impact i n p r a c t i c e . A B r i t i s h Medical 
A s s o c i a t i o n Working Party has now reported recommending a 
no=fault system i n cases of some medical i n j u r y ( i n f r a ) . 
The l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n , as one would expect, i s c l o s e l y 
c o n t r o l l e d by the courts i n a v a r i e t y of ways. As i t i s 
there i s no reason why a p r o f e s s i o n a l person should be 
exempt from l e g a l l i a b i l i t y u n l e s s a good case i s made 
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out. U l t i m a t e l y the p o s s i b i l i t y of l e g a l l i a b i l i t y 
might be the only e f f e c t i v e r e g u l a t o r of the q u a l i t y of 
s e r v i c e s provided. A l t r u i s m i s claimed to be a 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a p r o f e s s i o n . Members should see t h e i r 
f unction i n terms of the community r a t h e r than concern 
themselves with t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s . 
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Chapter 3 
The General I s s u e s of L i a b i l i t y A f f e c t i n g 
P r o f e s s i o n a l Ktegligenee 
L i a b i l i t y i n Contract and Tort 
The h i s t o r y of p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence has been 
examined e a r l i e r . A c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the law a t the 
present day shows t h a t the c i v i l l i a b i l i t y of a 
p r o f e s s i o n a l person f o r p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence may 
ge n e r a l l y be s a i d to be based upon an a c t i o n f o r breach of 
con t r a c t or t o r t . As the p r o f e s s i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p o f t e n 
a r i s e s as a r e s u l t of a c o n t r a c t , * the a c t i o n i n 
negligence w i l l often be based upon the c o n t r a c t . The 
con t r a c t w i l l c o n t ain terms, e i t h e r express or implied, to 
the e f f e c t t h a t the p r o f e s s i o n a l owes the c l i e n t a duty of 
2 
ca r e . \Many of the f i r s t reported cases i n negligence 
were a c t i o n s a g a i n s t persons who had undertaken to do 
something and who, by doing i t badly, had i n j u r e d the 
3 
other party to the t r a n s a c t i o n . The o l d w r i t of assumpsit 
- the forerunner of the modern law of c o n t r a c t - was used 
ag a i n s t persons engaged i n a p r o f e s s i o n or s k i l l e d t r a d e . 
Such persons were l i a b l e f o r damage caused when they d i d 
not e x h i b i t the degree of ca r e , s k i l l and competence 
a s s o c i a t e d with persons p r a c t i s i n g such c a l l i n g s . 
P r o f e s s i o n a l s p r a c t i s i n g the common c a l l i n g s were, 
however, already l i a b l e under t r a d i t i o n a l d o c t r i n e . The 
common c a l l i n g s e.g. surgeons had always a t t r a c t e d 
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l i a b i l i t y i n t o r t because of t h e i r s t a t u s and such 
persons were l i a b l e i n the absence of any c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n 
a c o n t r a c t . A l l c o n s i d e r a t i o n d i d was to provide 
l i a b i l i t y i n c o n t r a c t as w e l l as i n t o r t , mere payment not 
e x t i n g u i s h i n g the r i g h t of a c t i o n i n t o r t . At an e a r l y 
date l i a b i l i t y f o r breach of duty of care was extended to 
nonfeasance i . e . , a f a i l u r e to a c t , as w e l l as 
misfeasance. L a t e r the a c t i o n of assumpsit became the 
general a c t i o n f o r breach of c o n t r a c t and the p r a c t i c e of 
suing p r o f e s s i o n a l s i n c o n t r a c t arose. According to Lord 
Denning M.R., at t h i s l a t e r stage and p a r t i c u l a r l y the 
nineteenth century the e x i s t e n c e of a duty of c a r e a r i s i n g 
out of a c o n t r a c t ensured t h a t the a c t i o n would be brought 
5 
f o r breach of c o n t r a c t and not i n t o r t . Thus, the 
p r i n c i p a l means of e x e r c i s i n g c o n t r o l i n the c o u r t s over 
6 
p r o f e s s i o n a l conduct was the law of c o n t r a c t . The 
implied term i n a c o n t r a c t f o r p r o f e s s i o n a l s e r v i c e s i s 
t h a t the p r o f e s s i o n a l w i l l e x e r c i s e reasonable s k i l l and 
7 
c a r e . However, although the p r i n c i p a l a c t i o n or c l a i m 
w i l l be f o r breach of c o n t r a c t there i s no longer any 
p r o h i b i t i o n on an a c t i o n or c l a i m based on t o r t f o r ' i t 
can a l s o be based sometimes on negligence on the grounds 
th a t a reasonable man, owing a duty of c a r e i n such 
circumstances, would e x e r c i s e the care of a s k i l l e d man 
o 
doing the work.' 
The nature of l i a b i l i t y thus s t a t e d i s c o n s i s t e n t 
g 
with modern law g e n e r a l l y . I n Brown v Boorman the 
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p r i n c i p l e was l a i d down t h a t whenever there i s a c o n t r a c t 
under which something i s to be done, i f there i s a breach 
of duty i n the course of c a r r y i n g out the c o n t r a c t the 
10 
p l a i n t i f f may recover e i t h e r i n t o r t or c o n t r a c t . There 
are many cases i n which t h i s would be t r u e i n c l u d i n g 
'actions a g a i n s t a t t o r n e y s , surgeons and other 
11 
p r o f e s s i o n a l men f o r l a c k of s k i l l . ' 
12 
Since Bonoghmie v Stevenson there i s no reason why, 
once a duty r e l a t i o n s h i p i s e s t a b l i s h e d , t h a t duty i n t o r t 
should cease to apply because of a c o e x i s t e n t c o n t r a c t u a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p . I t i s accepted t h a t where the duty i s 
imposed s o l e l y because the defendant i s a c t i n g f o r reward 
the l i a b i l i t y i s c o n t r a c t u a l . However, i f a duty of c a r e 
has a r i s e n as a r e s u l t of the r e l a t i o n s h i p i n the A t k i n i a n 
sense, the e x i s t e n c e of the c o n t r a c t i s i r r e l e v a n t to the 
extent t h a t there may be a concurrent l i a b i l i t y i n t o r t . 
I t seems t h a t very often, both heads of l i a b i l i t y w i l l be 
a v a i l a b l e under the same or s i m i l a r s e t of f a c t s although 
the o b l i g a t i o n s under each head of l i a b i l i t y a r i s e i n 
13 
d i f f e r e n t ways and the consequences of each are a l s o 
d i s t i n c t . According to many w r i t e r s the d i s t i n c t i o n 
r e l a t e s to the o r i g i n of the o b l i g a t i o n . 
I t has been a s s e r t e d t h a t the most important 
p r i n c i p l e s of the law of o b l i g a t i o n s are the f u l f i l m e n t of 
expectations ( c o n t r a c t ) , the compensation of wrongful harm 
( t o r t ) and the r e v e r s i n g of u n j u s t enrichment 
( q u a s i - c o n t r a c t ) . W i n f i e l d i n 1931 s t a t e d 'At the present 109 
day, t o r t and c o n t r a c t are d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from one 
another i n t h a t the d u t i e s i n the former are p r i m a r i l y 
f i x e d by the law, while i n the l a t t e r they are f i x e d by 
the p a r t i e s themselves. Moreover, i n t o r t the duty i s 
towards persons g e n e r a l l y , i n c o n t r a c t i t i s towards a 
s p e c i f i c person or s p e c i f i c p e r sons.' 1^ Charlesworth a l s o 
expresses the d i s t i n c t i o n between c o n t r a c t and t o r t as 
t u r n i n g 'on the o r i g i n of the duty. I n c o n t r a c t the duty 
a r i s e s from the agreement of the p a r t i e s ? i n t o r t i t i s 
independent of agreement and i s imposed upon the p a r t i e s 
15 
by the law.' Not a l l commentators would agree t h a t 
16 
t h e r e i s such a simple d i s t i n c t i o n . Atiyah does not and 
maintains t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n i s one of o b l i g a t i o n s 
v o l u n t a r i l y assumed i . e . c o n t r a c t , and o b l i g a t i o n s 
imposed by the law i . e . t o r t . T his d i s t i n c t i o n , he 
argues, i s a product of the nineteenth century and t h e r e 
i s no reason why t h i s should always be so, there being no 
absolute t r u t h i n the d i s t i n c t i o n . What i s l e f t today i s 
a c l a s s i c a l model of c o n t r a c t i n h e r i t e d from the 
nineteenth century lawyers. Atiyah has argued t h a t t h i s 
i s not a s a t i s f a c t o r y way of looking a t o b l i g a t i o n s and 
t h e r e f o r e no s a t i s f a c t o r y d i v i s i o n . This disagreement i s 
l a r g e l y based upon h i s view t h a t there i s l i t t l e or no 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r p r o t e c t i n g the expectation i n t e r e s t . I n 
h i s a r t i c l e 'Contracts, Promises and the Law of 
17 
O b l i g a t i o n s ' Atiyah c o n s i d e r s the conceptual framework 
favoured by lawyers which encompasses the d i s t i n c t i o n made 
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w i t h i n the law of o b l i g a t i o n s . He s e t s out the main 
t r a i t s of t h i s 19th century c l a s s i c a l model ass 
1 being about what the p a r t i e s intend r a t h e r than what 
they do. (Tort i s about what people do). 
2. having an o b j e c t i v e e x i s t e n c e p r i o r to performance. 
3. having a d e t e r r e n t or hortatory purpose ( t o r t has a 
dispute s e t t l i n g f u n c t i o n ) . 
4. being one model. 
Atiyah's view i s t h a t the t r a d i t i o n a l l e g a l perception of 
c o n t r a c t i s wrong. There i s no one model. There i s no 
such t h i n g as a t y p i c a l c o n t r a c t . Neither i s t h e r e a 
requirement of promise. A c o n t r a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n may 
a r i s e based on b e n e f i t s rendered or reasonable r e l i a n c e . 
Furthermore, the requirement of i n t e n t i o n i s a f i c t i o n 
s i n c e i n t e n t i o n i s determined not by the p a r t i e s but 
o b j e c t i v e l y by the courts i . e . upon what the p a r t i e s do. 
Atiyah supports t h i s argument by c l a i m i n g t h a t c o n t r a c t s 
based s o l e l y upon promises (executory) are very r a r e 
whereas b e n e f i t and r e l i a n c e based c o n t r a c t s are common. 
However, he i s prepared to concede t h a t i n the case of 
wholly executory t r a n s a c t i o n s the p l a i n t i f f r e c o v e r s 
damages for l o s t expectations, i . e . the d i f f e r e n c e between 
the value of the defendant's performance, and the c o s t to 
him of h i s own performance. There i s t h e r e f o r e no need to 
111 
show him any b e n e f i t or any detrimental r e l i a n c e . But 
there i s not j u s t one p o s s i b l e model. 
Th i s c l a i m by Atiyah t h a t there i s no j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
for p r o t e c t i n g the expectation i n t e r e s t f o r breach of a 
18 
promise i s challenged by Burrows. F i r s t , he notes the 
o b j e c t i v e t e s t of i n t e n t i o n does not preclude the 
p r o t e c t i o n of an expectation. The expectation i s strong 
i e . t h a t the promisee w i l l be put i n t o the expected 
p o s i t i o n by the promisor. Secondly, evidence of b e n e f i t 
or r e l i a n c e i s not necessary. Under the present law, the 
promisee can c l a i m p r o t e c t i o n f o r h i s expectation i n t e r e s t 
19 
fo r breach of the promise. As A t i y a h admits even ' i n 
b e n e f i t and r e l i a n c e based l i a b i l i t i e s , the damages 
awarded are often c a l c u l a t e d as though the l i a b i l i t y was 
promise-based' and t h i r d l y , the law's p r o t e c t i o n of 
expectation i n t e r e s t s i s not so r a r e . Burrows p o i n t s 
20 
out t h a t Atiyah conveniently ignores promises under 
s e a l , the remedy of s p e c i f i c performance and the payment 
of an agreed sum. 
21 
Burrows concludes t h a t 'despite the changes i n the 
law during the twentieth century, the d i v i s i o n of the law 
of o b l i g a t i o n s i n t o c o n t r a c t , t o r t and r e s t i t u t i o n , i f 
c o r r e c t l y understood, i s a s a t i s f a c t o r y d i v i s i o n ' . 
22 
Poulton agrees t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e i s m a t e r i a l but does 
not know why t h i s should be so. I n both c a s e s , i . e . 
l i a b i l i t y f o r breach of c o n t r a c t and f o r t o r t , he p o i n t s 
out t h a t the duty i s imposed by law. A l l are under an 
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o b l i g a t i o n to keep t h e i r c o n t r a c t s . Both t o r t and breach 
of c o n t r a c t give r i s e to a l i a b i l i t y which i s imposed upon 
23 
the defendant and owed to the p l a i n t i f f . Poulton 
p o s t u l a t e s there i s no reason why every breach of c o n t r a c t 
could not be c a t e g o r i s e d as a s p e c i e s of t o r t . Indeed he 
argues t h a t h i s t o r i c a l l y i t i s s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h i s has 
not happened. 2 4 
25 
Holyoak considers t h a t attempts to r i g i d l y and 
a r t i f i c a l l y separate claims i n t o r t and c o n t r a c t were 
doomed to f a i l given the c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p which must 
i n e v i t a b l y e x i s t between them i n the l i g h t of key common 
f e a t u r e s ' . The impact of J u n i o r Books L t d v V e i t c h i & Co 
2 6 
L t d i n i t i a l l y was t h a t the t o r t of negligence may be 
a p p l i e d to p r o t e c t expectation i n t e r e s t s which were 
formerly s o l e l y w i t h i n the province of the law of 
27 
c o n t r a c t . The p r i n c i p l e i s , however, l i m i t e d i n 
a p p l i c a t i o n and the r a t i o i n J u n i o r Books i s construed 
narrowly. Cases decided subsequently to J u n i o r Books show 
th a t the courts were not prepared to allow a p r i n c i p l e 
s t a t e d on the b a s i s of the p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s of J u n i o r 
28 
Books , to develop too broadly and, i n so doing, pose a 
29 
t h r e a t to the law of c o n t r a c t and appropriate remedies 
I t i s thought u n l i k e l y by Holyoak t h a t the two forms of 
a c t i o n w i l l merge or t h a t t o r t w i l l absorb c o n t r a c t , but 
r a t h e r t h a t both a c t i o n s w i l l develop i n t o b e t t e r r e l a t e d 
but s t i l l separate e n t i t i e s . I t i s submitted t h a t t h i s 
c o n c l u sion i s probably j u s t i f i e d . Perhaps the s i t u a t i o n 
113 
r e l a t e d by W i n f i e l d i n 1931 i s the most appropriate a t the 
cu r r e n t stage of l e g a l developments 
'... both a n c i e n t l y and a t the present day, a 
p l a i n t i f f may sue a l t e r n a t i v e l y ( i . e . e i t h e r i n 
co n t r a c t or i n t o r t ) where he has a l t e r n a t i v e claims 
... and ... i f both prove to be s u b s t a n t i a l , he gets 
the advantages upon the su p e r i o r c l a i m ' . 
Thus the p l a i n t i f f gets the choice as to how he w i l l s e t 
about framing h i s a c t i o n a g a i n s t the p r o f e s s i o n a l . 
negligence i n Contract and Tort 
Negligence i s a r e l a t i v e l y p r e c i s e and p r a c t i c a l 
a c t i o n , whether founded i n c o n t r a c t or t o r t . Duties of 
car e must be owed to p a r t i c u l a r i d e n t i f i a b l e persons i n a 
31 
recognised r e l a t i o n s h i p . Breach i s measured by a 
determined standard of reasonable c a r e i n the 
circumstances and damage must be a consequence of the 
breach. The problem of ca u s a t i o n i s a r e a l problem. No 
caus a t i o n , no l i a b i l i t y . Negligent a c t s or omission might 
32 
not be a cause of i n j u r y . There may be u n c e r t a i n t y as 
to the cause i t s e l f , as i n the i s s u e s of the drugs 
Thalidomide and Opren and i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of 
whooping cough v a c c i n e . What then, makes a d i f f i c u l t 
p r a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n worse from the p l a i n t i f f ' s p o int of 
view on the i s s u e of c a u s a t i o n i s the i s s u e of the damage 
which i s l e g a l l y recognised as g i v i n g r i s e to a s u c c e s s f u l 
claims remoteness of damage. 
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Remoteness of Damage 
The consequences of any conduct might be i n f i n i t e . 
33 
The law has to draw a l i n e . T h i s process by which the 
t e s t s of remoteness have been formulated has not been 
exact. 'Causation i s to be understood as the man i n the 
s t r e e t , and not as e i t h e r the s c i e n t i s t or the 
34 
metaphysician would understand i t . ' I t i s e s s e n t i a l l y 
35 
'a p r a c t i c a l i n q u i r y ' . The question t h e r e f o r e i s s 'to 
what extent should the defendant have to answer f o r the 
consequences which h i s conduct has a c t u a l l y helped to 
36 
produce?' There has to be a reasonable connection 
between the harm threatened and the harm done. Mere proof 
of negligence as a c a u s a l f a c t o r of the p l a i n t i f f s ' i n j u r y 
i s i n s u f f i c i e n t . Compensation systems s e t l i m i t s to 
l i a b i l i t y . I n the case of negligence l i a b i l i t y i s 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y r e l a t e d to f a u l t , though i s d i m i n i s h i n g i n 
s i g n i f i c a n c e owing to the insurance element. The 
p r a c t i c a l t a s k of drawing t h i s l i n e which d e l i m i t s 
recovery i s not capable of p r e c i s e d e f i n i t i o n . The 
defendant i s to be l i a b l e f o r proximate cause. Proximity 
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i s determined by p u b l i c p o l i c y . 
The dilemma of remoteness of damage i n negligence i s 
t h a t of balance. Too s t r i c t a l i m i t a t i o n may deprive a 
p l a i n t i f f of compensation from a wrongdoer. On the other 
hand to r e l a x the l i m i t a t i o n unduly could i n v o l v e a 
wrongdoer i n l i a b i l i t y t o t a l l y d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e to what 
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has been an a c c i d e n t a l l a p s e . The t e s t , however 
formulated, w i l l f i n d i t s place i n the middle ground. 
Remoteness of damage or l e g a l c a u s a t i o n operates l i k e 
a j u d i c i a l horizon. The rope attached to a boat may s t i l l 
move through the hands of a watcher on the shore even 
though the boat i s out of s i g h t beyond the horizon. The 
damage or i n j u r y f o r which l i a b i l i t y i n negligence w i l l be 
e s t a b l i s h e d i s to be found by re f e r e n c e to p o l i c y . The 
p o l i c y a t t h i s moment which l a y s down the t e s t v a r i e s 
depending upon whether the c l a i m i s founded upon 
o b l i g a t i o n s i n c o n t r a c t or t o r t . Often the d u t i e s i n 
co n t r a c t and t o r t w i l l be interchangeable and 
39 
c o e x i s t i n g although the courts have not always been 
c o n s i s t e n t i n deciding t h i s question. Concurrency of 
ac t i o n s i n c o n t r a c t and t o r t has been recognised on some 
occasions, but on oth e r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n r e l a t i o n to 
p r o f e s s i o n a l a d v i s e r s there had been r e l u c t a n c e on the 
pa r t of the courts to impose l i a b i l i t y otherwise than i n 
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c o n t r a c t . There have been d i f f e r e n t views on the 
p u r s u i t of remedies i n c o n t r a c t and t o r t . A harsher view 
i s t h a t t o r t has no r o l e when the r e l a t i o n s h i p i s governed 
by c o n t r a c t between the p a r t i e s . The more l i b e r a l approach 
allows the p l a i n t i f f to choose from among concurrent 
causes of a c t i o n . There i s no reason, i t seems, why t o r t 
r i g h t s should be f o r f e i t e d by ent e r i n g i n t o a c o n t r a c t 
unless there i s agreement to l i m i t or exclude them.^* 
While the forms of a c t i o n held sway the p l a i n t i f f had the 
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r i g h t to choose, although t o r t was t r e a t e d as more 
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appropriate f o r p h y s i c a l i n j u r y and economic l o s s was 
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a s s o c i a t e d with c o n t r a c t . Doctors, d e n t i s t s and c a r r i e r s 
were normally s u b j e c t to t o r t but s o l i c i t o r s and stock 
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brokers to a c t i o n s f o r breach of c o n t r a c t . T o r t 
l i a b i l i t y was a l s o u s u a l l y r e s t r i c t e d to the o l d e r "common 
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c a l l i n g s " but c o n t r a c t to the newer. Recent d e c i s i o n s 
have shown t h a t o b l i g a t i o n s which could give r i s e to a 
cause of a c t i o n i n c o n t r a c t do not preclude p a r a l l e l 
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claims i n t o r t . A f t e r a l l , i f a p l a i n t i f f could sue i n 
t o r t when s e r v i c e s were performed g r a t u i t o u s l y i t seems 
absurd t h a t , i n the absence of e x c l u s i o n i n a c o n t r a c t , he 
could not sue i n t o r t when there was a c o n t r a c t . ^ The 
p l a i n t i f f may pursue h i s remedy both i n t o r t or f o r breach 
of c o n t r a c t . But ' i f he sues i n t o r t , he cannot afterwards 
sue i n c o n t r a c t , s i n c e the judgement of the f i r s t a c t i o n 
w i l l make the matter r e s j u d i c a t a . Nor would the p l a i n t i f f 
be allowed to pursue two d i s t i n c t a c t i o n s a t the same time 
for s u b s t a n t i a l l y the same grievance. E i t h e r the two 
a c t i o n s would be consolidated, or one would be stayed as 
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being f r i v o l o u s and vexatious.' As a r e s u l t of freedom 
of choice the p l a i n t i f f may invoke the more favourable 
r u l e i n t o r t obtaining advantages such as l i m i t a t i o n and 
c o n t r i b u t i o n . Sometimes, the a c t i o n i n c o n t r a c t w i l l be 
pre f e r e d owing to the unresolved i s s u e of no r e d u c t i o n f o r 
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co n t r i b u t o r y negligence i n case of breach of c o n t r a c t . 
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Concurrency of a c t i o n s may u n f o r t u n a t e l y l e a d to 
anomalies e.g. t h a t a p l a i n t i f f might obtain g r e a t e r 
compensation f o r the same damage depending upon whether 
the remedy i s pursued i n c o n t r a c t and t o r t . T h i s r e s u l t i s 
l i k e l y owing to the wider l i a b i l i t y i n t o r t and the 
d i f f e r e n t t e s t s f o r remoteness of damage i n c o n t r a c t and 
t o r t . I t i s i n the area of remoteness of damage and 
l i m i t a t i o n of a c t i o n s t h a t the anomaly r e f e r r e d to can be 
seen most c l e a r l y . I n an a c t i o n based upon t o r t remoteness 
of damage r e f e r s to t h a t damage which i s a reasonably 
' 50 foreeseable consequence of the breach. I n a c t i o n s based 
on breach of c o n t r a c t l i a b i l i t y i s f o r damages which might 
reasonably be supposed to have been i n contemplation by 
both p a r t i e s and when they made the c o n t r a c t as the 
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probable r e s u l t of a breach of i t . 
The case of H. Parsons ( L i v e s t o c k ) L t d v U t t l e y 
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Ingham and Co L t d concerned such an i s s u e . The anomaly 
was r e f e r r e d to and Lord Denning M.R. suggested a method 
by which the anomaly could be r e s o l v e d . The Master of the 
R o l l s , a f t e r drawing a p a r a l l e l between the t e s t s of 
remoteness of damage i n c o n t r a c t and t o r t , f e l t he could 
not apply the apparent d i f f e r e n c e s i n the r u l e s . His 
Lordship could not draw a d i s t i n c t i o n between what i s 
'contemplated' and what i s 'foreseen', such a d i s t i n c t i o n 
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being a semantic e x e r c i s e . The d i f f e r e n c e should 
depend upon the type of i n j u r y i . e . economic l o s s or 
p h y s i c a l i n j u r y and not the l e g a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . Thus, 
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i n the case of economic l o s s the d e f a u l t i n g party i s only 
l i a b l e f o r the consequences i f they are such as, a t the 
time of the c o n t r a c t he ought reasonably to have 
contemplated as a s e r i o u s p o s s i b i l i t y or danger - ' I n 
the case of p h y s i c a l i n j u r y 'the d e f a u l t i n g p a r t y i s 
l i a b l e f o r any damage which he ought to have reasonably 
foreseen a t the time of the breach as a p o s s i b l e 
consequence, even i f i t was only a very s l i g h t 
p o s s i b i l i t y ' . T his should be the d i s t i n c t i o n whether the 
c l a i m was i n c o n t r a c t or t o r t . 
However, i t i s not apparent from the Master of the 
R o l l s ' dictum what the p o s i t i o n would be i n the event of 
economic l o s s i n the absence of a c o n t r a c t , nor what the 
s i g n i f i c a n c e of the continued use of 'contemplated' and 
'foreseen' i s i f the d i s t i n c t i o n i s merely a matter of 
semantics. Scarman L . J . agreed with Lord Denning t h a t i t 
was 'absurd t h a t the t e s t f o r remoteness of damage should, 
i n p r i n c i p l e , d i f f e r according to the l e g a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
of the case of a c t i o n s ' . However, n e i t h e r Scarman L . J . nor 
Orr L . J . could f i n d any a u t h o r i t y f o r the d i s t i n c t i o n 
suggested by Lord Denning. I n due course Lord Denning went 
on to d i s c u s s h i s view i n the l a t e r case of Photo 
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Production v S e c u r i c o r i n 1978. The Parsons case 
a t t r a c t e d a l o t of i n t e r e s t , most commentators agreeing 
t h a t there was a danger of a b s u r d i t y i f a d i f f e r e n t 
outcome based upon d i f f e r e n t r u l e s of remoteness should 
emerge i n what was s u b s t a n t i a l l y the same i s s u e . I n the 
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Law Q u a r t e r l y Review the view of Lord Denning MR was 
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welcomed. Contract and t o r t i s beginning to merge, and 
th e r e f o r e the r u l e s of remoteness should too. 
P a r t i c u l a r l y welcomed was the a p p l i c a t i o n to economic l o s s 
because now t h a t the f o r e s e e a b i l i t y of economic l o s s alone 
can give use to l i a b i l i t y i n negligence, Lord Dennings' 
d i s t i n c t i o n could be a p p l i e d there to c o n t a i n what 
otherwise might be an 'uncontrollable and warranted growth 
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i n the ambit of t h a t t o r t ' . But, with r e s p e c t , t h a t 
would s t i l l beg an important question. Lord Denning's t e s t 
f o r remoteness i n cases of economic l o s s i s t h a t 
appropriate to c o n t r a c t . The t e s t i s what i s reasonably 
contemplated a t the time of making the c o n t r a c t . I n the 
event of economic l o s s i n the absence of a c o n t r a c t , what 
i s to be the point i n time at which the l o s s ought to have 
been contemplated? Perhaps the only reasonable time would 
be the time a t which the advice or whatever caused the 
l o s s took p l a c e . T h i s , of course, could be much e a r l i e r 
than the breach of duty under the normal t o r t r u l e . I n the 
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Modern Law Review, Hadjihambis d i d not consider t h a t 
Lord Denning's views a f f o r d a sound b a s i s i n l e g a l 
p r i n c i p l e . Rather than r e c o n c i l i n g c o n t r a c t and t o r t , the 
d i f f e r e n c e i s emphasised. Hadjihambis considered the view 
of Scarman L . J . more appealing i n t h a t i t would be 
'...absurd t h a t the t e s t f o r remoteness of damage should, 
i n p r i n c i p l e , d i f f e r according to the l e g a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
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of the cause of a c t i o n , . . . ' 0 However, Scarman L . J . 120 
thought "...the law i s not so absurd as to d i f f e r e n t i a t e 
between c o n t r a c t and t o r t save i n s i t u a t i o n s where the 
agreement, or the f a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p , of the p a r t i e s 
with each other r e q u i r e s i t i n the i n t e r e s t s of j u s t i c e ' . 
I n other words, the p r a c t i c a l nature of the law w i l l 
overcome the d i s t i n c t i o n and even be a s s i s t e d by what i s 
only a semantic and not a s u b s t a n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e i n the 
t e s t s f o r t o r t and c o n t r a c t . Perhaps, though , the r e a l 
problem with Lord Denning's attempts i s t h a t complete 
equation of t e s t s would upset the p r i n c i p l e s r e l a t i n g to 
the time for the a p p l i c a t i o n of the t e s t . As asked 
e a r l i e r , what i s to be the r e l e v a n t time f o r the economic 
l o s s caused i n the absence of a c o n t r a c t and, i n a d d i t i o n 
what i s to be the r e l e v a n t time i n cases of p h y s i c a l l o s s . 
Lord Denning's a p p l i c a t i o n of the t o r t t e s t to p h y s i c a l 
i n j u r y or l o s s caused by breach of c o n t r a c t would be a t 
v a r i a n c e with the understood c o n t r a c t u a l r u l e of 
contemplation at time of making c o n t r a c t and not a t time 
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of breach as i n t o r t c a s e s . 
Contract and T o r t - Assessment of Damages 
At t h i s juncture i t i s probably of value to c o n s i d e r 
some of the d i f f e r e n c e s between the r u l e s a f f e c t i n g the 
measure of damages i n c o n t r a c t and t o r t where the damages 
are awarded on the p r i n c i p l e of awarding compensation. The 
d i s t i n c t i o n i s l a t e n t as the general r u l e i s s u f f i c i e n t l y 
wide to cover both c o n t r a c t and tort.*** T his r u l e i s , 
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according to McGregor 1 that the p l a i n t i f f i s e n t i t l e d to 
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be put i n t o the same p o s i t i o n , as f a r as money can do i t , 
as he would have been had the wrong not been committed.' 
In terms of a c o n t r a c t , the p o s i t i o n he would have been i n 
had t h e - c o n t r a c t not been broken, and i n t o r t , on the 
b a s i s of r e s t o r i n g as f a r as p o s s i b l e the s t a t u s quo. 
But there appears to be no d i s t i n c t i o n between the 
assessment of t o r t and c o n t r a c t damages as f a r as the 
r u l e s as to m i t i g a t i o n of damages, c e r t a i n t y of proof, or 
as to the extent to which recovery f o r past and 
prospective l o s s i s allowed. Whether there i s any scope 
for reduction of damages i n c o n t r a c t f o r c o n t r i b u t o r y 
negligence remains to be seen. S l ( l ) Law Reform 
(Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 does not appear to be 
r e s t r i c t e d to t o r t and some judges a t f i r s t i n s t a n c e have 
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been prepared to apply the Act other than j u s t to t o r t . 
The Court of Appeal would not be committed i n e i t h e r c a s e . 
However, i t seems t h a t the 1945 Act would have no 
a p p l i c a t i o n i n cases of s t r i c t c o n t r a c t u a l duty although 
where the c o n t r a c t u a l duty i s the use of due c a r e t h e r e i s 
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support for apportionment of l o s s under the 1945 Act. 
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I n A = Bo Marintrans v Comet Shipping Co. L t d t h i s 
support was expressed i n oblique form. I n a s p e c i a l case 
s t a t e d pursuant to the A r b i t r a t i o n Act 1950 N e i l l L . J . , a t 
f i r s t i n s t a n c e i n the Queen's Bench D i v i s i o n , held t h a t on 
a proper c o n s t r u c t i o n the 1945 Act d i d not apply to permit 
the damages recoverable by a p l a i n t i f f i n r e s p e c t of a 
c o n t r a c t u a l or non-tortious c l a i m to be reduced by reason 
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of the p l a i n t i f f ' s c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence,, T h i s would be 
so eTCin though the breach of c o n t r a c t r e l i e d upon ^ a s i n 
the nature of a breach of c o n t r a c t u a l duty of c a r e . ^ ^ His 
Lordship did not consider t h i s to be a s a t i s f a c t o r y s t a t e 
of a f f a i r s but f e l t powerless to do anything about i t . 
'Thus i t may be t h a t a p l a i n t i f f w i l l be able to avoid the 
apportionment p r o v i s i o n by suing i n c o n t r a c t when a c l a i m 
i n t o r t would be as or more appropriate. But t h i s i s not a 
problem for a judge at f i r s t i n s t a n c e to attempt to s o l v e 
by p l a c i n g a s t r a i n e d c o n s t r u c t i o n on a s t a t u t e . The t o p i c 
may, however, be a s u i t a b l e t o p i c f o r study by those with 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r law reform. Indeed, I see great f o r c e 
i n the contention t h a t the same r u l e should apply to 
claims whether they are based i n c o n t r a c t or t o r t where 
the a c t complained of i n v o l v e s the breach of a duty of 
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care . ' 
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L i t i g a t i o n i n the United S t a t e s 
Much of the concern h e r e i n expressed has r e l a t e d to 
problems b e s e t t i n g p r o f e s s i o n a l people i n the United 
S t a t e s . Consideration, verging on f e a r , of the so c a l l e d 
medical malpractice c r i s i s has caused j u d i c i a l and 
l e g i s l a t i v e a c t i v i t y i n USA to take p l a c e and, indeed, 
many proposals for reforming m a l p r a c t i c e law and the way 
i n which medical v i c t i m s are compensated have been 
suggested. Indeed, so f a r has pendulum swung a g a i n s t 
defendant medical men i n the c o u r t s t h a t numerous 
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l e g i s l a t u r e s have passed s t a t u t e s i n t h e i r favour. 
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There i s a d e s i r e to balance 'victim compensation and 
s o c i e t y ' s need for a s t a b l e and not-too-timid medical 
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p r o f e s s i o n ' . Such l e g i s l a t i o n has l i m i t e d the p a t i e n t ' s 
r i g h t to sue by capping l i a b i l i t y , trimming informed 
consent r u l e s and r e q u i r i n g p l a i n t i f f s to pursue remedies 
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other than l i t i g a t i o n . Even so, the d i s c u s s i o n on the 
way forward continues, p a r t i c u l a r l y about medical 
m a l p r a c t i c e and ma l p r a c t i c e insurance which has been 
de s c r i b e d as 'one of the nations most v i s i b l e s o c i a l and 
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p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s . ' The pr o f e s s i o n s and the j u d i c i a r y i n 
the United Kingdom are aware of the developments i n the 
United S t a t e s and, as s t a t e d e a r l i e r , some are deeply 
concerned with the p o t e n t i a l hazards of the United Kingdom 
going the same way. However, the l e g a l and medical 
systems operating i n USA are so d i f f e r e n t from those i n UK 
t h a t i t does not follow t h a t USA trends w i l l be followed 
i n UK. 
Medical System 
The most g l a r i n g d i f f e r e n c e between medical c a r e i n 
the USA and the UK i s t h a t there i s a National Health 
S e r v i c e i n the UK whereas the American system i s p r i v a t e l y 
funded. I n the UK the bulk of medical p r o v i s i o n i s under 
the s t a t u t o r y s t a t e funded and operated National Health 
S e r v i c e . P r i v a t e h e a l t h c a r e , although on the i n c r e a s e , 
i s not the usual way by which p a t i e n t s r e c e i v e treatment. 
I n the USA the p r i v a t e s e c t o r i s the main provider. The 
c l o s e s t the Americans come to a h e a l t h s e r v i c e i s the 124 
p u b l i c l y funded Medicare. The Medicare programme was 
e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1965 as an insurance plan to help f i n a n c e 
medical s e r v i c e s to the e l d e r l y . Providers of medical 
s e r v i c e s e.g. h o s p i t a l s are reimbursed f o r s e r v i c e s 
covered by Medicare according to a pre=set formula 
determined by refe r e n c e to a diagnosis r e l a t e d group i n t o 
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which a case f a l l s . 
As a consquence i t seems t h a t p a t i e n t s form not only 
the u s u a l doctor/patient r e l a t i o n s h i p s with t h e i r doctors 
but a business r e l a t i o n s h i p . I t i s the 'trade' aspect of 
medical p r a c t i c e which tends to encourage p a t i e n t s to sue 
doctors. The e x i s t e n c e of the National Health S e r v i c e and 
the t r a d i t i o n a l B r i t i s h awe of doctors tends to discourage 
l i t i g a t i o n . Other remedies are sought other than by way 
of court a c t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n , the B r i t i s h appear more 
s t o i c a l , prepared to t o l e r a t e misfortune i n a way t h a t 
Americans apparently r e f u s e to do. But i t may be the 
l e g a l system i t s e l f as i t operates i n the USA t h a t causes 
the g r e a t e s t problem for medical p r a c t i t i o n e r s . 
L e g a l System 
I t may be o v e r s t a t i n g the case t h a t the American 
l e g a l system encourages and f a c i l i t a t e s a b i a s towards 
l i t i g a t i o n . Compared with the system i n the UK t h i s 
appears to be the case. 
F i r s t , the system which the United S t a t e s i n h e r i t e d 
from England has been changed. The l e g a l - e t h i c a l 
p r o h i b i t i o n s a g a i n s t s o l i c i t a t i o n , b a r r a t r y , champerty and 
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maintenance which prevented E n g l i s h lawyers from s t i r r i n g 
up l i t i g a t i o n - have been swept a s i d e i n the USA. There 
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i s a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t to s t i r up l i t i g a t i o n . 
Secondly, i n England locus s t a n d i i s an important 
impediment to l i t i g a t i o n . There has to be an aggrieved 
p l a i n t i f f . I n the USA, i n theory there i s s t i l l such a 
r u l e but i t i s t r e a t e d as a t e c h n i c a l i t y when convenient 
to do so. I n a d d i t i o n , the c l a s s a c t i o n i n USA provides 
more c l i e n t s . 
T h i r d l y , i n England, m e r i t l e s s , and i n some cas e s 
good, l a w s u i t s are discouraged by r e q u i r i n g the p l a i n t i f f 
to pay h i s own and the defendant's lawyer's fees i f he 
l o s e s . Losing l i t i g a n t s i n the USA do not have t h i s 
f i n a n c i a l burden and thus l i t i g a t i o n i s not discouraged. 
I n a d d i t i o n , the f i n a n c i a l burden of one's own lawyer's 
fees i s removed by the device of the contingency fee. The 
r i s k of c o s t s i s s h i f t e d to the lawyer who i s i n a b e t t e r 
p o s i t i o n to bear i t . Unfortunately, lawyers a l s o have an 
economic i n t e r e s t i n the recovery, i n c r e a s i n g the demand 
for l i t i g a t i o n . Even where contingent fee arrangements 
are not f e a s i b l e the court may order the s u c c e s s f u l 
p l a i n t i f f ' s lawyer's fees paid out of the judgment. 
Contingent fees may be based on r e s u l t s . More l i k e l y they 
are c a l c u l a t e d according to a complicated formula based on 
the number of hours worked. The r e s u l t i s to encourage 
lawyers to engage i n u s e l e s s work i n order to i n c r e a s e 
hours. 
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F o u r t h l y , the common law as developed i n the USA has 
been r e v i s e d to c r e a t e more i n c e n t i v e s f o r l i t i g a t i o n . 
Some defences have been removed or c u r t a i l e d i n some 
j u r i s i d i c t i o n s e.g. co n t r i b u t o r y negligence, assumption of 
r i s k . Sometimes p l a i n t i f f s do not have to prove what i n 
England would be regarded as t r a d i t i o n a l elements of a 
cause of a c t i o n e.g. p r i v i t y , c a u s a t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n , 
c o u r t s have fashioned whole new areas of l i a b i l i t y . But 
i t i s not only the courts which have worked to expand 
l i a b i l i t y . Various l e g i s l a t u r e s have done so c r e a t i n g new 
grounds for l i a b i l i t y or new remedies. 
F i f t h l y , j u r y t r i a l i n the USA i s a r e a l problem. I n 
USA j u r y t r i a l i s protected by the c o n s t i t u t i o n . J u r i e s 
are u s u a l l y sympathetic to p l a i n t i f f s and are p r e j u d i c e d 
a g a i n s t defendants with s u b s t a n t i a l r e s o u r c e s . I n UK 
j u r i e s do not feature i n c i v i l a c t i o n s a g a i n s t 
p r o f e s s i o n a l s . 
S i x t h l y , much i s s a i d i n America which deplores the 
explosion of l i t i g a t i o n but there i s no r e a l support f o r 
l i t i g a t i o n to be l i m i t e d . For Americans l i t i g a t i o n i s a 
quick s o l u t i o n , an expression of i n d i v i d u a l freedom, p a r t 
of an o p t i m i s t i c democratic t r a d i t i o n . Remedies are 
w i t h i n the reach of everyone. Americans appear to have 
more f a i t h i n l i t i g a t i o n than they have i n other methods 
of r e d r e s s , e.g. p o l i t i c i a n s , s t a t e agencies, and so 
l i t i g a t i o n i s i n greater demand. 
127 
F i n a l l y , l i t i g a t i o n i s a hazard to b u s i n e s s . 
Business, of which medicine and law are p a r t , i s more 
accountable to i n d i v i d u a l s a f f e c t e d by i t s a c t i o n s 
because of l i t i g a t i o n . I n court, because of the f a c t o r s 
mentioned e a r l i e r , the i n d i v i d u a l i s able to d e a l on equal 
terms with l a r g e i n s t i t u t i o n s . Even where there i s a r i s k 
of f a i l u r e , l i t i g a t i o n induces n e g o t i a t i o n by l a r g e 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s with the i n d i v i d u a l . 
There are many reasons why the l e g a l system i n USA i s 
d i f f e r e n t from UK. Perhaps the USA has gone too f a r and 
w i l l not i n f l u e n c e UK. The f r e e market philosophy of USA 
may be the reason why so much l i t i g a t i o n abounds. I t i s 
not yet apparent i n the UK. Whether the UK changes to 
resemble USA i s a matter fo r the f u t u r e . 
L i t i g a t i o n i n the United Kingdom 
I t i s a measure of the concern about the l i a b i l i t y of 
p r o f e s s i o n a l people i n the USA t h a t s i m i l a r l y attempts 
have been made to r e s t r i c t the l i a b i l i t y of p r o f e s s i o n a l s 
i n the United Kingdom i n some ways. These attempts have 
been made by some members of the j u d i c i a r y , the 
l e g i s l a t u r e and the p r o f e s s i o n s a l l with the same aim of 
producing a b e t t e r balance i e between the i n t e r e s t s of 
p r o f e s s i o n a l and c l i e n t / p a t i e n t , and, i f i t can be 
expressed i n such a vague fashion, u l t i m a t e l y of s o c i e t y 
i t s e l f . 
The attempts by the j u d i c i a r y to r e s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y 
have involved f i n d i n g s t h a t no duty of c a r e e x i s t e d 
128 
between p r o f e s s i o n a l and c l i e n t , or, i f i t e x i s t e d , the 
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duty had not been broken. I n a d d i t i o n the l e g a l d e v i c e s 
of l i m i t a t i o n of a c t i o n s and c a u s a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n 
the form of remoteness of damage, have been u t i l i s e d . I n 
the event of l i a b i l i t y being e s t a b l i s h e d , the same judges 
have been wary of the measure of damages awarded. The 
attempts to keep compensation l e v e l s down have been 
a s s i s t e d i n p a r t by the absence of j u r y t r i a l i n the 
United Kingdom i n negligence a c t i o n s . However, i t must be 
s a i d t h a t a t times the e x i s t e n c e of an a v a i l a b l e insurance 
p o l i c y has been counter productive to t h i s l a s t e f f o r t . 
Insurance i s seen as an important p a r t of the 
p r o f e s s i o n a l ' s equipment. Insurance w i l l help t o s t a v e 
o f f f i n a n c i a l r u i n . But there i s concern as to the extent 
t h a t an a v a i l a b l e insurance p o l i c y i s l i k e l y to i n c r e a s e 
the i n c i d e n t of l i a b i l i t y and the quantum of damages. 
The l e g i s l a t u r e , on the other hand, working as i t 
does a g a i n s t the background of judge-made law has t i n k e r e d 
with machinery, notably i n such areas as l i a b i l i t y towards 
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the unborn c h i l d and l i m i t a t i o n of claims i n c a s e s of 
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l a t e n t damage. However, change has been e f f e c t e d a t a 
g r e a t e r r a t e than had the i s s u e been l e f t to the 
j u d i c i a r y , hampered as they are by the a c c i d e n t s of 
l i t i g a t i o n . 
F i n a l l y , the p r o f e s s i o n s themselves, a c t i n g as 
p e r s u a s i v e and v o c i f e r o u s pressure groups, have attempted 
to p r o t e c t t h e i r members. How e f f e c t i v e t h e i r e f f o r t s have 129 
been i s d i f f i c u l t to a s s e s s , as i s the case with any 
pressure groups„ But, many of these groups are c h a r t e r e d 
or on a s t a t u t o r y b a s i s and as e s t a b l i s h e d do have ac c e s s 
to the important pressure p o i n t s . I n a d d i t i o n , ever 
cognisant of p o t e n t i a l l i a b i l i t y of members, the 
p r o f e s s i o n a l bodies have e i t h e r e s t a b l i s h e d insurance 
schemes or advised members to i n s u r e adequately. 
An Ou t l i n e of some of the Problems a f f e c t i n g P r o f e s s i o n a l 
L i a b i l i t y . 
I t i s probably appropriate a t t h i s stage to examine 
some of these attempts with a view to seeing the p o s s i b l e 
e f f e c t s upon p r o f e s s i o n a l a c t i v i t y . I t i s to be borne i n 
mind t h a t the b a s i s of l i a b i l i t y a t t a c h i n g to p r o f e s s i o n a l 
a c t i v i t y may be i n c o n t r a c t and/or t o r t and be a f f e c t e d 
accordingly. Indeed, as a r e s u l t of the d i s t i n c t i o n s 
between c o n t r a c t and t o r t , a c t i o n s f o r negligence a r e 
subjected to par a d o x i c a l and anomalous e f f e c t s dependant 
simply upon the choice of a c t i o n . Many of the e f f e c t s 
which follow must a l s o be seen i n the l i g h t of whether the 
source of the o b l i g a t i o n i s i n c o n t r a c t or i n t o r t . 
Whether or not the a c t i o n for a l l e g e d negligence i s 
brought i n t o r t or f o r breach of c o n t r a c t , the main burden 
i s upon the p l a i n t i f f - the p a t i e n t or c l i e n t . Negligence 
has to be e s t a b l i s h e d on a balance of p r o b a b i l i t i e s by the 
p l a i n t i f f . Within the concept of negligence there i s the 
notion of f a u l t . The need to f i n d t h a t f a u l t or blame i s a 
d i f f i c u l t p s y c h o l o g i c a l problem f o r the p l a i n t i f f . Acute 
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embarrassment can be caused when a person sues a 
p r o f e s s i o n a l a d v i s e r with whom one p r e v i o u s l y enjoyed a 
78 
harmonious or even intimate r e l a t i o n s h i p . Indeed, the 
problem of f a u l t i s t h a t the p l a i n t i f f ' s needs, l o s s e s or 
conduct seem to assume secondary importance. What i s 
c r u c i a l i s whether the p l a i n t i f f can f i n d someone to 
blame. Condemnation of the defendant depends not so much 
on c u l p a b i l i t y of h i s conduct as on i t s l a r g e l y 
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f o r t u i t i o u s consequences. I t may be t h a t given a f r e e 
hand and other means of compensation a v a i l a b l e , the 
conduct and consequences a l l e g e d would o r d i n a r i l y not 
appear to the reasonable man as negligence. But to ob t a i n 
t h a t compensation f a u l t must be found. F a u l t appears t o be 
a c r u c i a l but perhaps a l s o n o t i o n a l i s s u e . I n p r a c t i c e , 
the concern with f a u l t i s outweighed by insurance ( i n f r a ) . 
I n p r a c t i c e , t o r t l i a b i l i t y has l i t t l e to do with any 
80 
i d e a l t h a t those a t f a u l t pay. I f the c l a i m f a l l s 
w i t h i n a c l a s s t h at i s u s u a l l y covered by insurance the 
p l a i n t i f f w i l l even r e c e i v e g r e a t e r sympathy than i f i t i s 
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not. As p r o f e s s i o n a l indemnity insurance i s the norm 
then one might assume t h a t on proof of negligence, a 
s a t i s f a c t o r y award from the p l a i n t i f f ' s point of view w i l l 
be granted. But i t i s proof of negligence which p r e s e n t s 
a problem. I n cases of medical m a l p r a c t i c e , f o r example, 
i t i s n o t o r i o u s l y d i f f i c u l t f o r the p l a i n t i f f to o b t a i n 
the p r o f e s s i o n a l medical evidence. Doctors a r e , 
understandably, r e l u c t a n t to t e s t i f y a g a i n s t p r o f e s s i o n a l 
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82 c o l l e a g u e s . P r o f e s s i o n a l s have l i t t l e confidence i n a 
f a i r t r i a l . I n a case i n v o l v i n g an a l l e g a t i o n of 
p r o f e s s i o n a l incompetence the judge or witnesses may be 
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moved by 'ordinary human compassion 1 towards 
compensating the p l a i n t i f f a t the i n s u r e r ' s expense. The 
outcome of compensation, while not n e c e s s a r i l y u n f a i r i n 
terms of r e p a i r i n g a damaged l i f e , has the unfortunate 
consequence of p u t t i n g 'the p r o f e s s i o n a l r e p u t a t i o n of a 
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doctor a t stake on the i s s u e of compensation.' 
I n some cases of negligence the e v i d e n t i a l problems 
may be overcome by the do c t r i n e of r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r . The 
d e f i n i t i o n of r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r r e f e r s to a c c i d e n t s 
happening ' i n the ordinary course of t h i n g s ' . T h i s , as 
p c 
was r a i s e d i n Mahon v Osborne ? r e q u i r e s c o n s i d e r a t i o n of 
whether r e l i a n c e i s placed upon common experience. I f so, 
the experience of the expert i s i r r e l e v a n t and, indeed, 
incompatible. I n Mahon v Osborne Goddard L . J . a p p l i e d the 
do c t r i n e but Sco t t L . J . disapproved on the b a s i s t h a t 
where the judge could not have enough knowledge of the 
circumstances to draw an i n f e r e n c e of negligence, as i n 
t h i s medical operation case, the d o c t r i n e had no 
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a p p l i c a t i o n . The do c t r i n e has been a p p l i e d i n subsequent 
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medical negligence cases by the Court of Appeal and 
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r e j e c t e d by a court of f i r s t i n s t a n c e . The point 
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remains open. However, S t r e e t suggests 'that where an 
unexplained accident occurs under the c o n t r o l of the 
defendant, and medical or other evidence shows t h a t such 132 
accidents would not happen i f proper c a r e were used, t h e r e 
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i s a t l e a s t evidence of negligence f o r a j u r y ' ( s i c ) . 
Support f o r the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the d o c t r i n e i s to be 
found subsequently i n Saenders v Leeds Hesterm Health 
.91 On the other hand, where expert evidence i s 
a v a i l a b l e and given, there may be disagreement. Rather 
than r a i s i n g an i n f e r e n c e of negligence, the r e v e r s e 
occurs. Doctors may choose to follow one school of thought 
r a t h e r than another. The judge may even p r e f e r one school 
to another but th a t i s not the t e s t f o r negligence. The 
t e s t remains whether the defendant e x e r c i s e d the s k i l l of 
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a doctor. Medical evidence however, predominates i n 
such c a s e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n matters of ca u s a t i o n . Where 
d i f f e r i n g opinions are presented the judge must s e l e c t 
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from among them as best he can. Even so, cause can be 
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m i s a l l o c a t e d owing to an e r r o r of d i a g n o s i s . 
I t i s due to the d i f f i c u l t i e s presented by l i t i g a t i o n 
t h a t many would-be claimants are deterred. The f e a r of 
l e g a l c o s t s i s a d e t e r r e n t to those who are e i t h e r not 
wealthy or e l i g i b l e f o r l e g a l a i d or other support. T h i s 
r e l u c t a n c e to be involved i n l i t i g a t i o n i n f l u e n c e s the 
p r o f e s s i o n a l defendant a l s o . There i s an understandable 
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f e a r of adverse p u b l i c i t y . For these reasons alone 
there i s an i n c e n t i v e to s e t t l e out of court and most 
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claims are so s e t t l e d . L i t i g a t i o n appears to favour the 
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lar g e corporation more than the i n d i v i d u a l . E i t h e r way, 
the claimant appears to s u f f e r a d v e r s l e y from a unequal 
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bargaining p o s i t i o n . This weakness i s e x e m p l i f i e d by 
Ison by the formulas 'the bargaining p o s i t i o n of the 
claimant, although d i r e c t l y proportionate to the estimated 
value of h i s c l a i m , i s i n v e r s l e y proportionate to the 
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urgency of h i s f i n a n c i a l need.' Consequently, even 
s u c c e s s f u l claimants, according to Ison, recover l e s s than 
a f u l l indemnity where the c l a i m i s s e t t l e d out of 
c o u r t . T o balance t h i s Jandoo and Harland maintain 
t h a t settlement out of court where the claimant i s l e g a l l y 
aided, produces u n f a i r n e s s a g a i n s t the 
p r o f e s s i o n a l , (supra) 
Assessment of Damages i n P r o f e s s i o n a l Hegligemce 
Up to a point the p r o f e s s i o n s , the c o u r t s and the 
l e g i s l a t u r e share a common concern about the measure of 
damages awarded. Of the three, the p r o f e s s i o n s f e e l most 
c l o s e l y a f f e c t e d , even threatened, by the awards and have 
attempted to persuade government to impose l i m i t s on the 
damages awarded. As r e f e r r e d to e a r l i e r , i n the United 
S t a t e s some s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s have stepped i n and capped 
l i a b i l i t y and r e q u i r e d p l a i n t i f f s to pursue remedies other 
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than l i t i g a t i o n . I n the United Kingdom the p r o f e s s i o n s ' 
request to l i m i t the damages t h a t courts can award has 
been refused by the Government. Prompted by what they 
described as the ' c a t a s t r o p h i c consequences' of huge 
claims f o r damages' the p r o f e s s i o n s lobbied the Government 
to no a v a i l . Various f e a r s were expressed i n c l u d i n g 
deterrence of new e n t r a n t s , a lowering of p r o f e s s i o n a l 
134 
standards and l o s s of p u b l i c confidence. A s s o c i a t e d w i t h 
t h i s impact on the pro f e s s i o n s there were f u r t h e r problems 
to be faced by the pro f e s s i o n s such as the s c a l e of r i s i n g 
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claims and the d i f f i c u l t y of obtaining insurance cover. 
For the Government 1s p a r t there i s s t i l l no i n t e n t i o n of 
capping damages. Any f i g u r e chosen would be a r b i t r a r y and 
produce i n j u s t i c e when p l a i n t i f f s would be unable to 
recover the f u l l extent of damage s u f f e r e d . P a r t of the 
argument against r e l a t e d to insurance which was a v a i l a b l e 
to h o s p i t a l doctors a t r e l a t i v e l y low c o s t . As f o r the 
pro f e s s i o n ' s a s s e r t i o n t h a t some s e r v i c e s would be 
withdrawn there was, according to the Government, l i t t l e 
evidence to support that."*"^ 
I n c o n s i d e r i n g the i s s u e of damages the p r o f e s s i o n s 
were alarmed by 'catastrophic consequences should they 
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make an honest misjudgement or e r r o r * . I t i s submitted 
t h a t t h i s f e a r i s misplaced. Lord Denning MR. i n 
Whitehouse v Jordan expressed the view t h a t ' i n a 
p r o f e s s i o n a l man, an e r r o r of judgement i s not 
n e g l i g e n c e ' . H o w e v e r , Lord Denning MR. was wrong. I n 
the House of Lords Lord Edmund Davies thought t h a t 'To say 
th a t a surgeon committed an e r r o r of c l i n i c a l judgment i s 
wholly ambiguous, f o r , while some such e r r o r s may be 
completely c o n s i s t e n t with the due e x e r c i s e of 
p r o f e s s i o n a l s k i l l , other a c t s or omissions i n the course 
of e x e r c i s i n g " c l i n i c a l judgement" may be so g l a r i n g l y 
below proper standards as to make a f i n d i n g of negligence 
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107 i n e v i t a b l e . ' But l e s t t h i s might be taken to be the 
t e s t f o r medical men only, Lord Edmund -• Davies was a t 
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pains to put t h i s r i g h t and s t a t e d what i s known as the 
Bolam standard, t h a t i s , 'the standard of the o r d i n a r y 
s k i l l e d man e x e r c i s i n g and p r o f e s s i n g to have t h a t s p e c i a l 
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s k i l l o Thus, whether Lord Denning"s statement, verging 
on immunity or the q u a l i f i e d view of Lord Edmund Davies i s 
taken, the b a s i c f e a r of the p r o f e s s i o n s i s probably 
exaggerated, emanating, as i t probably does, from the 
d e s i r e to preserve a vested i n t e r e s t . 
However, there i s some j u d i c i a l c o n c ^ e r n 1 1 ^ t h a t 
damages may get out of hand and so the j u d i c i a r y i t s e l f i s 
prepared to put the brakes on t h i s expansion. I n 
Hhitehouse w Jordan Lord Denning r e f e r r e d to the s i t u a t i o n 
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i n the United S t a t e s where' [the] damages are c o l o s s a l ' 
and there are E n g l i s h cases i n which there have been ov e r t 
attempts to counter the measure of damages and to 
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r e a p p r a i s e the method of assessment. But i t i s a 
l i t t l e presumptuous to t r a n s l a t e the American experience 
i n t o the United Kingdom as there are fundamental 
d i f f e r e n c e between the l e g a l systems operating i n these 
two p l a c e s . 
F i r s t , the system of contingency fees does not 
operate i n the United Kingdom as i t does i n some s t a t e s i n 
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America ( s u p r a ) . At the moment as i t i s s t i l l regarded 
as a champertous p r a c t i c e but recent developments i n d i c a t e 
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a change i s l i k e l y . Secondly, j u r y t r i a l i s not used 
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116 i n the United Kingdom i n negligence t r i a l s , The 
tendency towards massive awards of damages has not 
m a t e r i a l i s e d . 
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I n h i s book What BJext La. the Law Lord Denning 
i d e n t i f i e s the d e r i v a t i o n of the law governing damages as 
t r i a l by j u r y . As there was only one t r i a l there could be 
only one award. As a consequences, damages were a s s e s s e d 
i n terms of a lump sum. There was no system of p e r i o d i c 
payments or payment by instalments. But the o b j e c t of the 
awards of damages was to give f a i r compensation. Judges 
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d i r e c t e d j u r i e s to t h a t e f f e c t . The award, when made, 
i s a composite f i g u r e of many p a r t s a l l of which should 
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come together to give f a i r compensation. But the 
composite f i g u r e began to break down when Parliament 
d e c l a r e d t h a t where damages are awarded f o r per s o n a l 
i n j u r i e s the court s h a l l 'include i n t h a t sum i n t e r e s t on 
those damages or on such p a r t of them as the cou r t 
120 
co n s i d e r s appropriate' Thus, the judges' view of 
damages became fragmented and di v i d e d i n t o v a r i o u s 
121 
heads. Some of these heads produce d i f f i c u l t i e s i n 
assessment, p a r t i c u l a r l y those r e l a t i n g to f u t u r e 
developments i n the l i f e of the p l a i n t i f f . I n Lord 
Denning's view t h i s has produced the e f f e c t of no longer 
awarding f a i r compensation but f u l l compensation based 
122 
upon a c t u a r i a l evidence and annuity t a b l e s , a t a s k 
which was never one f o r the judge or j u r y a t a l l . 
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An i n d i c a t i o n of Lord Denning's concern, a t l e a s t s i s 
shown by h i s d i s s e n t i n g judgment i n Linn Poh Choo v Camden 
123 
and I s l i n g t o n Area Health A u t h o r i t y where the award was 
'a staggering f i g u r e . . . the highest sum awarded up to t h a t 
124 
time i n the c o u r t s ' . I n cases of t h i s type there are 
i s s u e s which go beyond the requirement of compensating the 
p l a i n t i f f . 
Where, as i s the case i n the United Kingdom, th e r e i s 
a p u b l i c h e a l t h s e r v i c e , there i s a danger of compensating 
the v i c t i m twice. F i r s t , there may be the award of 
s u b s t a n t i a l damages by the h e a l t h a u t h o r i t y , and secondly, 
the h e a l t h s e r v i c e may continue to foot the b i l l i n 
r e s p e c t of f u r t h e r medical treatment as a consequence of 
the o r i g i n a l negligence. Not a l l judges would make the 
point and i n Lim Poh Choo i t was mainly as a r e s u l t of 
Lord Denning's d i s s e n t i n g judgment t h a t t h i s p oint i s 
p r e s e n t l y being made. Indeed, to balance Lord Denning's 
concern over awarding too great a sum, other judges were 
prepared to b u i l d i n sums to allow f o r i n f l a t i o n , 
producing even g r e a t e r awards of damages. But n e i t h e r 
stance i s wholly r i g h t or wrong, both being rooted i n the 
d e s i r e to award f a i r and reasonable damages. 
The o b j e c t of the r u l e s r e l a t i n g to damages i s to 
provide f a i r compensation f o r the i n j u r y s u f f e r e d . I n 
Lim a l l the judges involved were concerned to see t h a t the 
damages were f a i r and resonable, even Lawton L . J . , who 
125 
r e f e r r e d to the award as ' s t a r t l i n g ' . But there was a 
138 
d i f f e r e n c e i n the a t t i t u d e of the judges i n the Court of 
Appeal to t h i s i s s u e . Lord Denning M.R. considered t h a t 
' f a i r compensation must mean th a t she i s to be kept i n as 
much comfort and tended with as much c a r e as compassion 
for her so r i g h t l y demands. . . ' But h i s Lordship d i d not 
see t h a t any more was needed than t h a t , e s p e c i a l l y i n the 
case of unconscious p l a i n t i f f s . U l t i m a t e l y the r e a l 
b e n e f i c i a r y of these damages w i l l be the r e l a t i v e s or, i f 
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none, the Crown as bona v a c a n t i a . His Lordship made 
t h i s point as a repeated c r i t i c i s m of over l a r g e awards. 
I n speaking more g e n e r a l l y of the problem i n medical 
mal p r a c t i c e cases of t h i s kind Lord Denning r e f e r e d to the 
d i s s i p a t i o n of p u b l i c funds which 'have to be c a r e f u l l y 
husbanded and spent on e s s e n t i a l s e r v i c e s . They should not 
be d i s s i p a t e d i n paying more than f a i r compensation. I n 
many of these cases the National Health S e r v i c e w i l l i n g l y 
provides f u l l c a r e , nursing and a t t e n t i o n without charging 
anything f o r i t . S u r e l y t h i s , too, should go to reduce the 
amount awarded a g a i n s t them. The damages should not be 
i n f l a t e d so as to cover the c o s t of being kept i n the most 
expensive nursing home. I t has been known I am not 
saying i n t h i s case •• t h a t when such damages have been 
awarded, the r e l a t i v e s have afterwards arranged to take 
advantage of the f a c i l i t i e s afforded by the National 
127 
Health S e r v i c e . . . and thus save money for themselves. 1 
His Lordship a l s o r e f e r r e d to the e f f e c t on the p r i v a t e 
s e c t o r where l a r g e awards merely i n c r e a s e d premiums and 
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128 the consequent c o s t of medical treatment. To provide 
f a i r and reasonable compensation, Lord Denning argued, i t 
i s d e s i r a b l e to exclude an item f o r l o s s of earnings by 
the p l a i n t i f f rendered unconscious and i n c l u d e an item f o r 
129 
pecuniary l o s s s u f f e r e d by dependants. I n any event 
the p r i n c i p l e s of compensation r e q u i r e r a d i c a l 
r e a p p r a i s a l . ^ ® 
Lawton and Browne L J J i n Lim d i d not agree, although 
Browne L J a l s o considered t h a t the p r i n c i p l e s on which 
131 
damages are awarded needed r e a p p r a i s a l . I n s t e a d Lawton 
L J , although he regarded the i n i t i a l award as 
' s t a r t l i n g ' , dismissed the appeal. Parliament would have 
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to take a c t i o n not the c o u r t s . The award as i t stood 
was f a i r and reasonable and he would agree w i t h the 
a d d i t i o n a l f a c t o r to take int o account future i n f l a t i o n 
and tax a t the higher l e v e l . Browne L J concurred, thus 
proceeding i n the opposite d i r e c t i o n from Lord Denning MR 
on the b a s i s of a u t h o r i t y . Lord Reid had considered i t 
'quite u n r e a l i s t i c ' to r e f u s e to take [ f u t u r e i n f l a t i o n ] 
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i n t o account at a l l ' and t h a t t a x a t i o n should be taken 
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i n t o account a l s o . But t h i s was a g a i n s t the 
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a u t h o r i t i e s u n t i l Cookson v Enowles. I n f l a t i o n became 
a f a c t o r i n awarding damages by the use of m u l t i p l i e r s of 
4 or 5 per cent but there could be e x c e p t i o n a l cases where 
the award a t t r a c t e d tax at a high r a t e i n which case the 
m u l t i p l i e r could be i n c r e a s e d or i n f l a t i o n allowed f o r i n 
some other way. 140 
Thus, there i s a s i t u a t i o n which produces a dilemma. 
There must be adequate damages for the p l a i n t i f f . Lawton 
L J , r a t h e r than r e s t r i c t i n g the p l a i n t i f f ' s c l a i m 
p r e f e r r e d to go the other way. His Lordships' concern 
'for the p l a i n t i f f i s t h a t the award may not be enough f o r 
her care during her l i f e t i m e . ' 
Lira went to the House of Lords which r e j e c t e d the 
appeal without making the r e a p p r a i s a l t h a t Lord 
Denning M R and Browne L J had requested. Lord Scarman 
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s t a t e d 'the questions t h e r e f o r e , a r i s e s whether the 
s t a t e of the law which gives r i s e to such c o m p l e x i t i e s i s 
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sound. Lord Denning MR. ... d e c l a r e d t h a t a r a d i c a l 
r e a p p r a i s a l of the law i s needed. I agree. But I p a r t 
company with him on ways and means. The Master of the 
R o l l s b e l i e v e s i t can be done by the judges, whereas I 
would suggest to your Lordships that such a r e a p p r a i s a l 
c a l l s f o r s o c i a l , f i n a n c i a l , economic and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
d e c i s i o n s which only the l e g i s l a t u r e can take. The 
p e r p l e x i t i e s of the present case, f o l l o w i n g upon the 
p u b l i c a t i o n of the Report of the Royal Commission on C i v i l 
L i a b i l i t y and Compensation f o r Personal I n j u r y (1978) 
(Cmnd 7054) ("the Pearson Report"), emphasises the need 
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for reform of the law.' 
Lord Denning does not, of course approve of t h i s 
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r e f u s a l to take a c t i o n by the House of Lords. As 
Parliament has not yet acted the judge i s d r i v e n to look 
forward i n time and speculate upon future pecuniary 
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l o s s e s . He i s as l i k e l y to be wrong as to be r i g h t . For 
Lord Denning the s o l u t i o n i s p e r i o d i c payments i n s t e a d of 
a lump sum. But as t h i s i s not p o s s i b l e he advocated the 
next best system i s f i x i n g payments f o r the f i r s t t h r e e 
years and l i n k i n g them with an index. T h e r e a f t e r , a three 
y e a r l y review, a l s o index l i n k e d , could take i n t o account 
, 141 any changes. 
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The Pearson Report recognised t h a t i n many clai m s 
the l o s s e s are u s u a l l y i n p e r i o d i c form e.g. l o s t income 
and outgoings a l s o tend to be r e g u l a r and p e r i o d i c . T h i s 
being so the lump sum i s not the most appropriate form of 
compensation. T r a n s l a t i n g p e r i o d i c l o s s e s i n t o a lump sum 
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i s ' i n e v i t a b l y i n e x a c t ' although there are some 
advantages. Perhaps foremost there i s f i n a l i t y of 
l i t i g a t i o n . Both the p l a i n t i f f and defendant are f r e e of 
the dispute. The defendant may discharge h i s l i a b i l i t y . 
I n cases of p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence t h i s would of t e n mean 
t h a t the i n s u r e r can c l o s e the f i l e and keeps down 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o s t s which would be i n c u r r e d with 
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continuous payments. Premiums could be kept down. The 
145 
lump sum gives the p l a i n t i f f freedom of choice. The 
court w i l l not be concerned with how the p l a i n t i f f uses 
146 
the award. 
However, des p i t e these arguments i n favour of lump 
sum payments the Royal Commission was not convinced i n the 
case of death or s e r i o u s and l a s t i n g i n j u r y . F o r e c a s t i n g 
may be bad and the p l a i n t i f f undercompensated, the 142 
p l a i n t i f f would enjoy a freedom he would not have had had 
he not been i n j u r e d and exhaustion of the lump sum would 
mean support from the s t a r t i n the form of supplementary 
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b e n e f i t a form of double compensation. P e r i o d i c 
payments o f f e r more advantages i n s e r i o u s c a s e s . F i r s t , 
c l o s e r r e s t o r a t i o n of the p l a i n t i f f to h i s o r i g i n a l 
p o s i t i o n . Secondly, account could be taken of a c t u a l s 
r a t h e r than f o r e c a s t s changes i n the p l a i n t i f f ' s s i t u a t i o n 
a f t e r t r i a l . Compensation could be adjusted up or down to 
meet a change. T h i r d l y , i f p e r i o d i c payments were taxed 
as earned income the payments would avoid the high r a t e s 
of tax payable on a l a r g e lump sum award. Fo u r t h l y , other 
compensation r e c e i v e d by the p l a i n t i f f could be o f f s e t 
a g a i n s t the p e r i o d i c payment of damages. T h i s other 
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compensation i s a l s o l i k e l y to be p e r i o d i c . F i f t h l y , 
the dangers of p e r i o d i c payments prolonging i n c a p a c i t y are 
outweighed by the advantages i n r e l i e v i n g f i n a n c i a l 149 150 anxiety. The Royal Commission noted t h a t a system 
of p e r i o d i c payments would be opposed by v i r t u a l l y every 
o r g a n i s a t i o n concerned with personal i n j u r y l i t i g a t i o n . 
Even so, the commercial insurance market could s e r v i c e 
such a system. Taken a l l i n a l l the Royal Commission 
recommended a system of p e r i o d i c payments 'for f u t u r e 
pecuniary l o s s caused by death or s e r i o u s and l a s t i n g 
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i n j u r y ' d e s p i t e the p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
Although t h i s d i s c u s s i o n has been r e s t r i c t e d to 
damages fo r personal i n j u r i e s , i t does emphasise the 
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concern which i s f e l t f o r the perceived inadequacies of 
the present system of assessment. Not a l l would agree 
t h a t the system i s a t f a u l t , nor among those who do, with 
what i s necessary to remedy the def e c t s or the methods f o r 
doing so. But there appears s u f f i c i e n t cause f o r concern 
about the system and the pressure f o r reform i s u n l i k e l y 
to subside. 
M i t i g a t i o n o£ Damage 
Whatever award i s given by the court, the f i n a l 
f i g u r e w i l l have been a r r i v e d a t a f t e r a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of 
the need f o r a p l a i n t i f f to mitig a t e h i s damage. I n 
short, a p l a i n t i f f must take reasonable steps to minimise 
l o s s once he i s aware of the defendant's breach of duty 
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i . e . through negligence. I t follows t h a t a p l a i n t i f f 
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cannot recover f o r l o s s e s which he could have avoided. 
However, should the p l a i n t i f f take such reasonable steps 
he may recover f o r the l o s s i n c u r r e d as a r e s u l t of such 
154 
s t e p s , although, a p l a i n t i f f w i l l not recover f o r any 
155 
avoided l o s s . On the whole, the p r i n c i p l e of 
156 
m i t i g a t i o n of damage b e n e f i t s the defendant. 
The p r i n c i p l e of m i t i g a t i o n of damage i s e q u a l l y 
a p p l i c a b l e to c o n t r a c t and t o r t and w i l l apply, f o r 
example, to the case of a p l a i n t i f f who has been i n j u r e d 
as a r e s u l t of negligence and has f a i l e d to take 
reasonable steps to seek medical a i d thus f a i l i n g to 
157 
reduce pain and s u f f e r i n g r e s u l t i n g from the i n j u r y " 
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The r u l e s of m i t i g a t i o n w i l l apply i f the o r i g i n a l 
158 
negligence was, f o r example, medical negligence. 
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The purpose behind the duty to mi t i g a t e i s summed 
up i n D a r b i s h i r e v Marram by Pearson L J as 'that the 
p l a i n t i f f i s not e n t i t l e d to charge the defendant by way 
of damages with any gr e a t e r sum than t h a t which he 
reasonably needs to expend f o r the purpose of making good 
the l o s s . I n short he i s f u l l y e n t i t l e d to be as 
extravagant as he p l e a s e s but not at the expense of the 
defendant. • **>0 
The onus of proof i s upon the defendant. He has to 
show t h a t the p l a i n t i f f ought to have taken reasonable 
steps to m i t i g a t e . F a i l u r e to do so w i l l mean t h a t the 
normal measure w i l l apply.**** 
The p l a i n t i f f i s expected to a c t reasonably, such 
a c t i o n being assessed o b j e c t i v e l y by asking what the 
reasonable man i n the p l a i n t i f f ' s p o s i t i o n would have 
done. I n so a c t i n g the p l a i n t i f f should have h i s own and 
the defendant's i n t e r e s t s i n mind but t h i s does not 
l i c e n s e the defendant to be o v e r c r i t i c a l of the 
p l a i n t i f f ' s conduct. The courts do not r e a d i l y accept 
c r i t i c i s m of a p l a i n t i f f from a defendant who c r e a t e d the 
unfortunate s i t u a t i o n i n the f i r s t p l a c e . As Lord 
MacMillan put i t ' I t i s often easy a f t e r an emergency has 
passed to c r i t i c i s e the steps which have been taken to 
meet i t , but such c r i t i c i s m does not come w e l l from those 
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who have themselves c r e a t e d the emergency.' Whether 
145 
such steps are reasonable are matters of f a c t , not law. 
Even where reasonable steps have been taken and the l o s s 
i s thereby increased, such e n t i r e l o s s i s recoverable from 
the defendant. Dugdale and Stanton give the example, i n 
the p r o f e s s i o n a l context, of where a p r o f e s s i o n a l person's 
negligence leaves h i s c l i e n t i n a p o s i t i o n which he 
attempts to r e t r i e v e by t a k i n g proceedings a g a i n s t a t h i r d 
party. I f the proceedings do not a v a i l the p l a i n t i f f , the 
expenses i n c u r r e d i n the proceedings w i l l be recoverable 
from the negligent p r o f e s s i o n a l i f reasonably 
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i n c u r r e d . That would apply even i f the a c t i o n to 
mi t i g a t e took place not as soon as p o s s i b l e a f t e r the 
breach but l a t e r , provided l a t e r a c t i o n was 
reasonable. Should the p l a i n t i f f be unable to take 
such steps i n m i t i g a t i o n owing to h i s impecuniosity 
t h i s w i l l not p r e j u d i c e him. I n the opinion of Lord 
C o l l i n s i n Clippens O i l Co. v Edinburgh a n d . D i s t r i c t Water 
Tru s t e e s '... the wrong-doer must take h i s v i c t i m talem 
qualem, and i f the p o s i t i o n of the l a t t e r i s aggravated 
because he was without the means of m i t i g a t i n g i t , so much 
the worse for the wrongdoer, who has got to be answerable 
165 
f o r the consequence flowing from h i s t o r t i o u s a c t . ' 
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I n L i e s b o s c h Dredger v S S Edison Lord Wright 
considered Lord C o l l i n s ' dictum to be i r r e l e v a n t as he was 
not c o n s i d e r i n g m i t i g a t i o n . Dodd P r o p e r t i e s confirms 
Clippens O i l but perhaps the p r i n c i p l e s of remoteness and 
m i t i g a t i o n should not c o n f l i c t f o r i f 'the i n t e r e s t 
146 
charges were unreasonable, they were too remote? they were 
not caused by the breach; they were not p a r t of a 
reasonable form of m i t i g a t i o n . ' 
A f i n a l point on t h i s survey of m i t i g a t i o n of damage 
i s shown i n the s i t u a t i o n envisaged by Dugdale and 
'168 
Stanton." I n a case of p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence should a 
p l a i n t i f f m i t i g a t e by accepting an o f f e r of a s s i s t a n c e 
from the defendant? U s u a l l y the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the 
p r o f e s s i o n a l and the c l i e n t / p a t i e n t w i l l have been 
damaged, perhaps beyond r e p a i r . I f the c l i e n t has l o s t 
confidence i n the p r o f e s s i o n a l , Stanton and Dugdale 
suggest t h a t the c l i e n t should not be expected to accept 
the o f f e r i . e . not unreasonable conduct. Otherwise, 
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acceptance w i l l be necessary i n order to m i t i g a t e . 
M i t i g a t i o n w i l l , of course, operate from the base 
l i n e of the normal measure of damages and t h e r e f o r e , i n 
t h i s sense i s d i r e c t l y r e f e r a b l e to the system of 
assessment of damages. 
Jur y T r i a l 
However, i f the system of assessment i s d e f e c t i v e i n 
the hands of the judges, how much more would the problem 
be i n c r e a s e d i f , as a p p l i e s i n the United S t a t e s , j u r y 
t r i a l were to be adopted i n c i v i l c a s e s . 
Much of the concern generated about p r o f e s s i o n a l 
l i a b i l i t y appears to have been l a r g e l y as a r e s u l t of 
observations made of the s i t u a t i o n i n the United S t a t e s . 
There are, however, many d i f f e r e n c e s between the United 
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Kingdom and the United S t a t e s . (supra) The Pearson 
Commission noted t h a t l i t i g a t i o n i n the USA i s more 
expensive and the l e v e l of damages awarded g e n e r a l l y i s 
much higher there than i n t h i s country. The system of 
j u r y t r i a l makes t r i a l s longer and more expensive. J u r i e s 
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award damages but not l e g a l c o s t s , the l a t t e r being 
absorbed under the contingent fee system. J u r i e s are an 
important feature of t r i a l i n the United S t a t e s , so much 
so t h a t a b o l i t i o n of j u r y t r i a l could not be done without 
171 
amending the C o n s t i t u t i o n . Thus, i n the United S t a t e s 
j u r i e s r e i g n supreme. Where the j u r y was c o n s i d e r i n g 
claims i n negligence which i s based on the ' f a u l t ' system, 
and i t s moral overtones, the j u r i e s j u r i s d i c t i o n became 
almost unlimited on both the questions of l i a b i l i t y and 
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damages. As a r e s u l t of the v e r d i c t s of j u r i e s i t i s 
be l i e v e d , awards of damages were g r e a t e r , insurance r a t e s 
i n c r e a s e d and t h i s l e d to s t i l l g r e a t e r awards i n 
173 
i n d u s t r i a l c a s e s . I n the United Kingdom, although there 
174 
s t i l l i s j u r y t r i a l a v a i l a b l e i n some c i v i l c a s e s , 
s i n c e 1966 i t has not been a fe a t u r e of personal i n j u r y 
t r i a l s . 
P r o f e s s i o n a l Indemnity Insurance 
I n the meantime, the e f f e c t of insurance i s f e l t . 
The development of l i a b i l i t y i n negligence has been 
accompanied by the growth of l i a b i l i t y i n s urance. 
P o t e n t i a l defendants, i n t h i s context p r o f e s s i o n a l 
persons, pool the r i s k s . Nearly a l l persons who may i n c u r 
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p r o f e s s i o n a l l i a b i l i t i e s cover the r i s k by insurance. 
T h i s i s regarded as being i n the i n t e r e s t of both the 
p l a i n t i f f and the defendant, t h a t i s , the defendant i s now 
i n a p o s i t i o n to pay damages and thereby compensate the 
175 
p l a i n t i f f . Atiyah defines the purpose of l i a b i l i t y 
insurance to be... 'to p r o t e c t the insured a g a i n s t some 
contingency a g a i n s t which i t i s v i r t u a l l y impossible f o r 
17 6 
him to guard adequately by other means.' I n t u r n , 
commentators have come to regard negligence i n s u r a n c e . . . 
'as a necessary p a r t of every w e l l turned out lawyers' 
177 
p r o f e s s i o n a l equipment...' and medical negligence 
178 
insurance as customary. 
Where p a r t i e s are supported by insurance there i s an 179 180 enhanced chance of settlement. I n i t s Report, the 
Royal Commission s t a t e d "Usually there i s a settlement by 
agreement between the defendant's i n s u r e r and the 
p l a i n t i f f or h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , ' This i s to be 
applauded, provided such a settlement i s not 
181 
misconceived, as i t means t h a t l i t i g a t i o n w i l l r a r e l y 
take p l a c e . I n general, the law favours settlement. I t 
i s l e s s expensive than l i t i g a t i o n and the law regards the 
settlement as a c o n t r a c t which binds the p a r t i e s . More 
claims are s e t t l e d than pursued to judgment - over 90% i n 
182 
a c c i d e n t c a s e s . This e f f e c t , coupled with the a b i l i t y 
to s a t i s f y claims i s a p o s i t i v e b e n e f i t c o n f e r r e d by 
insurance. 
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There i s , however, a c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a t insurance can 
i t s e l f be a f a c t o r not only i n inducing a p l a i n t i f f to sue 
and, p o s s i b l y , take the c l a i m through to judgment, but 
a l s o i n f l u e n c e the l e g i s l a t u r e , judges and/or j u r i e s as 
f a r as the incidence of l i a b i l i t y i s concerned. I t i s 
worth c o n s i d e r i n g who the defendants are i n such cases 
where l i a b i l i t y insurance i s a f e a t u r e . On the s u r f a c e i t 
appears t h a t those who commit t o r t s are those who 
compensate for what they have done. But the t r u t h of the 
matter i s t h a t people who commit t o r t s very r a r e l y pay 
183 
compensation to anyone because of insurance. Indeed 
the expense of l i t i g a t i o n i s r a r e l y borne by the persons 
184 
p r i m a r i l y concerned. The great m a j o r i t y of t o r t 
c l a i m s , e s p e c i a l l y f o r p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence are made 
aga i n s t a person who has insurance a g a i n s t such 
i pc 
l i a b i l i t y . While there i s the b e n e f i t 
t h a t those i n j u r e d by the negligence w i l l , i f s u c c e s s f u l , 
be compensated, there i s the danger t h a t 'one major f a c t o r 
which determines whether a t o r t c l a i m i s l i k e l y to be made 
at a l l i s the very f a c t t h a t there i s a p o s s i b l e defendant 
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who i s insured.' As a r e s u l t , insurance ceases to be a 
form of p r o t e c t i o n f o r the insured but p a r t of a system 
fo r s e c u r i n g compensation. I n turn, l i a b i l i t y i nsurance 
changes i t s r o l e and e x i s t s f o r the p r o t e c t i o n of v i c t i m s , 
187 
so much so t h a t ' t o r t l i a b i l i t y can... be regarded as 
a means of inducing those who may cause l o s s e s to others 
to procure insurance i n t h e i r favour by compelling them to 
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pay f o r the losses themselves i f they f a i l t o procure such 
, 188 insurance.' 
I t appears, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t w hile l i a b i l i t y should be 
expected t o f o l l o w a f i n d i n g of f a u l t by the defendant, i n 
p r a c t i c e l i a b i l i t y seems t o f o l l o w the incidence of 
insurance. This increased incidence of l i a b i l i t y i s 
thought t o be q u a n t i t a t i v e l y s i g n i f i c a n t i n areas of 
a c t i v i t y where l i a b i l i t y insurance i s customary. I t may 
matter l i t t l e whether there i s insurance or not. I f the 
claim i s made i n an area where one would expect t o f i n d 
insurance, then i r r e s p e c t i v e of a c t u a l knowledge, the 
189 
claimant may f i n d more sympathy f o r the a l l e g a t i o n . The 
existence of insurance i s not supposed t o be known t o the 
judge but i t i s u s u a l l y obvious from the way i n which the 
case i s conducted. At a time when there was j u r y t r i a l i f 
a defendant was insured i n respect of l i a b i l i t y i t was a 
general r u l e of p r a c t i c e t h a t the j u r y must not be 
190 
informed. Should counsel merely suggest the f a c t of 
191 
insurance i t was held t o be improper and j u s t i f y the 
192 
discharge of the j u r y and a new t r i a l . The reason f o r 
keeping the j u r y i n ignorance was s t a t e d by Scrutton C J 
(supra n 188)» The defendant was not allowed t o j o i n the 
i n s u r e r where the l a t t e r disputed l i a b i l i t y by use of the 
193 
t h i r d p a r t y procedure. This r u l e does not apply i n the 
194 
case of t r i a l by judge alone. I t might be argued, 
t h e r e f o r e , t h a t i n the absence of j u r y t r i a l , t h i s r u l e i s 
195 
obsolete. 151 
And so i t seems t h a t the e f f e c t of l i a b i l i t y 
insurance i s two f o l d . I t ensures t h a t compensation i s 
payable even though i t may also increase the l i k e l i h o o d 
t h a t compensation w i l l have t o be paid. I n t u r n , there 
w i l l be higher premiums which the p r o f e s s i o n a l w i l l pass 
on t o the c l i e n t . I n a system based upon p r i v a t e 
medicine, such as the USA, there w i l l be the d i r e c t r e s u l t 
of passing on costs t o the p a t i e n t / c l i e n t . I n the United 
Kingdom there i s a National Health Service. 
P r a c t i t i o n e r s ' premiums are paid i n p a r t by the WHS. As a 
consequence increase i n awards w i l l push up premiums 
r e s u l t i n g i n a greater burden upon NHS resources. E i t h e r 
t h a t or an increase i n t a x a t i o n t o fund the p u b l i c 
s e r v i c e . Even so, t h i s i s not n e c e s s a r i l y a bad e f f e c t . 
I f i t means t h a t a l l p a t i e n t s / c l i e n t s pay a l i t t l e more 
t o cover an e v e n t u a l i t y t h a t may never come about, i t i s 
j u s t i f i e d i n order t h a t any p a t i e n t / c l i e n t who s u f f e r s 
i n j u r y w i l l not go uncompensated. This i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h 
the r o l e of the law of t o r t i n a l l o c a t i n g losses even 
though i n t h i s case spreading the r i s k appears t o be the 
method of implementation. 
A Defective System? 
The c u r r e n t s t a t e of a f f a i r s associated w i t h 
p r o f e s s i o n a l l i a b i l i t y i s u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . Professions are 
becoming anxious and developing unnecessary and, p o s s i b l y , 
unsafe p r a c t i c e s . Patients or c l i e n t s are f e e l i n g the 
s t r a i n i n s o f a r as the system of compensation t o which they 
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must have recourse i s beset w i t h d i f f i c u l t i e s . A l l o f the 
above appears t o be counterproductive and professions may 
become regarded as a n t i - s o c i a l o b s t r u c t i o n s t o j u s t i c e 
r a t h e r than bodies concerned w i t h the p r o v i s i o n of 
e s s e n t i a l services. So much so t h a t there appears t o be a 
continuous demand from one source or another f o r a r a d i c a l 
overhaul of the system of compensating v i c t i m s of 
accidents, and, i n t h i s case, p r o f e s s i o n a l mistakes. 
Mo-fault. Compensation 
The B r i t i s h Medical Association set up a working 
p a r t y on n o - f a u l t compensation which has now repo r t e d . 
The working p a r t y proposed t h a t v i c t i m s of medical 
accidents should be compensated according t o need and not 
according t o cause. To provide compensation would r e q u i r e 
a s t a t e funded scheme of £50 m i l l i o n t o provide speedy and 
automatic compensation t o a l l v i c t i m s of medical accidents 
without the need f o r proving negligence. The new scheme 
would not prevent those who thought they could prove 
negligence from pursuing t h e i r claim i n c o u r t . The 
advantages of a n o - f a u l t scheme, recommended on the basis 
of a study of the schemes i n New Zealand and Sweden, would 
be many. The scheme would not be expensive t o set up - i n 
Sweden t h i s was done a t less than £1 per head. Lump sum 
payments based upon an agreed scale of damages would be 
paid w i t h i n months instead of years and there would be 
regul a r f o l l o w up payments based on loss of earnings. The 
l a t t e r payment would, of course, remove some of the 
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problems of damages discussed supra. I n a d d i t i o n , by 
compensating i n many cases without recourse t o l i t i g a t i o n 
the incidence of high l e g a l fees, perhaps absorbing as 
much as 50% = 70% of an award, would be avoided. F i n a l l y , 
i t i s t o be hoped t h a t medicine would become less 
expensive and less defensive and as a consequence the r a t e 
of increase of insurance premiums should not be so gre a t . 
However, i t would seem there i s s t i l l a long way t o 
go i n the establishment of a n o - f a u l t compensation scheme. 
Not only government but the l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n and insurance 
i n d u s t r y w i l l have t o become involved and t h i s w i l l take 
196 
time. Proposals l i k e the above have t o be seen against 
the backcloth of other recommendations regarding n o - f a u l t 
compensation, such as the Pearson Report, which d i d not 
recommend the establishment of such a scheme, p r e f e r r i n g a 
mixed system of t o r t l i a b i l i t y complementing s o c i a l 
197 
s e c u r i t y . 
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CHAPTER 4 
Lawyers' Ktegllgemce 
The l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n i n England and Wales i s d i v i d e d . 
The d i v i s i o n i s not merely a matter of l a b e l i . e . 
b a r r i s t e r or s o l i c i t o r , but i s a matter of h i s t o r i c a l 
s i g n i f i c a n c e . Both p a r t s of the p r o f e s s i o n have developed 
d i f f e r e n t l y and separately. There are d i f f e r i n g r u l e s f o r 
members of each p a r t of the p r o f e s s i o n but more 
i m p o r t a n t l y f o r the purpose of t h i s t h e s i s there are 
d i f f e r e n t r u l e s r e l a t i n g t o l i a b i l i t y . As w i l l be seen, 
the general r u l e s r e l a t i n g t o negligence apply t o both 
p a r t s of the p r o f e s s i o n , but as a r e s u l t of the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two parts and also the h i s t o r y of 
each p a r t , those r u l e s are hedged about w i t h exceptions 
which i n t u r n lead t o s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e i n 
l i a b i l i t y . 
A. B a r r i s t e r s 
I t i s a primary f u n c t i o n of b a r r i s t e r s t o appear 
before courts of law as advocates. Other work involves 
advice i n connection w i t h l i t i g a t i o n and also other work 
t h a t might be r e f e r r e d by s o l i c i t o r s . 
1= Contractual L i a b i l i t y 
Normally a b a r r i s t e r can only act on a s o l i c i t o r ' s 
i n s t r u c t i o n . Unusually, f o r a p r o f e s s i o n a l person, a 
b a r r i s t e r does not enter i n t o a c o n t r a c t w i t h a s o l i c i t o r 
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who i n s t r u c t s or w i t h the l a y c l i e n t upon whose behalf he 
i s i n s t r u c t e d . Fees are not c o n t r a c t u a l but c o n s t i t u t e an 
honorarium f o r which the b a r r i s t e r has no r i g h t t o sue. 1 
2 o T o r t i o u s L i a b i l i t y 
As there i s no c o n t r a c t between a b a r r i s t e r and 
s o l i c i t o r nor between b a r r i s t e r and l a y c l i e n t , t h e r e i s 
no c o n t r a c t u a l l i a b i l i t y a t t a c h i n g t o b a r r i s t e r s i n 
respect of p r o f e s s i o n a l services rendered. I f there i s t o 
be l i a b i l i t y then t h i s must l i e elsewhere. There i s no 
reported d e c i s i o n i n England i n which a b a r r i s t e r has been 
held l i a b l e f o r negligence although there have been claims 
2 3 s e t t l e d out of c o u r t since Rondel v ^ o r s l e y . Except i n 
those areas of work f o r which immunity i s granted ( i n f r a ) 
there seems no reason why a b a r r i s t e r should not be l i a b l e 
j u s t as much as a s o l i c i t o r or any other p r o f e s s i o n a l 
4 
person. Perhaps i n some cases there i s more reason, as a 
b a r r i s t e r may hold himself out t o be an expert and should 
t h e r e f o r e expect t o a t t r a c t l i a b i l i t y where a s o l i c i t o r , 
a c t i n g as a general p r a c t i t i o n e r , would not. The matter 
might be taken f u r t h e r i n t h a t a b a r r i s t e r might be 
expected t o c o r r e c t an e r r o r made by a s o l i c i t o r i n the 
i n s t r u c t i o n s i f t h a t e r r o r i s obvious and a reasonable 
b a r r i s t e r i n the defendant b a r r i s t e r ' s circumstances would 
5 
have detected and corrected i t . There i s no duty, i t 
would seem, upon a b a r r i s t e r t o perform the d u t i e s o f the 
s o l i c i t o r i n respect t o h i s l a y c l i e n t . Consequently i n 
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a b a r r i s t e r was under no p r o f e s s i o n a l duty t o ensure t h a t 
his l a y c l i e n t , who was advised by s o l i c i t o r s , f u l l y 
understood a l l the i m p l i c a t i o n s of the b a r r i s t e r s advice. 
I n t h i s case there was no requirement of s p e c i a l i s t 
knowledge on the p a r t of the s o l i c i t o r . The b a r r i s t e r had 
already given adequate explanation of the scheme i n 
question and i n so doing had discharged h i s duty. 
O'Connor J went so f a r as t o allow a b a r r i s t e r t o assume 
7 
the competence of the s o l i c i t o r . U n f ortunately f o r the 
s o l i c i t o r , he would not appear t o be so w e l l p r o t e c t e d i n 
g 
h i s dealings w i t h a b a r r i s t e r . Although not a case 
deali n g w i t h p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence DaT?y-=Chiesimam v 
g 
Davy-Chiesman i s i n d i c a t i v e of the expectations contained 
i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between s o l i c i t o r and counsel. I t i s 
submitted t h a t t h i s d e c i s i o n i s more r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p and accords more w i t h the n o t i o n of 
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y f o r the exercise of p r o f e s s i o n a l s k i l l . 
The case s t a t e d t h a t although a s o l i c i t o r was i n many 
circumstances p r o t e c t e d from personal l i a b i l i t y i f he 
acted on the advice of experienced counsel, he could not 
be exonerated i f he b l i n d l y followed the views expressed 
by counsel without e x e r c i s i n g h i s own independent 
judgement.^ 
According t o D i l l o n L J i n Bavy-Chiesman v 
Davy-Chiesman a s o l i c i t o r w i l l o f t e n act c o r r e c t l y i f he 
r e l i e s upon the advice of experienced counsel p r o p e r l y 
i n s t r u c t e d 1 1 as an e f f e c t of the d i v i d e d p r o f e s s i o n . But 
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h i s l o r d s h i p went on t o say t h a t t h i s i s not a t o t a l 
p r o t e c t i o n . Wo a b d i c a t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y w i l l be 
12 
allowed by the simple device of i n s t r u c t i n g counsel? the 
13 
s o l i c i t o r i s expected t o form h i s own o p i n i o n . 
Otherwise, there would be a serious d e r e l i c t i o n of duty. 
The above l i a b i l i t y appears t o have been moderated by Hard 
v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary 1^ i n 
which the Court of Appeal held t h a t although a s o l i c i t o r 
having conduct of an a c t i o n i s not expected t o r e l y 
b l i n d l y on counsel's advice, he i s j u s t i f i e d i n r e l y i n g on 
i t where i t embodies a c a r e f u l and sensible assessment of 
the l e g a l and f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n . 
I t would seem t h a t the judges are sympathetic t o the 
b a r r i s t e r . Errors made by b a r r i s t e r s i n the p r a c t i c e of 
what i s not an exact science may be t r e a t e d as mere e r r o r s 
of judgment and not negligence. Not a l l e r r o r s of 
15 
judgment are t o be t r e a t e d as negligence and, as Lord 
• I C 
Diplock pointed out i n S a i f A l i v Sidney M i t c h e l l & Co , 
the t r i a l judge i s w e l l q u a l i f i e d t o appreciate and make 
allowances f o r the circumstances i n which a defendant 
b a r r i s t e r found himself. None of the judgments on the 
matter of b a r r i s t e r s 1 l i a b i l i t y c l a r i f i e s what c o n s t i t u t e s 
a d i s t i n c t i o n between 'errors of judgment' and 
'negligence' and there the matter would appear t o r e s t f o r 
the moment. 
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Bo S o 1 I c I t o r s 
The f u n c t i o n of s o l i c i t o r s i s t o give l e g a l advice 
more ge n e r a l l y and t o act on behalf of c l i e n t s i n l e g a l 
17 
matters. S o l i c i t o r s may enter i n t o c o n t r a c t s w i t h t h e i r 
c l i e n t s and a t t r a c t l i a b i l i t y f o r negligence i n the event 
of a breach of duty t o take care. I t now seems 
esta b l i s h e d t h a t a s o l i c i t o r may be co n c u r r e n t l y l i a b l e 
f o r breach of co n t r a c t and i n t o r t or even be l i a b l e i n 
t o r t i n the absence of a c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . Recent 
cases have equated the p o s i t i o n of the s o l i c i t o r , a t 18 19 l e a s t , w i t h t h a t of other p r o f e s s i o n a l persons. 
1. Contractual L i a b i l i t y 
' H i s t o r i c a l l y , the law of co n t r a c t i s the p r i n c i p a l 
means by which the courts have exercised c o n t r o l over the 
20 
conduct of p r o f e s s i o n a l men.' The r e l a t i o n s h i p of 
s o l i c i t o r and c l i e n t u s u a l l y comes i n t o being by c o n t r a c t 
21 
or r e t a i n e r . This c o n t r a c t may be o r a l or i n w r i t i n g 
although i t seems p r e f e r a b l e t h a t a t some e a r l y stage an 
22 
o r a l r e t a i n e r should be confirmed i n w r i t i n g . The 
e f f e c t of not doing so may be something the s o l i c i t o r w i l l 
23 
l a t e r have cause t o r e g r e t . The e f f e c t of the r e t a i n e r 
i s t o put ' i n t o operation the normal terms of the 
c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p , i n c l u d i n g i n p a r t i c u l a r the duty 
of the s o l i c i t o r t o p r o t e c t the c l i e n t s i n t e r e s t and c a r r y 
out h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s i n the matter t o which the r e t a i n e r 
24 
r e l a t e s , by a l l proper means'. This, of course, 
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explains the purpose of the r e t a i n e r i n r a t h e r general 
terms. What the p a r t i c u l a r d u t i e s are t o be and the 
extent depends 'upon the terms and l i m i t s of t h a t r e t a i n e r 
25 
and any duty of care t o be im p l i e d must be r e l a t e d t o 
2 6 
what he i s i n s t r u c t e d t o do' Thus, i n common w i t h other 
c o n t r a c t s the terms might be i n f e r r e d from and i n f l u e n c e d 
27 
by, conduct of the p a r t i e s . 
I n a consid e r a t i o n of negligence there i s a tendency 
t o t h i n k of the duty of care and the appropriate standard. 
However, concentration on the o b l i g a t i o n , express or 
i m p l i e d , t o take reasonable care may cause one t o overlook 
the other o b l i g a t i o n s assumed under the c o n t r a c t . The 
duty of care does not embrace a l l o b l i g a t i o n s nor i s i t an 
exhaustive statement of o b l i g a t i o n . The duty t o exercise 
2 g 
care i s but one among many. 
I t would seem t o f o l l o w t h a t each case must be looked 
at separately. The i m p l i e d standard of care w i l l be found 
as a minimum and the usual statements of what t h i s usual 
standard i s w i l l be the guide. The r e t a i n e r u s u a l l y 
provides f o r a p a r t i c u l a r service t o be performed but not 
29 
n e c e s s a r i l y t h a t a r e s u l t w i l l be achieved. Although 
the a c t i o n i s p r i m a r i l y f o r breach of c o n t r a c t , i t can 
also be based sometimes on negligence on the ground t h a t a 
reasonable man, owing a duty of care i n such 
circumstances, would exercise the care of a s k i l l e d , man i n 
30 
doing the work. 
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There i s , however, no reason why the standard of 
reasonable care should not give way t o a higher standard 
31 
i f the c o n t r a c t so provides , i . e . t h a t i n the p a r t i c u l a r 
circumstances of the case, the design would be reasonably 
32 
f i t f o r the purpose. The courts must be wary of 
imposing duties upon s o l i c i t o r s and other p r o f e s s i o n a l 
33 
people beyond the scope of the undertaking. On the 
other hand i t may be possible f o r a p r o f e s s i o n a l person t o 
guarantee a r e s u l t i n which case f a i l u r e t o provide what 
the c l i e n t contracted f o r may be s u f f i c i e n t t o i n v o l v e 
l i a b i l i t y . Usually reasonable care and s k i l l i s 
s u f f i c i e n t . However, there are cases i n which a 
pr o f e s s i o n a l person has undertaken t o d e l i v e r a c h a t t e l . 
I n such circumstances 'one who con t r a c t s t o design an 
a r t i c l e f o r a purpose made known t o him undertakes t h a t 
34 
the design i s reasonably f i t f o r the purpose'. This 
would impose a higher duty than t h a t c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the 
standard of reasonable care according t o the accepted 
35 
standards of the profession. 
2. T o r t i o u s L i a b i l i t y 
A f t e r Donoghue v Stevenson the judges had t o decide 
upon the development of the t o r t of negligence. There 
were circumstances where there was u n c e r t a i n t y as t o 
whether there should be r e c o g n i t i o n of a duty of care or 
whether l i a b i l i t y should not e x i s t due t o remoteness of 
damage, a reason f o r some time expressed i n cases of 
•J c 
economic lo s s . However, there were developments which 
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appeared t o favour general extension of the r e c o g n i t i o n of 
a duty of care and which required good reasons t o deny 
37 
t h a t extension. I t i s i n Anns w JSerton London Borough 
Council t h a t the view favouring an extension of the duty 
38 
of care came t o be formulated , as followss 
'Through t h e g t r i l o g y of cases i n t h i s House Donoghue v Stevenson * nHedley Byrne & Co L t d v H e l l e r & Partners L t d and Dorset Yacht Co L t d v Home 
O f f i c e , the p o s i t i o n has now been reached t h a t i n 
order t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t a duty of care a r i s e s i n a 
p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n , i t i s not necessary t o b r i n g 
the f a c t s of t h a t s i t u a t i o n w i t h i n those of previous 
s i t u a t i o n s i n which a duty of care has been he l d t o 
e x i s t . Rather the question has t o be approached i n 
two stages. F i r s t one has t o ask whether, as between 
the a l l eged wrongdoers and the person who has 
su f f e r e d damage there i s s u f f i c i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p of 
p r o x i m i t y or neighbourhood such t h a t i n the 
reasonable contemplation of the former, carelessness 
on h i s p a r t may be l i k e l y t o cause damage t o the 
l a t t e r - i n which case a prima f a c i e duty of care 
a r i s e s . Secondly, i f the f i r s t question i s answered 
a f f i r m a t i v e l y , i t i s necessary t o consider whether 
there are any considerations which ought t o negative, 
or t o reduce or l i m i t the scope of the duty on the 
class of persons t o whom i t i s owed or the damaged t o 
which a breach of i t may give r i s e . . . ' 
An apparently simple t e s t i t has been used i n various 
cases t o a s s i s t i n determining both the existence and 
42 
scope of a duty of care. But i t i s misleading t o regard 
43 
the above t e s t as the d e f i n i t i v e one i n each case. The 
House of Lords on two occasions has q u a l i f i e d the t e s t . 
F i r s t , i t must be borne i n mind t h a t ' i n determining 
whether or not a duty of care of p a r t i c u l a r scope was 
incumbent upon a defendant i t i s m a t e r i a l t o take i n t o 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n whether i t i s j u s t and reasonable i t should 
be s o . 1 ^ A second case has added t h a t Lord W i l b e r f o r c e 
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'was deal i n g . . . w i t h the approach t o the questions of the 
existence and scope of a duty of care i n a novel type of 
f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n ' . The same approach was not t o be 
adopted i n a f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n i n which a duty of care 
45 
'had repeatedly been held not t o e x i s t ' . To the 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n made by the House of Lords the P r i v y Council 
has now l e n t i t s voice t o the view t h a t the two stage t e s t 
i n Amis was not t o be regarded as i n a l l circumstances a 
46 
s u i t a b l e guide t o the existence of a duty of care. The 
f i r s t stage of the t e s t had been m i s i n t e r p r e t e d w h i l e the 
47 
second would be r a r e l y applied. The 'proximity of 
neighbourhood' r e f e r r e d t o by Lord Wilberforce (supra) was 
a composite expression importing the whole of the 
necessary r e l a t i o n s h i p between p l a i n t i f f and defendant 
48 
described by Lord A t k i n i n Donoghue v Stevenson. 
F o r e s e e a b i l i t y of harm was not s u f f i c i e n t of i t s e l f ? the 
directness and closeness of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the 
p a r t i e s would need t o be present. Such directness and 49 50 closeness was apparent i n Hedley Byrne , Dorset Yacht 
and Junior Books.^ The spe c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between the 
p a r t i e s i n those cases would e x p l a i n the f i n d i n g s of a 
duty of care even using the t e s t as enunciated by the 
Pri v y Council i n Yuen Kun Yeu and Others v A t t o r n e y 
52 
General of Hong Kong. 
3. Concurrency o f Actions 
None of the foregoing ought t o deny the concurrency 
of l i a b i l i t y f o r breach of co n t r a c t and t o r t i n general. 
177 
I t i s however not so long ago the existence of a c o n t r a c t 
between a p r o f e s s i o n a l person and a c l i e n t was held t o 
exclude l i a b i l i t y i n t o r t f o r negligence. The s o - c a l l e d 
' p r i v i t y f a l l a c y ' which had been scotched f i n a l l y , i t was 
thought, i n Bonoghue v Stevenson continued i n cases of 
alleged p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence by a s o l i c i t o r . Many 
problems were produced e.g. l i m i t a t i o n of actions where i t 
53 
would be more b e n e f i c i a l f o r a c l i e n t t o sue i n t o r t . 
54 
I f one commences w i t h Brown v Boomnan the p r i n c i p l e 
was l a i d down t h a t whenever there i s a c o n t r a c t under 
which something i s t o be done, i f there i s a breach of 
duty i n the course of the employment under the c o n t r a c t , 
the p l a i n t i f f may recover e i t h e r i n t o r t or i n c o n t r a c t . 
There are many cases i n which t h i s would be t r u e i n c l u d i n g 
'actions against a t t o r n i e s , surgeons and other 
55 
p r o f e s s i o n a l men f o r lack of s k i l l . ' 
There are i t seems p r o f e s s i o n a l groups who could be 
l i a b l e f o r negligence i n the absence of a c o n t r a c t . But 
56 
Kaye, i n 'The L i a b i l i t y of S o l i c i t o r s i n T o r t , regards 
as exceptional e.g. medical men, on the basis t h a t there 
were strong p u b l i c p o l i c y reasons f o r making a surgeon 
l i a b l e without proof of a c o n t r a c t between himself and a 
p a t i e n t whereas no such co n s i d e r a t i o n of p o l i c y appear t o 
have ar i s e n i n the case of s o l i c i t o r s . 
The views on the l i a b i l i t y of a s o l i c i t o r t o a c l i e n t 
has thus f l u c t u a t e d between t h a t of l i a b i l i t y i n c o n t r a c t 
and t o r t , t o c o n t r a c t only and back again t o concurrent 178 
l i a b i l i t y . A l i n e of cases supported the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t 
57 
l i a b i l i t y might be based on both c o n t r a c t and t o r t . At 
the same time there e x i s t e d a u t h o r i t i e s t h a t l i a b i l i t y l a y 
i n c o n t r a c t a l o n e . ^ The Court of Appeal d e c i s i o n i n 
59 
Groom vr Crocker i n 1939 t h a t a s o l i c i t o r owed no duty t o 
the c l i e n t beyond the c o n t r a c t u a l d u t i e s a r i s i n g from h i s 
r e t a i n e r was followed 'without question**^ i n subsequent 
61 
cases. 
6 2 
However, Kaye, does not consider t h a t Brown v 
Boorman<*(supra) has the e f f e c t of c r e a t i n g l i a b i l i t y i n 
negligence i n the absence of a c o n t r a c t and stressed t h a t 
n e i t h e r the Exchequer Chamber nor the House of Lords 
6 3 
decided on the basis of an independent t o r t . The a c t i o n 
i n negligence based on breach of c o n t r a c t or t o r t arose 
64 
out of breach of c o n t r a c t . Kaye contends t h a t read i n 
t h a t context, Groom v Cocker was c o r r e c t l y decided and 
was not based on a f a i l u r e t o consider ' e a r l i e r cases of 
high a u t h o r i t y . ' K a y e would f u r t h e r assert t h a t t h i s 
charge should be l e v e l l e d a t those courts which have since 
attempted t o base l i a b i l i t y f o r a s o l i c i t o r ' s negligence 
on the independent t o r t . 
I n the context of a s o l i c i t o r s ' l i a b i l i t y f o r 
p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence i t was f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d i n 
6 7 
Robertson v Fleming the Court of Appeal confirmed t h a t a 
s o l i c i t o r ' s duty t o h i s c l i e n t was based s o l e l y on breach 
of c o n t r a c t and not on t o r t ; a r u l i n g followed by the High 
6 9 
Court i n Clark v Kirby-Simith ° 
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I n Clark v Kirby-Smith Plowman J gave judgment f o r 
the p l a i n t i f f on the basis t h a t "the f i d u c i a r y o b l i g a t i o n 
t o give i n f o r m a t i o n or advice arises out of the 
70 
c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p of s o l i c i t o r and c l i e n t " 
Despite the d i c t a i n Medley Byrne & Co L t d v H e l l e r & 
71 
Partners L t d Plowman J d i d not accept the argument t h a t 
the Hedley Bryne case was an a u t h o r i t y f o r saying t h a t the 
l i a b i l i t y of a s o l i c i t o r t o h i s c l i e n t f o r negligence i s a 
72 
l i a b i l i t y i n t o r t . Plowman J noted the opinio n of S i r 
W i l f r e d Green M.R. i n Groom v Crocker t h a t the cause of 
a c t i o n was i n co n t r a c t and not i n t o r t because the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p o f s o l i c i t o r and c l i e n t i s a c o n t r a c t u a l 
one. 7 3 
But since the case of Clark v Kirby-Simith various 
d i s s e n t i n g opinions have also been expressed. Lord 
74 
Denning M.R. thought t h a t a p r o f e s s i o n a l man owes a duty 
of care t o persons whom he knows are r e l y i n g on h i s s k i l l 
t o save them from harm and could not see why a s o l i c i t o r 
should not also be under t h i s duty. Subsequently Lord 
75 
Denning M.R. gave h i s opi n i o n t h a t Groom v Crocker was 
7 6 
wrongly decided and indeed t h a t Hocton v Ashburton a 
case of high a u t h o r i t y had not been c i t e d t h e r e i n . The 
77 
Court of Appeal considering p r o f e s s i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n s 
g e n e r a l l y , agreed t h a t there was a concurrent o b l i g a t i o n 
i n t o r t and not s o l e l y l i a i b i l i t y i n c o n t r a c t . I t was not 
u n t i l the case of Midland Bank Trust Co L t d and Another v 
78 
Hett„ Stubbs & Kemp (a f i r m ) i n 1979 t h a t t h i s n o t i o n of 180 
concurrent l i a b i l i t y was t o form the r a t i o decidendi of a 
case i n v o l v i n g s o l i c i t o r s ' l i a b i l i t y . I n Midland Bank 
O l i v e r J., held t h a t a duty of care was imposed upon the 
defendant f i r m of s o l i c i t o r s by reason of the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
of s o l i c i t o r and c l i e n t e x i s t i n g between the p a r t i e s . The 
defendants were t h e r e f o r e l i a b l e i n t o r t independently of 
any l i a b i l i t y i n c o n t r a c t f o r t h e i r negligence. His 
Lordship applied Hedley Byrne v H e l l e r and Esso Petroleram 
v Mardon and declined t o f o l l o w Clark v Kirby-Sinith. 
I n a r r i v i n g a t t h i s d e c i s i o n O l i v e r J thought t h a t 
the view of Lord Denning M.R. i n Dutton v Bognor Regis 
79 
UDC was q u i t e i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the r e s t r i c t i v e view 
enunciated i n Groom v Crocker as indeed was the House of 
Lords dec i s i o n i n Hedley Byrne v H e l l e r . O l i v e r J thought 
'The case of the layman c o n s u l t i n g a s o l i c i t o r f o r advice 
seems t o me t o be as t y p i c a l a case as one could f i n d of 
the s o r t of r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n which the duty of care 
described i n the Hedley Byrne case exists? and i f I am 
f r e e t o do so i n the present case I would, t h e r e f o r e , hold 
t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p of s o l i c i t o r and c l i e n t gave r i s e t o 
a duty i n the defendants under the general law t o exercise 
t h a t care and s k i l l upon which they must have known 
80 
p e r f e c t l y w e l l t h a t t h e i r c l i e n t r e l i e d ' . 
This appears t o be a c o n s i s t e n t development of 
p r i n c i p l e . The cases since 1932 which are i d e n t i f i e d w i t h 
developing the p r i n c i p l e l a i d down i n Donoghue v 81 82 Stevenson e.g. Hedley Byrne v H e l l e r , and Anns v 
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Merton London Borough Council have shown t h a t the stage 
has been reached where previous a u t h o r i t y i s not necessary 
t o e s t a b l i s h the existence of a duty of care. What has t o 
be considered i s whether there i s s u f f i c i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p 
of p r o x i m i t y or neighbourhood between s o l i c i t o r and the 
p l a i n t i f f . These cases are also notable i n t h a t they 
express the duty of care i n wide terms and disapprove of 
the r e s t r i c t e d approach t o the duty problem, as does 
O l i v e r J i n Hett a t l e a s t w i t h regard t o Groom v Crocker. 
And t h i s seems t o echo the s p i r i t of f l e x i b i l i t y expressed 
by Ormrod L J i n Esso Petroleum v Mardons 'The p a r t i e s 
were i n the kin d of r e l a t i o n s h i p which i s s u f f i c i e n t t o 
give r i s e t o a duty on the p a r t of the p l a i n t i f f s . There 
i s no magic i n the phrase "special r e l a t i o n s h i p s " ? i t 
means no more than a r e l a t i o n s h i p the nature of which i s 
such t h a t one p a r t y f o r a v a r i e t y of pos s i b l e reasons, 
w i l l be regarded by the law as under a duty of care t o the 
84 
other. On these terms, Midland Bank appears t o be i n 
accord w i t h the p r i n c i p l e expressed i n Donoghue v 
Stevenson and developed i n subsequent cases. The 
c o n t r a c t u a l duty of care does not appear t o preclude a 
p a r a l l e l claim i n t o r t under the Hedley Byrne p r i n c i p l e . 
I t i s perhaps prudent t o say 'appears' as there has been 
strong c r i t i c i s m of Midland Bank. Kaye i n h i s a r t i c l e 
8 S 
'The L i a b i l i t y of S o l i c i t o r s i n Tort' i s not so sure. 
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4o L i a b i l i t y to T h i r d P a r t i e s 
With the acceptance of concurrent l i a b i l i t y comes the 
p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t a s o l i c i t o r may be l i a b l e to h i s c l i e n t 
i n negligence based upon e i t h e r the c o n t r a c t of r e t a i n e r 
or i n t o r t . As a p r o f e s s i o n a l man may be l i a b l e f o r 
negligence i n t o r t consequently i t i s no longer p o s s i b l e 
to maintain the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t the c l i e n t i s the only 
person to whom a duty i s owed. But i t i s s u r e l y going too 
f a r to make the p r o f e s s i o n a l man l i a b l e to a l l those who 
are a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d by h i s a c t s or ommissions. Even 
the p r i n c i p l e s t a t e d i n Donoghue v Stevenson e s t a b l i s h i n g 
the circumstances under which a duty of c a r e may be h e l d 
to e x i s t has been l i m i t e d by the House of Lords i n Anns v 
86 
Mertoin London Borough C o u n c i l . Following the view of 
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Lord Wilberforce i n which h i s Lordship atempted to 
r e s t r i c t the duty owed by defendants i n negligence c a s e s , 
t here may be good reasons why a p r o f e s s i o n a l man should 
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not be l i a b l e . I n the case of a s o l i c i t o r much of the 
work performed i s a d v e r s a r i a l i n nature and c a r r i e d out 
f o r the c l i e n t s i n t e r e s t s and i n opposition to the 
i n t e r e s t s of others. I n a d d i t i o n , i t would appear u n f a i r 
to allow any person who i s a f f e c t e d to r e l y on the 
statements of a s o l i c i t o r even when there are f o r s e e a b l e 
consequences owing to the wide nature of the 
dissemination. Having s a i d t h a t , one of the hallmarks of 
a p r o f e s s i o n a l man i s s a i d to be h i s a l t r u i s m and 
detachment from the i n t e r e s t of s e l f or c l i e n t . A 
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s o l i c i t o r i s an o f f i c e r of the court and expected to a c t 
with i n t e g r i t y i n h i s d e a l i n g s . I n the case of advocates' 
( i n f r a ) one of the reasons given f o r a l l o w i n g immunity to 
continue was the higher duty owed to the court i n the 
i n t e r e s t s of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e . 
I t may w e l l prove to be the case t h a t s o l i c i t o r s , by 
v i r t u e of the a d v e r s a r i a l nature of t h e i r work may w e l l 
not be too badly a f f e c t e d . Megarry V.C. has taken the 
notion of concurrent l i a b i l i t y f u r t h e r i n Ross v Caunters 
89 
(a firm) as has the Court of Appeal i n F o r s t e r v Qutred 
90 91 £ Co (a f i r m ) . The t h i r d p a rty i n Ross v Caunters- was 
a b e n e f i c i a r y who, owing to the a l l e g e d negligence of the 
t e s t a t o r ' s s o l i c i t o r , had l o s t a bequest under the 
t e s t a t o r ' s w i l l . Counsel f o r the defendants put forward 
the p r o p o s i t i o n e s t a b l i s h e d by the a u t h o r i t i e s t h a t a 
s o l i c i t o r could not be l i a b l e i n negligence i n r e l a t i o n to 
h i s p r o f e s s i o n a l work to anyone except h i s c l i e n t and t h a t 
such l i a b i l i t y was i n c o n t r a c t and not i n t o r t s the main 
92 
r e f e r e n c e was to Groom v Crocker, which was supported 
by, i n t e r a l i a , the post Hedley Byrne case of C l a r k v 
93 
Kirby-Smith. His Lordship observed on the matter of 
l i a b i l i t y i n c o n t r a c t or t o r t t h a t both Groom v Crocker 
and C l a r k v Kirby-Smith had been r e j e c t e d i n E s s o 
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Petroleum Co L t d v Mardon. The l a t e s t a u t h o r i t y on t h i s 
i s s u e , p r i o r to Ross v Caunters, was Midland Bank i n which 
O l i v e r , J . , a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g the above a u t h o r i t i e s , 
concluded t h a t the d o c t r i n e i n Groom v Crocker was not 
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law. S i r Robert Megarry V.C. i n Ross v Caunters concurred 
with O l i v e r , J , and r e j e c t e d t h i s contention, and went on 
to consider whether a s o l i c i t o r owes a duty of c a r e to a 
b e n e f i c i a r y under a w i l l made for a c l i e n t and the b a s i s 
of t h a t duty. 
The f i r s t c o n s i d e r a t i o n was t h a t there was no doubt 
th a t "the defendants could f a i r l y have been expected to 
contemplate the p l a i n t i f f as a person l i k e l y to be 
a f f e c t e d by any l a c k of c a r e on t h e i r p a r t ... The 
p l a i n t i f f was named and i d e n t i f i e d i n the w i l l t h a t the 
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defendants d r a f t e d f o r the t e s t a t o r . " The second was 
t h a t the duty of care to the t e s t a t o r included a duty to 
confer a b e n e f i t on the p l a i n t i f f , and t h i r d l y , t h a t to 
hold the s o l i c i t o r s owed a duty of care to the p l a i n t i f f 
would not impose "on the defendants of u n c e r t a i n and 
u n l i m i t e d l i a i b i l i t y ... I n s t e a d , there would be a f i n i t e 
o b l i g a t i o n to a f i n i t e number of persons, i n t h i s case 
one." 9 6 
With these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n mind h i s Lordship made 
refere n c e to Lord Atkin's statement of p r i n c i p l e i n 
97 
Donoghue v Stevenson? a p r i n c i p l e which according to 
9 8 
Lord Reid i n Dorset Yacht Co L t d v Home O f f i c e "ought to 
apply unless there i s some j u s t i f i c a t i o n or v a l i d 
explanation f o r i t s e x c l u s i o n " , and which, according to 
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Lord Wilberforce i n Anns v London Merton Borough C o u n c i l 
had reached the stage where " i n order to e s t a b l i s h t h a t a 
duty of c a r e a r i s e s i n a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n i t i s not 185 
necessary to b r i n g the f a c t s of t h a t p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n 
w i t h i n those of previous s i t u a t i o n s where a duty of c a r e 
has been held to e x i s t . " I n s t e a d Lord Wilberforce thought 
one should ask whether there i s a s u f f i c i e n t neighbourhood 
between the a l l e g e d wrongdoer and the person s u f f e r i n g 
damage so t h a t the former should reasonably contemplate 
h i s c a r e l e s s n e s s would cause i n j u r y to the l a t t e r , and 
a l s o whether there are any reasons why the scope of the 
duty should be reduced or l i m i t e d . 
The f a c t s of Ross v Caunters suggested to the 
V i c e - c h a n c e l l o r t h a t a duty was owed to the p l a i n t i f f and 
t h a t there was nothing i n t h i s case r e q u i r i n g t h a t the 
scope of the prima f a c i e duty of ca r e ought to be 
negatived, reduced or l i m i t e d . Indeed, the proximity of 
the defendants to the p l a i n t i f f and the l i m i t e d amount of 
l i a b i l i t y pointed the other way. 
The true b a s i s of l i a b i l i t y i s Donoghue v Stevenson 
i n Ross v Caunters and not the more r e s t r i c t e d b a s i s of 
Bedley Byrne. But the nature of the l o s s causes problems. 
I t had long been maintained t h a t apart from the Hedley 
Byrne s i t u a t i o n , a claim i n negligence for economic l o s s 
could not s u c c e e d . I n Ross v Caunters the p l a i n t i f f ' s 
l o s s was, of course, purely f i n a n c i a l . I s such l o s s 
i r r e c o v e r a b l e i f i t does not f a l l w i t h i n Hedley Byrne? I n 
Midland Bank, O l i v e r , J . , thought the case of a layman 
c o n s u l t i n g a s o l i c i t o r f o r advice was t y p i c a l of the 
Hedley Byrne r e l a t i o n s h i p . Counsel f o r the defendants 
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contended t h a t Hedley Byrne was i n a p p l i c a b l e i n Ross v 
Camnters because no r e l i a n c e had been placed on the 
s o l i c i t o r s by the p l a i n t i f f . ^ 1 His Lordship agreed t h a t 
there was nothing t h a t could f a i r l y be c a l l e d r e l i a n c e by 
the p l a i n t i f f on any statement made by the defendants, but 
added t h a t i n any event the true b a s i s of l i a b i l i t y i n 
Ross v Caianters d i d not r e s t on Hedley Byrne but proceeded 
d i r e c t l y from Donoghue v Stevenson. T h i s being so, the 
a p p l i c a b i l i t y of M i n i s t r y of Housing and L o c a l Government 
102 103 v Sharp was considered. Sharp's case i s analogous 
to Ross v Caunters as a negligent mis-statement was a l s o 
made by the defendant, not to the p l a i n t i f f but a t h i r d 
party. Salmon, L J based l i a b i l i t y i n Sharp's case on 
Bonoghue v Stevenson, holding the view t h a t the c l e r k 
must, or should, have known th a t u nless the s e a r c h was 
conducted, and the c e r t i f i c a t e prepared, with reasonable 
c a r e , any chargee whose charge was c a r e l e s s l y omitted from 
the c e r t i f i c a t e would be l i k e l y to s u f f e r damage. Salmon 
L . J , went on to says 
" I n my view, t h i s f a c t o r c e r t a i n l y c r e a t e s as c l o s e a 
degree of proximity between the c o u n c i l and the 
incumbrancer as e x i s t e d between the a p p e l l a n t and 
respondent i n Donoghue v Stevenson... I t i s t r u e t h a t 
i n Donoghue v Stevenson i t was p h y s i c a l i n j u r y t h a t 
was to be foreseen as a r e s u l t of the f a i l u r e to take 
reasonable c a r e whereas i n the present case i t i s 
f i n a n c i a l l o s s . But t h i s no longer matters, and i t 
i s now w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t q u i t e apart from any 
c o n t r a c t u a l or f i d u c i a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p , a many may owe 
a duty of care i n what he w r i t e s or says j u s t as 
much as i n what he does. See Hedley Byrne ... No 
doubt i n our c r i m i n a l law, i n j u r y to the person i s or 
should be regarded as more s e r i o u s than damage to 
property and punished accordingly. So f a r , however, 
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as the law of negligence r e l a t i n g to c i v i l a c t i o n s i s 
concerned, the e x i s t e n c e of a duty to take reasonable 
c a r e no longer depends upon whether i t i s p h y s i c a l 
i n j u r y or f i n a n c i a l l o s s which can reasonably be 
foreseen as a r e s u l t of a f a i l u r e to take such 
reasonable care»" 
The Court of Appeal has determined an a c t i o n i n 
negligence w i l l now l i e f o r f i n a n c i a l l o s s . The case was 
one i n which no statement was made to the p l a i n t i f f who of 
course d i d not r e l y oh i t . T h i s i s the analogy with Ross 
•w Caunters i n which the p l a i n t i f f was a l s o p a s s i v e and 
ignorant of the defendant's negligence. Sharp's case was 
c o n c l u s i v e f o r S i r Robert Megarry V.C. who h e l d the 
defendant's were l i a b l e to the p l a i n t i f f i n negligence and 
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purely f i n a n c i a l l o s s was no bar to t h a t l i a b i l i t y . 
However, i t must be noted t h a t the previous 
o b j e c t i o n s to such l o s s being recovered were on p o l i c y 
g r o u n d s , n a m e l y , "a l i a b i l i t y i n an indeterminate 
amount f o r an indeterminate time to an indeterminate 
107 
c l a s s . " I n Ross v Caunters there was "a f i n i t e 
o b l i g a t i o n to a f i n i t e number of persons, i n t h i s case 
108 
one." Ross v Caunters was to be regarded by some as a 
bold move. I n time the d e c i s i o n was followed i n 
109 
Al=Kandari v J R Brown & Co. But there have been 
doubters*"^ and the Court of Appeal decided otherwise i n 
"111 
C l a r k e v Bruce Lance' 
112 
Al~Kandari v J R Brora 6 Co held t h a t the 
defendant s o l i c i t o r owed a duty to the t h i r d p a r t y i n t o r t 
because t h a t t h i r d party was w i t h i n h i s d i r e c t 
188 
contemplation as someone l i k e l y to be a f f e c t e d by h i s a c t s 
or omissions t h a t the defendant could reasonably f o r s e e 
t h a t the t h i r d party was l i k e l y to be i n j u r e d by those 
113 
a c t s or omissions. This case, according to Markesinis, 
presents problems. F o r e s e e a b i l i t y , alone, i s no good 
reason f o r imposing l i a b i l i t y on a s o l i c i t o r . Lord K e i t h 
114 
of K i n k e l i n Yuen Knn Yen affirmed the point. 'As Lord 
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Wilberforce observed i n McLougMin v O'Brien i t was 
c l e a r t h a t f o r e s e e a b i l i t y d i d not of i t s e l f , and 
aut o m a t i c a l l y , lead to a duty of c a r e . F o r e s e e a b i l i t y of 
harm was a nevessary i n g r e d i e n t of a r e l a t i o n s h i p apt to 
give use to a duty of c a r e , but i t was not the only one'. 
I n Al-Kandari the a c t i o n was framed f o r breach of 
c o n t r a c t and/or t o r t . The f i r s t cause of a c t i o n d i d not 
succeed as the p l a i n t i f f was not the c l i e n t of the 
defendant s o l i c i t o r s . However, the judge d i d decide t h a t 
the s o l i c i t o r owed the p l a i n t i f f a duty of ca r e and had 
broken t h a t duty. The defendants were not l i a b l e because 
the damage s u f f e r e d by the p l a i n t i f f was not a n a t u r a l or 
probable consequence of the breach of duty. On appeal the 
e x i s t e n c e of the duty and the breach was confirmed by the 
Court of Appeal. The d e c i s i o n of French J . was r e v e r s e d 
s o l e l y upon the b a s i s t h a t the damage s u f f e r e d by the 
p l a i n t i f f was a n a t u r a l or probable consequence of the 
breach of d u t y . 1 1 6 
The concern expressed by Markesinis i s on the b a s i s 
117 
of the f i n d i n g of duty which he co n s i d e r s makes 
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Al-Kandari important . French J gave the c l e a r impression 
118 
t h a t Al-Kandari was on a l l four with Ross v Caunters. 
I n any event French J was prepared i f necessary to extend 
119 
the p r i n c i p l e s expressed i n Ross w Caunters. However, 
the duty i n question was one owed to the court not to the 
c l i e n t as i n Ross v Caunters and y e t the judge i n 
Al-Kandari d i d not acknowledge t h a t point, French J 
s t a t e d 'a s o l i c i t o r who has a u t h o r i t y from h i s c l i e n t to 
give an undertaking, one of whose o b j e c t s i s to p r o t e c t an 
i d e n t i f i e d t h i r d party, owes a duty of c a r e towards t h a t 
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t h i r d party. Here i t seems French J i s u s i n g a 
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c o n t r a c t u a l analogy and producing some confusion. 
I n C l a r k e v Bruce Lance & Co the d e c i s i o n t h a t 
s o l i c i t o r s owed no duty of c a r e to the b e n e f i c i a r i e s was 
made on the b a s i s of a f a c t u a l d i s t i n c t i o n . I n Ross v 
Caunters there had been a c l o s e degree of proximity 
between the defendant s o l i c i t o r and the p l a i n t i f f 
b e n e f i c i a r y . T h i s was not so i n C l a r k e . I n a d d i t i o n the 
i n t e r e s t s of the t e s t a t o r and b e n e f i c i a r y were c l o s e l y 
a l l i e d i n Ross v Caunters. I n C l a r k e the i n t e r e s t s were 
i n c o n f l i c t . F i n a l l y , the defendants contemplation of the 
p l a i n t i f f was not a c t u a l , nominate and d i r e c t i n C l a r k e as 
• T, 122 i t was i n Ross. Other Common law j u r i s d i c t i o n s saw no reason to 
123 
follow the reasoning i n Ross. I n A u s t r a l i a the 
c o n t r a c t l i a b i l i t y only l i n e was taken. Most A u s t r a l i a n 
S t a t e s s t i l l hold there i s l i a b i l i t y i n c o n t r a c t , some 
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124 accept concurrency of l i a b i l i t y i n c o n t r a c t and t o r t . 
The V i c t o r i a Supreme Court i n two rece n t cases has s a i d no 
125 
l i a b i l i t y i n t o r t i n the f i r s t and concurrency of 
126 
l i a b i l i t y i n the second. The Supreme Court of V i c t o r i a 
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i n S e a l e v Perry held t h a t the s o l i c i t o r owed no duty 
of c a r e to the intended b e n e f i c i a r i e s . The V i c t o r i a n 
Court performed a very thorough review of the E n g l i s h 
cases i n the course of judgment. Among t h i s catalogue was 
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Esso Petroleum v Mardon. I n Mardoa's case Lord Denning 
M.R., c i t e d cases from which p r i n c i p l e s or concurrent 
l i a b i l i t y might be e x t r a c t e d . But, s a i d Lush J , i n S e a l e 
v Perry, although there i s re f e r e n c e to cases which r e f e r 
to d u t i e s imposed by law even though there i s a c o n t r a c t , 
breach of which might be a t o r t , t h i s i s not the same as 
saying 'that a duty so cr e a t e d enures f o r the b e n e f i t of 
persons not p a r t i e s to the c o n t r a c t or other event which 
was the occasion of the duty. Murphy J agreed t h a t no 
129 
duty was owed to the b e n e f i c i a r i e s . 
The A u s t r a l i a n judge Beach J s t a t e d i n Macpherson & 
130 
K e l l y ( a firm) v Kevin J . Prunty A s s o c i a t e s ' I can f i n d 
no s a t i s f a c t o r y b a s i s f o r the a n a c h r o n i s t i c exemption of 
s o l i c i t o r s from the general p r i n c i p l e or r u l e t h a t members 
of p r o f e s s i o n s are l i a b l e to t h e i r c l i e n t s c o n c u r r e n t l y i n 
c o n t r a c t and i n t o r t . Indeed to hold otherwise could w e l l 
be productive of i n j u s t i c e . ' I n the same case Lush J 
though t h a t '... i n the welfare s t a t e , the performance of 
p r o f e s s i o n a l s e r v i c e s i n s i t u a t i o n s where there i s no r e a l 191 
c o n t r a c t between the s k i l l e d man and the p a t i e n t i s 
i n c r e a s i n g l y common. Hedley Byrne imposes a duty of c a r e 
131 
and provides a remedy i n such cases"* 
New Zealand has adopted the p o s i t i o n of c o n t r a c t u a l 
132 
l i a b i l i t y only while the Canadian view i s sympathetic 
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to concurrency. But there i s the problem of p u b l i c 
p r o t e c t i o n . I n the case of a w i l l which takes e f f e c t only 
upon the c l i e n t s death who can enforce the a c t i o n , i f i t 
be not i n t o r t . The s o l i c i t o r has a p r i v i l e g e d , near 
monopoly p o s i t i o n i n the preparation of w i l l s . As 
Sutherland points out, i n New South Wales fo r example, 
s o l i c i t o r s do have a l e g a l monopoly i n the p r e p a r a t i o n of 
w i l l s . 'Wo other p r o f e s s i o n a l group i s permitted to 
provide guidance i n exchange f o r reward i n the execution 
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of w i l l s . There must be some p r o t e c t i o n . 
On the other hand Kaye questions 'the j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
f o r imposing a p u b l i c duty on a p r o f e s s i o n a l man, i n 
a d d i t i o n to a p r i v a t e duty a r i s i n g from c o n t r a c t or 
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r e t a i n e r ' . A s i m i l a r problem a r i s e s r e l a t i n g to the 
i s s u e of lawyers' immunity from l i a b i l i t y i n negligence 
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connected with l i t i g a t i o n . 
T h i s i s not to say t h a t developments i n concurrent 
l i a b i l i t y w i l l continue to take place as h i t h e r t o . The 
J u d i c i a l Committee of the P r i v y Council had r e c e n t l y 
expressed concern about the over development of 
negligence. I n Yuen Kun Yeu and Others v Attorney General 
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of Hong Kong the P r i v y Council maintained t h a t the 192 
p r i n c i p l e s s t a t e d i n Aims v Merton London Borouglh 
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Coun c i l had been taken too f a r . S i m i l a r concerns were 
voiced i n T a i Rlmq Cotton M i l l L t d v Lira Clhiong Hing Bank 
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L t d on the u n d e s i r a b i l i t y of too rigorous a s e a r c h f o r 
concurrent l i a b i l i t y where the p a r t i e s have a c o n t r a c t u a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p . I n the Court of Appeal the same c a u t i o n 
i n f l u e n c e d the d e l i m i t a t i o n of l i a b i l i t y of a s o l i c i t o r to 
t h i r d p a r t i e s . ^ ® 
What then i s the prognosis? C r i t i c i s m cannot be 
l e v e l l e d a t the judgement i n Al=Kandari simply because the 
l i a b i l i t y of s o l i c i t o r s i s extended. Markesinis c i t e s 
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Cooke J i n G a r t s i d e v S h e f f i e l d '[one] should not 
decide a f a i r l y s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d case a g a i n s t the d i c t a t e s 
of j u s t i c e because of foreseeable t r o u b l e s ahead i n more 
d i f f i c u l t c a s e s . ' But a l l of t h i s must be done on the 
b a s i s of c o n s i s t e n t development of the law. There i s no 
r e a l o b j e c t i o n to l i a b i l i t y being widened provided c l e a r 
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l i m i t s can be s e t to the extension. S o l i c i t o r s w i l l , 
according to Markesinis, 'be apprehensive to see t h e i r 
l i a b i l i t y widening perhaps one day to uninsurable 
l e v e l s ' . 1 4 3 The Royal Commission on Legal S e r v i c e s shared 
144 
t h i s concern and recommended c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a l i m i t 
placed by s t a t u t e i n r e s p e c t of p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence. 
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To t h a t end the Royal Commission suggested t h a t an i n q u i r y 
should be s e t up without delay to review the i s s u e of 
l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y f o r claims of negligences 
'Cases have been known i n which partners have l o s t 
t h e i r personal a s s e t s as a r e s u l t of a c l a i m i n 
excess of t h e i r insurance cover? y e t where the c l a i n 
i s l a r g e , the t o t a l personal a s s e t s of the p a r t n e r s 
w i l l cover only a small proportion of i t . ' 
A c o n s i d e r a t i o n of Lord Scarman's judgement i n T a i 
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Hing r a i s e s the i n f e r e n c e t h a t the l i n e of reasoning 
used by O l i v e r , J . , i n Hett, Stubbs & Keimp i s i n c o r r e c t . 
I t may now be t h a t the newly commenced r e t r e a t from Anns 
w i l l operate to r e v e r s e the trend of widening l i a b i l i t y i n 
negligence. However, P r i v y Council d e c i s i o n s are not 
binding on E n g l i s h c o u r t s , merely p e r s u a s i v e . Only time 
w i l l t e l l i f t h i s l i n e of reasoning w i l l be followed by 
E n g l i s h s u p e r i o r c o u r t s . C l a r k e v Bruce Lance & Co might be 
the commencement of a t h r u s t i n t h a t d i r e c t i o n to the 
b e n e f i t of s o l i c i t o r s . 
A c c o u n t a b i l i t y of Lawyers i n a Time of Change 
Lawyers must be accountable to those whom they damaged but 
c a r e f u l l i m i t a t i o n of l i a b i l i t y must be the aim of the 
c o u r t s i f l e g a l s e r v i c e s are to be maintained on an 
e f f e c t i v e b a s i s . What has to be borne i n mind, however, 
i s t h a t the future development of the law of negligence as 
a f f e c t i n g the l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n may not be smooth. 
C l a r i f i c a t i o n of the law and the d e s i r e to avoid confusion 
w i l l have to be done a g a i n s t the background of change. 
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Pressure i s being brought to bear from many d i f f e r e n t 
sources. Attacks are being made upon the r e s t r i c t i v e 
p r a c t i c e s which both branches of the l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n are 
a l l e g e d to operate. Competition i s a c t i v e l y encouraged by 
Government and monopolies such as conveyancing a r e under 
t h r e a t . Commercial p r e s s u r e s , too, are coming to the fore 
and the emergence of l a r g e r firms i s becoming n o t i c e a b l e . 
So f a r mergers have l a r g e l y been between l e g a l f i r m s but 
i n c r e a s i n g l y one might expect to see mergers between firms 
of d i f f e r e n t p r o f e s s i o n a l groups. Mergers w i l l c r e a t e 
e t h i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s where commercial c o n s i d e r a t i o n s 
become more important. D i f f i c u l t y i s l i k e l y to be 
encountered i n r e c o n c i l i n g d i f f e r e n t e t h i c a l v a l u e s which 
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may c o n f l i c t w i t h i n new m u l t i = d i s c i p l i n a r y p r a c t i c e s . 
And r e c o n c i l e d such e t h i c a l values must become i f the 
t r a d i t i o n a l standard of s e r v i c e to the c l i e n t s i s to be 
maintained. Such changes as o u t l i n e d above would c r e a t e 
d i f f i c u l t i e s even i f the l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n remained 
unchanged. The Marre Report and statements made by the 
Lord Chancellor, Lord Mackay of C l a s h f e r n show t h a t reform 
of the p r o f e s s i o n i t s e l f i s probable and w i t h i n a sh o r t 
time s c a l e . The Lord Chancellor has a l s o i n d i c a t e d t h a t 
change must a l s o embrace t r a d i t i o n a l values and the 
147 
p r o f e s s i o n s must continue to serve the p u b l i c At an 
e a r l i e r time the Lord Chancellor s t a t e d t h a t high e t h i c a l 
standards had to be maintained i f the Bar was to s u r v i v e 
148 
as an independent p r o f e s s i o n . The Marre Committee, s e t 
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up by the Law S o c i e t y and the Bar Council reported i n J u l y 
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1988. I n many ways i t i s conservative? s e v e r a l c r i t i c s 
might see i t as too mild, not c h a l l e n g i n g the l e g a l 
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p r o f e s s i o n s u f f i c i e n t l y . There were, however, some 
s i g n i f i c a n t and welcome proposals such as the extension of 
r i g h t of audience i n the High Court to s o l i c i t o r s although 
the two branches of the l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n do not agree on 
such a reform. The proposal of d i r e c t access to the 
b a r r i s t e r has a t t r a c t i o n s but was a l s o opposed by the 
151 
Bar. D i r e c t access would, of course, a f f e c t the 
b a r r i s t e r s r e l a t i o n s h i p with h i s 'lay' c l i e n t . B a r r i s t e r s 
w i l l have a c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p with the l a y c l i e n t 
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and be able to sue f o r t h e i r f e e s . The Marre Committee 
did not recommend f u s i o n of the two branches, concluding 
that there i s no p u b l i c b e n e f i t to be derived from such a 
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reform. Nor was there a recommendation to remove s e l f 
r e g u l a t i o n which was seen as the c i t i z e n s ' best safeguard 
a g a i n s t tyranny. The Marre Committee came to no 
conclusion on contingency f e e s , merely recommending 
f u r t h e r study and d i s c u s s i o n of the problem. There have 
154 
been many s t u d i e s of t h i s i s s u e and c u r r e n t l y a working 
group e s t a b l i s h e d by the Law Reform Committee of the Bar 
155 
Council i s a c t i v e i n t h i s r e s p e c t . No changes to the 
156 
immunity of advocates was recommended. 
Lord Mackay announced i n l a t e October 1988 t h a t he 
would be preparing three Green Papers on Law Reform e a r l y 
i n 1989. The Green Papers were published i n January 
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1989. The main papers are concerned with r i g h t s of 
audience i n higher c o u r t s , f u s i o n of the two branches of 
the l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n , m u l t i d i s c i p l i n a r y p r a c t i c e s , the 
e l i g i b i l i t y of s o l i c i t o r s f o r the High Court Bench and an 
end to the probate monopoly. I n a d d i t i o n , the debate 
about the d e s i r a b i l i t y of contingency fees i s s e t to 
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assume a high p r o f i l e . Such fee arrangements have 
g e n e r a l l y not been approved by the l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n . The 
matter might be taken out of i t s hands. 
Response at t h i s e a r l y stage, to the Lord 
Chancellor's proposals seem to be mixed. Before 
p u b l i c a t i o n of the Green Papers Lady Marre, s t a t e d t h a t 
even though the main t h r u s t of her report had been 
supported by the Lord Chancellor, she considered the time 
s c a l e to be too s h o r t . Within the p r o f e s s i o n the 
short-time frame has been welcomed by some on the b a s i s of 
need to remove r e s t r i c t i v e p r a c t i c e s and commercial 
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sense. 
Whatever the outcome i n r e s p e c t of proposed changes, 
the future w i l l i n v o l ve change and the challenge t h a t goes 
with change. A c o n s t r u c t i v e response from the l e g a l 
p r o f e s s i o n i s necessary i f the confidence of the p u b l i c 
dependent upon the p r o v i s i o n of l e g a l s e r v i c e s i s to be 
maintained. The maintenance of t h a t confidence i s i n the 
i n t e r e s t of the p r o f e s s i o n s . A l l may b e n e f i t therefrom. 
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Chapter 5 
Advocates' Immunity 
The general trend o u t l i n e d p r e v i o u s l y i n d i c a t e s t h a t 
lawyers are s u b j e c t to c o n t r o l by the courts i n r e s p e c t of 
the q u a l i t y of the s e r v i c e they provide. There i s no 
reason to suppose t h a t the p o s i t i o n of lawyers, i n 
p a r t i c u l a r s o l i c i t o r s , should i n general terms be 
d i f f e r e n t from any other person as f a r as a c t i o n s f o r 
p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence are concerned. The p o s i t i o n of 
the b a r r i s t e r , however, r e q u i r e s f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 
Within the context of p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence the 
p o s i t i o n of the b a r r i s t e r i s anomalous. Alone among 
p r o f e s s i o n a l persons the b a r r i s t e r enjoys an immunity from 
s u i t for negligence, although the extent of such immunity 
i s s u b j e c t to l i m i t a t i o n s . Such a statement i s not to 
deny t h a t b a r r i s t e r s do a t t r a c t l i a b i l i t y i n negligence 
f o r the way i n which they provide some of t h e i r 
p r o f e s s i o n a l s e r v i c e s . However, the extent of the 
immunity and l i a b i l i t y appears to be i n a s t a t e of f l u x 
and w i l l yet r e q u i r e f u r t h e r examination before a c l e a r 
p i c t u r e begins to emerge. The leading case on the s u b j e c t 
of immunity i s Rondel v Worsley 1 although there have been 
2 
subsequent developments. 
3 
According to Jolowicz i t i s c l e a r from Rondel V 
Worsley that b a r r i s t e r s , i n common with other 
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p r o f e s s i o n a l s , owe a duty of care to t h e i r c l i e n t s - He 
4 
based t h i s view i n p a r t upon the dictum of Lord Morris § 
1 1 see no reason to doubt t h a t when r e t a i n e d a 
b a r r i s t e r owes a duty to e x e r c i s e due and reasonable 
ca r e and s k i l l . I n t h i s r e s p e c t he i s , i n my 
opinion, i n the same p o s i t i o n as the members of other 
p r o f e s s i o n s . ' 
Lord Reid s i m i l a r l y saw l i t t l e reason why the 
l i a b i l i t y of counsel should be d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of 
members of any other p r o f e s s i o n who give t h e i r 
p r o f e s s i o n a l advice and s e r v i c e s to t h e i r c l i e n t s . The 
members of every p r o f e s s i o n are bound to a c t honourably 
and i n accordance with the recognised standards of t h e i r 
p r o f e s s i o n . ^ 
Wherein, t h e r e f o r e , l i e s the d i f f e r e n c e i n treatment 
of b a r r i s t e r s which d i s t i n g u i s h e s them from the members of 
other p r o f e s s i o n s when f a c i n g an a c t i o n i n negligence? 
The answer to t h i s question today r e s t s on p u b l i c p o l i c y 
but h i s t o r i c a l l y the r a t i o n a l e i s not so c l e a r . 
The o r i g i n of the l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n i n England i s 
medieval, although i n the beginning the Bar was the only 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . P l u c k n e t t s t a t e s ' i t i s c e r t a i n t h a t 
(around 1300)... was the moment when the p r o f e s s i o n of the 
law was a c q u i r i n g i t s permanent o r g a n i s a t i o n which was to 
l a s t a l l through the Middle Ages, s u r v i v e the desperate 
t r i a l s of Henry V I I I ' s r e i g n and endure i n l a r g e p a r t 
u n t i l today.' The E n g l i s h system of p r o f e s s i o n a l 
o r g a n i s a t i o n d i f f e r e d from t h a t p r e v a i l i n g on the 
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continent i n that the j u d i c a r y was appointed from members 
of the Bars 
'The E n g l i s h method of appointing outstanding members 
of the bar to s i t on the bench of the su p e r i o r Courts 
i s , i n f a c t , t y p i c a l l y medieval, and i s the product 
of more than two c e n t u r i e s . The year 1300 may be 
taken as the tur n i n g point; a f t e r t h a t date i t was 
the general r u l e f o r judges to be appointed from 
among the most eminent members of the bar. P r i o r to 
tha t date, i t was more usual f o r r o y a l c l e r k s and 
ad m i n i s t r a t i v e o f f i c i a l s to be r a i s e d to the 
bench.' 
Because of t h i s e s t a b l i s h e d custom of recruitment f o r 
the bench from the bar, the pr o f e s s i o n became u n i f i e d . 
But the recruitment was from a p a r t i c u l a r branch of the 
bars the S e r j e a n t s . The Se r j e a n t s b e n e f i t t e d due to the 
c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of government i n England. The l e g a l 
p r o f e s s i o n grew with c e n t r a l i z e d government and the 
adm i n i s t r a t i o n of r o y a l j u s t i c e , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the 
a c q u i s i t i o n of j u r i s d i c t i o n by the Royal Courts a t 
Westminster. By the 14th century i t became e s t a b l i s h e d 
t h a t only S e r j e a n t s could become judges. I n a d d i t i o n , i t 
appeared t h a t as the Crown began to c a l l men to be 
S e r j e a n t s , t h i s c a l l could not be refused. I n time, the 
S e r j e a n t s became a s s o c i a t e d with the Court of Common Pl e a s 
and had an e x c l u s i v e r i g h t of audience t h e r e . U l t i m a t e l y , 
9 
the s e r j e a n t became a Crown o f f i c i a l . 
The development of the order of s e r j e a n t does not 
ex p l a i n how the l e g a l work of England was conducted. 
There had never been many S e r j e a n t s and they could not 
have conducted a l l of the business of the Court of Common 
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Pleas„ To e x p l a i n t h i s gap, re f e r e n c e has to be made to 
the s o - c a l l e d ' a p p r e n t i c e s ' 1 ^ Although l i t t l e i s known of 
these 'apprentices' they have l i t t l e i n common with the 
motion of indentured t r a i n e e s . They were 'men of eminence 
i n t h e i r p r o f e s s i o n , competent to give the government 
u s e f u l t e c h n i c a l advice, of s u f f i c i e n t substance to be 
taxed on the highest s c a l e of the p r o f e s s i o n , and, . . . f i t 
to be entrusted with the very r e s p o n s i b l e t a s k of l e g a l 
education.' 1''' Even so Plucknett i s s t i l l u n c e r t a i n about 
the place of the apprentice i n the p r o f e s s i o n a l 
o r g a n i s a t i o n . However, he speculates t h a t i n 1292 an 
apprentice may w e l l have addressed the Court of Common 
Pl e a s . A w r i t of t h a t year granted ' e x c l u s i v e audience to 
such "apprentices and attorneys" as the Court may s e l e c t . ' 
T h i s w r i t probably l e f t the S e r j e a n t s unaffected but 
enlarged the group of persons e l i g i b l e to p r a c t i c e before 
12 
the Court of Common P l e a s . I n t i m a t e l y connected w i t h 
the order of S e r j e a n t s are the Year Books, a p r i n c i p a l 
source of l e g a l h i s t o r y . The Year Books are remarkable i n 
t h e i r deference to the S e r j e a n t s and t h e i r almost t o t a l 
13 
absence of ref e r e n c e to apprentices. The Year Books 
appear to have had a small c i r c u l a t i o n and d i r e c t e d by 
Se r j e a n t s f o r the use of S e r j e a n t s . At the present day, 
the order of S e r j e a n t s i s no more but 'every b a r r i s t e r i s 
the h i s t o r i c a l s u c cessor of the t h i r t e e n t h century 
,14 
apprentice.' 
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Consideration of the e a r l y years of the l e g a l 
p r o f e s s i o n and the Year Book i s i n s t r u c t i v e . Based upon 
15 
such r e f e r e n c e s , Lawton J , i n Rondel v Morsley , 
concluded t h a t a t 'about 1435, the l e a d e r s of the l e g a l 
p r o f e s s i o n , namely, the S e r j e a n t s a t law and the judges, 
accepted t h a t lawyers who d i d not do t h e i r work pr o p e r l y 
were l i a b l e j u s t as f a r r i e r s and c a r p e n t e r s 
IS 
were...' Not only were counsel l i a b l e to t h e i r c l i e n t s 
but a l s o , when a b a r r i s t e r was r e t a i n e d as counsel he had 
17 
a r i g h t of a c t i o n a g a i n s t h i s c l i e n t f o r h i s f e e . 
18 
Bolland considered t h a t counsel's l i a b i l i t y f o r 
negligence and the r i g h t to sue f o r fees continued a t 
l e a s t u n t i l 1451 and t h e r e a f t e r became extinguished. T h i s 
19 
e x t i n c t i o n occurred , according to Bolland, before 1615 
20 
although R a s t e l l i n 1596 and a case r e p o r t of 21 22 1605 i n d i c a t e no change Baker confirms 'that i n medieval times the r e t a i n e r of men of law was a binding 
23 
covenant or c o n t r a c t . Counsel could both sue and be 
sued upon t h i s r e t a i n e r . T h i s r u l e operated up to the 
middle of the 16th century. Baker adds there was no l i m i t 
24 
of immunity i n medieval times'. 
Thus, i t seems reasonable to conclude t h a t some time 
between 1605 and 1615 counsel acquired immunity from s u i t 
i n negligence and s u f f e r e d the i n a b i l i t y to sue f o r f e e s . 
25 
I n 1615, S i r John Davys observed of counsel t h a t 'the 
fees and rewards which they r e c e i v e , are not of the nature 
of wages, or pay, or t h a t which c a l l s a l a r y or h i r e , which 214 
are indeed d u t i e s c e r t a i n and grow due by c o n t r a c t f o r 
labour or s e r v i c e , but t h a t which i s given to a l e a r n e d 
c o u n s e l l o r i s c a l l e d honorarium^ and not amerces j. being 
indeed a g i f t which g i v e t h honour as w e l l the the 
Taker as to the Giver^ n e i t h e r i s i t c e r t a i n or c o n t r a c t e d 
f o r ...the worthy Councellor may not demand i t without 
doing wrong to h i s reputation.' Even so there i s s t i l l 
r e f e r e n c e to c o n t r a c t u a l c a p a c i t y to sue i n 1652 i n which 
year there i s reference to a r e t a i n e r and a c l a i m f o r f i v e 
26 
years a r r e a r s . 
At t h i s juncture i t i s probably worth observing t h a t 
other changes a f f e c t i n g the l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n had taken 
p l a c e . During the middle ages communication between 
counsel and c l i e n t was d i r e c t . Up to the middle of the 
16th century c l i e n t s had to f i n d t h e i r counsel d i r e c t and 
i t was only t h e r e a f t e r t h a t s o l i c i t o r s were i n c r e a s i n g l y 
27 
consulted who would i n t u r n i n s t r u c t counsel. Even up 
to 1640 S e r j e a n t s newly c r e a t e d were i n s t r u c t e d not to 
take b r i e f s from s o l i c i t o r s but to draw the b r i e f s 
28 
themselves. I t was only i n the 1650's t h a t counsel 
began to abandon d i r e c t c o n s u l t a t i o n and to r e l y upon the 
i n s t r u c t i o n of s o l i c i t o r s . Today, t h i s p r a c t i c e i s 
regarded as e t i q u e t t e but at t h a t time i t was regarded as 
a time saving device c o n t r a r y to the best opinion of what 
was c o r r e c t . At the same time t h a t t h i s t r a n s i t i o n i n 
p r a c t i c e was t a k i n g p l a c e , s o c i a l changes were a l s o 
a f f e c t i n g the bar. Members now had to be genteel - not 
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concerned with earning a l i v i n g . S o c i a l contact w i t h the 
lower branch was p r o h i b i t e d by r u l e s of e t i q u e t t e <> To 
t h i s end b a r r i s t e r s sought to maintain s u p e r i o r i t y by 
excluding attorneys from the Inns of Court i n 16th and 
30 
17th c e n t u r i e s . Gentlemen, t h e r e f o r e , would perform 
t h e i r s e r v i c e s for an honorarium and not a s a l a r y or wage. 
As p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e d , the notion of the honorarium has 
been a t t r i b u t e d to S e r j e a n t Davys. Whether or not Davys 
was the o r i g i n a t o r of t h i s d o c t r i n e i s u n c e r t a i n , but 
31 
Baker considers him to be i n f l u e n t i a l . E i g h t y e a r s 
e a r l i e r i n 1607 t h i s notion of honorarium had been 
32 
applied, and i n 1610 the p r i n c i p l e had r e c e i v e d j u d i c a l 
33 
support. Baker a t t r i b u t e s to Davys the f i r s t c l e a r 
34 
statement of the honorarium p r i n c i p l e . 
Whatever the genesis of the hoKiorarimm d o c t r i n e , i t 
appears to have become g e n e r a l l y accepted from the middle 
of 17 century although not, a t t h a t time, t e s t e d i n c o u r t . 
There followed from the beginning of 18 century j u d i c i a l 
a f f i r m a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e . I n 1714, Powys, J . , i n 
35 
Dean's case r u l e d that ' i f gentlemen of the Bar would 
not take fees " a f t e r the u s u a l manner" ( i n advance), they 
ought not to be allowed to recover them i n an a c t i o n a t 
law'. From 1742 onwards Lord Hardwick d e c l a r e d himself a 
staunch proponent of the p r i n c i p l e i n three judgments 
between 1742 and 1754. I n T h o r n h i l l v Evans (1742) he 
p o s i t e d 'Can i t be thought t h a t t h i s Court w i l l s u f f e r a 
gentleman of the Bar to maintain an a c t i o n f o r fees which 216 
i s tpaxddsuiia JiOHioraurirai' 
38 
to recover h i s f e e s . 
37 and refused to allow a b a r r i s t e r 
To Lord Hardwicke's view can be 
added the considerable weight of Blackstone who, i n h i s 
' I t i s e s t a b l i s h e d with us that a Counsel can 
maintain no a c t i o n f o r h i s fees which are given 
...not as s a l a r y or h i r e , but a mere g r a t u i t y , which 
a Counsellor.cannot demand without doing wrong to h i s 
r e p u t a t i o n 1 . 
But l e s t i t be thought t h a t the d i s a b i l i t y was a one way 
process detrimental to a c o u n s e l l o r Blackstone continued 
with a statement p e r t a i n i n g to advocates' immunity% 
'And, i n order to encourage due freedom of speech i n 
the l a w f u l defence of t h e i r c l i e n t s , and a t the same 
time to give a check to the unseemly l i c e n t i o u s n e s s 
of p r o s t i t u t e and i l l i b e r a l men (a few of whom may 
i n s i n u a t e even i n t o the most honourable p r o f e s s i o n ) 
i t hath been holden t h a t a counsel i s not answerable 
f o r any matter by him spoken, r e l a t i v e to the counsel 
i n hand, and suggested i n h i s c l i e n t s i n s t r u c t i o n s ? 
although i t should r e f l e c t upon the r e p u t a t i o n of 
another and even though a b s o l u t e l y groundless? but i f 
he mentions an untruth of h i s own i n v e n t i o n , or even 
upon i n s t r u c t i o n s i f i t be impertinent to the cause 
i n hand, he i s Jjhen l i a b l e to an a c t i o n from the 
party i n j u r e d . ' 
By the use of the word 'reputation' Blackstone 
i s r e f e r r i n g to immunity from s u i t i n defamation, not 
negligence. Roxburgh s t a t e s t h a t there was no immunity 
42 
with regard to negligence i n Blackstone's time. 
However, the b a s i s of the immunity from defamation 
and from negligence i s e s s e n t i a l l y the same, v i z . the 
b e t t e r maintenance of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e . 
These two d i f f e r e n t immunities are separate strands of a 
CoHnmneialtaiTies 39 s t a t e d s 
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p o l i c y s e r v i n g the same o v e r a l l purpose. Therefore, a 
p o l i c y of some advocates' immunity c e r t a i n l y e x i s t e d i n 
Blackstone's day. 
Although there was no immunity from negligence the 
idea gained i n p o p u l a r i t y , the notion of i n a b i l i t y to sue 
fo r fees (honorarium) and immunity from s u i t becomming 
l i n k e d . I n F e l l v Brom ( 1 7 4 1 ) 4 4 Lord Kenyon dismissed an 
a c t i o n f o r negligence a g a i n s t a b a r r i s t e r . That same 
45 
year, Lord Kenyon s t a t e d i n Turner v P h i l l i p s the 
general opinion of the p r o f e s s i o n t h a t fees were a present 
from the c l i e n t to b a r r i s t e r s and not a payment f o r 
labour. I n a d d i t i o n , h i s Lordship dismissed the 
pr o p o s i t i o n t h a t counsel could be l i a b l e f o r c r a s s a 
megligentia. The 19th century produced other c a s e s 
47 
continuing t h i s l i n e of development. Poll o c k C B i n the 
48 
c l a s s i c case on immunity, Swinfen v Lord Chelmsford, i n 
1860, r u l e d t h a t members of the Bar 'have no l e g a l c l a i m 
to any remuneration f o r the s e r v i c e s they render, though 
they u s u a l l y r e c e i v e a fee, a honorarium, and they 
undoubtedly ( i n the ordinary course of b u s i n e s s ) e n t e r 
i n t o no express c o n t r a c t . . . . . . and i t may be very s a f e l y 
a s s e r t e d t h a t there i s no i n s t a n c e of any a c t i o n being 
s u c c e s s f u l l y brought a g a i n s t a b a r r i s t e r f o r n e g l e c t of 
duty; and on the other hand, there are i n s t a n c e s where 
such an a c t i o n has been s u c c e s s f u l l y r e s i s t e d . Upon an 
express agreement he would no doubt be l i a b l e as any other 
person party to a contract.......We are a l l of opinion 
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t h a t an advocate a t the E n g l i s h bar, accepting a b r i e f i n 
the usual way, undertakes a duty, but does not e n t e r i n t o 
any c o n t r a c t or promise, express or implied. Cases may, 
indeed occur, where, on an express promise ( i f he made 
one) he would be l i a b l e i n assumpsitf but we t h i n k a 
b a r r i s t e r i s to be considered, not as making a c o n t r a c t 
with h i s c l i e n t , but as taki n g upon himself an o f f i c e or 
duty, i n the proper discharge of which not merely the 
c l i e n t , but the court i n which the duty i s to be 
49 
performed, and the p u b l i c a t l a r g e , have an i n t e r e s t . 1 
P o l l o c k C B concluded '...and I think i t r i g h t to express 
my own opinion t h a t provided an advocate a c t s honestly, 
with a view to the i n t e r e s t s of h i s c l i e n t , he i s not 
re s p o n s i b l e a t a l l i n an a c t i o n . I t seems admitted on a l l 
hands t h a t he i s not r e s p o n s i b l e f o r ignorance of law, or 
any mistake of f a c t , or f o r being l e s s eloquent or l e s s 
a s t u t e than he was expected to be. According to my view 
of the law a b a r r i s t e r , a c t i n g with p e r f e c t good f a i t h and 
with a s i n g l e view to the i n t e r e s t s of h i s c l i e n t , i s not 
res p o n s i b l e f o r any mistake or i n d i s c r e t i o n or e r r o r of 
50 
judgement of any s o r t . ' 
51 
With Kennedy v Broun i n 1863 the p o s i t i o n r e l a t i n g 
52 
to fees appeared to become consolidated. E r i e C J 
considered 'that a promise to pay money to a counsel f o r 
h i s advocacy made before, or during or a f t e r the 
l i t i g a t i o n , has no binding e f f e c t ; and furthermore, t h a t 
the r e l a t i o n of counsel and c l i e n t renders the p a r t i e s 
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mutually incapable of making any co n t r a c t f o r h i r i n g and 
s e r v i c e concerning advocacy i n l i t i g a t i o n . . . . i n a l l the 
records of our law... there i s no t r a c e whatever e i t h e r 
t h a t an.advocate has ever maintained a s u i t a g a i n s t an 
advocate f o r break of c o n t r a c t to advocate... The 
pro p o s i t i o n i s confined to i n c a p a c i t y f o r c o n t r a c t s 
concerning advocacy i n l i t i g a t i o n . T his c l a s s of 
c o n t r a c t s i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from other c l a s s e s on account 
of the p r i v i l e g e s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y attached to such 
advocacy? and on t h i s ground, we consider the case s 
unconnected with such advocacy to be i r r e l e v a n t . ' His 
Lordship added that p h y s i c i a n s s u f f e r e d from no such 
i n c a p a c i t y . 'We know of no i n c a p c i t y a f f e c t i n g a 
p h y s i c i a n . According to usage, p h y s i c i a n s p r a c t i c e f o r a 
fee which i s honorarium, not merces; and no a c t i o n l i e s 
where the p a r t i e s are presumed to have acted according to 
t h i s usage. But, i f the presumption i s rebutted by 
evidence of an express c o n t r a c t , such c o n t r a c t binds, and 
53 
the p h y s i c i a n may sue and be sued thereon.' 
Further c o n s i d e r a t i o n of Kennedy v Broun r e v e a l s 
i s s u e s of p o l i c y . Why i s i t t h a t one p r o f e s s i o n a l group 
cannot sue i n r e s p e c t of fees obtained by way of 
honorarium f o r l i t i g a t i o n and yet another r e s p e c t a b l e and 
d i g n i f i e d group, obtaining fees on much the same b a s i s , 
can? The answer l i e s i n p o l i c y . The advocates' 
i n c a p a c i t y r e s t s on the r e l a t i o n s h i p of c l i e n t and counsel 
54 
i n l i t i g a t i o n i . e . s e r v i c e s as an advocate. 'The 
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i n c a p a c i t y of a c l i e n t i n l i t i g a t i o n to make a c o n t r a c t of 
h i r i n g a f f e c t s the i n t e g r i t y and d i g n i t y of a advocates, 
and so i s i n c l o s e r e l a t i o n with the highest of human 
55 
i n t e r e s t s , v i z . the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e . ' But why 
would a c o n t r a c t defeat the i n t e r e s t s of j u s t i c e ? I n the 
opinion of E r i e C J c o n t r a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n s would d i v e r t 
the advocate from h i s duty to the court i n favour of h i s 
56 
c l i e n t s ' wishes as expressed i n the c o n t r a c t , would 
degrade the standards necessary to perform the duty and 
would c r e a t e i n t e r e s t s i n l i t i g a t i o n c o n t r a r y to the 
p o l i c y on maintenance. I n short, E r i e CJ could p e r c e i v e 
no simple b e n e f i t to redeem the general and i n e v i t a b l e 
57 
d e c l i n e a s s o c i a t e d with c o n t r a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n s . 
Cases decided subsequently to Kennedy v Broun confirm 
the c o n t r a c t u a l i n c a p a c i t y of an advocate. I n Mostyn v 
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EJostym i n 1870, where a b a r r i s t e r claimed t h a t a 
co n t r a c t with a c l i e n t i n n o n - l i t i g i o u s business could be 
created, the court held that the claim a g a i n s t the c l i e n t 
was moral, not l e g a l . Fees i n re s p e c t of n o n - l i t i g i o u s 
business could be recovered only on proof of an express 
c o n t r a c t with the c l i e n t . According to E r i e CJ, i n 
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Kennedy v Broun, an express c o n t r a c t and an implied 
c o n t r a c t d i f f e r only i n mode of proof. But i n Mostyn v 
Mostyn there i s a suggestion echoing the l i a b i l i t y of a 
p h y s i c i a n , i . e . a presumption of i n c a p a c i t y i n 
n o n - l i t i g i o u s work which may be rebutted by evidence of an 
express c o n t r a c t . ^ Thus, proof of such an express 221 
c o n t r a c t to pay would convert the moral o b l i g a t i o n i n t o a 
l e g a l one. 
The i n a b i l i t y of counsel to c o n t r a c t f o r fees was 
recognised i n a Canadian case brought before the P r i v y 
C o u n c i l , but not on the b a s i s of the reasons given i n 
Kennedy v Brom. The c o n s i d e r a t i o n of p u b l i c p o l i c y was 
61 
regarded as unnecessary i n R v Domtre. Usage and the 
p a r t i c u l a r c o n s t i t u t i o n of the E n g l i s h Bar provided 
6 2 
s u f f i c i e n t explanation of the r u l e . Lord Watson 
recognised the d i f f e r e n t systems operating i n Canada, 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between Quebec, when counsel could recover 
f e e s , and Ontario, where, having a system i n which the law 
6 3 
of England p r e v a i l e d , counsel could not. I t was assumed 
th a t Kennedy v Broun c o r r e c t l y a p p l i e d the E n g l i s h 
p o s i t i o n on counsel's fees but on the b a s i s of usage, not 
p o l i c y . A c l i e n t r e t a i n s counsel upon the u s u a l terms. 
I n England, the usual terms were to render s e r v i c e s of a 
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purely honorary c h a r a c t e r . S i m i l a r l y , counsel who 
'combines i n h i s own person the v a r i o u s functions which 
are e x e r c i s e d by E n g l i s h p r a c t i t i o n e r s of every c l a s s i n 
England, a l l of whom, the Bar alone expected, can recover 
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t h e i r fees by an a c t i o n at law' such as i n Quebec, i s 
6 6 
allowed 'by law and p r a c t i c e to sue f o r h i s f e e s . ' 
But a concentration upon counsel's i n a b i l i t y to sue 
for fees may do t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n a d i s s e r v i c e . That 
such i n c a p a c i t y was regarded as e x i s t i n g i s important not 
for i t s own sake but as the foundation of the r u l e , a l b e i t 222 
one t h a t had emerged c e n t u r i e s before, t h a t a counsel 
could not be l i a b l e f o r negligence. I n 1896 L i n d l e y L J , 
i n c o n s i d e r i n g the consequence of al l o w i n g a b a r r i s t e r to 
r e l y on a c o n t r a c t f o r f e e s , opined ' I t would, I t h i n k , be 
much r e g r e t t e d i f t h i s Court, e i t h e r by i t s e l f or by i t s 
o f f i c e r s , d i d anything to enable counsel to recover h i s 
fees from h i s c l i e n t , whether the l a y c l i e n t or h i s 
s o l i c i t o r c l i e n t . Fees are payable as a matter of honour. 
The s o l i c i t o r can, i f so required by counsel, be compelled 
e i t h e r not to r e t a i n him or to pay h i s fees with the 
b r i e f . That i s the remedy of counsel, and he had i t i n 
h i s own hands. I f he does not choose to i n s i s t on payment 
of h i s fees with the b r i e f , the payment becomes a matter 
of honour, not of l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n . . . I t h i n k i t i s of the 
utmost importance t h a t the court should not a s s i s t 
b a r r i s t e r s to recover t h e i r f e e s . I f they do so, the 
whole r e l a t i o n between a b a r r i s t e r and h i s p r o f e s s i o n a l 
c l i e n t w i l l be a l t e r e d , . , The i n e v i t a b l e r e s u l t w i l l be to 
do away with t h a t which i s the g r e a t e s t p r o t e c t i o n of 
counsel a g a i n s t an a c t i o n f o r negligence by h i s 
c l i e n t . , 6 8 
69 
Lopes and Rigby L J J agreed, the former a s s e r t i n g . 
'The d e c i s i o n of the Court of Common Pleas i n Kennedy v 
Broun has always been acted upon, and i t e s t a b l i s h e s the 
u n q u a l i f i e d d o c t r i n e t h a t the r e l a t i o n of counsel and 
s o l i c i t o r renders the p a r t i e s mutually incapable of making 
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any l e g a l c o n t r a c t of h i r i n g and s e r v i c e i n regard to 
70 
l i t i g a t i o n . 1 
I n the l i g h t of t h i s l i n e of j u d i c i a l a u t h o r i t y i t i s 
hardly s u r p r i s i n g t h a t the textbooks of the period and the 
succeeding years reproduce the same r u l e as proposed i n 
v Broiam and l a t e r developed. For example, P o l l o c k r e f e r s to i n c a p a c i t y to c o n t r a c t f o r s e r v i c e s i n 
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l i t i g a t i o n . Bevan makes the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
l i t i g i o u s and n o n - l i t i g i o u s business, v i z . 'Contracts i n 
cases unconnected with advocacy... are not regarded as 
being w i t h i n the i n c a p a c i t y , and consequently the o r d i n a r y 
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r u l e s as to the l i a b i l i t y f o r negligence would apply.' 
Contary to t h i s , Halsbury does not make the d i s t i n c t i o n ; 
indeed the opposite point i s made t h a t ' t h i s immunity from 
a c t i o n i s not confined to l i t i g a t i o n , but extends to a l l 
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cases where the r e l a t i o n of counsel and c l i e n t e x i s t s . 
W i n f i e l d regarded the exemption as ' i n v e t e r a t e , whatever 
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might be i t s j u s t i f i c a t i o n ' . 
The modern law of negligence found i t s g r e a t e s t 
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expression i n Donoghue v Stevenson i n 1932. Using Lord 
Atkin's t e s t of f o r e s i g h t the approach to duty became more 
expansive. But, d e s p i t e Lord MacMillan's dictum t h a t 'the 
7 6 
c a t e g o r i e s of negligence are never cl o s e d ' , the c o u r t s 
d i d not take the g e n e r a l i z e d view, p r e f e r r i n g to develop 
the t o r t on a case by case b a s i s . Thus, there were 
l i m i t a t i o n s on the expansion of the duty, perhaps most 
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notably i n the area of economic l o s s . I t would seem 
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that not a l l judges regarded Lord Atkin's 'neighbour' 
7 8 
dictum as a statement of p r i n c i p l e or of p o l i c y . 'That 
"duty" r a i s e s a p o l i c y i s s u e has only gained b e l a t e d o v e r t 
admission from judges steeped i n the B r i t i s h p o s i t i v i s t 
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t r a d i t i o n . ' 
One of the major e f f e c t s of Donoghue v Stevenson was 
t h a t the ' p r i v i t y of c o n t r a c t f a l l a c y ' was exposed. 
L i a b i l i t y i n t o r t no longer depended upon the presence of 
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p r i v i t y or a c o n t r a c t between the p a r t i e s . As a 
consequence, the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t b a r r i s t e r s could not sue 
for t h e i r fees was weakened as a ground f o r d e n i a l of 
l i a b i l i t y i n negligence. Despite t h a t , advocates' immunity 
continued to operate i n the sense t h a t no case had y e t 
emerged denying i t . However, following the House of Lords' 
d e c i s i o n i n Hedley Byrne v H e l l e r the absence of a 
c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between b a r r i s t e r and c l i e n t was 
no longer adequate. The p r o p o s i t i o n was t h a t ' i f someone 
possessed of a s p e c i a l s k i l l undertakes q u i t e i r r e s p e c t i v e 
of c o n t r a c t , to apply that s k i l l f o r the a s s i s t a n c e of 
another person who r e l i e s upon such s k i l l , a duty of law 
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w i l l a r i s e ' . 82 83 I n Rondel v Worsley and subsequent c a s e s , t h i s 
broad statement of Lord Morris i n Hedley Byrne appears to 
be unquestioned. The d i f f i c u l t y was to become one of 
j u s t i f y i n g the immunity i f i t was r e t a i n e d , and d e f i n i n g 
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i t s extent. Two i s s u e s appear to have emerged f o r 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n as to the scope and extent of advocates' 
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immunity. The f i r s t i s i n r e l a t i o n to work i n c o u r t . The 
p c 
second, to p r e - t r i a l work i n chambers 
With regard to work i n court, i n Rondel v EJorsley i n 
1966 the Court of Appeal decided t h a t immunity was not 
based on the absence of c o n t r a c t between b a r r i s t e r and 
c l i e n t , but on p u b l i c p o l i c y and, according to Lord 
Denning M.R, and Danckwerts, L . J . , long usage i n t h a t the 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e r e q u i r e d f e a r l e s s and 
independent advocacy. I n a d d i t i o n , the absence of immunity 
would make the r e t r y i n g of cases i n e v i t a b l e and c o n t r a r y 
to the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , and f i n a l l y , immunity e x i s t s 
8 6 
because a b a r r i s t e r i s obliged to accept any c l i e n t . 
With regard to p r e - t r i a l work, immunity was thought 
to be appropriate by Lord Denning and Danckwerts L J . 
(Salmon L J d i s s e n t i n g ) . This immunity was again founded on 
long usage. But immunity was not to be extended to 
s o l i c i t o r advocates. The reasons given were t h a t 
s o l i c i t o r s entered i n t o a c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p with 
c l i e n t s and, indeed, could r e j e c t c l i e n t s . Other reasons 
were t h a t s o l i c i t o r s and b a r r i s t e r s were h i s t o r i c a l l y 
d i f f e r e n t p r o f e s s i o n s and t h a t a b a r r i s t e r faced 
p r o f e s s i o n a l hazards d i f f e r e n t from those of s o l i c i t o r s ' . 
I n a notable d i s s e n t i n g speech, Salmon L J s a i d t h a t 
p r e - t r i a l i s s u e s were not r e q u i r e d to be covered by 
immunity. That was not to say t h a t i t was not sometimes 
d i f f i c u l t to draw the l i n e and to know whether or not an 
opinion or d r a f t i s i n r e a l i t y p a r t of the management or 
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conduct of a c i v i l or c r i m i n a l a c t i o n . Lord Denning 
agreed with Lord Morris t h a t c o n t r a c t u a l c a p a c i t y was not 
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r e l e v a n t ; there had to be some other ground. Danckwerts 
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L J a l s o thought t h a t by w e l l known usage over the 
c e n t u r i e s i n s t r u c t i o n s were accepted by b a r r i s t e r s on the 
understanding t h a t he would not be l i a b l e to an a c t i o n i n 
negligence. Thus, the Court of Appeal considered t h a t the 
b a r r i s t e r advocate was immune from s u i t i n negligence i n 
the way i n which he conducted l i t i g a t i o n . The t r a d i t i o n a l 
immunity so f a r was reaffirmed. With regard to work 
conducted outside court, such immunity had y e t to be 
developed. Lord Denning went on to say t h a t i n a d d i t i o n to 
court work there should be ' u n r e s t r i c t e d immunity f o r work 
done i n chambers i n cases which might never come to c o u r t 
because he (counsel) should be able to give h i s opinion 
f u l l y without being s u b j e c t to f e a r . He (Lord Denning) di d 
not think t h a t the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t r e q u i r e d t h a t a 
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b a r r i s t e r should be made l i a b l e f o r negligence'. 
Danckwerts L J a l s o thought the immunity should extend to 
work i n chambers, although he acknowledged t h a t t h a t p a r t 
of the p o l i c y of immunity was not so obvious. 
Salmon L J s t a t e d h i s opinion more c l e a r l y and, i t i s 
submitted, more c o n s i s t e n t l y with the development of the 
t o r t of negligence. However, i t i s to p r e - t r i a l work t h a t 
Salmon L J addressed h i s thoughts. His statement i s of 
great value. 'The question i s whether p u b l i c p o l i c y 
demands t h a t , i n c e r t a i n circumstances, the law s h a l l 227 
confer immunity from such a c t i o n s ... I cannot agree with 
the view t h a t i n r e l a t i o n to matters unconnected with the 
conduct or management of a case i n court the duty of a 
b a r r i s t e r to take reasonable c a r e and h i s l i a b i l i t y to be 
sued f o r breach of t h a t duty should be any d i f f e r e n t from 
t h a t of an accountant, a r c h i t e c t , s o l i c i t o r or surgeon ... 
No doubt t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p can be r e s t r i c t e d so t h a t i t 
does not impose l i a b i l i t y ? the p r o f e s s i o n a l man may 
e x p r e s s l y s t a t e t h a t he i s prepared to advise only without 
91 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . ' But there can be, continued Salmon L J , 
no i m p l i c a t i o n 'that s o l i c i t o r s and counsel must be taken 
to a c t on the b a s i s t h a t there s h a l l be no l e g a l 
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r e s p o n s i b i l i t y upon counsel to take reasonable c a r e ' . 
I t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y unfortunate t h a t no s i n g l e 
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convincing reason was given f o r the immunity. However, 
Danckwerts L J s t a t e d 'Public p o l i c y i n my view r e a l l y i s 
the reason fo r the b a r r i s t e r s ' immunity as regards 
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proceedings i n c o u r t ' . Perhaps i n the l i g h t of 
subsequent cases we can be s a t i s f i e d with t h i s reason. I n 
the lower court, Lawton J gave the reason f o r immunity 
from s u i t a r i s i n g 'from the p a r t which the advocate p l a y s 
i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e , not from membership of 
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an Inn of Court'. This r e c o g n i t i o n of the reason behind 
the p o l i c y only seems, however, to make the treatment of 
96 
s o l i c i t o r s by the Court of Appeal a l l the s t r a n g e r , 
because i n considering whether a s o l i c i t o r advocate should 
be l i a b l e i n court work, c o n t r a c t u a l c a p a c i t y now became 
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i r r e l e v a n t . So the unusual p o s i t i o n had a r i s e n t h a t the 
s o l i c i t o r could be sued even when a c t i n g as an advocate i n 
court whereas a b a r r i s t e r when a c t i n g outside court could 
9 8 
not. According to Jolowicz the m a j o r i t y of the cour t 
gave two reasons f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between b a r r i s t e r s and 
s o l i c i t o r advocates. F i r s t , a s o l i c i t o r makes a c o n t r a c t 
with a c l i e n t ; a b a r r i s t e r does not. Secondly, a 
s o l i c i t o r may choose h i s c l i e n t ; a b a r r i s t e r may not. 
This d i s t i n c t i o n , says Jolowicz, i s inappropriate 
once the b a r r i s t e r s ' immunity i s seen to r e s t on p u b l i c 
p o l i c y i n r e l a t i o n to the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e , i t i s 
p a r t i c u l a r l y strange to see the e x i s t e n c e of a c o n t r a c t u a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the s o l i c i t o r and h i s c l i e n t used to 
j u s t i f y h i s l i a b i l i t y . . . 
... i n Rondel v Worsley i t s e l f Lord Denning made i t 
c l e a r t h a t the b a r r i s t e r s immunity can no longer be 
grounded on the absence of a c o n t r a c t . The Hedley Byrne 
case "made i t p l a i n t h a t the immunity can no longer be 
j u s t i f i e d on the ground t h a t a b a r r i s t e r cannot sue f o r 
h i s f e e s " . 'Yet Lord Denning r e f e r s to a s o l i c i t o r ' s 
c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s with h i s c l i e n t even to the 
point of l o c a t i n g the s o l i c i t o r s l i a b i l i t y i n c o n t r a c t and 
not t o r t . 'But' continues Jolowicz, 'how the presence of 
a c o n t r a c t makes the s o l i c i t o r advocate l i a b l e when i t s 
absence i s not the reason f o r the b a r r i s t e r s immunity i s 
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not explained'. 
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I t seems, l o g i c a l l y , t h a t the Court of Appeal cannot have 
i t both ways. E i t h e r c o n t r a c t i s r e l e v a n t or i t i s not. 
I f i t i s not, and p o l i c y i s the reason why immunity i s 
conferred, then i f two people, each from d i f f e r e n t 
branches of the p r o f e s s i o n but c a r r y i n g out the same 
function, are t r e a t e d d i f f e r e n t l y by the law, the v a l i d 
reasons remained to be given a f t e r the Court of Appeal 
d e c i s i o n . On an i s s u e as s e n s i t i v e as b a r r i s t e r ' s 
immunity i t was i n e v i t a b l e t h a t the case would go to the 
House of Lords. Perhaps i t was j u s t as i n e v i t a b l e t h a t 
the appeal would be dismissed as being 'devoid of 
m e r i t ' . 1 ^ 1 The House of Lords agreed t h a t immunity should 
remain. But what i s the b a s i s of t h i s immunity? What i s 
i t s i n t e n t ? I s immunity a r u l e or an exception to the 
r u l e ? The m a j o r i t y of the Appellate Committee (Lord 
Pearce d i s s e n t i n g ) thought t h a t immunity i s an exception 
to the r u l e of l i a b i l i t y . 
Lord Reid considered t h a t the ' r u l e ' of immunity was 
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based on p u b l i c p o l i c y . This p o l i c y was r e l a t e d to the 
exceptional p o s i t i o n of counsel while engaged i n 
l i t i g a t i o n . I n l i t i g a t i o n counsel was under a g r e a t e r 
duty to the court than to h i s c l i e n t . The discharge of 
h i s duty to the court may l e a d to a c o n f l i c t w ith the 
c l i e n t ' s personal i n t e r e s t s . Indeed, t h i s duty to the 
court may r e s u l t i n counsel a c t i n g i n a way which the 
c l i e n t c onsiders detrimental to h i s case. The c l i e n t 
would understandably be d i s g r u n t l e d i f he were then to 
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103 l o s e h i s case. But the p o l i c y of immunity i s , s a i d 
Lord Reid, l i m i t e d to counsel engaged i n l i t i g a t i o n . 
C o n f l i c t of duty does not n e c e s s a r l y a r i s e i n r e l a t i o n to 
other functions of counsel and there h i s Lordship could 
see l i t t l e reason why the l i a b i l i t y of counsel should be 
d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of members of any other p r o f e s s i o n who 
give t h e i r p r o f e s s i o n a l advice and s e r v i c e s to t h e i r 
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c l i e n t s ' . u 
Lord Morris concurred. He, too, saw no 'reason to 
doubt t h a t when r e t a i n e d a b a r i s t e r owes a duty to 
e x e r c i s e due and reasonable c a r e and s k i l l . I n t h i s 
r e s p e c t , he i s , i n my opinion, i n the same p o s i t i o n as the 
members of other p r o f e s s i o n s ... Accordingly, i n my view, 
there cannot be, and indeed there ought not to be, any 
question of one pr o f e s i o n being i n a s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n , 
save i f a t a l l , i n such l i m i t e d way as the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t 
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demands'. Lords Upjohn and Pearson spoke i n a s i m i l a r 
v e i n . 
Lord Upjohns ' I t h i n k t h a t p u b l i c p o l i c y n e c e s s i t a t e s 
t h a t , a t a l l events i n matters p e r t a i n i n g to l i t i g a t i o n , a 
106 
b a r r i s t e r should have t h i s immunity*. His Lordship 
made s p e c i a l reference to the counsel's duty to the court 
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and p o s s i b l e c o n f l i c t with the duty to the c l i e n t Lord 
Pearson; ' I think i t i s r i g h t to say t h a t the b a r r i s t e r ' s 
immunity from l i a b i l i t y f o r p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence i n the 
conduct of l i t i g a t i o n i n an exception from a general r u l e 
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of p r o f e s s i o n a l l i a b i l i t y . I t i s based on p u b l i c 
,. . 108 p o l i c y ' . 
On the r e l a t i v e l y subsidiary i s s u e s of n o n - l i t i g i o u s 
work and s o l i c i t o r - advocates immunity the House of Lords 
determined (Lord Pearson d i s s e n t i n g ) t h a t p u b l i c p o l i c y 
was again the v i t a l f a c t o r . Although the statements on 
t h i s i s s u e were o b i t e r the general view was t h a t no 
immunity was conferred where a negligence a c t i o n i s based 
on matters unconnected with cases i n court. I n such 
circumstances, f a i l u r e to a c t with care and s k i l l puts the 
b a r r i s t e r i n no b e t t e r p o s i t i o n than any other 
p r o f e s s i o n a l person. Secondly, a s o l i c i t o r a c t i n g as an 
advocate enjoys the same immunity as a b a r r i s t e r . 
Thus ended the f i r s t modern c o n s i d e r a t i o n , i . e . post 
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Donoghue v Stevenson, of the i s s u e of advocates 1 
immunity, although with some questions l e f t unanswered, or 
at best, p a r t l y answered, eg n o n - l i t i g i o u s work 
p r e - t r i a l work. The matter seemed s e t t l e d f o r the 
foreseable f u t u r e . 
However, the i s s u e reared i t s head once more and the 
Appellate Committee again considered the p r i n c i p l e of 
b a r r i s t e r s ' immunity i n l i t i g a t i o n i n S a i f A l i v Sydney 
M i t c h e l l . 1 1 ^ I n t h i s case, the House of Lords made 
observations on the extent of advocates' immunity. 
Lord Wilberforce i n S a i f A l i considered t h a t the 
immunity confered i n Rondel w Morsley was 'held to e x i s t 
on grounds, e s s e n t i a l l y of p u b l i c p o l i c y , mainly upon the 
232 
ground t h a t a b a r r i s t e r owed a duty to the c o u r t as w e l l 
as to h i s c l i e n t and should not be i n h i b i t e d , through f e a r 
of an a c t i o n by h i s c l i e n t , from performing i t ? p a r t l y 
upon the u n d e s i r a b i l i t y of r e l i t i g a t i o n as between 
b a r r i s t e r and c l i e n t of what was l i t i g a t e d between the 
c l i e n t and h i s opponent. T h i s n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e d a 
removal of the t o t a l blanket immunity and r e s t r i c t i o n of 
i t to such cases as might f a l l w i t h i n the area of p u b l i c 
,. ,111 polxcy• 
What then i s the area of p u b l i c p o l i c y ? Rondel w 
K o r s l e y had been concerned only with matters t a k i n g p l a c e 
i n court r e s u l t i n g i n an outcome undesirable to the 
c l i e n t . Observations had been made i n Rondel v Worsley on 
the extent of the immunity for matters t a k i n g p l a c e 
outside court and i n b a r r i s t e r s ' chambers. Although the 
c a t e g o r i e s of negligence were expanding, Lord W i l b e r f o r c e 
i n S a i f A l l did not consider t h a t t h i s would j u s t i f y 
sweeping away an immunity from s u i t which had e x i s t e d f o r 
c e n t u r i e s and had r e c e n t l y been r e s t a t e d i n Rondel v 
112 
fflorsley. Observations i n Rondel v ^ o r s l e y a l s o showed 
t h a t immunity was not l i m i t e d to what happened i n c o u r t 
but should include, as Lord Wilberforce put i t i n S a i f 
A l i , 'some things which occurred a t an e a r l i e r stage 
broadly c l a s s i f i e d as r e l a t e d to conduct and management of 
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l i t i g a t i o n ' . A h e l p f u l expansion of the phrase 
'conduct and management' had been suggested by 
McCarthy, P., i n the New Zealand Court of Appeal i n Rees v 
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S i n c l a i r namely, t h a t p r o t e c t i o n should be o f f e r e d to 
p r e - t r i a l work, as w e l l as t h a t done i n court, provided 
the p a r t i c u l a r work was 'so i n t i m a t e l y connected w i t h the 
conduct of the cause i n court that i t can f a i r l y be s a i d 
to be a p r e l i m i n a r y d e c i s i o n a f f e c t i n g the way t h a t cause 
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i s to be conducted when i t comes to a hearing.' I n S a i f 
M.i, Lord Wilberforce held that t h i s formulation was 
correct,and added 'the formulation takes proper account, 
as i t should of the f a c t t h a t many t r i a l s , c i v i l and 
c r i m i n a l , took p l a c e only a f t e r i n t e r l o c u t o r y or p r e - t r i a l 
proceedings. At these proceedings d e c i s i o n s may o f t e n 
f a l l to be made of the same nature as d e c i s i o n s a t the 
t r i a l i t s e l f ? i t would be i l l o g i c a l and u n f a i r i f they 
were protected i n the one case and not i n the other. 
Secondly, a d e c i s i o n t h a t a b a r r i s t e r ' s l i a b i l i t y extends 
so f a r as I have suggested n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e s t h a t i t 
does not extend beyond t h a t point. I n p r i n c i p l e those who 
undertake to give s k i l l e d advice are under a duty to use 
reasonable care and s k i l l . The immunity as regards 
l i t i g a t i o n i s an exception from t h i s and a p p l i e s only i n 
the area to which i t extends. Outside t h a t a r e a the 
normal r u l e must a p p l y . ' 1 1 ^ 
Lord Diplock was concerned about a s i t u a t i o n which 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d b a r r i s t e r s from other p r o f e s s i o n a l persons. 
Indeed, the trend as developed by the House of Lords was 
i n the opposite d i r e c t i o n i . e . 'to extend to new areas of 
a c t i v i t y the notion t h a t a man i s l i a b l e f o r l o s s or 
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damage to others r e s u l t i n g from h i s f a i l u r e to take 
117 118 ca r e . ' Immunity could only be j u s t i f i e d by p o l i c y . 
Lord Diplock f u r t h e r considered t h a t there were sound 
reasons f o r immunity but t h a t only a l i m i t e d immunity was 
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j u s t i f i e d f o r two reasons. F i r s t , advocates' immunity 
was p a r t of the general immunity granted to a l l persons 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the j u d i c i a l process and secondly, the 
maintenance of the i n t e g r i t y of j u s t i c e . i . e . 
u n d e s i r a b i l i t y of c o l l a t e r a l a t t a c k on the c o r r e c t n e s s of 
d e c i s i o n s except through the appeal process. Lord Diplock 
accepted the extension of immunity i n Rees v S i n c l a i r but 
added t h a t i t would not be wise to attempt a catalogue of 
b e f o r e - t r i a l work which would f a l l w i t h i n extension of the 
area of immunity. Lord Salmon a l s o concurred 
On the other hand, Lords R u s s e l l and K e i t h d i s s e n t e d . 
Lord K e i t h thought t h a t the immunity s t a t e d i n Rondel v 
Worsley extended to ' a l l stages of a b a r r i s t e r ' s work i n 
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connection with l i t i g a t i o n . ' He could not see any 
d i s t i n c t i o n between 'work i n connection with l i t i g a t i o n 
which a f f e c t s the way the case i s conducted when i t comes 
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to a hearing and t h a t which d i d not.' Lord K e i t h was, 
of course, r e c o g n i s i n g t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n i s a f i n e one 
and 'avoids the l o g i c t h a t every request f o r and g i v i n g of 
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advice has i n i t a seed of p o t e n t i a l l i t i g a t i o n . ' 
A major d i f f i c u l t y with the l i m i t e d immunity afforded 
to p r e - t r i a l work i s indeed the d e f i n i t i o n . There i s no 
catalogue of such work according to Lord Diplock, and 235 
Zander f o r e c a s t s t h a t there w i l l be f u r t h e r l i t i g a t i o n on 
what c o n s t i t u t e s p r e - t r i a l work. As the p o l i c y i s one of 
r e s t r i c t e d immunity one must only suppose t h a t f u t u r e 
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cases may narrow the immunity f u r t h e r . However, Lord 
Wilberforce does r e f e r to i n t e r l o c u t o r y or p r e - t r i a l 
proceedings and Lord R u s s e l l r e f e r e d i n h i s d i s s e n t i n g 
speech to 'preliminary proceedings before a master* which 
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'may be regarded as upon the same b a s i s as the t r i a l . ' 
I n Lord R u s s e l l ' s opinion ' i f a d e c i s i o n by counsel was 
a r r i v e d a t = a l b e i t n e g l i g e n t l y - before t r i a l which might 
w e l l have been a r r i v e d at a t t r i a l , or before a master, i t 
should not be open to a c l a i m f o r negligence... His 
immunity from claims of negligence should (granted t h a t i t 
i s to e x i s t a t a l l ) extend to areas which a f f e c t or may 
a f f e c t the course of conduct of l i t i g a t i o n , i n which areas 
are to be found the p u b l i c duty and o b l i g a t i o n of the 
b a r r i s t e r to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e . 
And t h i s should be so even i f the r e s u l t of the a l l e g e d 
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negligence i s t h a t l i t i g a t i o n does not come about.' 
The p o l i c y behind c o n f e r r i n g immunity, t h e r e f o r e , i s 
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the promotion of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e . The 
p o l i c y i s a l s o expressed i n terms of a f u n c t i o n i e 
advocacy. There i s no d i s t i n c t i o n between a b a r r i s t e r and 
a s o l i c t o r as regards immunity i n the performance of the 
127 
advocates' function. 
Whatever, t h e r e f o r e , might have been the b a s i s of 
advocates' immunity i n the past, there i s no doubt t h a t 
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now the reason i s one of p o l i c y . But the p o l i c y of the law 
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i s not immutable and the p o l i c y regarding the proper 
adminstration of j u s t i c e was t r e a t e d i n a d i f f e r e n t way i n 
1979 by the Ontario High Court of J u s t i c e i n Desmarco v 
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Umgaro, The d i f f e r e n t approach of the court i n t h i s 
case r e s u l t e d i n the same p o l i c y not r e q u i r i n g the 
immunity from s u i t i n cases of negligence i n v o l v i n g the 
conduct of a case i n court. Observations were a l s o made 
i n Deraiarco v Ungaro regarding the nature of the l e g a l 
p r o f e s s i o n i n Ontario. I n Canada the l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n i s 
fused u n l i k e the l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n s i n England and Wales. 
Th i s d i f f e r e n c e does not e x i s t between the l e g a l 
p r o f e s s i o n i n Canada and New Zealand i . e . both are fused. 
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Yet counsel i n New Zealand i s granted a s i m i l a r 
immunity to t h a t of counsel i n England while i n Ontario 
counsel i s not. I t follows t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e s i n 
p r o f e s s i o n a l s t r u c t u r e are a f a c t o r but are not the s o l e 
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determinant of p o l i c y on the question of immunity. 
Krever, J , i n Demarco v Ungaro, r e f e r r e d to two 
points of d i f f e r e n c e between the E n g l i s h and Canadian 
p r o f e s s i o n s . F i r s t , i n England a b a r r i s t e r i s not thought 
to be an o f f i c e r of the court, although a s o l i c i t o r i s . 
The court has no j u r i s d i c t i o n over a b a r r i s t e r . But i n 
Canada, the courts do have j u r i s d i c t i o n over cou n s e l . 
S i m i l a r l y , i n New Zealand, counsel may be s t r u c k o f f the 
r o l l by the court. T h i s feature t h a t the E n g l i s h 
b a r r i s t e r i s not an o f f i c e r of the court d i d not appear to 237 
be s i g n i f i c a n t to the House of Lords i n Rondel v ^Josley. 
As Lord Upjohn put i t '...but while counsel owes a primary 
duty to h i s c l i e n t to p r o t e c t him and advance h i s cause i n 
every way, y e t he has a duty to the court which i n c e r t a i n 
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cases transcends t h a t primary duty.' Secondly, an 
E n g l i s h b a r r i s t e r i s unable to sue for h i s fees because 
there i s a non-contractual r e l a t i o n s h i p between the 
b a r r i s t e r and c l i e n t . A b i l i t y to sue f o r fees would mean 
t h a t there was a c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p and thus the 
b a r r i s t e r could be sued fo r negligence. I n Ontario, 
lawyers are both b a r r i s t e r s and s o l i c i t o r s , and the lawyer 
who conducts l i t i g a t i o n c o n t r a c t s d i r e c t l y w i t h the c l i e n t 
and i s able to sue f o r the fee. I n New Zealand, a 
b a r r i s t e r - s o l i c i t o r and a l s o has the r i g h t to sue f o r 
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the fee. However, i t i s worth r e c a l l i n g t h a t the 
i n a b i l i t y to sue f o r the fee i s not regarded as the b a s i s 
f o r the immunity of an E n g l i s h b a r r i s t e r from s u i t i n 
negligence 
I t appears, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e s r e f e r r e d 
to between the l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n s i n v a r i o u s Commonwealth 
c o u n t r i e s are an i r r e l e v a n c e which serve only to cloud the 
i s s u e . At bottom the i s s u e revolves around p o l i c y and 
p o l i c y w i l l e x i s t , as i t i s or i n a changed form, whatever 
the nature of the p r o f e s s i o n s . An i n v e s t i g a t i o n of p o l i c y 
and the d e s i r a b i l i t y of change of t h a t p o l i c y i s of 
, 134 v a l u e . Lord Reid i n Rondel v fttosley l a i d down the parameters 
238 
of h i s judgement. ' . . . I s h a l l confine my a t t e n t i o n to 
conditions i n England and Scotland, between which t h e r e 
appears to be no r e l e v a n t d i f f e r e n c e . I do not know 
enough about conditions i n any other country to express 
any opinion as to what p u b l i c p o l i c y may t h e r e 
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r e q u i r e ? ' There i s i n t h i s statement the r e c o g n i t i o n 
t h a t d i f f e r e n t conditions may produce d i f f e r e n c e s i n 
p o l i c y . One must a l s o bear i n mind t h a t the 'Privy 
Council ,has i n a recent case e s t a b l i s h e d the p r i n c i p l e 
t h a t a d e c i s i o n of the House of Lords need not be a p p l i e d 
i n a Commonwealth country where the law has been 
d i f f e r e n t l y s e t t l e d i n a l e g a l sphere decided on p o l i c y 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s which have been fashioned by j u d i c a l 
opinion i n t h a t country... 
But what are these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of p u b l i c p o l i c y ? 
The immunity conferred by p u b l i c p o l i c y i n Rondel v 
Wosley was, according to Lord Wilberforce i n S a i f A l l , 
necessary to prevent b a r r i s t e r s being i n h i b i t e d i n 
d i s c h a r g i n g t h e i r duty to the court and to avoid 
r e l i t i g a t i o n . The judgement of Krever, J . i n Demarco v 
Ungaro must, of course, be read i n the context of 
conditions p r e v a i l i n g i n Ontario on the matter of duty to 
the c o u r t . Krever J thought t h a t there i s no e m p i r i c a l 
evidence t h a t the r i s k of counsel subordinating i t to the 
c l i e n t ' s i n t e r e s t s i s so s e r i o u s t h a t an aggrieved c l i e n t 
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should be rendered remediless. 
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The s i t u a t i o n which would a r i s e without immunity 
being conferred upon advocates, v i z the need f o r a r e t r i a l 
of the o r i g i n a l case i n a c i v i l c ourt, d i d not f i n d favour 
with the House of Lords i n Rondel w Elosley. I t might, f o r 
i n s t a n c e , i n v o lve the r e t r i a l of c r i m i n a l cases i n a c i v i l 
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court where the standard of proof, i s d i f f e r e n t . For 
Lord Reid 'that i s something one would not contemplate 
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with equanimity unless there i s a r e a l need f o r i t . ' 
And Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest considered 'a t r i a l upon a 
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t r i a l would r a i s e s p e c u l a t i o n upon s p e c u l a t i o n . ' 
Krever J i n Demarco v Ungaro showed more concern f o r the 
c l i e n t . I t was h i s view 'that the u n d e s i r a b i l i t y of t h a t 
event does not j u s t i f y the r e c o g n i t i o n of lawyers' 
immunity i n Ontario. I t i s not a contingency t h a t does 
not already e x i s t i n our law and seems to me to be 
i n h e r e n t l y involved i n the concept of r e s j u d i c a t a i n the 
r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t a party, i n a a c t i o n i n personam, i s only 
precluded from r e l i t i g a t i n g the same matter a g a i n s t a 
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person who was party to the e a r l i e r a c t i o n . Krever J 
could f i n d no f a u l t with r e l i t i g a t i o n ; indeed he 
considered i t 'Better t h a t than t h a t the c l i e n t should be 
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without recourse.' 
P u b l i c p o l i c y r e f l e c t s the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . 'Like so 
many questions which r a i s e the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t a d e c i s i o n 
one way w i l l cause hardships to i n d i v i d u a l s w hile a 
d e c i s i o n the other way w i l l i n v o l ve a disadvantage to the 
p u b l i c ' s i n t e r e s t . On the one hand, i f the e x i s t i n g r u l e 240 
of immunity continues there w i l l be c a s e s , r a r e though 
they may be, where a c l i e n t who has s u f f e r e d l o s s through 
the negligence of h i s counsel w i l l be deprived of a 
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remedy.' Such was the anxiety of Lord Reid. I n S a i f 
A l i , Lord Wilberforce i n c o n s i d e r i n g the boundary of 
immunity s t a t e d "... account must be taken of the counter 
p o l i c y t h a t the l o s s ought not to be without a 
remedy.' I n the House of Lords, t h e r e f o r e , the judges 
showed concern f o r the i n d i v i d u a l case but were prepared 
to allow the immunity to continue, a l b e i t i n a r e s t r i c t e d 
form. The p o s s i b i l i t y of a c l i e n t without a remedy was 
anathema to a t l e a s t one judge i n Canada, and r a i s i n g 
i s s u e s of p o l i c y , immunity was r e j e c t e d . 
I t seems t h a t i f immunity i s allowed then, 
i r r e s p e c t i v e of the blanket thrown over advocacy i n some 
cases the r e s u l t w i l l be j u s t . Unmeritorious c a s e s 
a g a i n s t counsel which would damage the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n 
the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e would not be brought to 
court. But even so, there i s u n l i k e l y to be f o s t e r e d any 
p u b l i c confidence i n the conferment of immunity upon a 
s e l e c t few. This e f f e c t may i n i t s e l f damage t h a t same 
p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , for the p u b l i c , the untutored laymen, f o r 
whose b e n e f i t the judges support the immunity, may 
consider t h a t no purpose i s served except t h a t lawyers are 
looking a f t e r lawyers i . e . t h e i r own s e l f i s h 
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i n t e r e s t s . Thus, the e f f e c t of the immunity i s to 
deprive ' C i t i z e n s of t h e i r r i g h t s a g a i n s t n e g l i g e n t 
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b a r r i s t e r s ? r i g h t s which they have a g a i n s t every other 
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p r o f e s s i o n a l man whom they might employ'. That t h e r e 
i s l a c k of t r u s t i n the notion of immunity i s evinced i n a 
v a r i e t y of a r t i c l e s , i n the p r e s s and l e g a l j o u r n a l s , 
c r i t i s i n g the conferment of immunity i n those r e c e n t 
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E n g l i s h cases p r e s e n t l y under s c r u t i n y . 
Although the p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n of the advocate i s 
assured f o r the time being, i t i s s u r e l y misconceived. 
This misconception i s over and above the resentment f e l t 
by the members of other p r o f e s s i o n a l groups and the p u b l i c 
i n general. The p o l i c y of maintaining and upholding the 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e i s one to be applauded, but so 
i s the counter p o l i c y r e f e r r e d to i n S a i f A l i and acted 
upon i n Desmarco v Ungaro,, namely, t h a t a l o s s ought not to 
without a remedy. An outcome of the E n g l i s h a u t h o r i t i e s 
which appears perplexing i s why the general trend of 
imposing l i a b i l i t y f o r negligence was sidestepped by 
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allowing an immunity. As Catzman puts i t s 
1 I n an age when t o r t l i a b i l i t y i s being expanded i n 
response to c o n s i d e r a t i o n of s o c i a l p o l i c y , l i a b i l i t y 
f o r p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence i s the r u l e and s i n c e a 
b a r r i s t e r f a l l s prima f a c i e w i t h i n the general 
p r i n c i p l e , h i s immunity from l i a b i l i t y c o n s t i t u t e s a 
unique and s i g n i f i c a n t exception.' 
The dangers i n allowing such an exception are t h a t 
the impression may be c r e a t e d of lawyers looking a f t e r 
lawyers to the detriment of others. Jolowicz i n 1967 
regarded the conclusions of the m a j o r i t y of the Court of 
Appeal i n Rondel v Wosley as weak and r e q u i r i n g 
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reinforcement by the House of Lords, otherwise 'the law 
w i l l merit the reproach of c a r i n g too much f o r i t s own. 
Rondel w T3osley has already a t t r a c t e d a good deal of 
a t t e n t i o n from the p u b l i c and the p u b l i c i s aware t h a t the 
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Bench i s r e c r u i t e d from the Bar.' However, W i n f i e l d 
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and Jolowicz point out i n 1984 t h a t the purpose of 
t h i s immunity i s not to p r o t e c t counsel from a l l e g a t i o n s 
of negligence f o r i t s own sake but to ensure t h a t counsel 
w i l l discharge h i s duty to the court. Fleming agrees and 
adds t h a t no one who argues f o r immunity i s condoning 
negligence. A l l th a t i s being a s s e r t e d i s t h a t the 
harassment of b a r r i s t e r s by c l i e n t s i s too high a p r i c e to 
pay f o r 'the r a r e i n s t a n c e where a charge of negligence 
r e l a t i n g to the conduct of l i t i g a t i o n might be 
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j u s t i f i e d . 1 I t seems, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t there i s support 
fo r the view t h a t there may be p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence by 
a b a r r i s t e r but th a t i t i s b e t t e r i n the i n t e r e s t s of the 
ad m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e t h a t no a c t i o n i s allowed to 
commence. Even Salmon L J , who i n Rondel v L e s l e y was keen 
to l i m i t immunity, thought counsel should be immune from 
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i n q u i r y as to whether he has been negligent. I t i s the 
law which i s deeming i t undesirable t h a t they should 
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defend themselves a g a i n s t such a charge says Fleming. 
But who pronounced t h i s law i f not the lawyers? Such 
co n s i d e r a t i o n s promoting immunity do not, i t i s submitted, 
help to r e i n f o r c e and c u l t i v a t e confidence i n the 
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a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e . The expressions 'immunity' 
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or ' p r i v i l e g e ' imply prima f a c i e cases of f a u l t or 
l i a b i l i t y , but then allow a s p e c i a l defence rendering the 
person a t f a u l t unaccountable. The problem ought to be 
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r e s o l v e d without reference to defences. At the root of 
t h i s n o n - l i a b i l i t y of advocates i s the c o n f l i c t between 
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the duty to the c l i e n t and the 'paramount' duty to the 
Court. Counsel, according to Lord Denning M.R. '...owes 
a l l e g i a n c e to a higher cause. I t i s the cause of t r u t h 
and j u s t i c e . He must not c o n s c i o u s l y m i s s t a t e the f a c t s . 
He must not knowingly conceal the t r u t h . He must not 
i n j u s t l y make a charge of fraud, t h a t i s , without evidence 
to support i t . He must produce a l l the r e l e v a n t 
documents, even those t h a t are f a t a l to h i s case. He must 
d i s r e g a r d the most s p e c i f i c i n s t r u c t i o n s of h i s c l i e n t , i f 
157 
they c o n f l i c t with h i s duty to the court.' One must 
not, of course, make l i g h t of t h i s duty to the cou r t as 
described above. That the judges recognise the i n t e g r i t y 
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of counsel i s w e l l and emphaticably s t a t e d . And 
desp i t e statements t h a t the advocates duty i s one of 
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honour only , Carey M i l l e r agrees t h a t t h i s e s s e n t i a l 
o b l i g a t i o n ' i s i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from other f o r e n s i c 
o b l i g a t i o n s which are wholly matters of a d j e c t i v a l 
i , 160 law. ' 
At t h i s point one i s prompted to ask 'where i s the 
negligence a g a i n s t which immunity i s sought?' Counsel has 
performed h i s paramount duty to the court and the c l i e n t 
may or may not have s u f f e r e d l o s s . I n h i s submission to 
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the House of Lords i n Rondel v Wosley Louis Blom=Cooper 
on behalf of the appellant s a i d , 'There i s a fundamental 
confusion between immunity f o r things done i n 
performance of duty and immunity fo r breach of duty.' To 
which Nightingale added ... and because immunity f o r 
the former i s perhaps j u s t i f i a b l e i n deference to p u b l i c 
p o l i c y , the l a t t e r i s completely without j u s t i f i c a t i o n . ' 
I t appears accepted t h a t there i s great s o c i a l 
u t i l i t y i n the performance of a duty to the c o u r t . I t 
would be b e t t e r , i t i s submitted, to prevent a c t i o n s being 
brought where t h i s duty has been performed than to confer 
immunity where there may have been a breach of duty to the 
c l i e n t by allowing no i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o the question of 
breach. ( I t i s p o s s i b l e to use standard negligence 
p r i n c i p l e s to j u s t i f y t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n . Asquith L . J . i n 
Oaborn v Bath Tramways Motor Co. L t d . and Trevor Smithy 
s t a t e d , 'In determing whether a party i s n e g l i g e n t , the 
standard of reasonable case i s t h a t which i s reasonably to 
be demanded i n the circumstances. A r e l e v a n t circumstance 
to take i n t o account may be the importance of the end to 
be served i n behaving i n t h i s way or t h a t . . . The purpose 
to be served, i f s u f f i c i e n t l y important, j u s t i f i e s the 
assumption of abnormal r i s k . ' Lord Denning M R supported 
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t h i s i n Watt v H e r t f o r d s h i r e County Counc i l '... you 
must balance the r i s k a g a i n s t the end to be achieved.' 
How, then, i n the l i g h t of such d i c t a above, can one say 
t h a t an advocate who has performed h i s duty to the court 
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i s n e g l i g ent. On the problem of harassment of counsel by 
c l i e n t s , s u r e l y the courts would not f i n d a g a i n s t an 
advocate who observed the highest standards of the law. 
I n performing h i s duty the advocate i s a c t i n g according to 
165 
the r u l e s and standards of h i s p r o f e s s i o n . Nor need 
the matter proceed to court i n the case of an 
unmeritorious claim. Such claims may, i t i s submitted, be 
disposed of i n i n t e r l o c u t o r y proceedings. Who b e t t e r to 
determine i n such proceedings whether the advocate has 
performed h i s duty to the court than a judge t r a i n e d i n 
the r u l e s and a p p l i c a t i o n of t h a t duty. That t h i s i s a 
p o s s i b l e process was i n d i c a t e d by Lord Salmon i n S a i f A l i , 
'Once i t i s c l e a r t h a t the circumstances are such t h a t no 
question of p u b l i c p o l i c y i n involved, the prospects of 
immunity f o r a b a r r i s t e r a g a i n s t being sued f o r 
n e g l i g e n t l y a d v i s i n g h i s c l i e n t v a n i s h i n t o t h i n a i r , 
together with the ghosts of a l l the excuses f o r such 
'166 
immunity which were thought to e x i s t i n the p a s t . 
Who does the immunity p r o t e c t ? Not only the advocate 
who properly performs h i s duty to the c o u r t i n 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n to the c l i e n t ' s wishes only but a l s o those 
who do not. An i n e v i t a b l e r e s u l t , perhaps, i f no 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n of negligence i s made. Perhaps the only 
b e n e f i c i a r i e s of immunity are the insurance companies and 
167 
the incompetent. I n an age of expanding t o r t l i a b i l i t y 
there i s the disadvantage of 'confering an anomalous 
p r i v i l e g e upon a c l a s s of p r o f e s s i o n a l men to the 246 
detriment of the p u b l i c whose i n t e r e s t i s to o b t a i n a 
remedy for negligent treatment a t the hands of men i n whom 
they must i n e v i t a b l y put t h e i r t r u s t . An unremedied 
breach of duty to take care must be an e v i l i n s o c i e t y ? i t 
needs powerful arguments to permit such e v i l to stand 
uncorrected. There are no such powerful arguments? only 
matters of s e l f i n t e r e s t p r o j e c t e d i n t o a l l e g e d b e n e f i t s 
to the p u b l i c Other j u r i s d i c t i o n s have demonstrated t h a t 
168 
the immunity i s both unnecessary an unwarrantable.' 
That there are d i f f e r e n c e s a f f e c t i n g the d i f f e r e n t 
j u r i s d i c t i o n s i s recognised and acted upon. I n Canada 
b a r r i s t e r s are recommended to take out insurance and t h i s 
was one f a c t o r which i n f l u e n c e d Krever, J i n h i s r e j e c t i o n 
of immunity i n Demarco v Ungaro. I n the case of England, 
169 
the Royal Commission of Legal S e r v i c e s recommended 
170 
t h a t , d e s p i t e the r a r i t y of a c t i o n s , a l l p r a c t i s i n g 
b a r r i s t e r s should be r e q u i r e d to have p r o f e s s i o n a l 
indemnity insurance cover a g a i n s t claims f o r negligence of 
a t l e a s t 50,000 pounds, t h i s f i g u r e to be reviewed 
r e g u l a r l y . The p r o f e s s i o n has long recognised the 
s e r i o u s n e s s of negligence claims and indemnity insurance 
i s widespread. P r a c t i s i n g s o l i c i t o r s are r e q u i r e d to be 
insured a gainst claims a r i s i n g from p r o f e s s i o n a l 
negligence. 
I f a l l have the b e n e f i t of indemnity insurance who i s 
the r e a l defendant? Who takes the f i n a n c i a l burden of the 
171 
award of damages ag a i n s t the advocate? The load i s 
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passed to the insurance company., The advocate need have 
no f e a r of f i n a n c i a l l o s s and r u i n a t i o n i f he i s 
adequately insured. Advocates may perform t h e i r duty to 
the court f e a r l e s s l y . Thus, ' i n these days when 
negligence insurance i s i n c r e a s i n g l y recognised as a 
necessary p a r t of every w e l l turned out lawyers 
p r o f e s s i o n a l equipment, who i s immuity from s u i t l i k e l y , 
i n the l a s t a n a l y s i s , to p r o t e c t except i n s u r a n c e 
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companies?' The approach of the Canadian c o u r t s to 
t h i s question should r e c e i v e a sympathetic hearing i n 
England and the courts p o l i c y of providing a remedy f o r 
t o r t showed p r e v a i l , or a t l e a s t be c a r e f u l l y considered. 
The p o l i c y of the law, a f t e r a l l , i s not immutable, but 
to date developments have not taken the law any f u r t h e r on 
the i s s u e of advocates' immunity. As the law stands a t 
present an advocate enjoys an immunity from a c t i o n s i n 
negligence based upon p u b l i c p o l i c y . The Royal Commission 
173 
on Legal S e r v i c e s d i d not recommend the a b o l i t i o n of 
immunity and t h i s now has been endorsed by the Marre 
174 
Committee r e p o r t i n g i n 1988 and i n the Green Paper of 
175 
1989. I n a d d i t i o n , the law has been amended i n such a 
way as to emphasise t h a t immunity s h a l l continue to 176 177 e x i s t . Rondel v Worsley appears to r e p r e s e n t the 
high water-mark of immunity. At present the law 
p r a c t i o n e r may assume t h a t only statements made or advice 
given during t r i a l are s a f e . S i m i l a r a c t i v i t i e s a t other 
178 
times are l e s s c e r t a i n to be immune. What do not 
248 
appear convincing are the arguments f o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
convenience and long usage given the Bar's c l a i m to 
e x p e r t i s e . I f there i s such confidence i n p r o f e s s i o n a l 
e x p e r t i s e the incidence of c l a i m s , s u c c e s s f u l or 
179 
otherwise, should be s m a l l . I n any event the immunity 
does not appear to be c o n s i s t e n t with the wider s o c i a l 
context i n which law has to operate. I n an age of 
180 
consumerism and the need to be even-handed i n t r e a t i n g 
181 
d i f f e r e n t p r o f e s s i o n a l c a t e g o r i e s the conferment of 
immunity seems s t r a n g e l y out of p l a c e . More needs to be 
done to c r e a t e a s a t i s f a c t o r y s t a t e of law. 
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Chapter 6 
Medical negligence 
H i s t o r i c a l l y , , the l i a b i l i t y of a medical p r a c t i t i o n e r 
for i n j u r i e s occuring as a r e s u l t of m a l p r a c t i c e i s 
1 
founded i n t o r t . Many of the e a r l i e s t a c t i o n s based on 
the developing common law a c t i o n s of negligence were 
brought a g a i n s t medical p r a c t i t i o n e r s . I t was only l a t e r 
as the modern law of c o n t r a c t began to develop t h a t 
recourse was made to an a c t i o n f o r breach of c o n t r a c t i n 
2 
cases a l l e g i n g p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence g e n e r a l l y . . I t 
i s , t h e r e f o r e , s u r p r i s i n g for Lord Templeman i n SIdarcay v 
Governors of Bethlem Royal H o s p i t a l to s t a t e 'The 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s between doctor and p a t i e n t i s c o n t r a c t u a l i n 
o r i g i n ' , the doctor performing s e r v i c e s i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
3 
fo r fees payable by the p a t i e n t . 
By ' o r i g i n ' Lord Templeman cannot mean the genesis of 
l i a b i l i t y as t h a t was p a t e n t l y t o r t i o u s . I n modern times 
a c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p probably became the norm a f t e r 
the development of a law of c o n t r a c t and p r i o r to the 
s e t t i n g up of the National Health S e r v i c e . I f Lord 
Templeman meant the ' o r i g i n ' i n terms of the source of the 
o b l i g a t i o n i n Sidaway i t s e l f i t i s d i f f i c u l t to a s c e r t a i n 
the e x i s t e n c e and nature of a c o n t r a c t . But to say t h a t 
t h a t i s t r u e of the period following 1946, when the 
National Health S e r v i c e was i n s t i t u t e d , i s s c a r c e l y 
c r e d i b l e . The National Health S e r v i c e was e s t a b l i s h e d 
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under the National Health S e r v i c e Act 1946. The s t a t u t o r y 
duty of the Health S e r v i c e i s now re-enacted i n S 1 
National Health S e r v i c e Act 1977 i n s i m i l a r terms, v i z 
S 1(2) 'The s e r v i c e s so provided s h a l l be f r e e of charge 
except i n so f a r as the making and recovery of charges i s 
e x p r e s s l y provided fo r by on under any enactment whenever 
passed'. The m a j o r i t y of people i n the United Kingdom are 
dependent upon or a t l e a s t make use of the National Health 
S e r v i c e at some time. I n so doing they are making use of 
a s e r v i c e which i s p r i m a r i l y f r e e of charge. A s i t u a t i o n 
i n which doctors perform s e r v i c e s i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n of fees 
payable by the p a t i e n t i s not the norm. 
Be that as i t may a medical p r a c t i t i o n e r may owe a 
duty of care to h i s p a t i e n t as a r e s u l t of e n t e r i n g i n t o a 
c o n t r a c t with a p a t i e n t or because of the operation of the 
law of t o r t . I f the medical treatment i n i s s u e was 
undertaken under the National Health S e r v i c e scheme i t i s 
probable t h a t there i s no c o n t r a c t between the doctor and 
the p a t i e n t . ^ I f , however, there i s a p r i v a t e engagement 
there i s a c o n t r a c t i n which there i s an implied term 
imposing a minimum requirement upon the p r a c t i t i o n e r to 
5 
e x e r c i s e reasonable care and s k i l l . A c o n t r a c t of i t s e l f 
does not impose an o b l i g a t i o n upon the p r a c t i t i o n e r to 
e x e r c i s e g r e a t e r care and s k i l l than normal.** I n a d d i t i o n 
there appears to be a separate implied undertaking on the 
p a r t of a p r a c t i t i o n e r to a c t i n the best i n t e r e s t s of the 
7 
p a t i e n t . 
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The imposition of a standard o b l i g a t i o n to e x e r c i s e 
reasonable care and s k i l l i s i n r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t no 
p r a c t i t i o n e r guarantees r e s u l t s i n the ordinary course of 
p r a c t i c e . As T i n d a l C.J. put i t i n Lamplhier v Phipos i n 
1838. 8 
'Every person who enters i n t o a learned p r o f e s s i o n 
undertakes to bring to the e x e r c i s e of i t a 
reasonable degree of care and s k i l l . He does not 
undertake, i f he i s an attorney, t h a t a t a l l events 
you s h a l l again your case, nor does a surgeon 
undertake that he w i l l perform a c a r e . . . ' 
That i s not to say t h a t a p r a c t i t i o n e r may not en t e r 
g 
i n t o a c o n t r a c t guaranteeing a r e s u l t . I n Eyr e v 
Measday^ the p r a c t i t i o n e r , i n c o n t r a c t i n g to c a r r y out a 
s t e r i l i s a t i o n operation, was held not to have undertaken 
to render the p a t i e n t a b s o l u t e l y s t e r i l e , whereas i n Thake 
v M a u r i c e ^ the p r a c t i t i o n e r was held a t f i r s t i n s t a n c e to 
have guaranteed that very r e s u l t . I n the opinion of Peter 
Pain J 'the c o n t r a c t i n Thake v Maurice was to make the 
12 
male p l a i n t i f f i r r e v e r s i b l y s t e r i l e * . The Court of 
13 
Appeal re v e r s e d t h i s d e c i s i o n . Nourse L J considered 
t h a t "... a doctor cannot be o b j e c t i v e l y regarded as 
guaranteeing the success of any operation or treatment 
unless he says as much i n c l e a r and unequivocal terms. 
The defendant did not do t h a t i n the present c a s e ' . N e i l l 
L . J . r e a s s e r t e d the u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y of medical treatment, 
c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t a reasonable person would not have 
expected a re s p o n s i b l e medical man to have intended to 
14 
gxve a guarantee. 263 
Even i f there i s no c o n t r a c t the general standard 
req u i r e d by the law i s to e x e r c i s e reasonable s k i l l and 
15 
care provided there i s a doctor-patient r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
Provided there i s t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p the p r a c t i t i o n e r 
16 
assumes a duty of care even i f a c t i n g g r a t u i t o u s l y . 
L i a b i l i t y a r i s i n g i n t o r t would be a d d i t i o n a l to l i a b i l i t y 
i n c o n t r a c t ( i f there was one) and the cl a i m would be 
framed accordingly. Such a duty i n t o r t could a l s o be 
owed to t h i r d p a r t i e s e.g. i n t r e a t i n g a pregnant woman 
17 
the p r a c t i t i o n e r owes a duty to the unborn c h i l d . 
The standard re q u i r e d of the p r a c t i t i o n e r , i s t h a t of 
reasonable s k i l l and c a r e . The standard has been s t a t e d 
18 
and r e s t a t e d on numerous occasions. However, the 
g e n e r a l l y recognised d e f i n i t i o n of the p r a c t i t i o n e r ' s duty 
i s t h a t given by McNair J i n Bolam v P r i e r n H o s p i t a l 
19 
Management Committees 'But where you get a s i t u a t i o n 
which i n v o l v e s the use of some s p e c i a l s k i l l or 
competence, then the t e s t as to whether there has been 
negligence or not i s not the t e s t of the man on the top of 
a Clapham omnibus, because he has not got t h i s s p e c i a l 
s k i l l . The t e s t i s the standard of the ordinary s k i l l e d 
man e x e r c i s i n g and p r o f e s s i n g to have t h a t s p e c i a l s k i l l . 
A man need not possess the highest expert s k i l l ' i t i s 
w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d law t h a t i t i s s u f f i c i e n t i f he e x e r c i s e s 
the ordinary s k i l l of an ordinary competent man e x e r c i s i n g 
t h a t p a r t i c u l a r a r t * . 
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The 'Bolam t e s t ' as i t i s known has been a p p l i e d to 
20 21 medical treatment to diagnosis and, indeed, to a l l 
22 
aspects of a medical p r a c t i t i o n e r ' s work. The problem 
next to be overcome i s th a t of breach of duty i n f a c t . 
How i s i t to be determined t h a t the appropriate medical 
standard of reasonable s k i l l and care has been observed? 
No p r o f e s s i o n a l person i s r e q u i r e d by the 'Bolam 
t e s t ' to know a l l . P r o f e s s i o n a l p r a c t i c e i s dynamic and 
there are many r a p i d changes and developments. The law 
may change overnight and medical techniques and forms of 
treatment are s i m i l a r l y i n a s t a t e of r a p i d change. At 
the time of t r i a l i t would be a simple matter to condemn a 
p r a c t i t i o n e r on the b a s i s of what we know now. The t e s t 
however i s what the p r a c t i t i o n e r should have known a t the 
time of the a l l e g e d m a l p r a c t i c e . I t i s e s s e n t i a l , 
t h e r e f o r e , t h a t advances i n medical knowledge s i n c e the 
date of the a l l e g e d m a l p r a c t i c e and up to the date of the 
t r i a l should be discounted. Negligence i s based upon 
23 
t e s t s of f o r e s i g h t and not the b l e s s i n g of h i n d s i g h t . 
S i m i l a r l y , a p r a c t i t i o n e r i s expected to keep reasonably 
up to date. I n Crawford v Board of Governors of Charing 
24 
Cross H o s p i t a l an a n a e s t h e t i s t was h e l d not neg l i g e n t i n 
f a i l i n g to read the p a r t i c u l a r r e c e n t a r t i c l e i n The 
Lancet. 
A f u r t h e r f a c t o r which a s s i s t s i n determination of 
the appropriate standard of care i s the p o s i t i o n of the 
defendant. Regard must be had to the defendant's s t a t u s 
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and s p e c i a l i s a t i o n , i f any. Reference has to be made to 
the standard of the ordinary competent p r a c t i t i o n e r i n the 
circumstances of the defendant. Thus, i n applying the 
Bolam t e s t the degree of knowledge or awareness which the 
p r o f e s s i o n a l man ought to have must be considered. I f the 
p r a c t i t i o n e r had i n f a c t a higher degree of knowledge or 
awareness and acted i n a way which, i n the l i g h t of t h a t 
a c t u a l knowledge, he ought reasonably to have foreseen 
would cause damage, he would be l i a b l e i n negligence even 
though the ordinary s k i l l e d man would not have had t h a t 
25 
knowledge. 
The above t e s t appears to apply i n the case of an 
inexperienced p r a c t i t i o n e r . The standard i n Junior v 
26 
McMicol was couched i n terms of the Bolam t e s t v i z '... 
there was a duty on her to d i s p l a y the c a r e and s k i l l of a 
prudent q u a l i f i e d house surgeon, i t being held t h a t such a 
27 
p o s i t i o n was held by a comparative beginner'. 
The relevance of 'position' or 'post' was r e a f f i r m e d 
28 
i n ftilsher v Essex MSA i n 1986 i n s o f a r as the 'duty of 
c a r e r e l a t e d , not to the i n d i v i d u a l , but to the post which 
he occupied and "post" was to be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from rank 
or s t a t u s . The standard was not j u s t t h a t of the 
averagely competent and well-informed j u n i o r houseman (or 
whatever the p o s i t i o n of the doctor) but of such a person 
who f i l l e d a post i n a u n i t o f f e r i n g a h i g h l y s p e c i a l i s e d 
s e r v i c e . I t i s thus, on the b a s i s of the p o s i t i o n h e l d 
266 
t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e to d i s t i n g u i s h U l l s h e r from Jraior even 
29 
though both cases involved inexperienced practitioners„ 
I t seems a c o r o l l a r y of t h a t r u l e t h a t when a 
p r a c t i t i o n e r l a c k s s k i l l he should be able to recognise 
t h a t f a c t and r e f e r the case to those who have the 
30 
r e q u i s i t e s k i l l . The possession of s k i l l presupposes 
a l s o t h a t the p r a c t i t i o n e r i s f i t to c a r r y out the 
treatment or other procedures and i s not i n some way 
31 
i n c a p a c i t a t e d from doing so. 
I n i t s t a s k of determining whether or not a 
p r a c t i t i o n e r has kept to the standard necessary i n the 
i n s t a n t case before i t , the court w i l l take account of the 
p r a c t i c e s of the medical p r o f e s s i o n . I n order to c a r r y 
out t h i s t a s k the court i s dependent on the expert w i t n e s s 
32 
as the judge w i l l u s u a l l y be ignorant of such matters. 
The court w i l l have to pla c e great r e l i a n c e upon the proof 
of such general and approved p r a c t i c e s . There i s , of 
course, a danger of o v e r s t a t i n g the case i n such a way as 
to i n d i c a t e t h a t the court w i l l f e e l bound to accept the 
33 
evidence as c o n c l u s i v e . I t seems t h a t d i f f e r e n t 
p r o f e s s i o n s and branches w i t h i n the same p r o f e s s i o n v a r y 
i n terms of success r a t e . Explanations of success vary. 
I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g to most people t h a t some p a t i e n t s do 
not recover or i f a c l i e n t l o s e s i n l i t i g a t i o n but t h e r e 
are expectations t h a t non=contentious l e g a l work w i l l be 
properly done and brought to a s u c c e s s f u l c o n c l u s i o n or 
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t h a t a bridge b u i l t by an engineer w i l l not c o l l a p s e . 
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T h i s may e x p l a i n t h a t d i f f e r e n t j u d i c i a l approach to 
35 
medical negligence as i n Maymard v Uest Eaidlamds R j . i , 
and non-contentious l e g a l work as i n Edward Uojmg Fimaiace 
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Co v Jolhumsoinii, Stokes s Master,, 
The adoption of t h i s a t t i t u d e by the j u d i c i a r y 
towards the medical p r o f e s s i o n appears to occur more 
r e a d i l y than i t does towards the p r a c t i c e s of other 
p r o f e s s i o n s and an analogy with the l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n may 
be i n s t r u c t e d . With regard to e i t h e r branch of the l e g a l 
p r o f e s s i o n the courts f e e l more competent to comment upon 
p r a c t i c e s as indeed one would expect. Various p r a c t i c e s 
such as those involved i n conveyancing come w i t h i n the 
sphere of most judges who are prepared to make some 
comment. However, i t does not always follow t h a t even i n 
such cases the judges w i l l be as i n touch with c u r r e n t 
37 
p r a c t i c e as they might wish to appear to be and they may 
a c t upon a notion of proper p r a c t i c e s which do not e x i s t 
3 Q 
or which formerly e x i s t e d but no longer do so. Thus, i n 
Edward Wong the P r i v y Council expected 'precautions' to be 
taken which were not pa r t of normal p r a c t i c e i n Hong Kong, 
the p l a c e where the a l l e g e d negligence took p l a c e . As a 
r e s u l t 'the defendant s o l i c i t o r s were held l i a b l e , d e s p i t e 
the f a c t t h a t they had complied i n a l l m a t e r i a l r e s p e c t s 
with the general p r a c t i c e of the p r o f e s s i o n i n Hong 
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Kong'. Jackson and Powell submit, however, t h a t ' i t i s 
only i n r e l a t i v e l y r a r e and extreme cases such Edward Wong 
268 
t h a t a s o l i c i t o r who complies with the general p r a c t i c e of 
the p r o f e s s i o n , w i l l be held to have been neg l i g e n t ' . 
Even so, the courts are s t i l l p r o t e c t i v e of 
41 
p r o f e s s i o n a l people. and never more so i t seems than i n 
the case of medical p r a c t i t i o n e r s . The B O I M t e s t appears 
to be very r e s t r i c t i v e of j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n , so much so 
t h a t where evidence i s adduced of d i f f e r e n t medical 
p r a c t i c e s the judges f e e l s incompetent to choose between 
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them, i . e . he may not show any preference. I n p r a c t i c e , 
the medical p r o f e s s i o n appears to f a r e b e t t e r than other 
p r o f e s s i o n s . The d i f f e r e n c e of 'non-negligent mistake' i s 
more r e a d i l y accepted, p a r t l y due, i t i s thought, to the 
Bolam t e s t and p a r t l y to the g r e a t e r degree of deference 
shown to expert witnesses i n cases a l l e g i n g medical 
negligence. I n Whitehouse v Jordan^^ Lord Denning M R 
r e f e r r e d to evidence of the medical exp e r t s . I n t h a t 
case, i t i s a l l e g e d by Joseph, he took the s t e p from 
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s t a t i n g the evidence of medical experts to accepting i t . 
Judges are not l i k e l y to be so r e a d i l y i n agreement w i t h 
expert evidence tendered by experts from other 
p r o f e s s i o n s . 
While accepting t h a t a good defence w i l l u s u a l l y be 
provided upon proof t h a t a p r a c t i t i o n e r acted i n 
accordance with the general and approved p r a c t i c e of the 
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p r o f e s s i o n , the courts do r e s e r v e the r i g h t to 
disapprove of medical p r a c t i c e s i n c l u d i n g d i a g n o s i s or 
treatment even though approved by, or a t l e a s t not 269 
condemned by, a r e s p e c t a b l e body of medical opinion. The 
w i l l i n g n e s s of the j u d i c i a r y to disapprove appears 
stronger i n cases i n which the i s s u e i n v o l v e s matters 
touching more upon e t h i c s and m o r a l i t y r a t h e r than 
t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t i s e , such as d i s c l o s u r e of r i s k ( i n f r a ) . 
Such a stance by the courts i s not i n c o n s i s t e n t with 
accepting expert opinions as h i g h l y p e r s u a s i v e 
e v i d e n t i a l l y . However, there i s a danger t h a t s u s p i c i o n 
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of the ' c o n s p i r a t o r i a l * nature of p r o f e s s i o n s may a r i s e . 
The p u b l i c i s already s u s p i c i o u s and the cou r t s must a l s o 
a c t to a l l a y p u b l i c f e a r s and encourage i n t e g r i t y i n a 
p r o f e s s i o n upon which so many depend. Such a r o l e f o r the 
court was w e l l s t a t e d i n the Supreme Court of South 
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A u s t r a l i a by King C J : 
'But p r o f e s s i o n s may adopt unreasonable p r a c t i c e s , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y as to d i s c l o s u r e , not because they serve 
the i n t e r e s t s of the c l i e n t s , but because they 
p r o t e c t the i n t e r e s t s or conveniences of members of 
the p r o f e s s i o n . The court has an o b l i g a t i o n to 
s c r u t i n i s e p r o f e s s i o n a l p r a c t i c e s to ensure t h a t they 
accord with the standard of reasonableness imposed by 
the law.' 
Ul t i m a t e l y , t h e r e f o r e , the i s s u e as to whether a 
p r a c t i t i o n e r has properly discharged h i s duty i s not 
dependent upon general and approved p r a c t i c e but upon the 
court a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g the evidence. T h i s view i s shared 
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a l s o by the Canadian c o u r t s . The court may depart from 
the views of the p r o f e s s i o n i n a r r i v i n g a t i t s d e c i s i o n . 
H i r s t J i n H i l l s v P o t t e r had no doubt t h a t he enjoyed 
t h a t freedom. The cou r t s had not abdicated the power of 
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d e c i s i o n to the doctors by adopting the Bolam p r i n c i p l e . 
The court has to be s a t i s f i e d t h a t the standard has been 
met. 
But t h i s begs the question of what i s the general and 
approved p r a c t i c e ? There may not be one? there may be 
s e v e r a l . The p r a c t i t i o n e r i s allowed to choose which 
p r a c t i c e to follow, s u b j e c t of course, to j u d i c a l 
acceptance of the p r a c t i c e s i n Bolam v F r i e r n H o s p i t a l 
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Management Committees McNair J i n d i c a t e d the l i m i t a t i o n s 
on choices 
'(A doctor) i s not g u i l t y of p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence 
i f he has acted i n accordance with a p r a c t i c e 
accepted as proper by a r e s p o n s i b l e body of medical 
men s k i l l e d i n t h a t p a r t i c u l a r a r t . . . p u t t i n g i t the 
other way around, a man i s not negligent, i f he i s 
a c t i n g i n accordance with such a p r a c t i c e , merely 
because there i s a body of opinion who would take a 
contrary view. At the same time t h a t does not mean 
th a t a medical man can o b s t i n a t e l y and pig-headedly 
c a r r y on with some o l d technique i f i t has been 
proved to be c o n t r a r y to what i s r e a l l y s u b s t a n t i a l l y 
the whole of informed medical opinion'. 
Faced as he w i l l be, i n such circumstances, with 
d i f f e r i n g views as to the proper course of a c t i o n to take, 
the judge w i l l have to decide. He has, a f t e r a l l , 
r e s e r v e d t h a t r i g h t of d e c i s i o n to h i m s e l f . He i s not 
allowed to choose one opinion as apposed to another merely 
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because he p r e f e r s i t . Lord Scarman s t a t e d i n Maynard v 
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West Midlands RHft s 
' I have to say t h a t a judges 'preference; f o r one 
body of d i s t i n g u i s h e d p r o f e s s i o n a l opinion to another 
a l s o p r o f e s s i o n a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d i s not s u f f i c i e n t 
to e s t a b l i s h negligence i n a p r a c t i t i o n e r whose 
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a c t i o n s have r e c e i v e d the s e a l of approval of those 
whose opinions, t r u t h f u l l y expressed, honestly held, 
were not p r e f e r r e d . I f t h i s was the r e a l reason f o r 
the judges* f i n d i n g , he e r r e d i n law . „«, f o r i n the 
realm of diagnosis and treatment negligence i s not 
e s t a b l i s h e d by p r e f e r r i n g one r e s p e c t a b l e body of 
p r o f e s s i o n a l opinion to another. F a i l u r e to e x e r c i s e 
the ordinary s k i l l of a doctor ( i n the appropriate 
s p e c i a l i t y , i f , he i s a s p e c i a l i s t ) i s necessary,' 
I r r e s p e c t i v e , t h e r e f o r e , of evidence of general and 
approved p r a c t i c e the d e c i s i o n regarding negligence has to 
be made according to the e x e r c i s e of s k i l l . Such an i s s u e 
becomes important where there i s departure from the 
p r a c t i c e s . I f departure takes place f o r no good reason 
and damage i s caused, the l i k e l i h o o d i s t h a t the 
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p r a c t i t i o n e r w i l l be found to be negligent. 
Where the accepted negligence has a r i s e n as a r e s u l t 
of a new form of treatment or the use of new techniques, 
t h i s may be regarded as a g r e a t e r departure from general 
or approved p r a c t i c e or, i n some c a s e s , a r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t 
there i s no p r a c t i c e a t a l l with which to compare. How 
f a r a new development may be taken and not amount to 
negligence poses a d i f f i c u l t question f o r the c o u r t . I t 
i s a r e t r o s p e c t i v e step to impose r e s t r i c t i o n s having the 
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e f f e c t of s t i f l i n g a l l new developments. 
Lord Diplock i n Sidaway expressed t h i s view very 
c l e a r l y and considered the Bolam p r i n c i p l e would provide 
adequate p r o t e c t i o n f o r the p r a c t i t i o n e r . A f o r t i o r i , i f 
the new development came to be accepted by a r e s p e c t a b l e 
part of the p r o f e s s i o n . However i n the case of i n n o v a t i v e 
treatment, i t i s probably d e s i r a b l e t h a t the p a t i e n t be 272 
informed of t h i s f a c t and be t o l d t h a t the proposed 
treatment has not y e t been approved by the medical 
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p r o f e s s i o n and t h a t a l t e r n a t i v e methods are a v a i l a b l e . 
The p a r t t h a t c l i n i c a l t r i a l s have to play i s recognised 
by the j u d i c i a r y . Much of the advance i n medical s c i e n c e 
has been achieved by such t r i a l s and i t would be 
u n d e s i r a b l e to s t i f l e them by the operation of an 
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o v e r - r e s t r i c t i v e r u l e . But i t i s important to remember 
the i n d i v i d u a l p a t i e n t . The community a t l a r g e would be 
the b e n e f i c i a r i e s of t r i a l s and i t would be i n e q u i t a b l e to 
expect the i n d i v i d u a l harmed to bear a l l of the c o s t . 
Consequently 'there are sound reasons of p o l i c y why anyone 
who s u f f e r s i n j u r y as a r e s u l t of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n 
r e s e a r c h or c l i n i c a l t r i a l s should recover damages 
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i r r e s p e c t i v e of negligence by those who t r e a t e d him.' I n 
p r a c t i c e i t i s d i f f i c u l t to show t h a t such t r i a l s are 
i n t r i n s i c a l l y negligent as there i s u s u a l l y consent given 
by an e t h i c s committee before the experiment commences. 
In any event, there i s a b u i l t i n element of r i s k i n 
experimental drug design. Any person i n j u r e d would 
t h e r e f o r e have d i f f i c u l t y i n r e c o v e r i n g i f proof of 
negligence was the only ground.^ 
A d i f f i c u l t y i n c o n s i d e r i n g evidence a r i s e s where an 
expert witness advances a view of what he (the expert 
witness) would have done i n the same or s i m i l a r 
circumstances. I n a case i n v o l v i n g a s o l i c i t o r ' s 
n e g l i g e n c e , ^ O l i v e r J considered such evidence t o be 273 
inadmissable. Jackson and Powell submit t h a t t h i s i s a 
view a p p l i c a b l e only i n cases i n v o l v i n g l a w y e r s 1 
negligence. The court may a s s e s s such evidence and a r r i v e 
a t an independent opinion. I n cases of medical negligence 
the s e l f acknowledged ignorance of the j u d i c i a r y i n 
t e c h n i c a l medical matters makes such a r u l e i n a p p l i c a b l e 
or a t l e a s t u n d e s i r a b l e . ^ 
A f i n a l , though r e l a t e d , problem f o r the c o u r t i n 
con s i d e r i n g the evidence i n medical negligence c a s e s i s 
causations the assessment of the standard of s k i l l and 
car e i s a d i f f i c u l t e x e r c i s e i n i t s e l f but c a u s a t i o n 
presents i t s own d i f f i c u l t i e s i n so f a r as there i s a need 
to prove the l i n k between the a l l e g e d negligence and the 
. . 64 i n j u r y . 
A f a i l u r e to prove the c a u s a l connection i s f a t a l to 
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the case a g a i n s t t h a t defendant. Where a p r a c t i t i o n e r ' s 
negligence was one of s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t f a c t o r s which 
could have caused the p l a i n t i f f ' s i n j u r y the f a c t t h a t 
i n j u r y followed the negligence does not r a i s e a 
presumption of c a u s a t i o n a g a i n s t the p r a c t i t i o n e r . I n 
cases of c o n f l i c t i n g expert evidence as to whether the 
negligence could have caused or m a t e r i a l l y c o n t r i b u t e d to 
the p l a i n t i f f ' s i n j u r y and the judge was unable to r e s o l v e 
the c o n f l i c t there i s no a l t e r n a t i v e to a r e t r i a l . 
Causation 
Causation c o n s t i t u t e s a p r e s s i n g problem f o r the 
p l a i n t i f f i n any l i t i g a t i o n . I t i s a problem which 
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assumes g r e a t e r proportion i n cases of p r o f e s s i o n a l 
negligence. Apart from the choice of the courts not to be 
too hasty i n a t t a c h i n g l i a b i l i t y to medicant persons, 
l a r g e l y because from s o c i e t y ' s point of view t h a t would be 
counter-productive, there i s the d i f f i c u l t y of proving 
that the medical man's conduct caused the i n j u r y to the 
p a t i e n t . Recently, a t t e n t i o n has been focussed upon the 
i s s u e of whether b r a i n damage was caused by whooping cough 
6 7 
v a c c i n e . In Loveday v Rentont and Another Stuart-Smith 
L . J . dismissed a c l a i m by an i n f a n t p l a i n t i f f t h a t b r a i n 
damage had been s u f f e r e d as a r e s u l t of having been 
administered whooping cough vac c i n e as a baby. 
Stuart-Smith L . J . considered t h a t i s fo r the c o u r t to 
decide as a matter of f a c t whether the v a c c i n e could cause 
permanent b r a i n damage i n young c h i l d r e n . The burden of 
proof i s on the p l a i n t i f f * * 8 which i s discharged on a 
balance of p r o b a b i l i t i e s . I n the circumstances of t h i s 
case t h a t burden was extremely onerus. Medical opinion 
was deeply d i v i d e d . A report i n 1981 by the National 
Childhood Encephalopathy study showed t h a t there was no 
evidence to show the vaccine caused permanent b r a i n 
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damage. But t h a t i s not the s o l e problem f a c i n g the 
p l a i n t i f f i n such c a s e s . Proof of c a u s a t i o n i s only the 
f i r s t hurdle. Next there i s the hurdle of proving 
negligence on the p a r t of the doctor or nurse r e s p o n s i b l e 
for g i v i n g the v a c c i n e i n the face of c o n t r a i n d i c a t i o n s . 
Stuart-Smith, L . J . described the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n showing 
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such negligence as 'insuperable'. A s i m i l a r point was 
made i n the House of Lords i n Kay v A y r s h i r e & Arram 
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HeaHtBi Board. I t i s d i f f i c u l t enough to prove a breach 
of duty of ca r e although i n t h i s case the respondents 
admitted negligence i n the treatment. The d i f f i c u l t y was 
tha t the weight of evidence showed no c a u s a l connection 
between the i n j u r y i . e . deafness, and the neg l i g e n t 
treatment i . e . mistaken overdose of p e n i c i l l i n . P a r t of 
the problem i s t h a t medicine i s an in e x a c t s c i e n c e . There 
are inherent r i s k s i n most forms of treatment and 
procedure. I t i s coupled with t h a t p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the 
enquiry may have occurred i n the absence of negligence. 
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Causation may be an insurmountable o b s t a c l e . I t i s not 
always easy to a s s i g n a cause. To remedy t h i s Jones " 73 suggests r e v e r s a l of the burden of proof. The Pearson 
Commission considered t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y but r e j e c t e d i t 
says Jones, on the b a s i s t h a t i t might work.^ L i k e many 
others the Pearson Commission was wary of producing an 
i n c r e a s e i n defensive medicine. I t i s submitted t h a t i f 
r e v e r s a l of the burden of proof should be adopted then i t 
would r e l a t e mainly to the i s s u e of breach of duty i n 
circumstances where the p l a i n t i f f could show a departure 
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from the general p r a c t i c e . An example of s h i f t i n g the 
burden i s to be found i n the judgement of Peter P a i n J i n 
7 6 
C l a r k v Maclennam i n 1983. The Pearson Commission a l s o 
r e j e c t e d a n o - f a u l t scheme i n cases of medical negligence. 
One would s t i l l have to prove c a u s a t i o n i n the i n d i v i d u a l 
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case. However, d e s p i t e t h i s view, the B r i t i s h Medical 
A s s o c i a t i o n e s t a b l i s h e d a working party to co n s i d e r a 
no - f a u l t compensation scheme i n 1983 which has now 
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reported. I t i s not normal f o r a s h i f t of the burden as 
i n d i c a t e d above i n the judgment of Peter Pain J i n C l a r k w 
Maclennan. I t i s more usual to s h i f t the burden when 
applying the maxim r e s i p s a loqpaitur. Recent cases have 
shown the courts are w i l l i n g to apply the maxim i n the 
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p l a i n t i f f s ' favour 
The problem i s f u r t h e r aggravated by the passage of 
time between the i n j u r y and the i s s u e coming to t r i a l . 
T h i s point was noted by May C J i n Buyer v Roderick and 
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Others ? 
'In negligence cases a g a i n s t p r o f e s s i o n a l men the 
words of Denning, L . J . i n Bates v Bates (1951) p.35, 
37 should be noted. I t was to shut one's eyes to the 
obvious i f one denied t h a t the burden of a c h i e v i n g 
something more than the mere balance of p r o b a b i l i t i e s 
was g r e a t e r when one was i n v e s t i g a t i n g the 
complicated and s o p h i s t i c a t e d a c t i o n s of a q u a l i f i e d 
and experienced lawyer, doctor, accountant, b u i l d e r 
or motor engineer, than when one was i n q u i r i n g i n t o 
the momentary i n a t t e n t i o n of a d r i v e r of a motor c a r 
i n a simple running down a c t i o n ' 
P o l i c y Considerations 
I t should be evident from much of the d i s c u s s i o n t h a t 
has taken place about medical negligence t h a t t here are 
many d i f f i c u l t p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . On the one hand 
there i s a need to consider the i n d i v i d u a l who has been 
i n j u r e d . On the other hand there i s a danger of imposing 
too great a s t r a i n on the h e a l t h s e r v i c e i n general and on 
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doctors i n p a r t i c u l a r . There are f e a r s of l a r g e awards of 
damages and the use of defensive medicine both of which 
would c o n t r i b u t e alarmingly to e s c a l a t i n g medical c o s t s . 
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On the whole Jackson and Powell consider t h a t the 
medical p r o f e s s i o n f a r e s b e t t e r than other p r o f e s s i o n s 
before the c o u r t s . 'Non negligent' mistake or 'e r r o r of 
judgement' not amounting to negligence succeeds more oft e n 
as a defence, h primary cause of t h i s phenomenon i s 
thought to be the Bolam p r i n c i p l e and the deference p a i d 
to expert w i t n e s s e s . The f e a r s of an explosion of medical 
negligence l i t i g a t i o n are not w e l l founded. Comparisons 
with the problems i n the United S t a t e s are not apposite. 
Medical i n j u r i e s cases are not t r i e d by j u r i e s i n t h i s 
country and the p o t e n t i a l l i a b i l i t y of p r a c t i t i o n e r s i s 
kept down by the use of e s t a b l i s h e d t a r i f f s f o r a s s e s s i n g 
awards. 
However, there i s an apparently i n c r e a s i n g i n c i d e n c e 
of claims of medical negligence. Medical p r a c t i t i o n e r s 
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i n s u r e a g a i n s t l i a b i l i t y . Insurance arrangements are 
often made with defence s o c i e t i e s i . e . Medical Defence 
Union or Medical P r o t e c t i o n S o c i e t y . These s o c i e t i e s 
c l a i m to c o n t e s t a l l unmeritorious claims without regard 
82 
to the c o s t . The primary aim i s to v i n d i c a t e the 
p r a c t i t i o n e r , to preserve h i s r e p u t a t i o n and to s e t t l e 
only cases which show no prospect at a l l of a favourable 
outcome. However, defence s o c i e t i e s are u n l i k e l y to 
recover t h e i r c o s t s i n many of t h e i r c a s e s , e s p e c i a l l y 278 
where the p l a i n t i f f i s l e g a l l y aided. Even cases w i t h a 
good chance of the p r a c t i t i o n e r being cleared may be 
s e t t l e d out of c o u r t . The p a t i e n t t h i n k s he has won and 
the doctor has l o s t . Damage i s done t o the p r a c t i t i o n e r ' s 
r e p u t a t i o n . Who on the outside i s able t o d i s t i n g u i s h 
between a case s e t t l e d i n favour of the p a t i e n t because of 
commercial considerations or because of accepted medical 
malpractice? 
The courts are aware of the problems a f f e c t i n g 
p r a c t i t i o n e r s ' r e p u t a t i o n s . There are d i c t a t o the e f f e c t 
t h a t the outcome even i n f u l l y l i t i g a t e d claims should not 
"> 84 a f f e c t the p r a c t i t i o n e r ' s r e p u t a t i o n . A f i n d i n g of 
f a u l t has consequences f o r a p r a c t i t i o n e r ' s career. 
85 
James considers t h a t the s o l u t i o n i s t o make the h e a l t h 
a u t h o r i t y d i r e c t l y l i a b l e . Such a s o l u t i o n could preserve 
the p r a c t i t i o n e r ' s r e p u t a t i o n where he was po s s i b l e not 
mainly a t f a u l t , as i n the U i l s h e r case. But where 
accidents happen as a r e s u l t of f i n a n c i a l s t r i n g e n c y i n 
the NHS which impose greater s t r a i n s upon medical s t a f f , 
the problem of f i n a n c i a l s t r a i n i s clouded by the c l a i m of 
pr o f e s s i o n a l n e g l i g e n c e . ^ 
Unfortunately the award of damages against a h e a l t h 
a u t h o r i t y has an adverse f i n a n c i a l e f f e c t upon the 
resources of t h a t a u t h o r i t y . The burden of the award i s 
not cushioned by insurance. National Health Service 
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a c t i v i t i e s are c a r r i e d out on behalf of the Crown. As a 
88 
r e s u l t the National Health Service i s s e l f - i n s u r i n g . The 
279 
award of damages i s t h e r e f o r e not paid by an insurance 
company under a p o l i c y of indemnity but by the h e a l t h 
a u t h o r i t y . Consequently, the award drains from the h e a l t h 
a u t h o r i t y moneys which could have been spent on f u r t h e r i n g 
the care and treatment of p a t i e n t s . Doctors employed i n a 
h o s p i t a l are the employees of the h e a l t h a u t h o r i t y . 
Doctors are thus l i a b l e f o r negligence p e r s o n a l l y w h i l e 
the h e a l t h a u t h o r i t y i s also l i a b l e v i c a r i o u s l y f o r the 
doctor's negligence. Membership of a defence s o c i e t y i s 
now a p r e r e q u i s i t e of o b t a i n i n g a p o s i t i o n i n a N a t i o n a l 
89 
Health Service H o s p i t a l . I t must, however, be borne i n 
mind t h a t a defence s o c i e t y i s not i n law an insurance 
company and does not have t o comply w i t h the s t a t u t e s 
90 
r e g u l a t i n g insurance companies. Payments under the 
scheme are d i s c r e t i o n a r y as the s o c i e t y has a d i s c r e t i o n 
whether or not t o support i t s members i n actions and also 
91 
as t o how much of an award w i l l be met. However, 
schemes operated by the defence s o c i e t i e s are t r e a t e d as 
p r o v i d i n g the indemnity cover r e q u i r e d by the N a t i o n a l 
92 
Health Service. 
The v i c t i m of alleged negligence i s i n a s a t i s f a c t o r y 
p o s i t i o n i n compensation terms i f he can prove h i s c l a i m . 
Funds are a v a i l a b l e from the s e l f i n s u r i n g h e a l t h 
a u t h o r i t y or the insured doctor, or both. P r i o r t o 1954 
the i n j u r e d p a r t y would sue the h o s p i t a l a u t h o r i t y who 
would i n t u r n b r i n g t h i r d p a r t y proceedings against the 
93 
doctor. Since 1954 an agreement has e x i s t e d between 
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h o s p i t a l a u t h o r i t i e s and the defence s o c i e t i e s whereby 
l i a b i l i t y i s apportioned, provided the defence s o c i e t y 
a c c e p t s . l i a b i l i t y f o r the doctor. Apportionment i s by 
agreement o r , i n the absence of an agreement, i n equal 
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shareso The agreement does not a f f e c t the problem of 
apportionment between doctors and members of other 
95 
professions involved i n treatment of the p a t i e n t . 
The d i f f i c u l t y of proving medical negligence i s w e l l 
documented. The Royal Commission on C i v i l L i a b i l i t y and 
Compensation f o r Personal I n j u r y reported t h a t the 
p r o p o r t i o n of successful claims f o r damages i n t o r t i s 
much lower f o r medical negligence than f o r a l l negligence 
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cases. Wot, i t would seem only because doctors are w e l l 
t r a i n e d but also due t o l e g a l impediments. Jones 
maintains t h a t obstacles are put i n the paths of 
p l a i n t i f f s . P o l i c y d i c t a t e s t h a t the courts have i n 
p r a c t i c e , i f not i n theory, tended t o r e q u i r e a higher 
standard of proof i n cases of medical negligence than i n 
97 
other cases of p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence. Why should the 
medical profession be so protected? Jones asserts t h a t 
the ' p o l i c y behind t h i s pro-defendant a t t i t u d e has been t o 
discourage medical malpractice claims f o r fe a r of 
encouraging defensive medicine, and an apparent d i s t a s t e 
f o r the i n e v i t a b l e p u b l i c c r i t i c i s m of the medical 
98 
profession t h a t a negligence a c t i o n engenders'. Breach 
<?, 
of duty and causation, as has already been discussed 
present problems i n a co n s i d e r a t i o n of medical negligence. 281 
Both of these requirements also have a p a r t i c u l a r 
relevance i n these cases associated w i t h d i s c l o s u r e of 
r i s k or what i s sometimes c a l l e d , the d o c t r i n e of informed 
consent. 
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Chapiter 7 
Disclosuare of r i s k 
From the foregoing discussion of medical negligence 
i t appears t h a t a doctor w i l l not be l i a b l e f o r negligence 
i f he has complied w i t h what has become known as the Bolam 
p r i n c i p l e , t h a t i s i f he has acted ' i n accordance w i t h a 
p r a c t i c e accepted as proper by a responsible body of 
i 
medical men s k i l l e d i n [ t h e ] p a r t i c u l a r a r t ' This i s the 
2 
accepted standard f o r diagnosis and treatment, and 
appears to be i n accordance w i t h general p r i n c i p l e s f o r 
determining the l i a b i l i t y of p r o f e s s i o n a l people. There 
i s , however, the problem of determining the appropriate 
standard f o r d i s c l o s u r e of r i s k s by a medical man when 
proposing s u r g i c a l procedures or other medical treatments. 
The case of Sidaway v Board of Governors of t h e Bethlem 
3 
Royal H o s p i t a l and the Manadsley H o s p i t a l suggests t h e r e 
i s a marked reluctance of the English courts t o depart 
from the standards a p p l i e d by Bolam i n favour of any other 
approach. This i s perhaps due t o a ' t r a d i t i o n a l j u d i c i a l 
deference t o the views of the medical profession about i t s 
4 
l i a b i l i t y f o r negligence.' I n other words, the 
p a t e r n a l i s t i c approach of 'doctor knows best' i s favoured, 
perhaps due t o a series of f a c t o r s which are not s o l e l y 
based on the need t o do j u s t i c e i n a p a r t i c u l a r case. 
J u d i c i a l fears of an explosion of l i t i g a t i o n have been 
5 
voiced over a period of a t l e a s t t h i r t y years. These 
f e a r s , appearing sometimes t o verge on paranoia i n s i m i l a r 
293 
fashion t o the 'floodgates' fears of a l l o w i n g actions f o r 
economic l o s s , are probably unfounded being based upon the 
so- c a l l e d American 'malpractice c r i s i s ' . But the 
di f f e r e n c e s between both the l e g a l and medical care 
systems operating i n England and the United States make 
6 
such an explosion u n l i k e l y . However, the problems of 
di s c l o s u r e have occupied much time i n the courts i n recent 
years and has generated a l o t of opinions as t o i t s 
relevance i n cases of medical negligence. 
Informed Consent 
The d o c t r i n e of informed consent i s t r a n s a t l a n t i c i n 
o r i g i n and may be traced back i n i t s present form as an 
issue of malpractice t o the American case of Canterbury v 
7 
Spence i n 1972. I n the context of p r o f e s s i o n a l 
negligence the d o c t r i n e has posed a most vexing question? 
not only i n USA and Canada but i n the United Kingdom where 
i t has not been received? the courts c o n s i s t e n t l y 
g 
r e j e c t i n g the d o c t r i n e . The complexity of issues 
associated w i t h t h i s d o c t r i n e i s t y p i c a l of the problems 
i n p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence actions g e n e r a l l y , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
how much of a f r e e hand are the courts w i l l i n g t o allow 
the professions t o have. I n an e a r l i e r chapter i t was 
seen as a s i g n i f i c a n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of p r o f e s s i o n a l 
bodies t h a t they were independent of much e x t e r n a l 
r e g u l a t i o n and being the p r a c t i t i o n e r s of the s p e c i a l 
occupation l a r g e l y determined standards of conduct f o r 
themselves. But there i s a l i m i t t o such independence and 
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i n the words of S i r John Donaldson M.R. i n SIdaway v Board 
of Governors of the Bethlema Royal H o s p i t a l and Elanadsley 
g 
H o s p i t a l '... the law w i l l not permit the medical 
p r o f e s s i o n to play God.' 
The r o l e of the courts i s to dispense j u s t i c e between 
the l i t i g a n t s and a l l o c a t e the l o s s e s i n accordance with 
the u s u a l p r i n c i p l e s of law. But as i n d i c a t e d e a r l i e r , 
the c o u r t s have another r o l e which i s wider than t h a t of 
doing j u s t i c e to the l i t i g a n t s i n a p a r t i c u l a r c a s e . I t 
i s important t h a t the courts maintain the confidence both 
of the p r o f e s s i o n and of the p u b l i c i n the p r o f e s s i o n . I n 
t h i s sense the courts help to maintain the i n t e g r i t y of 
the p r o f e s s i o n . They must not 'throw out the baby with 
the bathwater' because i t i s d e s i r a b l e t h a t the 
occupations which are c a l l e d 'professions' should continue 
to provide those s e r v i c e s which are necessary i n the 
pu b l i c i n t e r e s t . However, the i n t e g r i t y of a p r o f e s s i o n 
i s not maintained e i t h e r i n the long term or the s h o r t 
term i f the p u b l i c i s endangered by unsafe p r a c t i c e s . 
Much of the value of the work of the medical p r o f e s s i o n 
must be judged i n the context of p u b l i c confidence. 
Confidence w i l l not be enhanced i f the p u b l i c p e r c e i v e s a 
conspiracy between the courts and the p r o f e s s i o n s . Nor 
w i l l i n d i v i d u a l members of the p r o f e s s i o n f a r e w e l l . I t 
i s i r o n i c , says Jones, 'that, s i n c e the most g l a r i n g c a s e s 
of negligence w i l l be s e t t l e d before t r i a l , i t i s doctors 
whose conduct i s l e a s t ( s i c ) " ^ r e p r e h e n s i b l e whose 
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reputations become t a r n i s h e d even where the a c t i o n 
11 
f a i l s ' . Then there i s the r o l e of p u b l i c p r o t e c t o r 
which the court assumes i n order t h a t the p u b l i c i s not 
endangered by unsafe p r a c t i c e s and t h a t reasonable 
standards are maintained. Maintaining t h i s balance 
between the p r o f e s s i o n s and the aggrieved c l i e n t / p a t i e n t 
i s a fundamental problem f o r the cou r t s as may be evinced 
by the dictum of Denning L . J . (as he then was) i n Roe v 
12 
M i n i s t e r of Health and l a t e r Lord Denning M.R. i n 
13 
Whitefooiase v Jordan. Of a l l the p r o f e s s i o n s the medical 
p r o f e s s i o n appears to enjoy g r e a t e s t p r o t e c t i o n by the 
j u d i c i a r y . I n a v a r i e t y of ways there appears to be 
greater > l e g a l o b s t a c l e s placed i n the path of the 
p l a i n t i f f pursuing a medical negligence c l a i m . For 
example a higher standard of proof appears to be necessary 
to e s t a b l i s h negligence and the problem of c a u s a t i o n may 
appear almost insurmountable. The e f f e c t c r e a t e d seems to 
be t h a t the medical p r o f e s s i o n i s composed of persons of 
gre a t e r i n t e g r i t y than would be found i n other 
p r o f e s s i o n s . However, the r e a l i t y i s probably t h a t no 
gre a t e r s k i l l i s possessed on average by members of the 
medical p r o f e s s i o n than members of other p r o f e s s i o n s . The 
image i s merely b e t t e r , b o l s t e r e d by the concurrence of 
the j u d i c i a r y i n allowing the medical p r o f e s s i o n to s e t 
the standard of competence r e q u i r e d a t law under the Bolaim . , 14 p r i n c i p l e . 
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At the root of the i s s u e of informed consent i s 
b o d i l y i n t e g r i t y . There i s the notion t h a t , i n medical 
treatment, touching without consent w i l l render the 
p r a c t i t i o n e r l i a b l e i n e i t h e r t r e s p a s s to the person or 
negligence o I n Sclkloeiadlorff w .Society o£ W®w York 
15 
H o s p i t a l Cardozo, J . s a i d 'Every human being of a d u l t 
years and sound mind has a r i g h t to determine what s h a l l 
be done with h i s own body? and a surgeon who performs an 
operation without h i s p a t i e n t s consent commits an a s s a u l t 
f o r which he i s l i a b l e i n damages. This i s t r u e except i n 
cases of emergency, where the p a t i e n t i s unconscious and 
where i t i s necessary to operate before consent can be 
obtained.' Thus, there i s a p r i n c i p l e of b o d i l y s e l f -
determination. Anglo-American law demands the consent of 
e i t h e r the p a t i e n t or some other person who i s a u t h o r i s e d 
to a c t f o r t h a t person, before a medical or s u r g i c a l 
procedure i s performed. Cardozo, J . admits emergency as 
an exception but even t h a t might be a s t r i c t l y l i m i t e d 
exception. No treatment may be forced on the p a t i e n t 
a g a i n s t h i s w i l l or the w i l l of someone a u t h o r i s e d to a c t 16 17 on h i s behalf, r e g a r d l e s s of the urgency" Southwick 
regards t h i s exception as l i m i t e d to cases where treatment 
may go ahead without consent because 1 some e s p e c i a l l y 
strong s o c i a l p o l i c y i s c a l l e d i n t o p lay to p r o t e c t the 
i n t e r e s t s of others.' Southwick concludes t h a t ' I t can 
t h e r e f o r e be s a i d t h a t a competent adul t has the r i g h t to 
die i f he wishes; ....however courts have sometimes 
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ordered t h a t care be rendered even when a competent adu l t 
18 
has e x p r e s s l y refused it„' He does not, however, c i t e 
these c a s e s . But even i f emergency does c o n s t i t u t e an 
exception to the requirement of consent, the problem i s 
exacerbated by the d i f f i c u l t y of d e f i n i n g an emergency. 
I t seems that the 'medical' need f o r prompt operation or 
treatment i s not tantamount to an emergency, t h e r e f o r e the 
t r a d i t i o n a l l e g a l concept of a medical emergency demands a 
s i t u a t i o n where there i s an immediate t h r e a t to l i f e , or a 
t h r e a t of permanent impairment to h e a l t h . .. I f d e l a y i n g 
treatment while consent i s obtained would not i n c r e a s e the 
hazards to the p a t i e n t , the "emergency" i s not s u f f i c i e n t 
19 
to j u s t i f y treatment without consent.' The doctor, 
t h e r e f o r e , i s s u b j e c t to a l e g a l r i s k i f he i s u n c e r t a i n 
of the e x i s t e n c e of an emergency. The unfortunate 
outcome, apart from the subsequent death or impairment of 
the h e a l t h of the p a t i e n t might be the development of 
20 
u n s a t i s f a c t o r y defensive medical p r a c t i c e s . S i m i l a r to 
t h i s i s the s i t u a t i o n which may a r i s e where consent has 
been obtained to a medical procedure but something 
un a n t i c i p a t e d a t the time of the o r i g i n a l consent a r i s e s . 
C o n s i s t e n t l y with the r u l e s r e l a t i n g to emergency i t would 
seem t h a t t r a d i t i o n a l l y no extension of the o r i g i n a l 
consent must take p l a c e with regard to the u n a n t i c i p a t e d 
c o n d i t i o n which a r i s e s u n l e s s there i s a t h r e a t to l i f e or 
21 
a considerable r i s k of permanent impairment of h e a l t h . 
298 
However, there are cases i n which a more l i b e r a l 
l e g a l r u l e has developed, v i z 'a surgeon may extend the 
o r i g i n a l l y contemplated surgery whenever an u n a n t i c i p a t e d 
c o n d i t i o n becomes evident during surgery and makes i t 
m e d i c a l l y a d v i s a b l e i n h i s medical judgment to c o r r e c t the 
22 
c o n d i t i o n immediately.' The extension of the medical 
procedures i s l i m i t e d to those which would probably have 
been consented to by the p a t i e n t , i f conscious, and a l s o 
i n v o lve the same i n c i s i o n and not e n t a i l i n g s u b s t a n t i a l l y 
23 
d i f f e r e n t r i s k s from those o r i g i n a l l y contemplated. 
Trespass or negligence 
The s i t u a t i o n d i s c u s s e d above does not d e a l with the 
problem of consent i n a manner which i s r e l e v a n t to 
m a l p r a c t i c e or negligence. A p o s s i b l e form of a c t i o n had 
been t r e s p a s s . I n the case of a t r e s p a s s , the consent of 
the p a t i e n t w i l l make the touching by the doctor l e g a l l y 
24 
innocuous. I n recent years the form of a c t i o n has moved 
away from t r e s p a s s i n t o negligences- p r o f e s s i o n a l 
25 
negligence. There has been a considerable i n c r e a s e i n 
the volume of medical m a l p r a c t i c e l i t i g a t i o n i n common law 
c o u n t r i e s , notably USA and Canada, and more l a t e l y the 
United Kingdom. Some of t h i s l i t i g a t i o n has focused upon 
the i s s u e of consent. The d o c t r i n e of informed consent 
has taken on i t s own s p e c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e i n the debate 
26 
about medical negligence. Even so, the i n c i d e n c e of 
a c t i o n s f o r negligence based on informed consent have 
27 
hardly reached c r i s i s proportions. Be t h a t as i t may, i n 
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Canada u n t i l 1976 i n K e l l y v H a s l e t f the problem of 
consent could be t r e a t e d e q u a l l y e a s i l y as e i t h e r b a t t e r y 
or negligence. The Ontario Supreme Court drew a 
d i s t i n c t i o n between the meaning of consent r e l e v a n t to 
each form of a c t i o n . I t i s c l e a r t h a t to give informed 
consent the p a t i e n t must possess reasonably complete 
information about the advised medical treatment or 
29 
surgery. The i s s u e i s t h e r e f o r e one which r e l a t e s to 
m a t e r i a l r i s k and i s s i g n i f i c a n t i n the a c t i o n based upon 
negligence. I n r e l a t i o n to b a t t e r y , informed consent must 
be to the b a s i c nature and c h a r a c t e r of the medical 
30 
treatment. But i n the event of an a c t i o n i n negligence 
for breach of the duty to inform the p a t i e n t of the 
c o l l a t e r a l r i s k s the j u d i c i a l approach i s more s u b t l e and, 
as P i c a r d points out, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to d i s t i n g u i s h 
between the d i f f e r e n t types of consent. What, P i c a r d 
asks, i s the d i f f e r e n c e i n content between b a s i c nature 
and c h a r a c t e r , on the one hand, and c o l l a t e r a l r i s k on the 
other, to produce a hard and f a s t r u l e f o r deciding which 
a c t i o n to pursue. I n any event, i n p r a c t i c e , the 
d i f f e r e n c e s between a c t i o n s f o r t r e s p a s s and negligence 
31 
are many, and hardly l i k e l y to depend s o l e l y on the r o l e 
of consent. 
I t i s now commonly held t h a t claims based upon 
negligence are more appropriate i n most of these medical 
32 
treatment c a s e s . The p l a i n t i f f has given h i s consent to 
an a c t , the general nature of which i s explained (thus 300 
negating b a t t e r y on the above t e s t ) , but there has been 
some flaw i n the consent obtained r e s u l t i n g i n no consent 
33 
a t a l l to c e r t a i n concomitant f e a t u r e s of the a c t . The 
negligence of the doctor i s based upon a f a i l u r e to obtain 
the consent of the p a t i e n t by v i r t u e of i n s u f f i c i e n t 
d i s c l o s u r e of the r i s k . Thus, although there may be 
a l t e r n a t i v e a c t i o n s based on t r e s p a s s or negligence, l a c k 
of d i s c l o s u r e i s now t r e a t e d as negligence or m a l p r a c t i c e 34 I S r a t h e r than as b a t t e r y as i n R e i b l v Hiaghes and 3 fi 
CfoattertomL v Gerson. 
Bearing i n mind the importance of the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , 
the two a c t i o n s of t r e s p a s s and negligence must be 
37 
c a r e f u l l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d from each other and, indeed, 
negligence must be capable of d e f i n i t i o n as the a c t i o n 
38 
i n negligence appears most l i k e l y . M a l p r a c t i c e as 
Southwick puts i t , ' i s p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence, or the 
f a i l u r e to adhere to l e g a l l y imposed p r o f e s s i o n a l 
39 
standards.' Even so, the question to be asked i n 
matters of negligence r e l a t e to the duty and to the 
appropriate standard i f the duty i s to be performed. 
Commencing with the premise of b o d i l y i n t e g r i t y every 
person has the r i g h t to determine what i s to be done with 
h i s own body. The doctor faces the dilemma t h a t the 
treatment may have been s u c c e s s f u l but the p a t i e n t has 
s u f f e r e d adverse consequences and was not adequately 
40 
informed. The doctor's duty i s to d i s c l o s e a l l m a t e r i a l 
r i s k s . Whether t h i s has been done w i l l be determined by 
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r e f e r e n c e to the appropriate standard. But what the 
standard i s seems l e s s c l e a r . O r d i n a r i l y i n c a s e s 
i n v o l v i n g p r o f e s s i o n a l persons the standard i s determined 
by r e f e r e n c e to the p r a c t i c e s of the reasonable 
41 
p r o f e s s i o n a l or p r a c t i t i o n e r . Thus, one might ask what 
c o n s t i t u t e s being adequately informed of the m a t e r i a l 
42 
r i s k s s i n c e there appears to be a myriad of t e s t s which 
have been suggested, d i s c u s s e d , r e j e c t e d and accepted over 
the l a s t few y e a r s . 
I f the p r o f e s s i o n a l standard i s adopted t h i s w i l l a c t 
i n derogation of the p a t i e n t ' s r i g h t to b o d i l y 
determination as the standard w i l l be defined p r i m a r i l y by 
re f e r e n c e s to the p r a c t i c e s of the medical p r o f e s s i o n . 
For t h i s reason, the standard has, i n some c a s e s , been 
determined i n terms of whether a reasonable person i n the 
p a t i e n t ' s p o s i t i o n would a t t a c h s i g n i f i c a n c e to the 
information given to the p a t i e n t . The American case of 
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Canterbury v Spence has been i n f l u e n c i a l i n the r e s p e c t 
and has been so r e f e r r e d to i n the American case of S c o t t 
44 
v Bradford. 
According to Doolin, J . , i n S c o t t v Bradford, the 
court i n Canterbury v Spence recognised t h a t some 
j u r i s d i c t i o n s considered the customary p r a c t i c e of 
p h y s i c i a n s i n making d i s c l o s u r e to the p a t i e n t to be the 
appropriate standard. The standard of customary p r a c t i c e 
was r e j e c t e d i n Canterbury v Spence and the cou r t 
s u b s t i t u t e d i t s view t h a t 'The standard measuring 
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performance of the duty of d i s c l o s u r e i s conduct which i s 
45 
reasonable under the circumstances 1 S c o t t v Bradford 
a l s o r e j e c t e d the p r o f e s s i o n a l standard. What a doctor 
needs to t e l l h i s p a t i e n t i s measured by the p a t i e n t 1 s 
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need to know enough to enable the p a t i e n t to make an 
i n t e l l i g e n t c h o i c e. T h i s t e s t r e q u i r e s f u l l d i s c l o s u r e of 
a l l m a t e r i a l r i s k s , producing the problem of 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g the m a t e r i a l from the immaterial - a 
question of f a c t . I n ad d i t i o n , there i s an immediate 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n of ' f u l l d i s c l o s u r e ' by the e x i s t e n c e of a 
l i m i t e d p r i v i l e g e of non d i s c l o s u r e which contains s e v e r a l 
f e a t u r e s . Apart from immaterial r i s k the doctor i s not 
expected to d i s c l o s e unexpected r i s k s although t h i s might 
be a matter of degree. Some r i s k s which are thought 
improbable might need to be di s c u s s e d owing to the severe 
consequences should the r i s k m a t e r i a l i s e . Neither i s 
there any need f o r d i s c l o s u r e i n an emergency, or where 
the p a t i e n t s u f f e r s from i n c a p a c i t y , or where the p a t i e n t 
waives h i s r i g h t to r e c e i v e the information. No 
d i s c l o s u r e ought to be necessary where there are r i s k s 
which are commonly understood, and obvious, or are a l r e a d y 
known to the p a t i e n t . And f i n a l l y , though not l e a s t i n 
importance, there i s non-disclosure, which a r i s e s out of 
the doctor's primary duty to do what i s best f o r the 
p a t i e n t and where f u l l d i s c l o s u r e would be detrimental to 
47 
t o t a l c a r e and the best i n t e r e s t s of the p a t i e n t . T h i s 
l a t t e r element, t h e r a p e u t i c p r i v i l e g e , i s a p p l i c a b l e even 303 
i n j u r i s d i c t i o n s which focus a t t e n t i o n upon the p a t i e n t ' s 
r i g h t s and i s t e s t e d by medical evidence. I t i s perhaps 
not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t d i f f i c u l t i e s have a r i s e n i n the 
E n g l i s h Courts which g e n e r a l l y support the p r o f e s s i o n a l 
48 
standard. Although Canterbury v Spesice has been 
approved i n some cases i n America, and t h e r e f o r e the 
p r o f e s s i o n a l standard has been r e j e c t e d , i t must be 
pointed out t h a t the do c t r i n e of informed consent i n t h i s 
form i s maintained only by a minority of j u r i s d i c t i o n i n 
A Q the USA. 
Also of importance i n the determination of informed 
consent i s the matter of cau s a t i o n , i d e n t i f i e d as the 
50 
second element a f t e r duty i n the cause of a c t i o n . The 
p a t i e n t must prove a c a u s a l l i n k between the 
non-disclosure and the harm s u f f e r e d . The p l a i n t i f f has 
to prove t h a t he would not have undergone the treatment or 
would have undergone a d i f f e r e n t form of treatment, had 
51 
the m a t e r i a l r i s k s been made known to him. That the 
focus of a t t e n t i o n has been upon c a u s a t i o n i s n a t u r a l as 
the p a t i e n t i s a s s e r t i n g he would not have s u f f e r e d i n j u r y 
had he r e c e i v e d the information of which he was a l l e g e d l y 
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deprived. Without such information being provided c l a i m 
i s t h a t the consent given i s i n e f f e c t i v e . I f , of course, 
the p l a i n t i f f would have consented had the doctor complied 
with h i s duty then the p l a i n t i f f would have no remedy. 
As the requirement f o r informed consent i s not to be 
f u l l d i s c l o s u r e but reasonably complete d i s c l o s u r e only, 304 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n has to be given to what f u l f i l l s t h i s 
requirement. There have been va r i o u s approaches to the 
extent of the d i s c l o s u r e , n e c e s s i t a t e d by the presence of 
p a t i e n t h i n d s i g h t . The problem of hindsight was c l e a r l y 
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h i g h l i g h t e d i n Roe v M i n i s t r y of Health A p a t i e n t 
knowing he has s u f f e r e d some misfortune as a r e s u l t of 
medical procedures may now choose to a s s e r t t h a t had he 
been adequately warned he would not have given h i s 
consent. The approaches suggested range from the 
s u b j e c t i v e to the o b j e c t i v e , with v a r i a n t s i n between. 
The s u b j e c t i v e approach inv o l v e s a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of 
tha t p a r t i c u l a r p a t i e n t . This i n t u r n gives a g r e a t e r 
weighting to the a s s e r t i o n by t h a t p a t i e n t t h a t he would 
not have consented i f he had been aware of the m a t e r i a l 
f a c t s . T h i s approach i s not g e n e r a l l y acceptable s i n c e i t 
i s regarded as u n f a i r l y weighted i n favour of the p a t i e n t . 
At the other end of the s c a l e , the o b j e c t i v e approach 
considers the reasonable p a t i e n t i . e . would the reasonable 
p a t i e n t have given h i s consent when confronted with f u l l 
information of the r i s k s involved. Canterbury v Spence 
deals with t h i s problem by the device of the 'reasonable 
p a t i e n t ' even though emphasising b o d i l y s e l f determinates. 
The e f f e c t i s t h a t a doctor would only be l i a b l e f o r 
n o n d i s c l o s u r e i f a reasonable p a t i e n t would have been 
a f f e c t e d i n making h i s d e c i s i o n to undergo treatment. 
That the a c t u a l p a t i e n t would not i s i r r e l e v a n t i n t h i s 
o b j e c t i v e t e s t . T h i s approach too i s not acceptable 
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according to Mason and McCall Smith as being p o t e n t i a l l y 
u n f a i r to the p a t i e n t as he may not have consented even 
though the reasonable p a t i e n t would have done so. Mason 
and McCall Smith suggest a t h i r d t e s t i . e . an e n t i r e l y 
o b j e c t i v e approach which i s q u a l i f i e d by i n v e s t i n g the 
reasonable p a t i e n t with the s p e c i a l p e c u l a r i t i e s of the 
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p a t i e n t . As to how r e a l i s t i c t h i s t e s t i s remains to be 
seen but the Supreme Court of Canada l a i d down such a t e s t 
i n R e i b l v Hughes. Writing of f u l l d i s c l o s u r e , the 
cases do not u s u a l l y i n v o l v e such a degree but r a t h e r a 
measure of non-disclosure. The i s s u e i s u s u a l l y how much 
information should be d i s c l o s e d . I n a d d i t i o n , i t i s 
d i f f i c u l t to envisage any case of f u l l d i s c l o s u r e , whether 
i n r e l a t i o n to a reasonable p a t i e n t or a p a r t i c u l a r 
p a t i e n t , where, i n the event of an a l l e g a t i o n of l a c k of 
consent, negligence could be s u b s t a n t i a t e d . Presumably, 
no doctor can give more than f u l l information and i t i s 
d i f f i c u l t to see how a duty framed i n such a way could be 
performed. D i f f i c u l t y i s c r e a t e d by the l a c k of c l a r i t y 
attached to ' f u l l d i s c l o s u r e ' . I n theory, the amount of 
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information a doctor could give i s v i r t u a l l y l i m i t l e s s . 
Perhaps a b e t t e r way of addressing the problem i s t h a t , on 
a s u b j e c t i v e b a s i s , a p a t i e n t might c l a i m t h a t what a 
"reasonable p a t i e n t " would regard as " f u l l d i s c l o s u r e " 
would be so regarded by him. 
Even t h i s approach may not r e s u l t i n a s a t i s f a c t o r y 
s o l u t i o n . F u l l d i s c l o s u r e may prove to be i n a d v i s a b l e on 
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t h e r a p e u t i c grounds and t h a t measure of d i s c l o s u r e may 
i t s e l f give r i s e to an a c t i o n i n negligence. But t h a t , i t 
i s submitted, r e l a t e s to another duty and another element 
of c a u s a t i o n . 
The Canadian cases thus use a s u b j e c t i v e t e s t i n so 
f a r as the p r o f e s s i o n a l standard measures the doctor's 
duty of d i s c l o s u r e and t h a t standard i s modified by 
e v a l u a t i o n of the p a r t i c u l a r p a t i e n t not the reasonable 
p a t i e n t . ^ A f t e r the E n g l i s h case of Chatterfcom v Gersom^ 
the approach adopted i n R e i b l v Htaghes was favoured as 
l i k e l y to be appli e d i n E n g l a n d . ^ An e f f e c t of the 
d e c i s i o n i n R e i b l w Hughes was observed i n Un i t e v 
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Turner as being t h a t 'no longer does the medical 
p r o f e s s i o n alone c o l l e c t i v e l y determine, by i t s own 
p r a c t i c e s , the amount of information a p a t i e n t should have 
i n order to decide whether to undergo an operation.' 
Cases decided subsequently i n England show a l s o t h a t the 
courts are not prepared to allow the doctors to have the 
s o l e and f i n a l say as to the p r a c t i c e s adopted. 
The Standards of D i s c l o s u r e 
At t h i s stage i t might be worthwhile recapping on the 
nature of these v a r i o u s standards of d i s c l o s u r e and t h e i r 
e f f e c t s . There are two standards applying i n v a r i o u s 
j u r i s d i c t i o n s - the p r o f e s s i o n a l standard and f u l l 
d i s c l o s u r e . 
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P r o f e s s i o n a l Standard 
The doctors determine what information doctors u s u a l l y 
give to p a t i e n t s . I f the doctor gives s u f f i c i e n t 
information to s a t i s f y t h a t t e s t the p a t i e n t i s deemed to 
have enough information to give consent. There i s no 
doubt t h a t t h i s standard operates i n the best i n t e r e s t s of 
the medical p r o f e s s i o n . An image of a p a t e r n a l i s t i c 
'doctor knows best' - p r o f e s s i o n i s c r e a t e d . I n t u r n few 
doctors w i l l be prepared to t e s t i f y a g a i n s t the defendant 
p r a c t i t i o n e r s . 
F u l l d i s c l o s u r e 
T h i s t e s t i s supportive of the p a t i e n t s ' s r i g h t of 
6 3 
s e l f determination. Canterbury v Spence i s the most 
i n f l u e n t i a l case. Using t h i s t e s t the judge (or j u r y where 
appropriate) w i l l not be bound by the judgment of the 
medical community. F u l l d i s c l o s u r e appears to be welcomed 
by many American commentators as f o s t e r i n g b e t t e r 
doctor/patient r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Unfortunately, i t i s more 
l i k e l y to r e s u l t i n the doctor being defensive and t e l l i n g 
the p a t i e n t everything even when, on t h e r a p e u t i c grounds, 
such f u l l d i s c l o s u r e would be u n d e s i r a b l e . Moreover, 
there i s no doubt t h a t there i s great doctor and p a t i e n t . . 64 anxxety. 
Standards i n Various J u r i s i d l e t i o n s 
I n New Zealand there i s a p r o f e s s i o n a l standard. 
I n Canada, the p r o f e s s i o n a l standard has a l s o been adopted 
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with the exception of r e s e a r c h and experimentation i n 
which case the f u l l d i s c l o s u r e r u l e a p p l i e s . One of the 
f e a r s t h a t the development of the law of consent appears 
to have generated i s t h a t m a l p r a c t i c e l i t i g a t i o n has been 
encouraged. I n the USA most s t a t e s have chosen the 
p r o f e s s i o n a l standard of c a r e . A s u b s t a n t i a l m a j o r i t y 
have accepted the reasonable p a t i e n t standard. An 
unfortunate e f f e c t has been t h e r e f o r e an i n c r e a s e i n 
defensive m e d i c i n e S u c h a f e a r of a l i t i g a t i o n 
e x p l o s i o n i s , however probably u n j u s t i f i e d . Dyer r e p o r t s 
t h a t a n a t i o n a l survey of malpr a c t i c e claims conducted i n 
1975=6 i n U.S.A showed t h a t the i s s u e of consent was 
69 
r a i s e d only i n three per cent of c a s e s . Therefore, seen 
i n the context of medical negligence g e n e r a l l y i t i s a 
minor i s s u e . However, some appear to regard the i s s u e of 
consent as a 'back door' approach to l i t i g a t i o n i n the 
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absence of c l e a r e r medical negligence. Whatever t e s t i s 
adopted the focus of informed consent i s the p a t i e n t . Has 
the p a t i e n t made a d e c i s i o n to allow the treatment or the 
procedures to be performed on the b a s i s of the 
information. Strangely P i c a r d makes the observation t h a t 
'Comprehension of the information u n d e r l i e s h i s (the 
p a t i e n t ' s ) d e c i s i o n and i s most important to negligence 
because the requirement of cau s a t i o n i s made out by the 
p l a i n t i f f proving t h a t had he been f u l l y informed he would 
not have consented to the treatment which r e s u l t e d i n the 
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i n j u r y ' . However 'comprehension' does not appear to be 
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a r e q u i s i t e of d i s c l o s u r e under the Bolam t e s t or any 
other t e s t . I f i t were there would be the a d d i t i o n a l 
d i f f i c u l t y of t e s t i n g the extent of such comprehension. 
I t i s not always c l e a r i n what sense the information given 
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to the p a t i e n t has been understood. 
At t h i s stage i t i s appropriate to co n s i d e r the law 
i n England. The d o c t r i n e of informed consent had no p l a c e 
i n E n g l i s h law. Medical negligence, i n whatever form i t 
was to be found was judged according to the u s u a l 
standards a p p l i c a b l e to medical men i . e . the Bolam t e s t . 
But the law does not develop i n i s o l a t i o n and when cases 
come before an E n g l i s h court concerning i s s u e s of 
d i s c l o s u r e of information and consent i t i s i n e v i t a b l e 
t h a t a c t i v i t y i n other p a r t s of the common law world w i l l 
a t t r a c t a t t e n t i o n . 
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I n RMtehouse v Jordan Lord Edmund-Davies s a i d "The 
t e s t i s the standard of the ordinary s k i l l e d man 
e x e r c i s i n g and p r o f e s s i n g to have t h a t s p e c i a l s k i l l " . I f 
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a surgeon f a i l s to measure up to t h a t standard i n any 
re s p e c t ( " c l i n i c a l judgment" or otherwise) he has been 
negligent.....' A s i m i l a r view t h a t the Bolam standard 
a p p l i e d to a l l aspects of medical treatment was expressed 
75 
i n A s h c r o f t v Mersey Health Authority" I n H i l l s -w 
7 6 
P o t t e r the p o s i t i o n was made e x p l i c i t by H i r s t J . i n 
th a t the Bolam standard should apply. I n h i s view t h e r e 
'was no c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between the standard of c a r e i n 
g i v i n g advice and t h a t i n diagnosis and treatment. The 
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standard was not that of absolute and frank disclosure as 
77 
a fiduciary ...' By holding such a view Hir s t J . was 
rejecting the Canadian and American authorities which were 
7 8 
c i t e d to him" There was no higher standard of disclosure 
and SIdaway w Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal 
79 
Hospital and the Mauadsley Hospital and Others confirms 
the view expressed by Hirst J, In the Court of Appeal 
i n Sldaway Donaldson M.R. declined to develop English law 
80 
along the lin e s set out i n Canterbury v Spence. The 
Master of the Rolls took the opportunity to reaffirm the 
Bolam principle, pointing out that Bolam had been approved 
81 
on many occasions, although the duty of disclosure i s 
not the same as the duty l a i d upon the medical man 
generally i n Bolam0 The duty of medical man i n matters of 
disclosure was expresseds 
'The general duty of a doctor to disclose information 
to his patient as I would formulate i t , i s to take 
such action by way of giving or witholding 
information as was reasonable i n a l l the 
circumstances of which the doctor knew or ought to 
have known, including the patient's true wishes, with 
a view to placing the patient i n a position to make a 
rational choice Rwhether or not to accept the doctor's recommendation' 
Stating the duty i n t h i s fashion begs the question of how 
much information should be disclosed and when. The Master 
of the Rolls considered that t h i s question was answered by 
reference to the doctor's relationship with a p a r t i c u l a r 
patient. There i s therefore no adoption of the prudent 
83 
patient t e s t as l a i d down i n Canterbury v Spence. 
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Performance of the duty of disclosure involves 
some professional expertise and professional judgment. 
Whether a doctor has complied with the requirements of the 
duty i s determined by reference to the Bolam t e s t - the 
way i n which other doctors discharge the duty. The Master 
of the Rolls was, however, concerned that adoption of the 
Balaam t e s t did not r e s u l t i n an abdication of 
res p o n s i b i l i t y by the court. The defin i t i o n of the duty 
of care i s not a matter for the medical profession but for 
the judges and the courts. The medical practitioner may 
only, i n the view of S i r John Donaldson, discharge the 
duty of care as his Lordship defined i t . So strongly did 
the Master of the Rolls feel about t h i s issue he expressed 
the view that a judge could 'reject a unanimoms medical 
view i f he were s a t i s f i e d that i t was manifestly wrong and 
that the doctors must have been misdirecting themselves as 
to t h e i r duty i n law.' In defining the duty of disclosure 
S i r John Donaldson refined the Bolarnn pr i n c i p l e by the 
84 
insertion of the word 'rightly'. The t e s t for 
performance of the duty of disclosure was now to be ' i f 
the doctor acts i n accordance with a practice r i g h t l y 
accepted as proper by a body of s k i l l e d and experienced 
85 
medical men'. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to t e l l whether he merely 
expressed that which was i m p l i c i t i n the t e s t or was 
taking the opportunity to express the courts h o s t i l i t y 
towards paternalism of the medical profession which denied 
86 
the patient a r e a l choice. Dunn L.J. concurred with the 
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view of the Master of the Rolls with a reservation 
r e l a t i n g to c l i n i c a l judgment. Where disclosure forms 
part of the overall c l i n i c a l judgment of the doctor 'the 
court should not interfere unless the c l i n i c a l judgment of 
the doctor taken as a whole f a l l s below the generally 
accepted standards of the profession.' As the 
professional standard i s the appropriate standard, i n the 
judgment of Dunn CJ the doctrine of 'informed consent' 
88 
forms no part of English Law. Browne-Wilkinson L . J . 
concurred. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal i n Sida^ay had an 
i n f l u e n t i a l effect upon the development of English law i n 
89 
subsequent cases. In Freeman v Home Office. a l a t e r 
Court of Appeal referred to Sidaway* I t was accepted by 
Stephen Brown L.J. that 'informed consent' had no place i n 
90 
English law. In Freemam S i r John Donaldson also took 
the opportunity to restate the view expressed i n Sidaway 
that there was no place in English law for the doctrine of 
91 
'informed consent'. 
But a tendency seems to be developing that the Bolam 
principle applies to a l l aspects of medical practice 
diagnosis, treatment and disclosure of r i s k . Dunn L. J . i n 
92 
Sida^ay considered that the duty to advise and warn as 
bound up i n the overall c l i n i c a l judgment of the doctor. 
No d i s t i n c t i o n was made i n Bolam between diagnosis and 
treatment on the one hand and warning of the r i s k s 
involved on the other. Although House of Lords' approval 313 
of Bolama i s r e s t r i c t e d to diagnosis and treatment there 
had never been the suggestion that f a i l u r e to warn was 
93 
judged by a separate t e s t . On the other hand Lord 
Scarman i n Elajimard v Best Midlamds Regional Health 
2)4 
Authority may have taken a different view. Bearing i n 
mind that t h i s was not a case of disclosure, Lord Scarman 
referred to the matter of ' c l i n i c a l judgment'. Later he 
discussed c l i n i c a l judgment' i n terms of 'diagnosis and 
treatment.' 
I t may be reading too much into the judgment to come 
to the conclusion that Lord Scarman r e s t r i c t e d ' c l i n i c a l 
judgment' to diagnosis and treatment only. His Lordship 
did not say that disclosure of r i s k s did not feature as 
part of ' c l i n i c a l judgment' as disclosure was not an issue 
before the court. And i t might be that the opinion of 
Dunn L.J. i n Sidaway (supra) i s apposite - i . e . that no 
reference does not mean that disclosure i s excluded. But 
i f Lord Scarman was excluding disclosure from ' c l i n i c a l 
judgment' then he was imposing a severe li m i t a t i o n on the 
Bolam princ i p l e . However Lord Scarman's judgment i n 
Sidaway i n the House of Lords may shed more l i g h t on the 
matter. In his powerful opening judgment i n Sidaway Lord 
Scarman dissented from the view that the Bolam t e s t was 
comprehensive and would embrace a l l aspects of the 
doctor's duty of care. In his Lordship's view 'the 
question whether or not the omission to warn constitutes a 
breach of the doctor's duty of care towards his patient i s 
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to be determined not exclusively by reference to the 
current state of responsible and competent professional 
opinion and practice at the time, although both are, of 
course, relevant considerations, but by the court's view 
as to whether the doctor i n advising his patient gave the 
consideration which the law requires him to give to the 
right of the patient to make up her own mind i n the l i g h t 
of the relevant information whether or not she w i l l accept 
95 
the treatment which he proposes. In Lord Scarman's view 
the standard of 'competent professional opinion' while 
appropriate to diagnosis and treatment i s not necessarily 
the 'criterion i n determining whether a doctor i s under a 
duty to warn his patient of the r i s k , or r i s k s , inherent 
i n the treatment which he recommends.'^ Indeed, his 
Lordship continued, i t would be a strange conclusion i f 
the courts should be led to conclude that our law, which 
undoubtedly recognises a right in the patient to decide 
whether he w i l l accept or r e j e c t the treatment proposed, 
should permit the doctors to determine whether and i n what 
circumstances a duty requiring the doctor to warn his 
patient of the r i s k s inherent i n the treatment proposed 
97 
a r i s e s . Lord Scarman concluded that there i s room i n 
our law for a legal duty to warn a patient of the r i s k s 
inherent i n the treatment proposed... as a aspect of the 
98 
duty of care owed by the doctor to the patient.' Lord 
Scarman was sensitive also to the fact that i n very many 
cases factors other than the purely medical w i l l play a 315 
s i g n i f i c a n t part i n the patient's decision making process. 
In acknowledging t h i s Lord Scarman was opening the way to 
greater self-determination by the patient. 
Thus Lord Scarman preferred to come down i n favour of 
the American view v i z there i s a duty to warn of r i s k s 
inherent i n treatment provided that i t i s a material r i s k . 
Materiality i s to be determined by reference to what a 
reasonable patient i n the patient's position would be 
l i k e l y to attach significance, subject to the doctor's 
assessment that a warning would be detrimental to his 
patient's health. The therapeutic privilege exercised by 
the doctor i s a limitation upon the right of 
self-determination by the patient but i s consistent with 
the doctor's overall duty of care towards a p a r t i c u l a r 
patient. American courts which would place greater 
emphasis upon the right to self-determination also 
recognised the benefits to be enjoyed in the exercise of 
such a privilege. 
The remaining four members of the House of Lords did 
nor share Lord Scarman's views. By a majority the Bolam 
principle was reaffirmed. A t e s t of the type suggested by 
Lord Scarman was regarded as impractical i n 
a p p l i c a t i o n . * ^ However, the House of Lords reserved some 
rights to the courts. There i s always a danger with a 
principle such as that l a i d down i n Bolam that the medical 
profession w i l l have free r e i n even i n matters not so l e l y 
concerned with medical expertise. I t would be intolerable 
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i f the medical profession made the legal rules for the 
medical profession. In Canterbury v Spence there was 
expressed the d e s i r a b i l i t y of 'a standard set by law for a 
physician rather than one which physicians may or may not 
101 
impose upon themselves.' Thus, there may be 
circumstances where the court w i l l rule that the r i s k 
should have been disclosed, e.g. 'that the disclosure of a 
parti c u l a r r i s k was so obviously necessary to an informed 
choice on the part of the patient that no reasonably 
prudent medical man would f a i l to make i t . . . . In such a 
case, i n the absence of some cogent c l i n i c a l reason why a 
patient should not be informed, a doctor, recognising and 
respecting his patient's right of decision, could hardly 
f a i l to appreciate the necessity for an appropriate . , 102 warning'. 
The scene i s set for further actions to be brought 
against doctors on the issue of whether there has been 
proper disclosure of the r i s k . As t h i s consideration of 
law began with reference to Canadian law i t may be 
instructive to take a look at yet another Canadian case to 
see how well the standards marry together. In Haugfoiora v 
Palne^®^ the Canadian rule on informed consent involves an 
objective t e s t i e whether a reasonable person would have 
proceeded i n the circumstances and consented to the 
treatment. The court held that a reasonable person would 
not have consented to the operation had there been f u l l 
disclosure. Accordingly there was a lack of informed 
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consent. Thus, the Canadian courts are not using 
professional standard as indicated in Relbl v Hughes 
As Brahams puts i t 'In B r i t a i n , the p l a i n t i f f would almost 
cer t a i n l y have f a i l e d , since the doctor would not have 
been negligent and the courts would have been unlikely to 
105 
overide professional standards on disclosure.' 
Now that the English courts would seem to agree that 
the t e s t for disclosure of r i s k i s the Bolam pri n c i p l e 
based upon the professional standard the matter should 
appear to be settled. Sidaway was regarded as a novel 
106 
case by Lord Scarman as issues were being raised i n the 
House of Lords which had not been previously considered. 
To Lord Scarman the Bolam principle does not appear to 
answer the issue of the factors influencing medical 
decision making. Not a l l of these factors are medical 
factors. There are many other c r i t i c s of the Bolam 
principle i n respect of disclosure of r i s k and medical 
decision-making. Kennedy suggests a duty to disclose any 
unusual and material r i s k s inherent i n the proposed 
treatment and any feasible alternatives, the issue of 
materiality being determined on the basis of the 'prudent 
107 
patient' t e s t . Teff addresses the therapeutic value of 
disclosure, stressing the medically b e n e f i c i a l e f f e c t s . 
He points out that enhanced communication would help to 
form a 'therapeutic a l l i a n c e which could lead to a general 
108 
improvement i n the patient's condition'. 
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There are also problems associated with the degree of 
disclosure needed i n cases of 'elective' and 'non 
e l e c t i v e ' siargery or i n the case of treatment which i s 
'therapeutic' on 'non therapeutic'. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to 
know precisely what i s meant by such terms. Presumably 
109 
a l l treatment i s e l e c t i v e unless of course the patient 
was treated at a time when consent could not have been 
given e.g. unconscious and that patient would not have 
given consent i f he had been conscious. Examples of 
e l e c t i v e surgery often included s t e r i l i z a t i o n and cosmetic 
surgery. Even assuming the term electi v e to be correct, 
how does one decide upon the issue of whether the 
treatment i s 'therapeutic' or 'non therapeutic'. I f one 
takes the broader view of medical treatment suggested by 
Teff there i s no reason to r e s t r i c t therapeutic to the 
removal of l i f e threatening causes or the r e l i e f of pain. 
Patients attach significance to 'quality as against length 
of l i f e , and to physical integrity or appearance as 
against diminution of pain'.^® There i s therefore no 
reason to suppose that 'the optimum "outcome" i s ... 
necessarily to be equated with the technically successful 
r e s u l t of a given operation, but may embrace a prognosis 
of the patient's subsequent medical and psychological 
condition and a b i l i t y to function, as well as other s o c i a l 
and f i n a n c i a l considerations where r e l e v a n t . ' T h u s , 
the labels elec t i v e or non-elective, therapeutic or 
112 
non-therapeutic are not p a r t i c u l a r l y helpful. 
319 
However, i n the case of experimental medical 
procedures different considerations may a r i s e . Innovative 
procedures used i n the course of normal treatment probably 
involves the usual principles of disclosure discussed 
above provided the patient i s notified of t h i s feature, 
the r i s k s and the alternatives available. 
In the case of experimentation on healthy human 
volunteers i t may be that f u l l disclosure of a l l r i s k s 
however improbable i s the true standard. Dugdale and 
113 
Stanton , commenting on the Canadian Case of Halushka v 
114 
University of Saskatchewan suggest the standard to be 
that there can i n no circumstances be any j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
for withholding r i s k s from the patient i n his own best 
interests as there i s no advantage to be gained by the 
115 
patient i n undergoing the procedure. Dugdale and 
Stanton suggest further that the approach to 
experimentation outlined above would be adopted as 
expressing English Law and that everyday and remote r i s k s 
would not require disclosure i n such circumstances.**** 
However, i t i s unclear what i s meant by 'remote' and i t i s 
submitted that the two suggestions contain an element of 
inconsistency. How i s i t possible to assert there i s no 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n for withholding r i s k s from such a patient 
while maintaining that everyday and remote r i s k s are 
117 
exempted? 
The requirement of freely-given informed consent 
obtained from a patient involved i n experimental c l i n i c a l 
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118 tes t s i s contained i n the Declaration of Helsinki" But 
in q u a l i f i c a t i o n the Declaration states that ' i f the 
doctor considers i t ess e n t i a l not to obtain informed 
consent, the s p e c i f i c reasons for t h i s proposal should be 
119 
stated i n the experimental protocol. . . ' In the United 
States there i s a legal requirement that patients 
undergoing c l i n i c a l t r i a l s give written informed 
120 
consent. In the United Kingdom the si t u a t i o n i s 
different. The B r i t i s h Medical Association recommends 
that consent to alternative therapies i s obtained from 
individual patients but i n practice whether consent i s 
obtained depends upon the decision of a l o c a l e t h i c a l 
121 
committee. Sometimes consent i s required at other 
times not. Pocock thinks that the d i v e r s i t y of view i s 
partly due to different attitudes as to whether patients 
undergoing t r i a l s are informed of t h e i r disease. This 
reluctance to inform patients i s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the 
p a t e r n a l i s t i c approach of doctors towards patients who are 
i l l . I t should not have any place i n the case of the 
122 
healthy volunteer. The case of C v S also produced 
problems re l a t i n g to medical matters ultimately coming 
123 
before the courts for resolution. In C v S reference 
was made to the words of S i r George Baker P. i n Paton v 
124 
B r i t i s h Pregnancy Advisory Service Trustees "... not 
only would i t be a brave and bold judge... who would seek 
to interfere with the discretion of doctors acting under 
the Abortion Act 1967, but I think he would r e a l l y be a 
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foolish judge who would t r y and do any such thing'. Not 
a l l judges appear so cautious. Comyn J . i n Miitmore and 
toother y Emzowa.ys Express Coaches Ltd amd Others 
displays a more robust attitude towards issues 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y l e f t to doctors. In the case of shock i n 
OTiitmore Comyn J . asserted he was i n as good a position as 
any physician or doctor to judge whether the p l a i n t i f f had 
suffered shock. How are the problems to be resolved? 
X 2 6 
Grubb and Pearl draw attention to such cases which 
often involve 'sociological, moral and profound r e l i g i o u s 
127 
aspects which arouse anxieties' which the courts are 
not e n t i r e l y competent to handle, not l e a s t because there 
i s no tradition of amicus b r i e f s . Further, Parliament i s 
reluctant to provide l e g i s l a t i v e guidance i n these 
controversial areas.' They ask has not the time come for 
the creation of a monitoring body independent of the 
medical profession with substantial lay representation to 
review and recommend l e g i s l a t i o n or codes of practice 
a f t e r wide consultation and having been properly informed 
of the issues which at present the courts have not?' The 
prospect i s interesting but begs the question of whether 
such a body w i l l be in a better position to act than the 
judges and l e g i s l a t o r s at present. The proposed lay body 
would have a daunting task ahead i f i t i s to provide for 
consistency of decision which one imagines both the 
profession and the public desire. 
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I t would seem that the problem of disclosure i s s t i l l 
a matter of controversy„ Sidaway has, for the moment, 
settle d the matter i n legal terms and the Balaam p r i n c i p l e 
continues to reign supreme. The Court of Appeal has 
strongly reaffirmed the Balaam principle since the decision 
12 8 
i n Sidaway. In Gold v Harariagay Health Authority the 
Bolasii principle has been applied i n the 21021=therapeutic 
129 130 context. In Blyth v Bloomsbury i.H.A, i t i s 
possible for Bolam to apply even when the patient has 
131 
asked for information. Furthermore, the requirement of 
disclosure has been considered with regard to a differe n t 
time within medical treatment. Hitherto, the question of 
disclosure has been discussed i n the content of what i s 
appropriate before treatment or surgical procedures are 
carried out. I t has also been suggested that Sidaway 
principles imply a 'duty of candour' where something has 
gone wrong after treatment. Such a 'duty of candour' 
requires doctor to be frank about what has occurred and 
has been expressed by S i r John Donaldson MR i n Maylor v 
132 
Preston"Area Health Authority i n which he took the 
opportunity to r e i t e r a t e views e a r l i e r expressed by 
himself and Mustill L.J. i n Lee v South West Thames 
133 
Regional Health Authority. But there are uncertainties 
ahead owing to the s e n s i t i v i t y of the patient/doctor 
relationship and the e t h i c a l and moral considerations 
which have to be taken into the balance as well as those 
of a medical and legal nature. 
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Cone lias i o n 
The i n v e s t i g a t i o n conducted above has examined the 
nature of p r o f e s s i o n a l work, the maintenance of standards 
and the s a n c t i o n s i f standards f a l l below an acceptable 
l e v e l . When standards f a l l too low and someone a l l e g e s 
damage or l o s s as a consequence thereof, complaint may be 
made e i t h e r to the courts or to the p r o f e s s i o n a l body. I t 
i s when the complaint i s made to a court t h a t the i s s u e of 
p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence a r i s e s and such a complaint may be 
pursued i n both c o n t r a c t and t o r t , i f appropriate. 
However, pursuing an a c t i o n i n court i s not without 
considerable d i f f i c u l t y as has been i n d i c a t e d i n e a r l i e r 
chapters. There i s much anguish. P l a i n t i f f s f e e l anguish 
because the l e g a l system produces what seem to be 
laborious procedures and, sometimes, insuperable 
o b s t a c l e s . The p r o f e s s i o n a l f e e l s the anguish of being 
subjected to proceedings which he would regard as 
d e s t r u c t i v e . The perception of d e s t r u c t i o n operates on 
two l e v e l s a t l e a s t . F i r s t , y ears of study and p r a c t i c e 
coupled with a growing re p u t a t i o n are put i n jeopardy as a 
r e s u l t of an accident which has happened during the course 
of some a c t i v i t y which was intended to be f o r the b e n e f i t 
of the p l a i n t i f f . Secondly, there i s the anguish of 
members of the p r o f e s s i o n t h a t they are a t t r a c t i n g the 
unwelcome gaze of the p u b l i c . The a t t e n t i o n i s no good 
for them p e r s o n a l l y and puts the p r o f e s s i o n i n a bad l i g h t 
g e n e r a l l y . Even when the p r o f e s s i o n a l and the p r o f e s s i o n 
are v i n d i c a t e d , the p u b l i c may s t i l l harbour f e a r s t h a t 
a l l i s not w e l l and t h a t the outcome was due to f a c t o r s 
other than the merits of the case. A l l of t h i s i s 
d e s t r u c t i v e , although t h a t i s not to deny t h a t some good 
may come of i t , i n s o f a r as i t suggested t h a t there may be 
a b e t t e r way of d e a l i n g with conduct we l a b e l as 
negligent. 
Should a d i s s a t i s f i e d c l i e n t or p a t i e n t approach the 
p r o f e s s i o n a l body with a complaint of negligent treatment, 
the matter, i t i s often a l l e g e d , i s not always disposed of 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . P r o f e s s i o n a l bodies are charged with 
the duty of maintaining standards and imposing s a n c t i o n s 
should members of the p r o f e s s i o n f a l l s h o r t of the 
standards l a i d down. But cases over the l a s t few y e a r s 
show t h a t the p r o f e s s i o n s have not always discharged t h i s 
duty adequately. Concern has been expressed p u b l i c l y and 
steps are needed to put the s i t u a t i o n on a more 
s a t i s f a c t o r y b a s i s . The stage now seems to have been 
reached t h a t u n l e s s the p r o f e s s i o n s put t h e i r own house i n 
order someone e l s e i . e . Parliament, w i l l have to do i t f o r 
them. 
What are these changes to be? A c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the 
l e g a l system shows many inadequacies when a l l e g a t i o n s of 
p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence are made. 
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A. Problems a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the L e g a l System 
Many of the problems a s s o c i a t e d with d i s p u t e s 
i n v o l v i n g a l l e g a t i o n s of p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence are a l s o 
r e l a t e d to l i a b i l i t y g e n e r a l l y . The usual method f o r 
obtaining r e d r e s s f o r i n j u r y s u f f e r e d as a r e s u l t of 
p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence i s the t o r t system. I n c r e a s i n g l y , 
the t o r t system has become s u b j e c t to c r i t i c i s m . C r i t i c s 
have advocated reform of the t o r t system a t the l e a s t and 
even a b o l i t i o n a t the other extreme. Almost everyone 
seems to agree t h a t some reform i s necessary.''" The most 
r a d i c a l proponents of reform of the law of t o r t have 
2 
suggested i t s a b o l i t i o n with regard to property damage. 
Most a t t e n t i o n has, however, been d i r e c t e d to problems 
3 
a s s o c i a t e d with personal i n j u r y claims and i t i s to t h i s 
form of damage t h a t the following remarks r e l a t e . I t may 
appear a narrow choice i n s o f a r as the types of damage 
considered i n t h i s t h e s i s have been property damage, 
f i n a n c i a l l o s s and personal i n j u r y . Despite t h a t , an 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n of changes deemed necessary with regard to 
personal i n j u r y caused by p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence may 
s t i l l give an i n d i c a t i o n of what improvements might be 
made. Ins t a n c e s of property damage caused by p r o f e s s i o n a l 
negligence w i l l i n many i n s t a n c e s a l s o be remedied 
e f f e c t i v e l y by recourse to the law of c o n t r a c t . 
Buckley i n The Modern Law of Megligence i d e n t i f i e s 
the major o b j e c t i o n s to the t o r t system under three heads. 
F i r s t , t h a t t o r t i s an i n e f f i c i e n t and w a s t e f u l 
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compensation system. Secondly, t h a t i t s operation i n both 
p r a c t i c e and theory i s a r b i t r a r y and c a p r i c i o u s . T h i r d l y , 
the spread of the insurance system which s h i e l d s 
t o r t f e a s o r s from the f i n a n c i a l consequences of t h e i r 
a c t i o n s has robbed the t o r t of negligence of i t s moral 
4 
b a s i s . ' I t i s submitted t h a t the second and t h i r d of 
these o b j e c t i o n s are probably most p e r t i n e n t to 
p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence causing personal i n j u r y although 
the f i r s t has i t s own s i g n i f i c a n c e . Many v i c t i m s of 
accident and d i s e a s e cannot l a y a c l a i m f o r compensation 
at anyone's door under the present f a u l t based system. 
Indeed, only a small proportion of a c c i d e n t v i c t i m s 
5 
a c t u a l l y succeeds i n obtaining compensation. 
Although these problems are general to t o r t , i n many 
ways, and i n p a r t i c u l a r with regard to personal i n j u r y , 
the problems can be examined under the head of medical 
negligence. 
B. Medical Klegligence 
I n Chapters 6 and 7 of t h i s t h e s i s t h ere was an 
examination of problems a s s o c i a t e d with medical 
negligence. Some of those problems are now to be 
rehearsed with a view to a r r i v i n g a t some c o n c l u s i o n . 
There are problems a s s o c i a t e d with c a u s a t i o n i . e . no 
compensation under the t o r t system unless the d i s a b i l i t y 
was caused by others. I n ad d i t i o n , there are problems 
a s s o c i a t e d with proof. Although the burden of proof i n a 
c i v i l a c t i o n i s discharged by e s t a b l i s h i n g f a u l t on the 
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balance of p r o b a b i l i t i e s , the onus i s often d i f f i c u l t f o r 
p l a i n t i f f s . The i s s u e of insurance r a i s e s mixed problems. 
On the one hand, the e x i s t e n c e of insurance has kept the 
t o r t system i n operation by providing the funds without 
which i t would not be worthwhile pursuing most defendants. 
On the other hand, the e x i s t e n c e of insurance may prompt a 
cla i m , may i n c r e a s e the l i k e l i h o o d of the court f i n d i n g 
l i a b i l i t y and, thus, p o t e n t i a l l y introducing d i s t o r t i o n 
and, f i n a l l y may remove the stigma of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
which, on the face of i t , f a u l t suggests. I f f a u l t , i n 
the normal sense, need not be present f o r the purpose of 
l i a b i l i t y , as some cases would suggest**, perhaps some 
comprehensive insurance scheme would achieve much the same 
r e s u l t without the need for e s t a b l i s h i n g f a u l t and a l l the 
problems t h i s e n t a i l s . 
1. Proof of Megligemce 
However, on the assumption t h a t the t o r t of 
negligence i s to be the means of e s t a b l i s h i n g whether 
compensation i s to be paid as a r e s u l t of medical i n j u r y , 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n has to be given to other i s s u e s which a l s o 
cause problems. Perhaps the most p r e s s i n g i s t h a t of 
proof. 
Medicine i s not an exact s c i e n c e . There are many 
schools of thought, a l l of which might be reasonably 
maintained. Judges may not show preference f o r one school 
7 
as opposed to another. I t i s not p o s s i b l e to e s t a b l i s h 
e i t h e r cause of i n j u r y or breach of duty by simply 
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producing a medical expert prepared to t e s t i f y i n support 
of the p l a i n t i f f ' s case. The defendant may s i m i l a r l y 
produce an expert. There may even be b a t t e r i e s of 
ex p e r t s . I n a d d i t i o n to t h a t i t i s sometimes d i f f i c u l t to 
get a doctor, or any p r o f e s s i o n a l , to t e s t i f y a g a i n s t a 
8 
colleague" I n any event, the burden of proof i s on the 
9 
p l a i n t i f f . As a means of countering t h i s problem 
suggestions have been made th a t the burden of proof 
should be r e v e r s e d . ^ These suggestions have not been 
implemented and the Pearson Commission made no 
recommendation as to the burden of proof i n medical i n j u r y 
cases,''' 1 However, the Commission d i d r e f e r to statutory-
attempts a t r e v e r s a l of proof, r e f e r r i n g to the Road 
T r a f f i c (Compensation f o r Accidents) B i l l introduced (but 
never passed) i n 1932. Buckley r e f e r s to Ontario's 
Highway T r a f f i c Act 1980, s l 6 7 , which does r e v e r s e the 
burden of proof and which, submits Buckley, deserves 
12 
f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . As matters stand the n e a r e s t 
approach to the implementation of a r e v e r s a l of the burden 
13 
of proof operates through the maxim r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r . 
14 
2. Defensive Medicine 
The Commission expressed i t s f e a r t h a t there would be 
an i n c r e a s e i n claims and a r e s u l t a n t i n c r e a s e i n 
defensive medicine. I t i s submitted t h a t the constant 
r e f e r e n c e to defensive medicine, bordering on obsession, 
when any attempt i s made to r e d r e s s the balance i n favour 
of a p l a i n t i f f who has s u f f e r e d medical i n j u r y , w i l l i n 
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time probably a s s i s t i n robbing the medical p r o f e s s i o n of 
i t s moral a u t h o r i t y . Facing up to r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i s 
a l s o the hallmark of a p r o f e s s i o n a l body and a p e r c e i v e d 
r e l u c t a n c e to do so does not help i t s cause. 
Defensive medicine i s a catch-phrase used both by 
doctors concerned with the incidence of medical negligence 
a c t i o n s and the courts who are anxious to preserve a 
p r o f e s s i o n a l standard f o r t e s t i n g medical p r a c t i c e . There 
i s an i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t doctors p r a c t i s e p a t i e n t c a r e more 
i n the, i n t e r e s t s of avoidance of a l l e g a t i o n s of 
p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence than of the best i n t e r e s t s of the 
4.15 patxent. 
There a r e , of course, p o s i t i v e aspects of what i s 
u s u a l l y expressed i n negative form. S o - c a l l e d d e f e n s i v e 
medicine might r e s u l t i n extremely good p a t i e n t c a r e , 
whatever the motive f o r g i v i n g i t . There may be more 
thorough examination and treatment. On the other hand, i t 
may be a l l e g e d t h a t defensive medicine c o n s t i t u t e s 
expensive and unnecessary treatment. Recent developments 
i n the UK may a f f e c t a t t i t u d e s towards, and even the 
u t i l i s a t i o n of, defensive medicine. F i r s t , the Green 
Paper on Contingency Fees**' might be the forerunner of a 
system which c r i t i c s f e a r might e s c a l a t e medical 
negligence c l a i m s . Secondly, the i n c r e a s e i n p r i v a t e 
medicine may change the doctor/patient r e l a t i o n s h i p from 
t h a t c u r r e n t l y encountered i n the NHS. T h i r d l y , the White 
17 
Paper on the Health S e r v i c e may lead to the i n t r o d u c t i o n 
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of budgetary c o n t r o l s . On the one hand such c o n t r o l s may 
preclude the expensive procedures which are a t r a i t of 
defensive medicine. On the other hand, p a t i e n t s who are 
of f e r e d more cost-conscious treatment and procedures and 
then s u f f e r medical i n j u r y may f e e l they have been 
subjected to an inadequate standard of c a r e and 
consequently be more prepared to l i t i g a t e . I t i s too 
e a r l y to say. 
However, the i s s u e of h e a l t h s e r v i c e funding i s 
p o l i t i c a l l y c o n t r o v e r s i a l . Arguments range over whether 
the funding of s t a t e provided h e a l t h c a r e has been 
i n c r e a s e d or has been c u t . I n any event, i t appears t h a t 
c l o s e r budgetary c o n t r o l i s envisaged. Bearing i n mind 
the d i f f e r e n c e i n the UK and the USA h e a l t h p r o v i s i o n and 
the d i f f e r e n t philosophy behind p r o v i s i o n i n each country, 
rec e n t e x e r c i s e s i n c o s t c o n t r o l i n USA may give some 
i n d i c a t i o n of a future p o s s i b l e trend. M a l p r a c t i c e 
l i a b i l i t y l e d to the growth of defensive medicine and the 
p h y s i c i a n s were reimbursed under Medicare. As the c o n t r o l 
began to take e f f e c t some of the procedures adopted as 
pa r t of defensive medicine were cut back and the 
expectation was t h a t there was l i k e l y to be 'an i n c r e a s e d 
r a t e of erroneous diagnosis and a consequent i n c r e a s e i n 
18 
preventable i n j u r y and m o r t a l i t y . ' The r e s u l t may be 
19 
g r e a t e r m a l p r a c t i c e or medical negligence exposure. 
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The f i n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n of problems a s s o c i a t e d with 
medical negligence i s t h a t of insurance. Claims a g a i n s t 
medical p r a c t i t i o n e r s are i n c r e a s i n g and as a r e s u l t 
insurance premiums are i n c r e a s i n g a l s o . The medical 
p r o f e s s i o n has expressed concern. I f we are to r e t a i n a 
t o r t system of compensation then p r o f e s s i o n a l indemnity 
insurance i s going to be a f a c t of l i f e . But the p i c t u r e 
i s perhaps not so black as i t i s painted. Medical and 
dental p r a c t i t i o n e r s i n the United Kingdom i n s u r e a g a i n s t 
negligence claims with one of three defence s o c i e t i e s . 
The Pearson Commission reported t h a t j u s t over a t h i r d of 
the claims made l e d to payments of compensation? a much 
20 
lower proportion than f o r other personal i n j u r y c l a i m s . 
I f t h i s be so today, and I have no data to suggest 
otherwise, the incidence of l i a b i l i t y i s not so g r e a t . 
The insurance premiums for doctors have i n c r e a s e d over the 
21 
l a s t few y e a r s , but not more so than f o r other 
p r o f e s s i o n a l groups. I n any event, i t i s a tax d e d u c t i b l e 
expense and one to which Health A u t h o r i t i e s c o n t r i b u t e . 
However, doctors put £90 m i l l i o n a year i n t o indemnity 
insurance of which l e s s than h a l f reaches damaged 
22 
p a t i e n t s . I t i s submitted t h a t i t i s t h i s l a t t e r p o int 
which r a i s e s a major i s s u e f o r concern. 
That so l i t t l e of the insurance reaches the p l a i n t i f f 
i s a s e r i o u s i n d i c a t i o n of the i n e f f i c i e n c y of the system 
which i s r e f e r r e d to above. And t h a t brings us back to 
the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of an a l t e r n a t i v e system of compensation 343 
d i s c u s s e d above. Also r e l a t e d to claims i s the p o s i t i o n 
of the Health A u t h o r i t i e s . These bodies which are 
s e l f - i n s u r i n g are not able to compensate other than out of 
t h e i r budgets. As a r e s u l t funds which could be used to 
t r e a t the s i c k are d i v e r t e d i n t o s a t i s f y i n g awards of 
compensation. Even allowing f o r the s h a r i n g agreement 
with the Defence S o c i e t i e s the sums involve d are 
s i g n i f i c a n t . A separate fund i n re s p e c t of medical i n j u r y 
would reduce the burden upon the Health A u t h o r i t i e s and 
help to prevent a s i t u a t i o n where the reduction of funds 
i t s e l f might i n c r e a s e the p o t e n t i a l f o r medical i n j u r y . 
3. Reform off tlie La^r off T o r t 
I t has been suggested t h a t the law of t o r t should be 
reformed. The Royal Commission on C i v i l L i a b i l i t y and 
Compensation f o r Personal I n j u r y was s e t up i n 1973 under 
23 
the chairmanship of Lord Pearson. Apart from 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of compensation f o r ac c i d e n t s from a 
p a r t i c u l a r cause e.g. road t r a f f i c , the Pearson Commission 
recommended reform of the law of t o r t . A step proposed 
would, i f implemented, c o n s t i t u t e a d i s i n c e n t i v e to 
commencing l i t i g a t i o n f o r negligence. The recommendation 
was t h a t b e n e f i t s r e c e i v e d by p l a i n t i f f s from s o c i a l 
s e c u r i t y should be f u l l y o f f s e t a g a i n s t any damages i n 
24 
t o r t subsequently recovered. I n an attempt to r e d r e s s 
the imbalance i n the present system, the Pearson 
Commission a l s o recommended changes preventing the l e s s 
s e r i o u s l y i n j u r e d from being compensated and ensuring t h a t 344 
the more s e r i o u s l y i n j u r e d are b e t t e r compensated. The 
problems of lump sum awards f o r personal i n j u r i e s a l s o 
r e c e i v e d a t t e n t i o n . The Commission recommended t h a t the 
court should be obliged to award damages f o r f u t u r e 
pecuniary l o s s caused by death or s e r i o u s and l a s t i n g 
i n j u r y i n the form of p e r i o d i c payments. Lump sum awards 
would only be made i f the court was s a t i s f i e d t h a t such an 
award was more a p p r o p r i a t e . ^ 
However, the Report of the Pearson Commission has 
come i n f o r severe c r i t i c i s m . Those who opposed the 
continuance of the present t o r t system of compensation 
b e l i e v e t h a t the Commission could have made fi r m e r 
recommendations f o r the a b o l i t i o n of t o r t i n the area of 
personal i n j u r i e s . Those c r i t i c s would have favoured the 
development of a scheme along the l i n e s of t h a t operating 
27 
i n New Zealand s i n c e 1974. I f one takes the case of 
p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence r e s u l t i n g i n medical i n j u r y the 
e f f e c t of the Pearson Commission's approach would have 
been thuss apart from i n j u r y i n c u r r e d as a r e s u l t of 
voluntary c l i n i c a l t r i a l s where l i a b i l i t y should be 
28 
s t r i c t , the b a s i s of l i a b i l i t y i n t o r t should continue 
29 
to be negligence. The Commission went on to recommend 
t h a t a n o - f a u l t scheme f o r medical i n j u r y should not be 
introduced but t h a t the New Zealand and Swedish schemes 
should be studied and as s e s s e d i f a d e c i s i o n was taken to 
30 
introduce a no=fault scheme i n the United Kingdom. 
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I f the Commission had recommended the establishment 
of a scheme along the l i n e s of New Zealand, and i f t h a t 
recommendation had been implemented what would have been 
the r e s u l t ? There would have been a r a d i c a l reform 
introducing a comprehensive s t a t e compensation system f o r 
those who s u f f e r personal i n j u r y as a r e s u l t of an 
a c c i d e n t . Such an a c c i d e n t may be caused as a r e s u l t of 
p r o f e s s i o n a l conduct, and i n p a r t i c u l a r , medical i n j u r y . 
The r e l e v a n t New Zealand l e g i s l a t i o n i s the Accident 
Compensation Act 1972, as amended. I t i s to be observed 
t h a t the scheme deals only with personal i n j u r y caused by 
accident and not with d i s a b i l i t y caused i n some other 
ways. This c a u s a l d i s t i n c t i o n w i l l no doubt di s a p p o i n t 
31 
many who wish to see reform i n the United Kingdom. 
But a t the moment t h i s i s not to be. I n the United 
Kingdom the v i c t i m of i n j u r y as a r e s u l t of medical 
treatment w i l l have to pursue a c l a i m f o r compensation 
through the machinery designed to e s t a b l i s h negligence. 
P r o f e s s i o n a l negligence i s s t i l l a r e l e v a n t i s s u e w ith a l l 
i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s . However, the d e s i r e f o r a f u t u r e 
n o - f a u l t system has not abated. The B r i t i s h Medical 
A s s o c i a t i o n i s s t r o n g l y i n favour of the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a 
n o - f a u l t system and has reported to t h a t e f f e c t . As 
32 
r e c e n t l y as 1989 i t has confirmed i n t e r e s t i n reform to 
remove a source of the problems c u r r e n t l y b e s e t t i n g 
personal i n j u r y . 
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The B r i t i s h Medical A s s o c i a t i o n has emphasised t h a t 
any compensation system w i l l impose a f i n a n c i a l burden on 
33 
doctors. However, the primary concern i s to i d e n t i f y an 
arrangement which i s f a i r e r to p a t i e n t s than the one 
c u r r e n t l y operating. Weed, and not proof of negligence, 
should be the b a s i s of a system of compensation. The 
proposed scheme would not r e p l a c e the t o r t system i n i t s 
e n t i r e t y i n r e s p e c t of medical i n j u r y . Nor i s the scheme, 
34 
s t r i c t l y speaking 'no-fault'. A l l t h a t i s d e s i r e d i s to 
r e l i e v e the p a t i e n t of the n e c e s s i t y to prove c u l p a b i l i t y 
i n order to obtain compensation. However the e l i g i b i l i t y 
of an i n d i v i d u a l f o r compensation should not depend upon 
an undertaking not to take proceedings i n c o u r t . Nor 
would such an i n d i v i d u a l be judged i n e l i g i b l e i f the 
proceedings were u n s u c c e s s f u l and he subsequently a p p l i e d 
35 
fo r compensation under the scheme. Although 
compensation under the suggested scheme would be f o r 
p h y s i c a l i n j u r y there are areas not envisaged as l y i n g 
w i t h i n the scope of the scheme. Compensation would be 
confined to p h y s i c a l i n j u r y ? problems r e s u l t i n g from 
progress of the underlying d i s e a s e would not be 
compensated. Neither would there be compensation f o r 
i n j u r y caused by e r r o r of diagnosis judged reasonable by a 
panel of experts or for complications a r i s i n g from 
3 6 
competently performed procedures. I n j u r y caused by the 
use of drugs used i n accordance with the manufacturer's 
recommendations would not be compensated e i t h e r . There 347 
i s , of course, with a 'no f a u l t ' scheme, a danger t h a t 
compensation f o r t r i v i a l i n j u r y would be sought* As a 
consequence the Report recommends t h a t a minimum period of 
d i s a b i l i t y would be necessary before claims could be made. 
A minimum d i s a b i l i t y of 30 days or 10 days excess time 
spent i n h o s p i t a l seemed reasonable to the working p a r t y . 
Such a scheme would be expensive. A scheme s i m i l a r 
to the Swedish scheme would, according to the B r i t i s h 
Medical A s s o c i a t i o n , c o s t annually £50M f o r England, 
37 
probably £75M f o r the UK as a whole. Much of the c o s t 
would f a l l upon doctors who already c o n t r i b u t e £90M a year 
i n indemnity cover. To what extent the Health A u t h o r i t i e s 
could share the burden i s not c l e a r . C u r r e n t l y , the 
Health A u t h o r i t i e s do not i n s u r e a g a i n s t medical i n j u r y 
r i s k s . Awards made as a r e s u l t of s u c c e s s f u l l i t i g a t i o n 
a g a i n s t them s t r a i n o v e r - s t r a i n e d budgets. Government 
a s s i s t a n c e would be needed i f only to permit Health 
38 
A u t h o r i t i e s to j o i n such a scheme. Nothing w i l l be 
served by damaging the National Health S e r v i c e as a r e s u l t 
of such a scheme. As the scheme would not r e p l a c e the 
t o r t system but operate a t i t s s i d e , f a i l u r e to implement 
such a scheme may mean t h a t the t o r t system w i l l have to 
be reformed. I f the law's delays were reduced, i f proof 
became l e s s of an o b s t a c l e and i f the c o s t of a c t i o n 
became l e s s of a d e t e r r e n t to those seeking compensation, 
39 
t h a t would i t s e l f be a major improvement. 
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The B r i t i s h Medical A s s o c i a t i o n has continued to back 
t h i s scheme by r e f e r e n c e to p o t e n t i a l l i a b i l i t y c u r r e n t l y 
d e t e r r i n g would=be s p e c i a l i s t s . The frequency of c l a i m s 
a g a i n s t o b s t e t r i c i a n s has doubled i n the l a s t t h r e e 
y e a r s . There i s a danger t h a t B r i t a i n w i l l see a d e c l i n e 
i n medical p r a c t i t i o n e r s e n t e r i n g what i s perceived to be 
a h i g h - r i s k s p e c i a l i t y . 4 ^ The B r i t i s h Medical A s s o c i a t i o n 
has s t a t e d t h a t the Government and the medical p r o f e s s i o n 
must grapple with the problem and propose a new 
compensation system not r e q u i r i n g proof of negligence. 
4» Ttie Medical P r o f e s s i o n 
An agency f o r reducing the p o t e n t i a l f o r i n f l i c t i n g 
i n j u r y might be the p r o f e s s i o n a l body i t s e l f i n the way i n 
which standards are maintained. Standards maintained to 
the s a t i s f a c t i o n of the medical p r o f e s s i o n performing 
i t s f unctions adequately should r e s u l t i n a b e t t e r s e r v i c e 
g e n e r a l l y . Given the nature of a c c i d e n t s , however, the 
g r e a t e s t s u p e r v i s i o n i n the world cannot prevent i n j u r y a t 
some stage to someone. How may the improvement be 
e f f e c t e d ? Continuing the theme of medical negligence the 
General Medical Council now has 'gross negligence' added 
to i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n over 'serious p r o f e s s i o n a l 
misconduct'. Although the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the GMC i s not 
designed to compensate v i c t i m s , a s e r i o u s attempt to 
ensure higher standards among p r a c t i t i o n e r s might r e s u l t 
i n a l e s s e r incidence of s u c c e s s f u l claims f o r negligence 
i n the c o u r t s . Only time w i l l t e l l i f t h i s r e d u c t i o n can 
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be achievedo The power with regard to 'gross negligence' 
i s of f a i r l y r ecent i n t r o d u c t i o n . Hitherto the GMC 
appears to have been more concerned with the maintenance 
of moral pr o p r i e t y , which, although d e s i r a b l e , was not 
d i r e c t e d towards a maintenance of high standards i n the 
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p r a c t i c e of medicine. 
C. Lawyers" negligence 
Other problems a s s o c i a t e d with p r o f e s s i o n a l 
negligence may a l s o be examined by r e f e r e n c e to the 
p r o v i s i o n of l e g a l s e r v i c e s . 
A lawyer who has had an a l l e g a t i o n of negligence made 
i n r e s p e c t of h i s work w i l l face the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
c o n t r o l by a) the courts i n l i t i g a t i o n , b) the c o u r t by 
v i r t u e of i t s s u p e r v i s o r y j u r i s d i c t i o n over a s o l i c i t o r as 
an o f f i c e r of the court or c) the r e l e v a n t branch of the 
l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n . 
1. The Courts" Control over the L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n 
As f a r as c o n t r o l l i n g the l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n i s 
concerned the courts are able to p l a y a much more 
s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e . By v i r t u e of t h e i r membership of the 
l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n most judges are able to understand and 
a p p r e c i a t e p r o f e s s i o n a l conduct i n a way t h a t most judges 
cannot with regard to the medical p r o f e s s i o n . As members 
of the Bar the judges e x e r c i s e c o n t r o l through the 
r e g u l a t o r y machinery a s s o c i a t e d with t h a t branch of the 
l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n . S o l i c i t o r s may be c o n t r o l l e d by the 
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c o u r t s owing to a s o l i c i t o r ' s s t a t u s as a court o f f i c e r . 
Under the S o l i c i t o r s Act 1974 the court has an absolute 
r i g h t to ensure high standards of conduct are maintained. 
As the s o l i c i t o r i s an o f f i c e r of the court he may be made 
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l i a b l e f o r l o s s e s caused to a c l i e n t . 
I n matters of l i t i g a t i o n f o r negligence the c o u r t s 
have shown themselves prepared to f i n d a s o l i c i t o r l i a b l e 
i n circumstances where a member of the medical p r o f e s s i o n 
or the Bar might have been more fortunate, as i n G r i f f i t h s 
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v Evans. However, when i t comes to d i s c i p l i n e of 
members of the Bar through the process of l i t i g a t i o n the 
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law appears l e s s than even handed. Members of the Bar 
e x e r c i s e a wide range of fun c t i o n s , although p r i n c i p a l l y 
advocacy. P r o f e s s i o n a l negligence claims based upon the 
conduct ,of l i t i g a t i o n i n v a r i a b l y f a i l owing to advocates' 
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immunity. S o l i c i t o r s a c t as advocates l e s s 
f r e q u e n t l y , ^ ' b a r r i s t e r s being regarded as s p e c i a l i s t s i n 
t h a t area. Owing to the e x c l u s i v e r i g h t of audience i n 
the s u p e r i o r courts t h a t b a r r i s t e r s should be regarded as 
s p e c i a l i s t s i s hardly s u r p r i s i n g . 
2. Advocates' Immunity 
I t i s i n r e s p e c t of advocates' immunity from 
negligence i n conducting l i t i g a t i o n t h a t members of the 
Bar i n p a r t i c u l a r , appear to enjoy s p e c i a l p r i v i l e g e . The 
r u l e c o n f e r r i n g immunity i s a common law r u l e c r e a t e d by 
the judges. The continuance of immunity has been 
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recommended by the Benson Committee, the Marre Committee 
48 
and most r e c e n t l y the Green Paper. 
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I n the Green Paper the Government has accepted the 
cogency of the arguments for p r e s e r v i n g advocates' 
immunity. The Green Paper s t a t e s t h a t i n future a l l 
recognised advocates should enjoy the immunity from 
a c t i o n s i n negligence. The immunity i s based upon p u b l i c 
p o l i c y . The lawyers' notion of p u b l i c p o l i c y i n the case 
of immunity i s not shared g e n e r a l l y by others. The notion 
appears to be t a i n t e d with the i n f l u e n c e of ' s e l f 
aggrandisement 1. Other p r o f e s s i o n s do not enjoy immunity 
nor does there seem any need to seek i t . Common law does 
not impose any l i a b i l i t y f o r e r r o r of judgement u n l e s s 
t h a t e r r o r i s one t h a t no reasonably competent member of 
the p r o f e s s i o n would have made. Su r e l y t h i s i s s u f f i c i e n t 
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p r o t e c t i o n f o r lawyers. 
3. Control of Members of the Le g a l P r o f e s s i o n by the 
Leg a l P r o f e s s i o n 
As mentioned above the l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n has power of 
d i s c i p l i n e over i t s members. I n the case of the Law 
S o c i e t y t h i s power i s conferred by s t a t u t e . There i s 
considerable d i s q u i e t about the way i n which standards are 
maintained by the Law S o c i e t y and how powers of d i s c i p l i n e 
are e x e r c i s e d . 
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a. C r i t i c i s m of the Present Arrangements f o r D i s c i p l i n e 
I t i s hardly s u r p r i s i n g t h a t most of the c r i t i c i s m of 
the complaints procedures has been d i r e c t e d a t the Law 
Society., The S o l i c i t o r s ' Complaints Bureau r e c e i v e d 
17,800 complaints i n 1987, the Bar p o s s i b l y 1% of t h a t . 
I t i s hardly s u r p r i s i n g as there are many more p r a c t i s i n g 
s o l i c i t o r s than p r a c t i s i n g b a r r i s t e r s and the s o l i c i t o r ' s 
work brings him i n t o more d i r e c t contact with the 
c l i e n t . 5 1 
The S o l i c i t o r s ' Complaints Bureau was s e t up i n 1986 
to handle the complaints p r e v i o u s l y handled by the Law 
S o c i e t y ' s P r o f e s s i o n a l Purposes Department. The e a r l i e r 
procedure had been c r i t i c i s e d on grounds t h a t i t 
apparently lacked i m p a r t i a l i t y . P a r t of the problem i s 
t h a t both the Bar and the Law S o c i e t y combine s u p e r v i s o r y 
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and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e r o l e s . However, i t was i n an attempt 
to counter c r i t i c i s m of the handling cases the Law S o c i e t y 
s e t up the S o l i c i t o r s ' Complaints Bureau with a l a y 
dominated I n v e s t i g a t i o n Committee. They do not appear to 
have been s u c c e s s f u l . 
The Green Paper h i g h l i g h t s s e v e r a l problems w i t h the 
Law S o c i e t y ' s present arrangements and echoes other 
c r i t i c i s m s made over the r e c e n t p a s t . F i r s t , the Law 
S o c i e t y ' s i n v e s t i g a t i o n of complaints was confined to 
matters of conduct u n t i l 1987. Under the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
of J u s t i c e Act 1985 i t may now i n v e s t i g a t e complaints 
about inadequate p r o f e s s i o n a l s e r v i c e . The Chairman of 
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the A d j u d i c a t i o n Committee i n the f i r s t r eport of the 
S o l i c i t o r s ' Complaints Bureau expressed the d i f f i c u l t y 
encountered i n i d e n t i f y i n g what t h i s poor work might be. 
From the Government's point of view, t h i s d i f f i c u l t y i s 
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l a r g e l y due to the absence of w r i t t e n codes of conduct. 
Secondly, the S o l i c i t o r s ' Complaints Bureau i s u n w i l l i n g 
to take a c t i o n where the complainant r a i s e s the question 
of negligence as opposed to p r o f e s s i o n a l misconduct. The 
S o l i c i t o r s ' Complaints Bureau e x p l a i n s i t cannot a c t i n 
matters of negligence because t h a t i s a matter of law f o r 
the c o u r t s . I n s t e a d the S o l i c i t o r s ' Complaints Bureau 
sends the complaint to a s o l i c i t o r on one of i t s 
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negligence panels. The S o l i c i t o r s ' Complaints Bureau 
admits t h a t i t i s g u i l t y of delay i n handling 
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complaints. I n order to improve the handling of 
complaints the Government expects the Law S o c i e t y to 
i n s t i t u t e an a r b i t r a t i o n procedure to obviate u s i n g the 
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f u l l Bureau procedure. 
The I n v e s t i g a t i o n Committee had hoped t h a t l a y 
elements and independence would reduce the workload of the 
Lay Observer. However, the Bureau has not developed 
machinery f o r d e a l i n g with complaints t h a t i n s p i r e p u b l i c 
confidence. The Lay Observer's powers are l i m i t e d being 
confined to how a complaint i s handled, and not extending 
to the substance of the complaint i t s e l f . The Lay 
Observer's powers are regarded as inadequate. I n 
ad d i t i o n , there i s an anomaly t h a t there i s no e q u i v a l e n t 354 
o f f i c e r with regard to the complaints procedure of the 
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Bar. 
Because the system above i s inadequate the Government 
intends to a b o l i s h the o f f i c e of Lay Observer and the Lord 
Chanc e l l o r w i l l appoint a Legal S e r v i c e s Ombudsman with 
g r e a t e r powers to examine the handling of complaints by 
the Bar, the Law So c i e t y and any other l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n a l 
c a 
groups. 
b. h Catalogue of C r i t i c i s m 
Even before p u b l i c a t i o n of the Green Paper i n 1989 
some of the attempts made by the Law S o c i e t y to improve 
i t s handling of complaints had been l a b e l l e d as inadequate 
to say the l e a s t . The Law S o c i e t y i t s e l f has acknowledged 
t h a t the Negligence Panel was s e t up as a p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s 
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e x e r c i s e to defuse c r i t i c i s m of the p r o f e s s i o n . I n 1985 
a whole s e r i e s of complaints about the Law S o c i e t y ' s 
handling of complaints r e c e i v e d p u b l i c i t y . A p r i v a t e 
member's b i l l to c r e a t e a General Legal C o u n c i l t a k i n g 
over the Law So c i e t y ' s r o l e f o r i n v e s t i g a t i n g complaints 
was introduced i n Parliament. The main c r i t i c i s m r e l a t e d 
to the c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t inherent i n the Law S o c i e t y ' s 
r o l e as a body p r o t e c t i n g members' i n t e r e s t s and 
i n v e s t i g a t i n g complaints a g a i n s t members. The new body 
was to be independent of the Law Soci e t y . I t i s f a i r to 
say t h a t the complaints about the Law So c i e t y arose a f t e r 
the Parsons a f f a i r . The Law Soc i e t y , i n an attempt to 
improve i t s image h i r e d management c o n s u l t a n t s . ^ ^ The 
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c o n s u l t a n t s reported a need for ' s u b s t a n t i a l improvement 
i n the machinery for d e a l i n g with complaints. 1 At t h a t 
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time i t was seen t h a t a r a d i c a l approach was needed. 
L a t e r i n 1985 the National Consumer Council c a l l e d f o r a 
complete overhaul of the machinery f o r d e a l i n g with 
complaints a g a i n s t s o l i c i t o r s . The Council supported the 
c r e a t i o n of an independent body to process a l l complaints 
and c r i t i c i s e d the fragmented system c u r r e n t l y i n 
f o r c e . 6 2 
According to the Legal Action Group the opportunity 
to t i g h t e n up c o n t r o l s over s o l i c i t o r s was missed when the 
S o l i c i t o r s Act 1974 was amended by the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of 
J u s t i c e Act 1985. I t i s however acknowledged t h a t the Law 
6 3 
S o c i e t y did acquire g r e a t e r power over s o l i c i t o r s . 
From t h i s stage on, i t was always going to be a 
d i f f i c u l t t a s k f o r the newly e s t a b l i s h e d S o l i c i t o r s ' 
Complaints Bureau to r e s t o r e p u b l i c confidence i n the Law 
S o c i e t y ' s handling of c o m p l a i n t s . T h e r e would seem to 
be no a l t e r n a t i v e to changing the present s i t u a t i o n faced 
by the Law S o c i e t y . The r o l e s of p r o t e c t i o n of members 
i n t e r e s t s and d i s c i p l i n e of members must become separated 
and d e a l t with by t r u l y independent bodies. I r r e s p e c t i v e 
of what steps the Law S o c i e t y might take with regard to 
d i s c i p l i n e , p u b l i c confidence i n the d i s c i p l i n a r y r o l e 
appears to have been l o s t . An independent complaints body 
i s needed. Perhaps the Green Paper has come not a moment 
too soon. 
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4. H m l t i = d i s c i p l i n a r y P r a c t i c e s 
A f u r t h e r problem w i l l have to be faced when 
co n s i d e r i n g the s e t t i n g up of m u l t i = d i s c i p l i n a r y 
p r a c t i c e s . E s s e n t i a l l y such p r a c t i c e s would be 
par t n e r s h i p s between s o l i c i t o r s and members of other 
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p r o f e s s i o n s . At present the S o l i c i t o r s ' P r a c t i c e Rules 
prevent such p a r t n e r s h i p s and the suggestion has been made 
t h a t the r u l e s should be changed. The Benson Committee**^ 
considered the p o s s i b i l i t y of pa r t n e r s h i p s with doctors, 
e s t a t e agents and accountants but concluded '...we do not 
thi n k t h a t i t would be i n the i n t e r e s t s of c l i e n t s or i n 
the general p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i f a t present p a r t n e r s h i p s 
were permitted between s o l i c i t o r s and members of other * • .67 p r o f e s s i o n s . ' 
C O 
The Green Paper proposes t h a t s o l i c i t o r s should be 
allowed to engage i n m u l t i - d i s c i p l i n a r y p r a c t i c e s and the 
law would have to be amended accordingly. The Law S o c i e t y 
would be expected to change i t s P r a c t i c e R u les. Should 
these changes occur then there would have to be safeguards 
fo r p r o t e c t i n g c l i e n t s . The proposal i n c l u d e s continued 
personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the p r a c t i t i o n e r and being 
s u b j e c t to the r u l e s of h i s or her p r o f e s s i o n a l body. 
B a r r i s t e r s may be allowed to enter i n t o p a r t n e r s h i p s and 
even m u l t i = d i s c i p l i n a r y p r a c t i c e s . I t may be t h a t other 
forms of o r g a n i s a t i o n may be allowed f o r members of each 
p r o f e s s i o n . 
357 
Whatever happens i n the future there w i l l be a 
r a d i c a l change. A l l those concerned w i l l have to continue 
to be v i g i l a n t to prevent abuses and maintain standards. 
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5. Contxmigency Fees 
Hitherto contingency fee arrangements have not been 
permitted i n England and Wales. I n Scotland s o l i c i t o r s 
have been allowed to conduct l i t i g a t i o n on a ' s p e c u l a t i v e ' 
b a s i s . The Benson Commission recommended no change i n the 
law should be made as i t was not i n the p u b l i c ' s i n t e r e s t 
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to do so. Pressure has a r i s e n to re-examine the 
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p o s s i b i l i t y of allowing contingency fee arrangements. 
One of the main arguments f o r such an arrangement has been 
based on the inadequacy of the l e g a l a i d system. Many 
people whose means take them out of the l e g a l a i d scheme 
cannot a f f o r d to bri n g a l e g a l a c t i o n . The f e a r of l o s i n g 
and the consequent burden of c o s t s i s a great d e t e r r e n t . 
A contingency fee system would improve access to the 
courts f o r such people. I t must be borne i n mind t h a t 
such an arrangement may save a party ' s own c o s t s only not 
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n e c e s s a r i l y those of an opponent. 
There seems to be a good p o s s i b i l i t y t h e r e f o r e t h a t 
i n c r e a s e d a ccess to the courts would r e s u l t but a l s o t h e r e 
might be an e s c a l a t i o n of l i t i g a t i o n . The Green Paper 
c a s t s doubts upon t h a t p a r t i c u l a r l y i n marginal c a s e s 
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where there was l i t t l e prospect of s u c c e s s . I n any 
event, what i s envisaged i s not u n r e s t r i c t e d contingency 358 
fees but something a k i n t o speculative a c t i o n s , as i n 
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Scotland, based on a fee s t r u c t u r e . 
Only p a r t of the costs problem i s addressed by 
reference t o a contingency fee system. Other costs are 
large and as long as the p l a i n t i f f i s beset w i t h problems 
of causation, and of evidence i n medical negligence 
a c t i o n s , f a i l u r e could s t i l l be f i n a n c i a l l y d i s a s t r o u s . 
D. The Objects o f Professional negligence 
The continued existence of the professions would seem 
to be i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . The services provided by 
professions are needed and, i n the main, are c a r r i e d out 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . The argument has centred around 
r e g u l a t i o n and maintenance of standards. There i s a 
d e l i c a t e balance t o be maintained between too much and too 
l i t t l e r e g u l a t i o n . Too much and the professions lose the 
necessary freedom t o operate. And members of professions 
need some freedom i f they are t o exercise judgment. Too 
l i t t l e r e g u l a t i o n and standards may s l i p endangering the 
p u b l i c . There are issues of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t a t both 
extremes of c o n t r o l . 
Whether the professions are seen t o be a c t i n g i n the 
pu b l i c i n t e r e s t i s a matter f o r doubt. The p u b l i c 
perception of p r o f e s s i o n a l a c t i v i t y may be t h a t 
professions are no more than monopolies a c t i n g i n the best 
i n t e r e s t s of t h e i r members. The p u b l i c confidence must be 
res t o r e d . 
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1. Medical Care 
The p u b l i c must f e e l t h a t doctors are a c t i n g i n the 
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best i n t e r e s t s of the p a t i e n t . There are increased 
expectations as t o what medical science can achieve and 
p a t i e n t s are now b e t t e r educated. The remoteness t h a t 
many doctors appear t o have from t h e i r p a t i e n t s may have a 
d e t r i m e n t a l e f f e c t . More and more p a t i e n t s probably wish 
t o know more about t h e i r c o n d i t i o n and what i s proposed. 
Bearing i n mind t h a t a doctor must exercise h i s own 
c l i n i c a l judgment i t may be t h a t more confidence must be 
placed i n p a t i e n t s . They too have an i n t e r e s t i n what i s 
7 S 
going on. Not a l l matters a f f e c t i n g a p a t i e n t are 
p e c u l i a r l y matters of c l i n i c a l judgment. Relaxation of a 
t r a d i t i o n a l reluctance t o communicate on the p a r t of 
doctors might make p a t i e n t s f e e l partners i n the d e c i s i o n 
making process. And having p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the d e c i s i o n 
i t s e l f , the p a t i e n t may not f e e l i n c l i n e d t o complain of 
bad treatment i f , as must happen sometimes, something goes 
wrong. 
2. Legal Services 
The l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n appears t o be s u f f e r i n g a c r i s i s 
of confidence. C r i t i c i s m i s being voiced t h a t the 
professions are incapable o f , and u n w i l l i n g t o , maintain 
standards among t h e i r members. The courts are c r i t i c i s e d 
too. 'Lawyers l o o k i n g a f t e r the i n t e r e s t s of lawyers' has 
been a complaint. Lawyers must be held f u l l y responsible 
f o r t h e i r negligence and immunities are misplaced. 
E. The Puatwre 
What needs t o be done? Many of the problems 
associated w i t h p r o f e s s i o n a l negligence appear t o be based 
on expectations of the p u b l i c not being s a t i s f i e d . 
Perhaps the expectations are unreal. I n other ways the 
professions' loss of p u b l i c confidence appears t o be a 
s e l f - i n f l i c t e d wound. Given t h a t there i s a common 
i n t e r e s t among a l l concerned t h a t p r o f e s s i o n a l services 
should be provided p r o p e r l y , the professions, the cou r t s 
and the p u b l i c w i l l have t o be responsive t o change i n 
order t o derive maximum b e n e f i t from the services 
provided. The balance must be maintained. 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o avoid the conclusion t h a t many of 
the recent proposals f o r reform put forward by the 
Government a f f e c t i n g both the medical and l e g a l 
professions are motivated by ideology. There i s no doubt 
t h a t professions are not p e r f e c t and r e q u i r e reform. 
However, the two apparently m o t i v a t i n g f a c t o r s , i . e . 
budgetary c o n t r o l and competition, at the r o o t of the 
r e c e n t l y suggested reforms i n the White Paper and the 
Green Paper do not r e l a t e n e c e s s a r i l y t o improvement of 
standards which could have a marked e f f e c t upon the 
incidence of negligence a c t i o n s . Concern has been 
expressed t h a t the reforms could be d e s t r u c t i v e of 
p r o f e s s i o n a l a c t i v i t y i f professionals are not encouraged 
t o work according t o an e t h i c of service but r a t h e r one of 
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p r o f i t maximisation. I n a d d i t i o n , the absence of 
adequate c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h the professions themselves, 
apparently regarding the members of professions as 
o b s t r u c t i v e conservers of vested i n t e r e s t s , i s t o ignore 
the r e a l p a r t t h a t professions could, and should, p l a y i n 
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reform. 
There are many who regard the proposed reform of the 
l e g a l p r ofession as i l l - c o n c e i v e d . There are, i t i s 
claimed, r e a l dangers t h a t the independence of the 
79 
p r o f e s s i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y the Bar, w i l l be destroyed. An 
attempt t o introduce the contingency fees of the American 
p a t t e r n was thought l i k e l y t o increase vexatious 
80 
l i t i g a t i o n against doctors. Increased claims and awards 
w i l l r e s u l t i n increased medical insurance premiums. I n 
t u r n , defensive medicine, i t i s argued, w i l l increase. 
How l i k e l y t h i s development i s remains u n c e r t a i n but on 
t i g h t budgets even less resources may be a v a i l a b l e f o r the 
care of the p a t i e n t s . 
The s i t u a t i o n described above i s p e s s i m i s t i c when i t 
should be o p t i m i s t i c . There should be increased scope f o r 
p r o f e s s i o n a l a c t i v i t y . Insurance should be the norm i n 
cases of l i a b i l i t y e s t a b l i s h e d by the co u r t s . A l l t h a t i s 
then needed i s the f o r m u l a t i o n by the courts of p r i n c i p l e s 
by which l i a b i l i t y might p r o p e r l y be attached t o n e g l i g e n t 
conduct and proper, balanced awards of f a i r compensation 
given. The worst excesses of the l e g a l system might be 
avoided by the i n t r o d u c t i o n of n o - f a u l t l i a b i l i t y i n cases 362 
of medical i n j u r y . Professionalism imp l i e s m a t u r i t y and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I t also e n t a i l s a d m i t t i n g where t h a t 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y l i e s i n respect of t h a t o f t e n v u l n e r a b l e 
partys the p a t i e n t / c l i e n t . I t should be possible t o allow 
p r o f e s s i o n a l services t o f l o u r i s h i n a c l i m a t e of adequate 
p r o t e c t i o n f o r the p u b l i c . 
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